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Preface
This book is the first of a series dealing with recent and past experi-
ences of crises in Indonesia, and aims at disseminating the results of a
research program on the same subject. The Experiences with Crisis pro-
gram was a subset of the broader Indonesia in Transition program,
sponsored by the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW)
in the period 2001-2005. This latter program was set up as a multidisci-
plinary research in social, cultural, and historical sciences, bringing to-
gether Indonesian and Dutch scholars from several renowned academic
institutions with specialist knowledge on the region. The purpose of
this wider program was to study the recent social, cultural, and politi-
cal-economic changes in Indonesia since the fall of the New Order re-
gime and the impacts of the recent economic crisis, from historical and
contemporary perspectives. The Indonesia in Transition program con-
sisted of four subprograms, of which Experiences with Crisis was one
of the largest and most comprehensive.
It is the purpose of this book to present the results of the Experiences
with Crisis sub-program which examined and analyzed livelihood strate-
gies, coping mechanisms, and resource management practices in rural
communities in Indonesia during and just after the recent crisis (1997-
2003). As this crisis really was a multidimensional one, with its various
sociocultural, political-economic, and environmental implications, its
impacts had to be studied at various levels of analysis and in different
types of environmental settings, communities and households. The Li-
velihood and Resources component of the sub-program, therefore, in-
cluded no fewer than ten research projects in different locations: three
individual (PhD) research projects in rather remote areas of the outer
provinces, namely Torajaland (Central Sulawesi), Lower Mahakam (East
Kalimantan), and Kerinci (W. Sumatra), which were conducted by
Dutch researchers (E. de Jong, G. Nooteboom, and P. Burgers). Four
other Ph.D. research projects were carried out by Indonesian geogra-
phers from Gadjah Mada University in different types of villages in the
Special Region of Yogyakarta (Central Java). These comparative analyses
examined the differential impacts of the crisis in quickly transforming
rural communities in densely populated areas (see contributions by R.
Riyanta, S.W. Djarot, M. Baiquni, and A. Sutanto). Finally, three village
studies were carried out by Dutch graduate students in human geogra-
phy from Utrecht University during their five months of fieldwork in
Gowa District (South Sulawesi) (see contributions by M. Singeling, M.
Rijerse, and R. Vogelij). Their field studies were developed into full
master’s theses, which were supervised by the editor who wrote the
concluding chapter in this book.
The Livelihood and Resources component of the Experiences with Cri-
sis sub-program focused on three major research questions or issues:
– What were the main impacts of the economic crisis on rural liveli-
hoods in Indonesia? This question was analyzed in terms of differ-
ences in vulnerability or resilience of households and communities,
and to a lesser extent also differences in sustainability of the re-
source use impacts.
– Which response mechanisms were developed at the community
and the household levels to cope with these impacts? This was ana-
lyzed in terms of adaptations in resource use, livelihood strategies,
and institutional arrangements in response to the crisis.
– Who were the winners and the losers of the coping strategies in-
duced by the crisis? This question was analyzed in terms of differ-
ential benefits according to socioeconomic position, life-cycle phase,
and main type of livelihood base.
The focus of the Livelihood and Resources research on livelihood im-
pacts and responses in rural communities was chosen for several rea-
sons: First, because there was an obvious lack of reliable information
on the differential nature of the impacts of the crisis in rural areas in
Indonesia (cf. Gérard & Ruf 2000), and second, because there were nu-
merous unproved assumptions with respect to these impacts, which
also affected the government’s policies. For example, the crisis in rural
areas was often assumed to be less severe than in the urban areas, be-
cause the rural economy was less integrated into international markets,
while public budget cuts, cost price increases, and mass dismissals
were especially hitting the urban economies (cf. Booth 2002).
Moreover, rural communities are often assumed to possess a higher
degree of social coherence and economic flexibility in absorbing surplus
labor, sharing agricultural produce and income, and switching produc-
tion as compared to urban societies/economies which are much more
commercialized and individualized, and considerably more dependent
on imported supplies/inputs that have to be bought at increasingly un-
favorable prices due to the monetary effects of the crisis.
Contrary to these assumptions, most rural communities in Indonesia
have been incorporated into larger political and economic networks for
a long time, and, consequently, also have been strongly commercialized
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and monetarized. At the same time these communities were struggling
with severe forms of population pressure upon local resources through
the proliferation of sub-marginal farms and landlessness. Under these
circumstances it may be expected that both social coherence and tradi-
tional produce or resource sharing arrangements have come under
strong pressure, and particularly so under the recent crisis conditions
which were aggravated by the prolonged drought caused by El Niño. It
is not surprising, therefore, that a growing stream of studies suggests a
broad spectrum of impacts and experiences of the crisis among the var-
ious types of rural communities in Indonesia, not only because of the
wide differences in agro-ecological conditions and resource use sys-
tems, but also due to different sociocultural conditions and differences
in (local) policies.
It is the purpose of this study to identify and elucidate the role of
these differentiating factors, as well as the differential response patterns
which they have engendered with respect to coping with the impacts of
the crisis. This was achieved by comparing a series of case studies in
different types of rural communities; within each case study, the use of
livelihood was specifically analyzed. This approach implies that commu-
nities and households construct their livelihoods on the basis of rational
choices resulting from various opportunities and limitations, which are
determined by their available assets, capabilities and needs within the
framework of the local environmental, sociocultural, and political-eco-
nomic conditions. Usually these choices are articulated through what is
known as a “household strategy”, wherein long-term stress conditions
and regularly recurring disturbances are anticipated, and coping re-
sponses are conceived as ex post facto reactions to sudden shocks that
could not be foreseen or prevented at the individual or household levels
(cf. White, Titus and Boomgaard 2002). This analytical framework has
been very helpful in providing the various case studies in this book a
common research focus, which enabled a comparative approach and
the subsequent drawing of conclusions at higher levels of analysis.
The structure of the book consists of three clusters of case studies
grouped according to regional and thematic criteria. The first three con-
tributions study the crisis impacts and responses in relatively isolated
rural communities in the outer provinces of Indonesia: East Kaliman-
tan, Central Sulawesi, and West Sumatra. With their strong anthropolo-
gical orientation, these studies mainly focus on the social aspects of li-
velihood construction and resource use, namely changing social rela-
tions and institutional arrangements regulating access to resources. In
his study, Burgers, as a human geographer, also concentrates on speci-
fic adaptations in the resource use systems. Much attention is also de-
voted to the role of shifting social networks under the impact of macro-
level processes such as globalization, the economic crisis, and various
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types of policy interventions. This emphasis on the social aspects of li-
velihood construction and crisis responses is quite different from the
approach in the other two clusters of case studies, which mainly focus
on the changes and adaptations in the resource use systems and liveli-
hood strategies as such.
The second cluster consists of four case studies on the effects of rural
development and the recent crisis on rural resource use in different
types of village communities in the Special Region of Yogyakarta in In-
ner Indonesia. These studies are based on comparative analyses of live-
lihood strategies and coping responses adopted by households and their
enterprises in various agro-economic and environmental settings, but
situated in densely populated rural areas with strong relations to nearby
urban centers. Each of the four studies also presents a comparative ana-
lysis of the crisis impacts and responses at the community level. The
communities studied range from highly commercialized lowland vil-
lages to (semi) subsistence-oriented upland villages, and from remote
rural settlements to semi-urbanized settlements. Furthermore, these
studies are much more based on the analysis of quantitative data, col-
lected at the household and enterprise levels, as compared to the case
studies in the first cluster.
A similar approach characterizes the third cluster of case studies;
these focus on the impacts of the crisis on livelihood conditions and
coping responses in three Macassarese villages in Gowa District (south-
west Sulawesi). Again, these villages have been selected in such a way
that they represent the major livelihood systems and environmental set-
tings of Macassarese society. The first case study was conducted in a
mountain village in the upper reaches of the Jeneberang Valley, where
intensive vegetable cultivation prevails. The second study deals with an
upland village in the middle reaches of the same valley, with a mixed
wet rice and upland agriculture economy. The third study concerns a
fishing village with a mixed farm/non-farm economy at the mouth of
the Jeneberang River, near the city of Makassar.
Finally, the concluding chapter attempts to answer the three major re-
search questions by synthesizing the main results and conclusions from
the respective case studies and placing them in a wider perspective.
The editors wish to express their gratitude to the Royal Dutch Academy
of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), the International Institute for Asian Stu-
dies (IIAS), and Amsterdam University Press (AUP) for enabling the
publication of this volume. In particular, we would like to thank the Ur-
ban and Regional Research Center (URU) of the Department of Human
Geography & Urban and Regional Planning, Faculty of Geosciences,
Utrecht University, for their support to contribute financially to the pub-
lication of this book. This also applies to the many Indonesian institu-
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tions that facilitated successful cooperation in the respective research
projects, such as the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the var-
ious cooperating universities such as including Gadjah Mada Univer-
sity, Hasanuddin University, and Andalas University. Our appreciation
also goes to the local authorities and planning agencies (BAPPEDA II),
all of whom helped to providely favorable conditions for the researchers
in the respective communities. Our special thanks, however, are re-
served for the two secretaries of the Faculty of Geosciences of Utrecht
University, Anneke van der Loo and Paula Duivenvoorde, who have
patiently and meticuously prepared the texts and figures for this publi-
cation.
Milan J. Titus and Paul P.M. Burgers
December 2008
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1 Making a Living in Turbulent Times: Livelihoods
and Resource Allocation in Tana Toraja During
Indonesia’s Economic and Political Crises
Edwin de Jong
Since 1997, it has become clear that the economic and political crises
in Indonesia have taken different shapes. The crises have “had varied
and often highly contradictory impacts in different regions, economic
sectors and among different social groups” (White et al 2002: 149-150).
More recently conducted micro-studies show a much more heteroge-
neous range of impacts, experiences, and responses than the basically
monotonous yet puzzling picture ensuing from large-scale surveys car-
ried out shortly after the onset of the Indonesian crises (Lont and White
2003). However, many of these micro-studies still view entire ethnic
groups or communities under investigation as homogeneous, often
overemphasizing “survival strategies” and ignoring the concomitant
challenges and opportunities emerging from the crises.
This study provides a picture of the great variety of ways and the ex-
tent to which the Indonesian crises influenced the livelihoods and re-
source allocations of people in Tana Toraja, a district in the Indonesian
province of South Sulawesi. Two contrasting locations (in socioeco-
nomic, political, and even religious respects) were selected, and the var-
ious wealth groups were differentiated.1
The difference between the northern and southern regions of Tana
Toraja is striking in many ways, especially with regard to social organi-
zation and stratification, ceremonial activities, and economic and politi-
cal aspects. Kurre2 is an example of a rice-growing village in the north-
ern area of Tana Toraja where the lives of the inhabitants are centered
on a variety of rituals (predominantly funeral and house-building cere-
monies). Through the funeral ceremony, the Torajan self (place and sta-
tus in society) is manifested and validated.3 Competition between as-
cribed status and achieved wealth takes the form of a symbolic battle on
the ceremonial field between blood ties and money (Volkman 1980: 8).
These extravagant and costly potlatches explain partly why Kurre’s
dwellers and their family members go in search of money far away
from their homeland. Consequently, the livelihood activities within this
village are basically composed of the cultivation of subsistence crops,
raising livestock, and migration (or remittances).
In contrast to the rice-growing village of Kurre, Sabara represents a
southern Torajan village where the majority of the population is in-
volved in the cultivation of a large variety of cash crops, such as coffee,
cacao, vanilla, and clove. The uneven distribution of wet rice fields
among Sabara’s inhabitants prevents more than half of the farmers
from cultivating rice. In this region, blood ties determine status, and
mobility between the different classes rarely occurs. Because of the im-
possibility of improving one’s social status at funeral ceremonies, the
society at large refrains from organizing large-scale rituals; this leaves
the puang (traditional rulers) from the highest class unrivalled in their
extraordinary displays of extravagance which reinforce their authority.
As in Kurre, most households in Sabara have one or more family mem-
bers who have migrated to other places in the Indonesian archipelago.
However, migration was undertaken to earn a living rather than to accu-
mulate considerable financial resources to contribute toward funeral
ceremonies.
The contrasting cases – with regard to context, resources, and liveli-
hood activities – were selected in order to ascertain whether crisis ef-
fects and responses typically correspond to a particular class or group of
society, location, or ethnic group as a whole. The chapter, thus, aims to
draw lessons from a comparative study of Kurre and Sabara for various
social levels of Torajan society (household, wealth group, village, re-
gion). Considering the high number of migrant family members in
both locations, the “non-local” aspects (migration and remittances) will
be examined in an attempt to understand the full contours of recent
transformations in rural livelihoods.
In this chapter specific attention is paid to “productive” livelihood ac-
tivities, defined here as all activities undertaken by household members
in order to earn an income or to create useful outputs that can be used
directly by the household (Ashley et al 2003). According to Frank Ellis
(2000: 3), “Most rural livelihoods are found to depend on a diverse
portfolio of activities and income sources amongst which crop and live-
stock production feature alongside many other contributions to family
well-being”, and “livelihood diversification is widespread and is found
in all locations, as well as across farm sizes and range of income and
wealth” (Ellis 2000: 4). The diversification of activities is more or less
the result of a conscious or unconscious long-term strategy of the
household to establish, secure, or enhance their living. The plethora of
activities might reveal a particular pattern over time. Identifying and in-
terpreting these patterns and their changes make up the basis for locat-
ing the effects of the crises. As the livelihood activity patterns in Tana
Toraja (as elsewhere in the world) depend largely on resource allocation
or wealth, the changes in livelihood patterns are assessed by differen-
tiating the various wealth groups found in Tana Toraja.
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Because of the complexity of Torajan society and its embeddedness
in a wide cultural repertoire, I start this chapter with a short discussion
of the sociocultural context in which the case studies are situated. This
section will be followed by an overview of the numerous resources and
livelihood activities available to Torajan people to make a living. Subse-
quently, I outline the major changes in the livelihood conditions that
took place in Tana Toraja during the recent crisis years (1997-2003) be-
fore turning to the two case studies. In the village studies I will examine
whether these changing conditions also led to changing resource alloca-
tions or livelihood activities, and, if so, in what way. The chapter closes
with some conclusions on resource allocation and livelihoods in Tana
Toraja during the recent economic and political crises, and provides
some recommendations for further crisis research in general.
Tana Toraja
The regency of Tana Toraja is located 350 kilometers northwards from
the capital city of the Indonesian province South Sulawesi (see map 1).
Tana Toraja is a mountainous region covered with rice terraces, pine
forests, bamboo groves, and groves of coconut palms. The mountain
plateau is traversed by the brown water of the Sa’dan River and its tri-
butaries. Tana Toraja covers an area of 3,178 square kilometers and it is
populated by a little more than 400,000 inhabitants (BPS Kabupaten
Tana Toraja 2004a). Many people have left their homeland in search of
work, for educational purposes, or to escape the prevailing social sys-
tem. It is estimated that around 400,000 to one million Torajan people
live outside the region.4
On hillocks in the midst of the rice terraces stand large saddle-roofed
houses (tongkonan) decorated with colorful carvings. These houses “pro-
vide more than shelter, they are extremely important modes in the kin-
ship network – the points of reference through which one traces famil-
ial ties” (Waterson 2000: 116). Family trees and generations are impor-
tant in Torajan society and even the lowest class (slave class) are well
aware of their genealogy. People consider themselves related to others
through a particular house and are invariably able to name the houses
where their parents and grandparents were born. When we talk about
Torajan kinship, a “house” idiom predominates (Waterson 1991). Hun-
dreds to thousands of people feel deeply attached to a tongkonan. Their
place (and thus rights and obligations) in society is quite literally de-
fined by the way they are related to the tongkonan and is manifested or
activated through ceremonial activities.
Since Dutch colonizers set foot on Tana Toraja in the beginning of
the twentieth century century, some 87 percent of the population have
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become Christian.5 The remaining Torajan population are either Mus-
lim or adherents of aluk to dolo, the traditional religion. Before the Tora-
jans came into contact with the outside world (Dutch administrators
and missionaries) they did not have any conception of a separate do-
main of thought and action directed towards the spirit world (Volkman
2000: 120). Aluk to dolo refers to the way in which both rituals and daily
life are to be conducted (Volkman and Caldwell 1991). Presently it
seems that aluk has faded away as an all-embracing way of life and
thought “but as an idea it has been revived, and has given the Toraja a
firm sense of identity” (Volkman 2000: 121). A wealth of rituals, which
are profoundly linked to agricultural cycles, houses, and to death and re-
birth, has remained the center of Torajan life. These rituals also seem
to have enhanced, rebuilt, and reinforced Torajan identity for migrants
in a multiethnic and religious Indonesian state. While migrants might
have left their kinship networks, “paradoxically they have done so partly
in order to provide for their ancestors (and more immediate family) at
times of death” (Waterson and Volkman 2000: 114).
Torajan society is stratified into three to four levels. A person’s status
in this system is determined by birth and wealth. Through the funeral
ceremony, the Torajan self (place and status in society) is manifested
and validated. Competition between ascribed status and achieved wealth
Figure 1.1 The island of Sulawesi and the regency of Tana Toraja
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is symbolically carried out in a battle on the ceremonial field between
blood ties and money (Volkman 1980: 8). The necessity of upholding
honor and status lead many Torajans into an ever-increasing slaughter
of buffalo and pigs at funeral ceremonies, accompanied by a reception
of thousands of guests. At death ceremonies, guests bring plenty of
gifts, such as water buffalo, pigs, money, palmwine, and so forth, there-
by initiating a new debt relationship or ending one. It is expected that
the same kind of gift (in size, weight, and price) is returned to the giver
at future ceremonies. Whereas debts of this kind are inheritable, it is
not necessary to undo the debt in one’s present life. “Any Toraja has in-
tricate networks of such debts, acquired by inheritance, adoption, loy-
alty, or other peculiarities of personal history” (Volkman 2000: 125).
These extravagant ceremonies, which sometimes even receive na-
tional or international media attention, put a high pressure on people’s
financial resources and usually force them to migrate to find a well-paid
job. The funeral ritual is so important that it is even held when a Tora-
jan dies in another region of Indonesia or in a distant country. Most mi-
grants return to the Torajan highlands (even from distant countries) for
funerals of kin and other important rituals. It seems that these rituals
are an efficient mechanism for maintaining remarkably strong ties be-
tween migrants and Torajans in the highlands.
Making a living in Tana Toraja: a historical perspective
The inhabitants of Tana Toraja derive their living mainly from agricul-
ture, livestock, tourism, government jobs and small-scale industry and
manufacturing. The majority (82.49 percent) of the economically active
population in Tana Toraja is involved in agriculture (BPS Kabupaten
Tana Toraja 2000c: 29). The main subsistence crops grown in the re-
gency are rice, cassava, maize, and vegetables. Rice plays a major role
in rituals and it is the preferred Torajan staple. Except for some large
landholders, most people do not own enough land to provide them with
rice all year round and they have to buy the rice needed or/and supple-
ment their diet with other crops grown in their garden. Contrary to
what the green landscape and rice-field-covered mountains may sug-
gest, the soil of most of the land in the region is actually infertile or
poorly suited for cultivation (Nooy-Palm 1979a: 13). The introduction of
“high-yield variety” seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, technical assistance, and
improvement of irrigation systems by the Indonesian government in
the 1970s increased the yearly amount of rice harvested.6 Mechaniza-
tion made it possible to prepare larger plots of land over a shorter time
span, while the use of pesticides with the improved varieties greatly re-
duced losses and fluctuations in harvest. On the other hand, these new
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techniques needed larger investments, which imposed constraints upon
lower income earners (if they possessed rice fields at all). Additionally,
the development of waterworks lagged behind so that the success or
failure of the harvest (or double cropping) for the majority of the rice
farmers still depends on the amount of annual rainfall.
Next to the cultivation of rice on rain-fed paddy fields, many farmers
grow cash crops such as coffee, cacao, clove, and vanilla on dry land.
Agricultural production for the national and international markets, how-
ever, is generally small scale in nature, and commercial estates are rare.
Most farming is done by individual smallholders who grow a variety of
crops on family-owned plots. Coffee (both arabica and robusta) is by far
the most popular commercial crop grown. Robusta is generally grown
for domestic consumption or the local market, at least before 1998. Ara-
bica had been cultivated for the world market in the upland regions of
Tana Toraja since 1870 (Nooy-Palm 2003: 87). In the early twentieth
century, coffee production provided the main means for obtaining cash
and brought prosperity to some large landowners in the Torajan high-
lands. By 1928, coffee prices were high and centers of coffee production
were booming. However, the reliance on an economy increasingly de-
pendent on exports made Torajans also vulnerable to fluctuations in
world demand and coffee prices. Especially during the Great Depres-
sion in the late 1930s the bottom had fallen out of the coffee market
and Torajans had to struggle to find cash (Bigalke 1981: 254). In the fol-
lowing period, the Torajan economy remained largely dependent on an
unstable international coffee market. Nevertheless, it was not until the
late 1970s that the cultivation of cloves was introduced in the highlands
of Tana Toraja as a second cash crop, next to coffee. At that time, Tora-
jan farmers also started to pay more attention to the cultivation of fruit
and vegetables because of greater demand from the growing number of
tourists and people working at the mining centers of South Sulawesi
(Nooy-Palm 1979b: 22).
In the 1980s, pepper was introduced as a third cash crop but it was
never grown on a large scale until recently. By the end of the same dec-
ade, cacao appeared much more promising in the Torajan highlands
and partly even displaced coffee and traditional rice farming (Potter
2000: 249). Despite a lack of government assistance, the rumors of
large profits induced people to plant cacao. While cacao trees did not
yield as high an output as coffee, and prices per kilogram were lower,
cacao cultivation was much easier to handle. In the mid-1990s, vanilla
was introduced in the highlands and became another popular cash crop,
but it is grown on a much smaller scale than cacao. The vanilla plant
yields pods after only two or three years, but usually dies after three har-
vesting years. The plants are also quite vulnerable and need much care,
relatively. By 1996, coffee was still by far the most cultivated cash crop.7
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Animal husbandry is another livelihood activity in Tana Toraja which
is practiced by virtually every household, usually on a small scale. Buffa-
lo, cows, pigs, goats, chickens, and, more recently, ducks are raised.
Buffalo and pigs are the most popular animals as they are status sym-
bols and sacrificed in large numbers at funeral and house restoration
ceremonies, as are chickens (Kis-Jovak et al 1988: 14). Buffalo meat is
eaten and the buffalo hides are exported to Makassar. In addition, the
animals are bred for the local and national market.
Tourism offers Torajan people the principal non-agricultural alterna-
tive to the narrow range of available government and commercial posi-
tions (Morrel 2001). The peculiar character and beauty of the landscape,
the extravagant ceremonies of the Torajans, together with a pleasant
temperature all year round, hold great appeal for tourists. Tourism in
Tana Toraja burgeoned since the early 1970s. Only a few years after the
Indonesian government issued its second five-year plan in 1974, which
stimulated the development of tourism in Outer Island destinations,
the tourist industry in the Torajan highlands was booming. Since then,
the number of tourists in Tana Toraja has grown steadily. Hotel registra-
tion figures show that in 1996 over 58,000 international and 218,000
domestic tourists visited Tana Toraja (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja
1996).8 Tourism provides opportunities for some Torajans to invest in
hotels or restaurants. Others find employment as drivers, guides, ser-
vants, or cooks. Moreover, some farmers benefit from the sale of vegeta-
bles, eggs, poultry, handicrafts, and even entrance tickets for tourist at-
tractions located in their village.
Regardless of the benefits that tourism has brought to some people of
Tana Toraja, most Torajans believe that the bulk of profits from tourism
goes to domestic, non-Torajan tour companies headquartered in Jakarta,
Bali, and Makassar who have their agents and facilities in the capital of
South Sulawesi (Crystal 1989: 159). In addition to the non-Torajan domi-
nation of the tourist market, people in and around the town of Rantepao
in particular have a sizeable share in this industry. Although recent stu-
dies on the influence of tourism on the Torajan livelihood are lacking, it
is argued that tourism has had little impact on most of the 75 percent of
the Torajan population who subsist as village farmers (Crystal 1989: 159).
In addition to agriculture, animal husbandry and tourism, some 10
percent of the population is employed as civil servants, school teachers,
or church officials. Just as in the tourist industry, local shops and the
supply industry are largely dominated by Chinese and Bugis people. Lo-
cal industry and manufacturing have remained fairly small scale and
contribute only in limited ways to the wealth of the area. Some small
home industry (i.e., the production of handicrafts in mountain villages)
exists in Tana Toraja, but in general the only industry in the region can
be found in Rantepao or Makale.9
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The narrow range of jobs outside agriculture, a shortage of agricultur-
al land, limited opportunities for higher education, a constraining social
class system, and a money-devouring potlatch system at funeral ceremo-
nies all contributed to a mass migration of Torajans to other regions in
Indonesia and beyond. Since the nineteenth century, many Torajans
have left their homeland. In the beginning, the transfer of people from
the densely populated highlands to the sparsely populated lowlands was
closely connected to networks of trade in arms, coffee, and slaves
among the ruling elites of the Bugis lowlands and Torajan highlands
but remained on a small scale (Bigalke 1981). From the 1920s and (par-
ticularly) the 1930s onwards, migration to the lowlands of Sulawesi
(Luwu, Enrekang) gradually increased, due to the struggle to pay taxes
imposed by the Dutch administration and the expansion of agriculture
that reached its limits. The bulk of Torajan migrants, however, left by
the 1960s after President Suharto opened Jakarta’s doors to foreign in-
vestment on Indonesian soil (Volkman 1985: 135). Multinational cor-
porations established themselves in Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, Central Su-
lawesi and elsewhere to exploit the natural resources of the Indonesian
archipelago, providing ample job opportunities. The relatively highly
educated Torajans10 were attracted by the job and income opportunities
abroad. The flow of remittances into Tana Toraja is the largest source of
income for the region. In fact, 80 percent of the total income in Tana
Toraja comes from remittances.11 In this respect, remittances are an im-
portant income-generating source for Torajan households.
Tana Toraja in transition 1997-2003
After more than three decades of steady growth under the Suharto re-
gime, Tana Toraja entered a rapid transitional period in the late 1990s.
Several conditions – on which Torajan livelihoods are built – had been af-
fected by the national economic and political crises. How Torajans experi-
enced these changing conditions and reacted to them will be discussed in
the following section. First, it is necessary to obtain an understanding of
the emergent events that transformed livelihood conditions in Tana Tora-
ja since the late 1990s from an objective (or outsider’s) point of view.
In 1998, the growth rate of the regional bruto product (RBP) had
dropped dramatically from 9.12 percent in 1996 to -3.38 percent (BPS
Kabupaten Tana Toraja: 2000b: 12). By 1999, Tana Toraja had recovered
from the economic downfall and the growth rate of the regency slightly
increased again, reaching four percent in 2001 (BPS Kabupaten Tana
Toraja 2004a). However, in 2003 it decreased once more to 2.29 per-
cent and, to date, the high growth rates of the early and mid-1990s have
remained unparalleled.
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Because of Tana Toraja’s high involvement in cash crop cultivation,
its economy was not hit as hard as in other areas of Indonesia.12 Owing
to higher world market prices, and a lower rupiah caused by the Indo-
nesian economic and financial crisis, the rupiah prices of coffee (robus-
ta and arabica), cacao, and cloves skyrocketed by July 1997. By mid-
1998, the prices of these crops in Tana Toraja had more than tripled
compared to January 1997.13 In 1999, prices of robusta coffee and
cloves dropped again and were almost at pre-crisis levels by the end of
2000. Thanks to its high quality, the price of arabica (at least the Tora-
jan variety) appeared to be more stable and less prone to fluctuation
than robusta. By 2002, the price of one kilogram of arabica was still
worth twice as much as before the impressive price increases of 1997.
The price of cacao also remained more stable until the beginning of
2003, when it collapsed completely. After the heavy price fluctuations of
coffee, cacao and cloves came more or less to a standstill, and vanilla
prices started to rise enormously in 2002. By 2003, one kilogram of
wet vanilla yielded as much as 250,000 rupiah at the local market of
Tana Toraja.
Next to the price increases for cash crops in the initial phase of the
Indonesian crisis, inflation of the rupiah pushed up the costs for daily
necessities such as food, toiletries, electricity, fuel, medicines, and edu-
cation. Import products such as pesticides, fertilizer, machines, and lux-
ury goods also became more expensive. In 1998, the inflation rate in
South Sulawesi province reached 80 percent, compared to 4.56 percent
in 1996 (BPS Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan 2000). The inflation ended in
1999 and more or less in the years thereafter.
Beside fluctuating profits for cash crops and costs for daily necessi-
ties, the local tourist industry collapsed completely. When violent con-
flicts spread throughout Indonesia in 1998 and 1999, tourists began to
stay away and the number of people visiting the area dropped from
280,000 to about 25,000 in 2001. In 2002, it seemed that tourists re-
gained confidence in Indonesia and started to return to Tana Toraja.
However, the blast in Bali in October 2002 marked the collapse for
Tana Toraja’s tourist industry as well, as tourists avoided the country.
Moreover, thousands of Torajans have returned from conflict areas
such as Poso, East Timor, the Moluccas, Aceh, and Kalimantan (Sam-
bas) to the safe haven of Tana Toraja since 1999.14 In 2002, many mi-
grants also returned from Malaysia, after the Malaysian government in-
troduced stiffer measures to stem the flow of illegal immigrants. Ac-
cording to local records, 391 migrants returned as a result of the
Malaysian crackdown, but in reality the numbers are even higher. As
one Torajan official explained:
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It is difficult to get accurate data on the number of migrants
who returned to Tana Toraja. Torajan people always feel embar-
rassed if they return to Tana Toraja after failing to succeed
where they had migrated to. They do not want to register be-
cause they do not want other people to know about their failure.
Finally, the regional parliament of Tana Toraja passed a law that pre-
scribed the reorganization of territories and government structures, aim-
ing at the reestablishment of the lembang. The lembang symbolizes a geo-
graphical area of a group of people that have ancestral origins over gen-
erations and who share a sociocultural set of laws and values as well as a
traditional form of government organization.15 The implementation of
this far-reaching autonomous unit set in motion the competition for lem-
bang leadership among the traditional elites, and some regions became
an arena in which the Torajan traditional nobility (living in and outside
Tana Toraja) struggled over boundaries, names, and political authority.16
The following two sections will show how all these changes affected
Torajan livelihoods by narrowing down the focus to the village and
household levels.
Sabara: a village in the south of Tana Toraja
Introduction
In the south of Tana Toraja lies the village of Sabara in a broad valley.
The valley floor of Sabara is dominated by rice fields which are sur-
rounded by houses that stand in the midst of bamboo and coconut
palms. Sabara village is located at an altitude between 900 and 1100
meters and it is populated by around 800 people who live in 166
houses. All rice fields (rain-fed) in the village are in the possession of a
small number of families that make up the highest social stratum of Sa-
bara society. Nevertheless, 44 percent of the households in Sabara have
direct access to these rice fields through share tenancy arrangements,
and most households have at least some access to the rice harvest
through different forms of labor arrangements (see table 1.1 for an over-
view of the number of households involved in the various livelihood ac-
tivities in Sabara). Because of the rocky soil of the valley, rice cultivation
remains limited and there is hardly any surplus for sale on the market.
In addition to rice, most inhabitants of Sabara grow vegetables and
some cassava (48%) and maize (12%) for household consumption. Next
to subsistence crops, as many as 86 percent of the households grow
one or more cash crops on small plots of dry fields, usually nearby the
house. Robusta coffee is the most popular cash crop grown (71%), fol-
lowed by cacao (67%), vanilla (59%), and cloves (7%).
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Although agriculture is by far the most important source of income
in Sabara, cattle breeding adds greatly to the households’ income and
constitutes a fallback position in times of economic distress. Every
household in Sabara raises at least some livestock, such as pigs (92%),
chickens (85%), or buffalo (9%). Besides being a source of income and
social security, cattle are also raised by some for gifts at funeral, house-
building, or wedding ceremonies. Others even rear buffalo for exchange
on the market or cocks for fighting contests (gambling). As many farm-
ers lack the resources for large initial investments in buffalo or pigs, a
sharing arrangement with a cattle owner or trader is not uncommon.
In addition to agriculture and cattle breeding, Sabara’s inhabitants
employ several other activities to diversify the household’s income.
About 17 percent of the households have at least one member who
works as a carpenter, bricklayer, or handicraftsman, on a part-time ba-
sis, depending on the work supply in or in the vicinity of Sabara. Four
percent of the households are involved in small-scale trading of cattle
and cash crops. Some households (5%) are more fortunate to have a
stable monthly income through government employment.
As local possibilities for employment from agriculture and non-farm
activities are fairly limited in Sabara, those in need of a supplementary
income have little choice than to leave the village. Consequently, 30 per-
cent of the total population, including men, women, and children, have
migrated (semi-) permanently to various places elsewhere in Tana Tora-
ja (40.9%), Indonesia (55.5%), or even abroad (3.6%). Of the surveyed
households in Sabara, 35 percent claimed to receive remittances at least
once a year (whether in the form of goods, cash, or both). Money and
goods are transferred home by post, bank, through family, friends, or
acquaintances visiting the village, or brought home by migrants them-
selves.17 Especially migrants living and working outside Tana Toraja
(such as Luwu, Makassar, Kalimantan, and Irian Jaya) send money
home to support their family members for their daily needs (70.6%),
for funeral ceremonies (15.6%), or house (re)building (10%). Migrants
living in Tana Toraja support their household mostly with labor, or by
bringing food or small cash gifts with them upon returning; these are
usually not considered to be remittances.
In summary, it can be stated that most households in Sabara obtain a
living through raising pigs or chickens in combination with the cultiva-
tion of one or more cash crops, which range from coffee (robusta), ca-
cao, and vanilla to cloves. Less than half of these households are in-
volved in rice growing and/or in the cultivation of cassava. One-third of
the households receives some remittances from one or more migrant
family members. A minor proportion of the households has a regular
income through government employment or an irregular income
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through business, carpentry, craftwork, and so on, which is often on a
part-time basis.
Livelihood portfolios of various wealth groups in Sabara
Considering the above regarding the available livelihood activities in Sa-
bara and the extent to which households employ them, it remains un-
clear whether particular activities are related to a household’s wealth or
not. However, to understand whether crisis effects and responses are ty-
pical for the village as a whole or correspond to households within a
particular wealth group, it is necessary to gain insight into the predomi-
nant livelihood activities within each wealth group. This section will
compare households belonging to different wealth groups and the way
in which they make a living.
Sabara’s inhabitants can be differentiated into four wealth classes
(very rich, rich, moderate, and poor) that largely correspond to the pre-
vailing social categorization.18 The first two categories of the very rich
(3%) and rich (8%) make up only 11 percent of Sabara’s population. The
group with households considered moderate comprises 33 percent of
Sabara’s total population. The remaining and largest group of house-
holds (56%) is considered poor. The very rich and rich were often those
who own a large amount of land. In fact, they are the only ones who
possess considerable acreage of rice fields. The very rich households
yield 20-40 karung19 of rice per harvest, while the rich have 5-8 karung
per harvest. Moderate and poor households depend on access to the
fields of the richer people and obtain, thus, obviously less than 5 kar-
ung. Other determining criteria for wealth are: the state of the house in
which the household is living or the tongkonan of the forefather(s)/
mother(s) they still acknowledge; the children’s educational level and
current employment and amount of remittances sent home accordingly;
and the material assets of a household, such as motorcycles, hand trac-
tors, and rice-milling machines.
The pattern of activities that comprise the livelihood portfolios of the
various wealth groups is shown in table 1.1. Considering the involve-
ment in the cultivation of rice, it should be added that the very rich
households never buy rice, some rich households do buy rice or supple-
ment their own harvest, and all households of the moderate and poor
categories have to buy rice to ensure sufficient food in the household.
This leaves the latter two groups of households more vulnerable to fluc-
tuations of rice prices on the local market.
With regard to the cultivation of cash crops and livestock breeding,
there is no significant difference between the various wealth groups ex-
cept that nearly all households of the upper classes are involved in these
activities. Although involvement in these activities might not seem to
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be a significant marker, the extent of the activities does. The rich own
more cash crop trees than the poor because the former have more ara-
ble land and investments to plant and look after the trees (fertilizer, pes-
ticides, labor, and so forth). The same is true for the number of cattle
that the households in the various wealth groups possess.
Supported by the qualitative information of the wealth rankings, it ap-
pears that salaried jobs are associated with wealth. People in the village
studied for this paper see government jobs (or rather the regular salary
that comes with it) as a means to obtain wealth or at least to secure an
acceptable living. A salary makes it possible to invest in agricultural ac-
tivities while it might also serve as collateral to obtain loans from the
bank for more investments or to buy desired consumer goods. Finally,
relatively richer households seem to receive financial and material sup-
port from migrant members than the poorer ones. Nevertheless, for
Table 1.1 Households involved in the various livelihood activities per wealth group,
Sabara (%)
Livelihood activity Very rich
(%)
Rich
(%)
Moderate
(%)
Poor
(%)
All groups
(%)
Agriculture
Rice 100 58 44 40 44
Cash crops 100 92 83 85 86
Coffee (robusta) 100 67 67 73 71
Cacao 100 50 65 70 67
Vanilla 75 75 52 61 59
Cloves 0 25 4 6 7
Breeding livestock
Buffalo 0 17 4 11 9
Pigs 100 100 92 90 92
Chickens 100 92 85 84 85
Non-farm activities
Salaried jobs 25 17 8 0 5
Business/trade 0 0 8 2 4
Carpentry/bricklaying 25 8 15 20 17
Migration1
Labor migrants 75 83 67 65 67
Migrants in Tana Toraja 50 42 40 45 43
Migrants in South Sulawesi 50 67 29 24 30
Migrants in other parts of Indonesia 50 58 35 38 39
Migrants abroad 25 0 6 2 5
Remittances 75 58 25 35 35
Source: Survey questionnaire and wealth ranking, conducted in Sabara in 2003
1 It should be emphasized that some households have several migrant members at
different locations.
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most of the moderate and poorer households, remittances are a vital
source of income to make a living or to cope with crisis or economic
distress. The richest families, or those from the highest social strata,
generally use remittances for ceremonies to maintain or increase their
status.
In conclusion it can be said that most livelihood activity patterns of
households across all wealth classes include at least some agricultural
activities and livestock breeding. The income from regular employment
or magnitude of the remittances seems to be more related to a particu-
lar wealth group. The poorer households are characterized by the smal-
ler scope of the activities they undertake. The poorest households
mostly rely on breeding pigs and chickens while they try to find some
additional income by growing small quantities of sweet potatoes20 or
small vegetables that are sold at the market.
Crisis or a godsend
The following section examines the ways and extent to which the Indo-
nesian crisis influenced the livelihoods and resource allocations of Sa-
bara’s households across the various wealth groups. For the number of
households that experienced positive or negative income fluctuations,
see table 1.2. In all wealth categories, a minor proportion of the house-
holds experienced an increase in their income over the five years after
1998. The major reason for this income growth is the exorbitant rise in
Table 1.2 Households that experience income fluctuations, crises, or positive events
(%), Sabara
Very rich
(%)
Rich
(%)
Moderate
(%)
Poor
(%)
Income fluctuation 1998-2003
More income 25 17 8 7
Less income 0 17 38 46
Stable 75 64 54 47
Confronted with serious problems/crises 1998-2003
25 83 67 84
Facing positive events 1998-2003
25 17 8 5
Situation of the household
Improved 50 36 8 7
Worsened 0 17 29 23
The same 50 47 63 70
Source: Survey questionnaire conducted in Sabara in 2003
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the price of vanilla and, to a lesser extent, cacao on the local and na-
tional markets. Some families mentioned that the amount of remit-
tances from their family members in Jakarta or Japan increased sub-
stantially. As the amount of vanilla grown by households from the weal-
thier classes is considerably more than that of the poorer ones, it is not
surprising that the “first category households” are the ones that profit
the most from price increases of that crop. As one respondent from the
rich class pointed out, “Thanks to the price rises of vanilla in 2001, our
income increased remarkably and we were able to build a new house.”
Notwithstanding the rising prices for cash crops, it seems that nota-
bly more households had to contend with a drop in income, at least in
the three lower wealth categories. In the moderate and poor groups,
around 75 percent of these households were afflicted by the long
droughts of 1999 and 2002. Because of these droughts, villagers had to
delay rice planting for months (making a second crop in this year im-
possible and extending the periods between successive rice harvests)
while the harvest fell short. The harvests of coffee, cacao, and/or vanilla
of some of these households were disappointing or even failed as a con-
sequence of the dry soil. In addition to the lengthy dry season, the
household income of all three wealth groups appeared to be affected by
plant and animal diseases. Every year a fair number of buffalo, pigs,
and chickens are struck by disease. Because of superstition,21 ignor-
ance, or lack of money, most villagers refrain from vaccinating their li-
vestock. Crop diseases are also quite common in Sabara. Especially the
poorer households that lack the money to invest in, or the knowledge to
use, pesticides often face crop plagues. For the last several years, begin-
ning in 2001, Sabara has been struck by an epidemic that affected most
of the cacao trees in the village. Though the fruits look healthy from the
outside, the cacao beans inside are rotten.
Another cause for declining household incomes in the moderate and
poor classes is the return of family members from the conflict-torn
areas of Poso, East Timor, and Ambon in 1998 and 1999. These house-
holds face a double burden because the income from remittances
abruptly ended while they also had to care for the returnees. Further-
more, some households of the poorest category reported a reduction in
income due to a lack of construction work, as many people have re-
frained from building or renovating their houses in the last few years.
One rich household mentioned the shrinking remittances from Kali-
mantan as a reason for declining income but there is no indication that
this is an overall trend in Sabara. Instead, most people pointed to remit-
tances as a resource that enables new investments or that strengthens
the fallback position of the household, as these can be utilized in times
of crisis. Last but not least, the illness or death of a family member, and
the subsequent the loss of labor, has been mentioned by households
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across all four wealth categories as another reason for the decline in in-
come. Interestingly, in response to the question whether households
faced a serious problem or “crisis” during the period 1998-2003, the
number of households that mentioned an illness or death of a family
member was lower than those who cited droughts and crop and animal
diseases.22 In general, the serious problems that households identified
coincide with the reasons for declining incomes; however, a crisis is not
necessarily related to the income of the household (see table 1.2).
Quite a few households from the rich category referred to a serious
problem that is worth mentioning in more detail, namely, the theft of
vanilla plants and vanilla harvests. Since vanilla prices skyrocketed (fol-
lowing world market prices), vanilla quickly become a desirable crop in
Tana Toraja. In Sabara, around 40 percent of the moderate and poor
and 25 percent of the very rich and rich households started to grow this
crop in response to the price rises. Vanilla seeds became scarce and
theft of the plants has nowadays become a new phenomenon in the Tor-
ajan highlands. The chopped-off vanilla stems can be planted again
while the harvest can be sold on the market. Even within village bound-
aries, suspicions and accuzations of vanilla theft are becoming more
frequent, leading to social distrust and sometimes conflict. Moreover,
the high vanilla yields lead to jealousy among those growing cacao or
coffee or those whose vanilla crop had failed. Vanilla plants need special
care and not everyone has the knowledge or ability to care for the
plants. It is no coincidence that especially the richest households in Sa-
bara are plagued by theft because most of them grow vanilla in consid-
erable quantities and started to cultivate the crop before its price began
to rise on the market. Most of the poor and moderate households (two-
thirds of all vanilla farmers) planted the crop fairly recently and have
either no harvest yet or the harvest is rather small. Except for a few
households within the moderate class who started to raise silkworms or
grow white pepper, the cultivation of vanilla was the only new activity
undertaken by Sabara’s inhabitants between 1998 and 2003.
The number of households experiencing a positive event is consider-
ably lower than the households confronted with crises (see table 1.2).
All positive events of households across all wealth classes had to do
with the increasing income households obtained for cash crops (primar-
ily vanilla and, to a lesser extent, cacao and coffee) sold on the market
after prices rocketed.
Now that it is clear who and how many households experienced posi-
tive or negative changes in their income and livelihoods activity portfo-
lio, the question remains to what extent these changes affected the si-
tuation of these households, from its members’ perspective. Compared
to the households from the very rich and rich classes, fairly few house-
holds from the poor and moderate classes experienced an improvement
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in their situation (see table 1.2). Not surprisingly, the improvement of
the households’ situation in all wealth classes is generally ascribed to
the increasing prices of cash crops. The deteriorating situation of
households in all wealth classes is imputed to the reasons outlined
above, namely disappointing harvests, animal diseases, death of family
members, and so on. However, households from the moderate and
poor classes also emphasized the ever-growing expenditures for daily
needs such as food (rice, sugar, salt, fish, etc.), kerosene, toiletries, local
transport, children’s education, and medicines. For some, the rising
costs of agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides, had
a large effect on the household budget. Notwithstanding these some-
times heavy fluctuations that occurred in Tana Toraja in the period be-
tween 1998 and 2003, the bulk of the households in Sabara did not ex-
perience any notable change in their situation at all.
Kurre: Ceremonies and rice cultivation
Introduction
The village of Kurre is situated northeast of Rantepao which is the main
business center of Tana Toraja in the northern part of the regency (see
fig. 1). Historically, Kurre is one of the twelve divisions that are integral
to the sociocultural organization of Tondon. Throughout the Torajan
highlands, Tondon is well known for its organization of extravagant fun-
eral ceremonies and its members’ fondness for gambling. The sociocul-
tural and administrative borders of Kurre stretch from the banks of the
Banki River towards the mountain ridge of the same name. While the
lowest part of the village is located near the river at 800 meters above
sea level, at its highest point, Kurre reaches an altitude of 1000 meters.
The houses stand in the midst of bamboo on the upland, looking over
the rice fields that lie scattered over the lower regions of the village,
some on the banks of the river. A total of 148 households comprised of
789 people live in the village of Kurre.
The main activity that people in Kurre engage in to make a living is
the cultivation of rice. A few households (all originating from the high-
est social class) possess rice fields which are irrigated by the Banki Riv-
er, enabling them to harvest two crops a year. However, the majority of
Kurre’s population have rain-fed rice fields, yielding only one crop of
rice per year. Notwithstanding the unequal distribution of rice fields,
both in quantity and quality, 73 percent of the village’s households are
directly involved in rice growing; this is far more than in Sabara (44%).
The majority has indirect access to the rice fields, which takes the form
of labor during the plowing, planting, or harvesting season, which in
turn brings them a small share of the harvest. Rice is the main subsis-
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tence crop and there is rarely any surplus for sale on the market. Be-
sides rice, the daily menu is supplemented by cassava, maize, fruits,
and vegetables which are grown in small gardens around the house.
Although the soil in Kurre appears fairly suitable for rice growing, it
is less conducive for growing trees or plants as cash crops. Only 27 per-
cent of the households possess a few coffee, cacao, or clove trees or va-
nilla plants that produce small quantities of harvest. Both coffee and ca-
cao are grown by 19 percent of the households in Kurre. Vanilla and
cloves are cultivated by four and three percent of the households, re-
spectively (see table 1.3).
As in Sabara, livestock breeding is a popular activity to generate in-
come in times of economic distress, as well as being very important for
gifts at ritual activities. Each household in Kurre raises chickens (98%),
pigs (91%), or buffalo (24%). Most young men breed cocks, which they
train to fight at ceremonies, gambling dens, or semi-formal gatherings
with friends or co-villagers. Fifteen percent of the households have a
member who contributes to their income through part-time work as a
carpenter, bricklayer or handicraftsman, usually in the slack season. Se-
ven percent of the households are involved in small-scale trading of cat-
tle. After the introduction of the lembang system, the village headman
and his assistant no longer received their salary from the government
and now rely upon a percentage of the taxes levied on ceremonial activ-
ities for the slaughtering of buffalo and pigs.
In Kurre, people place much importance on funeral and tongkonan-
building ceremonies and their livelihood is basically centered upon
these extraordinary large events. Due to the high costs of funeral cere-
monies and few job opportunities in or near the village, 27 percent of
its total population migrated to places outside Tana Toraja to earn
money. This means that 81 percent of the households in Kurre have
one or more members that have left the village. The majority of the mi-
grants (34%) moved to Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) as well as coun-
tries such as Singapore and Japan. In Tana Toraja, the Tondon area (in-
cluding Kurre) is known as a place where a lot of women work as pros-
titutes in the larger industrial areas of Malaysia. Tondon men are seen
as criminals who earn their money in “dark” places (illegal gambling
dens, brothels, etc.) in the same areas. In other words, the reputation of
Tondon is that of a close(d) community whose people have lost their
ma’siri’ (shame and honour).23 Outside Tana Toraja, many do their ut-
most to increase their sociocultural status back home. Other villagers
(28%) migrated to other parts of Indonesia, especially Kalimantan and
Irian Jaya, or stayed closer to home and moved to Luwu or Makassar
(6%), or different locations around Tana Toraja (28 %).
Of all surveyed households in Kurre, 58 percent indicated that they
receive remittances from migrant members on a more or less regular
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basis. Most migrants who send money home do this to support their fa-
mily for their daily necessities (77%), for funeral and other ceremonies
(65%), and/or for house (re-)building (16%). Just as in Sabara, family
members living in Tana Toraja support their home household often
with labor, food or small amounts of money.
In conclusion, most households in Kurre are involved in raising
chickens or pigs in combination with the cultivation of rice. Only one-
quarter of the households grows cash crops (mostly cacao and coffee)
on a small scale. Contrary to the situation in Sabara, vanilla has hardly
entered the farming scene in Kurre. Beside these local activities, almost
60 percent of the households obtain an additional income through re-
mittances from one or more family members. A small number of
households find some income through part-time work such as construc-
tion work and small-scale business.
Livelihood portfolios of various wealth groups in Kurre
Just as in Sabara, Kurre’s residents distinguish four wealth classes in
the same manner: very rich (paling kaya), rich (kaya), moderate (sedang),
and poor (miskin). However, in Kurre, wealth is even more interwoven
with social stratification. Some names of particular social positions in
society directly refer to a person’s economic status. As a consequence of
the closely interwoven social and economic dimensions, wealth in Kurre
is measured by the number, size, and price of buffalo and pigs that a
household has slaughtered at a funeral or tongkonan-building ceremony,
as well as by the state of the house (tongkonan) of forefathers/mothers
from whom a household acknowledges their descent. The number of
migrants and the quantity of remittances they send home for ceremo-
nial activities are important criteria for Kurre’s dwellers to distinguish
the poor from the rich households. Last but not least, physical assets
such as rice fields, houses, motorcycles, hand tractors, and rice milling
machines complete the wealth mapping exercise.
In Kurre, wealth seems a little more equally distributed than in Sa-
bara. The very rich (11%) and rich (12%) account for 23 percent of all
households in the village. The group with households considered mod-
erate make up 29 percent of the population. Almost half of Kurre’s
households (48%) belong to the category of the poor.
The activities that comprise the livelihood portfolios of the various
wealth groups are shown in table 1.3. Almost all households from the
top two categories own rice fields, with most of the very rich even hav-
ing fields irrigated by the Banki River. A lot of households of the third
class (moderate) grow rice on the fields of large landowners in return
for a share of the yield after the harvest. People from poor households
generally work on the land of those who own or rent the land, and are
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paid in rice or money in the harvest season. In general, the members
of the first and second wealth groups own land, the members of the
third wealth group rent the land through sharecropping, and laborers
from the fourth wealth class work the land of the owners and share-
croppers in return for rice.24 It should be noted that there are some ex-
ceptions of poor people owning rice fields or rich people without rice
fields.
Across all wealth groups, cash crops are only grown on a small scale.
More households (in absolute terms) of the poor category are involved
in the cultivation of cash crops, especially coffee and cacao. At first
glance, there seems to be no significant difference between the four
wealth groups with regard to breeding livestock. However, the number
of buffalo, pigs, and chickens that a household raises drops relative to
the wealth in each of the categories.
All wealth groups have a fairly high number of labor migrants. Never-
theless, the total number of migrants within households from the very
Table 1.3 Households involved in the various livelihood activities per wealth group,
Kurre (%)
Livelihood activity Group 1
(%)
Group 2
(%)
Group 3
(%)
Group 4
(%)
All groups
(%)
Agriculture
Rice 82 77 65 75 73
Cash crops 45 23 16 31 27
Coffee (robusta) 18 16 9 28 19
Cacao 27 15 10 24 19
Vanilla 9 0 3 4 4
Cloves 0 15 3 0 3
Breeding livestock
Buffalo 27 46 29 16 24
Pigs 91 92 84 94 91
Chickens 91 100 97 100 98
Non-farm activities
Salaried jobs 0 0 0 0 0
Business/trade 0 23 13 4 8
Carpentry/bricklaying 0 15 13 18 15
Migration
Labor migrants 100 77 74 80 81
Migrants in Tana Toraja 82 54 26 31 37
Migrants in South Sulawesi 36 15 13 8 13
Migrants in other parts of Indonesia 55 54 48 20 36
Migrants abroad 55 31 32 47 42
Remittances 91 62 52 53 58
Source: Survey questionnaire and wealth ranking, conducted in Kurre in 2002-2003
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rich and rich groups is much larger than within the lower wealth
groups. Also, the direction of migration differs considerably. Among
the poor households, not many migrants remain in South Sulawesi to
try their fortune; instead they travel to Malaysia or to other parts of In-
donesia such as Irian Jaya and Kalimantan where they are able to make
more money without high educational requirements.25
Migrants who settle in Tana Toraja usually live in the Tondon region
or in the nearby town of Rantepao at the main market (pasar Bolu). A
few very rich or rich households even have a second house in Rantepao
where family members run a little shop or food stall. Most households
from the very rich category receive remittances. Of the moderate and
poor households, over 50 percent receive money from migrant mem-
bers. Both the number of households receiving remittances and the
amount of money sent are considerable, especially for occasions such
as a funeral ceremony.
Crisis, but flourishing funeral ceremonies
Having elaborated on the livelihood activities and resource allocations
that predominate within the various wealth groups, this section focuses
on the extent and ways in which the Indonesian crisis affected them
(see table 1.4). In contrast to Sabara, the rise in income experienced by
several households in Kurre between 1998 and 2003 had nothing to do
with increasing returns for cash crops. The rising incomes were rather
Table 1.4 Households that experience income fluctuations, crises or positive events
(%), Kurre
Very rich
(%)
Rich
(%)
Moderate
(%)
Poor
(%)
Income fluctuation 1998-2003
More income 20 0 7 10
Less income 40 30 14 37
Stable 40 70 79 53
Confronted with serious problems/crises 1998-2003
90 75 93 80
Facing positive events 1998-2003
55 45 41 19
Situation of the household
Improved 43 50 29 21
Worsened 14 8 7 3
The same 43 42 64 76
Source: Survey questionnaire conducted in Kurre in 2003
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a result of remittances that started to arrive from household members
who had found well-paying job in Malaysia, or because of higher re-
turns from rice fields through increasing use of fertilizer.
Households that received comparatively lower incomes specifically at-
tributed the prolonged dry seasons of 1999 and 2002 as the major
cause. Households from the upper classes complained about disap-
pointing rice harvests and households from lower groups pointed out
the diminishing amount of labor needed on the fields. Several house-
holds from all wealth groups said that a large part of their rice crops
was affected by infestation of mice and caterpillars in 2002.
Just like in Sabara, the majority of the households in Kurre did not
experience any noticeable changes in their income. Nevertheless, it
should be pointed out that the income of Kurre’s villagers is never com-
pletely stable but varies each year to some extent. It is dependent on the
amount of rainfall, health of plants and animals, available labor, market
prices, and the continuity of the remittances they receive from migrant
family members.
Droughts, animal and pest diseases, and sickness and death of house-
hold members across all wealth groups seemed as much a crisis for
most households in Kurre as in Sabara. Especially various pests and dis-
eases that spread through Kurre in late 2002 killed many chickens and
pigs in the village. Strangely enough, most households hardly men-
tioned this as a reason for decreasing incomes. From each wealth
group, one household noted that the cut in remittances was a real crisis.
One household from the very rich class said that their vanilla was de-
stroyed, and the land of a household from the moderate wealth group
was flooded in 2001. Besides these rather personal crises, there was
only one other factor that affected some families negatively: gambling.
Since the central government in Jakarta loosened control over Tana Tor-
aja in the late 1990s, the number and size of gambling activities have
burgeoned. With formal permission of the Torajan government, some
cockfights are allowed at funeral ceremonies as part of a ritual activity
but, apart from that, gambling is still illegal. However, according to
Morell, “the immediate post-Suharto period saw a resurgence of cock-
fighting and gambling in Tana Toraja, as advantage was taken of bu-
reaucratic disarray and inattention” (Morrel 2001: 12). Many Chinese,
Buginese, Makassarese, and Torajan migrants bring their money from
outside Tana Toraja to try their luck in the highlands. They generally
gamble to pass the time and losing some money does not worry them
much. In contrast to such recreational gambling, quite a few less-well-
off Torajans gamble seriously in the hope of boosting their income or
paying off debts; these people often return home worse off, causing
trouble and conflict in their households. Thus, while gambling might
provide a new source of income for some, it causes financial and social
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problems as well. One respondent from the poorest wealth class said
that from the day her husband gave up gambling, she noted a positive
effect on their household’s income.
The positive experiences or events between 1998 and 2003 singled
out by respondents once again make clear the importance of migration
and remittances for Kurre. The majority of the households viewed the
graduation of their children from high school and the employment they
found after that and the remittances they consequently sent home as
positive events. Their children have become successful (keberhasilan),
which allows them to invest even more in funeral ceremonies to show
their enhanced wealth and thereby increase their social status. Chil-
dren’s success in obtaining a well-paid job is also the major reason
mentioned for the improvement of the household’s situation. The other
positive events cited match the reasons for increasing incomes: the sale
of cattle, and higher profits for rice and cacao harvests.
Interestingly, only a small minority of households felt that they were
worse off after 2003 than five years before that. The ones experiencing
a poorer situation in their household gave the rise of prices for cooking
oil, petrol, food, transport, and fertilizer as the main reason. Although a
majority of households in Kurre acknowledged the increase in prices
for food and goods, most of them commented, “There is no crisis in
Tana Toraja because the funeral ceremonies are still flourishing.”
Concluding remarks
The Tana Toraja case demonstrates that the livelihoods of some people
have turned upside down, while those of others have changed very little,
or actually have changed for the better. It also shows that local liveli-
hoods are subject to risks, threats, and opportunities even without the
influence of external shocks; rural people live in a vulnerable environ-
ment and are regularly faced with crop and livestock diseases, droughts,
floods, forest fires, and so forth. The local economy is still lively and re-
mittances continue to arrive in Tana Toraja from Kalimantan, Irian Jaya,
and even Malaysia. The Tana Toraja economy depends in large part on
the money that continues to flow into Tana Toraja for funeral or house-
building ceremonies or just daily needs. Translocal or transnational net-
works appear to be important for establishing and maintaining a liveli-
hood as well as for enhancing and securing a livelihood in times of cri-
sis. Most people do not live in isolation but are part of local and trans-
national networks of social relations (kin and friends), which might
help them to cope with unexpected setbacks or to make use of new op-
portunities.
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As postulated in the introduction of this book, a nationwide response
to the Indonesian total crisis does not exist; nor is there an ethnically
shared response to the regional emergent events that spread throughout
Tana Toraja (as an expression of the Indonesian crisis). In the study of
livelihoods and their resilience in times of change, the Torajan case pro-
vides a clear example of the necessity to differentiate between house-
holds and larger social units or classes, while taking life objectives, past
experiences, and contextual aspects as well as translocal relations into
account.
Notes
1 Data for this case study was collected during an extensive period of field research in
2002-2003 and two shorter visits to Tana Toraja in 2001 and 2005. A variety of data
collection methods and techniques (e.g., in-depth interviews, oral histories, surveys,
rankings, mappings, etc.) has been used to gather information on the crisis effects
over the period 1997-2005, at different levels of society. The cases presented here
served as sample villages within my research in the northern and southern parts of
Tana Toraja. The field research on which this paper is based was part of the Indonesia
in Transition research program of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences
(KNAW).
2 The names of the villages in this study are pseudonyms.
3 There are various spellings for the name of the people from Tana Toraja. The more
common ones are Toraja, Toradja, and Toraya. According to Torajan linguistics at the
Christian University of Tana Toraja (IKIP), within the English language the term Tora-
jan should be used to refer to someone who originates from the Tana Toraja region.
Accordingly, for the purpose of this work, I apply the term Torajan to refer to the peo-
ple from Tana Toraja.
4 The Indonesian census in 2000 arrived at a figure of 750,828 Torajans living in Tana
Toraja (Suryadinata et al 2003: 7). This means that around 350,000 Torajans live out-
side Tana Toraja, at least according to the official accounts. In reality the number is
much higher if we include the non-registered migrants and commuters or the Tora-
jans who live overseas. It is estimated that about 50,000 Torajans reside in Malaysia.
5 Nearly 80 percent of the Christians are Protestants, while 20 percent are Catholics
(BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 2001). The number of people practicing Pentecostalism
is growing steadily, but there are no official figures.
6 In 1970 the rice harvest yielded 40,000 tons (Nooy-Palm 1979a: 12), while the rice
harvested in 1996 amounted to 133,559 tons (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 1996),
which is more than a threefold increase.
7 In 1996, 13,033 hectares were planted with coffee yielding 5,078 tons of coffee; 3,037
hectares with cloves (110 tons); 904 hectares with cacao (733 tons); 277 hectares with
vanilla (57 ton); and 33 hectares with pepper (8 tons) (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja
1996).
8 This official number is probably a little on the high side because it also includes Indo-
nesian guests, such as traders, politicians, and NGO members attending conferences
and workshops, and occasional Torajan migrants with their families who prefer to stay
in hotels while partaking in ritual activities.
9 Rantepao is the main business and Makale the main administrative center of the re-
gency.
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10 “Tana Toraja possesses the finest educational system in all of rural South Sulawesi.
Developed over half a century by missionaries, Toraja Protestant and Catholic schools
have produced high caliber high schools and technical school graduates whose skills
have been utilized in government service, the armed forces, and private industry”
(Crystal 1989: 165).
11 This number is based on an interview with the editor of a local newspaper who inves-
tigated the money flows into Tana Toraja through banks, post office, and so forth.
12 Indonesia’s gross domestic product shrank in 1998 with 14 percent far below zero
(Gérard and Ruf 2001: 3).
13 The contribution of cash crops to the regional bruto product (RBP) of Tana Toraja
more than doubled from 9.95 in 1996 to 19.73 percent in 1998 (BPS Tana Toraja
2000b). The increase in the share of agriculture to the RBP of Tana Toraja (52.46 per-
cent in 1996 to 62.23 percent in 1998) seemed to be entirely due to the growing pro-
duction of cash crops and rising market prices for these crops.
14 By 2002, as many as 7,588 Torajans had registered themselves as return migrants (Di-
nas Kependudukan dan Tenaga Kerja Kabupaten Tana Toraja 2001/2002).
15 To some extent the traditional ethnic concept of lembang can be compared with the
more widely known nagari in West Sumatra. The lembang is a political and adminis-
trative unit which is larger than the New Order village (desa) and supposedly existed
before the Dutch colonial regime administratively redesigned the region.
16 For more information over the implications of decentralization and power politics in
Tana Toraja see De Jong (forthcoming).
17 Migrants usually visit their home village during holidays (usually Christmas) or to at-
tend funeral, house-building or wedding ceremonies.
18 In order to construct the four wealth categories, I used an emic approach. Six groups
of people from various socio-economic backgrounds and a mixture of different age
groups were asked to place the name cards of all households in the village into differ-
ent piles, according to their wealth. In all six exercises, the respondents ended up with
four rows of households: very rich, rich, moderate, and poor. It seemed that the first
and second categories were more obvious than the distinction between the moderate
and poor. The criteria utilized by the villagers for distinguishing households provided
information on the importance of access to certain resources and activities for secur-
ing or enhancing a living. The average of the total six wealth rankings has been used
as the determinative factor for a household’s position in a particular wealth group.
19 Karung means “sack”, and corresponds to approximately 100 liters.
20 In Tana Toraja sweet potatoes are usually boiled and added to a mixture of rice and
bran to feed pigs.
21 A few years ago, one farmer in Sabara decided to vaccinate his pigs. Soon thereafter,
they all died. After that people doubted the benefits of what they consider “expensive
injections”.
22 Sickness refers to serious illness for which hospitalization is needed, or something
that resulted in incurable disability. Death not only implies a shortage of labor but also
brings with it the high costs of a funeral ceremony, even though the rituals might be
kept relatively small scale.
23 Although there may be some truth to this reputation, one should be careful not to
overgeneralize; I came across several migrants who earned a living through a highly
valued job.
24 Land division in Kurre (as well as in most other places in Tana Toraja) is very compli-
cated. Most land, especially rice fields are divided at funeral ceremonies among con-
sanguineous relatives of the deceased person. The amount of land inherited usually
depends on the number and value of buffalo they sacrifice at the ceremony. Because
of the many divisions and redivisions of land, many households own several small
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plots of rice fields of different quality at various locations. The rice fields usually re-
main the property or common wealth of the tongkonan and are therefore seldom sold.
In the past, all rice fields belonged to people from the highest class. A thorough divi-
sion of land has never taken place in Tana Toraja, thus denying most low-status
households (usually from the poorer stratum) access to rice fields. Most villagers re-
tain ownership of their land even after they have migrated. However, in return for a
share in the harvest or cash, others are usually allowed to work on such plots.
25 Migrants of the poor and moderate wealth groups generally have a lower level of edu-
cation than their richer co-villagers and accordingly find different employment.
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2 Through Turbulent Times: Diversity,
Vulnerability, and Resilience of Madurese
Livelihoods in East Kalimantan
Gerben Nooteboom
For some categories of people in Indonesia, and probably in Southeast
Asia at large, the 1997 economic crisis, the related political turmoil, and
the sociopolitical changes in its aftermath have led to a reshuffling of
positions, with some groups experiencing a gain in livelihood condi-
tions and access to resources, and others merely losing. An increasing
number of studies on social change and the long-term effects of the cri-
sis indicate, for instance, new opportunities and a rise of old elites as
well as a recovery on the part of formerly suppressed groups (Antlöv
2004; Rosser, Roesad & Edwin 2004; Van Klinken 2002). At the same
time, some of the groups that previously were relatively protected under
Suharto’s regime are losing out. Old and regional elites, such as adat of-
ficials and some Islamic leaders, are now riding the waves of opportu-
nity, while the rural and urban poor, unskilled laborers, and margina-
lized migrants face declining political influence, decreasing economic
opportunities, and a lack of social protection (Bertrand 2004; SEMERU
2004; Wanandi 2002).
This process of reshuffling has mostly been taking place along ethnic
lines, although large differences within ethnic groups can be observed.
Since the crisis has shaken society’s social, economic, and political struc-
tures, some groups are doing better, while others lose influence and ac-
cess. In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese, for instance, now celebrate their es-
cape from the doldrums of discrimination (Susanto 2005), adat elites re-
turn in West Sumatra (Indiyanto 2004), and Malay and Javanese Islamic
middle classes also prosper under this period of political windfall (Rut-
ten 2005). On the other hand, migrants of poor and less privileged back-
grounds such as Madurese and people from eastern Indonesia (NTT)
face stagnant or deteriorating positions as a direct or indirect effect of
the crisis (Mathews 1998; Suryahadi & Sumarto 2003; Vel 2001). Some
of these ethnic groups, which occupied relatively privileged positions
during New Order rule as migrants or laborers, now seem to lose out.
Little is known, however, about the multiple impacts of the crisis on live-
lihoods within such marginalized groups and the mechanisms of inter-
pretation and reallocation of these changes at the local level.
In an attempt to understand the background of this reshuffling of po-
sitions, it is illuminating to look into the differential effects of the Indo-
nesian crisis on the livelihoods of such groups as one of its prime
causes. This chapter aims to shed some light on the micro processes of
livelihood change among Madurese migrants – one of the less privi-
leged groups in Indonesia – and analyzes aspects of livelihood and vul-
nerability to crisis in a wider economic, political, and social perspective.
For this purpose, I distinguish three crises which are mutually en-
tangled in practice: (1) an economic crisis (marked by inflation, a loss of
labor opportunities, and declining income earning opportunities); (2) a
political crisis that led to a weak state, the erosion of protective struc-
tures, and unbalanced decentralization; and (3) a social and ethnic crisis
which gave rise to increasing ethnic and religious tensions leading to
violence, trauma, and fear. The ‘echoes of violence’ had by far the lar-
gest impact on Madurese migrants in East Kalimantan and this group
will receive the most attention here.
It is difficult to specify the direct causal relationships between the vio-
lence and ethnic conflicts in Indonesia (during the years 1998-2001),
the economic crisis and the changes at the political level, due to the
complexity of developments in this turbulent period. Nevertheless, the
large number of studies on violence shows that economic crisis, regime
collapse, and violence are interrelated and have influenced each other
(De Jonge & Nooteboom 2006). Explanations of the violence against
Madurese in West and Central Kalimantan for instance ranged from:
exotic explanations relating to “headhunters” and “savages” (CNN 1999;
Jakarta Post 2001; New York Times 1999) to errors of the past three dec-
ades, such as forced migration of hundreds of thousands of people
from densely populated islands such as Java, Bali, and Madura to less
populated islands without proper integration of these migrants with na-
tive groups in the settlement areas (Ave 2003; Dove 1997; HRW 1997;
Peluso & Harwell 2001); and, further, the political heritage of suppres-
sion under Suharto’s New Order (Davidson & Kammen 2002); the poli-
tical instability after his fall (Davidson 2003; Putra 1999); a failing jus-
tice system and probable political manipulation by Indonesian authori-
ties (HRW 1997; ICG 2001; Schiller & Garang 2002); and deeply
rooted cultural and religious controversies (Schiller & Garang 2002).
Van Klinken put his analysis in a context of decentralization and
blamed local ethnic elites “who deflect democratization by stimulating
ethnic conflict” (Van Klinken 2003: 70). In retrospect, these studies ta-
ken together provide a fairly convincing explanation for the violence in
West and Central Kalimantan, at least from the Dayak point of view.
The Madurese perspective so far has been poorly represented, and their
position has received less attention (Nooteboom 2005b). Moreover, we
do not know what the effect of the violence has been on Madurese mi-
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grants in other areas, such as neighboring East Kalimantan, where no
large-scale violence occurred.
In an attempt to fill this gap, this chapter deals with the study of one
of the categories of people who are among Indonesia’s most margina-
lized groups: Madurese migrants in East Kalimantan. Two questions
will be investigated in this chapter: what impact did the different types
of crises have on the livelihoods within different categories of Madurese
migrants in East Kalimantan, and what were the mechanisms through
which these different impacts of the crisis periods affected Madurese li-
velihoods? To answer these questions, I will first give some historical
background on Madurese migration, then I will describe Madurese live-
lihoods in East Kalimantan, and finally I will deal with the major impact
of the crises and the mechanisms through which they affected Madur-
ese livelihoods.
Research locations and methodology
This chapter is based on material gathered during a larger study on live-
lihood and social security styles of Madurese migrants in East Kaliman-
tan in the context of crisis and decentralization in Indonesia. It builds
on previous fieldwork among Madurese-speaking people in Bondowoso,
East Java (Nooteboom 2003; Nooteboom & Kutanegara 2003), an area
from which many people migrate to Kalimantan. Fieldwork was carried
out in January 2003 and from September 2003 to February 2004 in the
district of Samarinda, the provincial capital of East Kalimantan. I stu-
died Madurese settlers in three clearly demarcated clusters of economic
activity: brickmaking, stonecutting, and vegetable production. The first
two sectors are dominated by Madurese from Bangkalan (West Madura)
and Sampang (Central Madura), respectively. Most brickmakers work
on the outskirts of the city and stonecutters can be found in the hills of
Batu Putih and Batu Besaung, west and north of the city of Samarinda
(see map). In the vegetable production area of Lempake (northeast of
Samarinda), Madurese-speaking migrants from Malang (East Java) dom-
inate economic activities.
Within these relatively homogeneous clusters of economic activity (in
respect of place, descent, social class, and ethnic identity), I observed a
wide range of different ways in which people tried to make a living, in-
terpreted the crisis, maintained contacts with other ethnic groups, and
aimed for “success”.
The research consisted of both quantitative and qualitative methodol-
ogies and comprised three phases with an increasingly narrowing
scope. In the first phase, the different economic activities, locations,
and backgrounds of Madurese migrants were mapped. After this phase,
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two sectors dominated by the Madurese were selected. In the second
phase, a large-scale survey was conducted on livelihood constitution, li-
velihood patterns, incomes, remittances, social security, perceptions of
crisis, and interethnic relationships. In the last phase, a dozen families
from the first and second phase were again approached for lengthy in-
terviews and life histories. These families were visited on a weekly basis
and they were studied more intensively to constitute case studies.
Some members of these families were traced back to the island of
Madura and family members were visited in Bangkalan, Madura. In
practice, the second and third phases overlapped, as case studies started
when the survey was still running. In total, 79 brickmaking families
and individual workers were surveyed, as well as 45 stonecutters, 20
farmers, and 10 contractors. Besides these, Dayak, Bugis, and Javanese
key informants were interviewed, as well as members of the police and
the administration.
Madurese migration
A short history of Madurese migration
For centuries, the Madurese have been known as brave soldiers, strong
and reliable laborers, and vigorous migrants traveling to many places in
the Malay world. There are indications that as early as the thirteenth
century, the Madurese traveled and settled in Java as serfs and rural la-
borers (Husson 1997). From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century,
Madurese soldiers, recruited by Javanese and colonial authorities
(VOC), were a feared force and crucial instrument in the power play of
kings and rulers (Husson, 1997). Many of them were rewarded for their
military services with land in East Java.
Since the seventeenth and eighteenth century, large numbers of the
Madurese have moved to the mainland of Java, and especially to its
northern coast and the eastern part (Cribb 2000; Nooteboom 2003;
Tennekens 1963). Husson (1997: 85) quotes Van Nes (1832) who wrote
that, by 1832, the residency of Pasuruan (on the mainland of Java) had a
population of 170,049 Javanese and 92,463 Madurese. This migration
increased in the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth
century, when many Madurese laborers were sought to work in planta-
tions in the Malang and Besuki districts and in the expanding factories
of Surabaya (Nawiyanto 2003).
Although the migration wave to plantations abated, the Madurese still
continued to migrate elsewhere. In the population census of 1930, 14
percent of all people born in Madura were living in other parts of the ar-
chipelago (Cribb 2000). According to some sources, the population on
the island of Madura even declined in the period between 1940-1950
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(Husson 1997: 89). Major factors behind this massive migration, which
has continued to the present day, are the infertility of soil on Madura, a
lack of natural resources and labor opportunities, overpopulation, and
the widespread belief that economic success can be achieved only by
migration (merantau).
Since the year 2000, the Madurese have been officially ranked as In-
donesia’s fourth largest ethnic group, with 6,771,727 people, or 3.37 per-
cent of all citizens (BPS 2001; Suryadinata Arifin & Ananta 2003).
Other estimations give even higher numbers for the Madurese and rank
them as the third largest ethnic group (Husson 1997). Nowadays, less
than one-third of these Madurese live on Madura. Ninety-eight percent
of the Madurese live in East Java, where they comprise 18.1 percent of
the provincial total.
There has been a Madurese diaspora, mainly to Kalimantan, which is
relatively near and offers many opportunities for unskilled laborers. Ac-
cording to official data collected in 2000 (BPS 2001), about 4.92 per-
cent of counted self-identified Madurese citizens live in Kalimantan
(the proportions are 5.5 percent in West Kalimantan, 3.5 percent in Cen-
tral Kalimantan, 1.22 percent in South Kalimantan, and 1.24 percent in
East Kalimantan). These figures do not include temporary workers,
those who regard themselves as temporary, or those who wish to avoid
calling themselves Madurese, as these figures are based on ethnic self-
definition, and temporary workers without a residential permit are not
included in the statistics. Real figures of the Madurese in East Kaliman-
tan are therefore expected to be much higher.
Madurese migration to Kalimantan
It is difficult to find exact figures of Madurese migration to Kalimantan,
since figures about ethnic descent were not provided by Indonesian sta-
tistics. It is clear, however, that the first considerable numbers started to
migrate shortly before World War II when work opportunities in Kali-
mantan in the oil industry, plantation sector, and logging industry
started to gain importance (Harjono 1988). The Madurese were the
most popular cheap and reliable laborers and they were probably also
part of the first Dutch transmigration (at that time called colonization)
projects in 1921 in Kalimantan. In 1938, the settlers in the Madurejo
dry land transmigration area in South Kalimantan were all Madurese
(Harjono 1977).
Contrary to what has generally been said, the Madurese were seldom
part of these large-scale transmigration programs and the majority of
Madurese migrants came to Kalimantan of their own accord. The major
waves of Madurese migrants came after the oil boom in the mid-1970s.
They took their cue from the new labor opportunities and their migra-
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tion was only indirectly stimulated by the transmigration programs.
The importance of the transmigration programs has probably been that
they opened up new areas, provided infrastructure, and prepared the
way for spontaneous migration of the Javanese and Madurese, as well
as Buginese, Banjarese, and Torajans.
When the numbers of immigrants in Kalimantan increased dramati-
cally, frictions with the local population and with other migrant groups
regularly occurred. Due to strong military repression under Suharto’s
New Order, these frictions were never able to develop into large con-
flicts, and migrants, especially from Java and Madura, were generally
well protected. In the early 1990s, however, the success of the New Or-
der developmental model started to show cracks. Local groups in the
outer islands started to contest the Jakarta and Javanese-based domina-
tion and expressed their resentments more openly. The (often corrupt
and internally divided) police and military forces were no longer able to
stop ethnic and religiously inspired clashes between migrants and eth-
nic Chinese. Widespread and repeated looting and ethnic violence in
Java (against the Chinese), the Moluccas, Central Sulawesi (Poso), and
in the outer islands (against the Madurese and Chinese) were one of
the first indications of the shortcomings and weaknesses of the Indone-
sian New Order political system that suppressed tensions rather than
solving them (Antlöv 1999; Breman 2000; Hill 1999).
In 1999 and 2001, when government legitimation had severely de-
clined due to the political crisis, large ethnic conflicts occurred in Sam-
bas and Sampit (West and Central Kalimantan).1 Most of the Madurese
in these districts originate from the Sampang and Pamekasan districts
of Madura and from the eastern districts of East Java.
In East Kalimantan, however, the situation is slightly different. Most
of the Madurese who migrated to East Kalimantan originated from
Bangkalan, with smaller proportions from Sampang and the Eastern
Salient of Java. Generally they do not own land and work as unskilled
laborers for logging companies, in road construction, for contractors,
and in the plantation sector. Nowadays some have been able to start
small or medium-sized businesses, but the majority remain poor. Mi-
gration patterns of the Madurese in East Kalimantan differ in this re-
spect from those in West and Central Kalimantan, as in the latter area,
large numbers of the Madurese settled in rural areas and obtained land
(Peluso & Harwell 2001).
Madurese migrants in Samarinda
It is difficult to ascertain when exactly the first Madurese came to Sa-
marinda. Of the Madurese currently living in Samarinda, those living
there longest came to town in the early 1960s. They worked as un-
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skilled laborers and, at least from the mid-1960s, a few Madurese brick-
makers have been active. Before that period nearly all houses were
made of wood and occasionally the Madurese were reported to be work-
ing as carpenters or traders. When, at the end of the 1960s, large trans-
migration schemes were established in Samarinda, the Madurese found
work in road and house construction, in logging, and in the construc-
tion of irrigation dikes, canals, and ditches.
After 1970 the situation started to change. Employment opportunities
grew, large transmigration areas around the city brought larger popula-
tions, and Samarinda started to develop as a provincial city. In this peri-
od, logging activities in the vicinity of Samarinda also increased, a large
number of sawmills were opened along the Mahakam river, govern-
ment buildings were put up, and the demand for unskilled laborers for
road construction and building activities increased sharply. Moreover,
the demand for gravel, stone, bricks, and building materials skyrocketed
and newcomers, many of them Madurese, grasped the opportunities to
start a trade or business.
Nowadays, the ethnic chart in economic activities is as follows: the Ja-
vanese dominate farming in the transmigration areas as well as the
middle and higher ranks of the service sector, in government bureau-
cracy, and in education. Buginese immigrants from Sulawesi dominate
petty trade and transport, as well as the large trade in wood, vegetables,
and fruit; they own restaurants and some of the large production enter-
prises. The Banjarese are farmers, factory workers, and owners of many
small shops and restaurants. The Kutai, the original population, can be
found in agriculture, business, and higher ranks of government person-
nel. The Chinese are in the majority in the retail and supply sector, own
most of the larger shops in town as well as many sawmills, and they
dominate the capital-intensive branches of the economy. Most Dayak
people of East Kalimantan are found in the faraway forests of the upper
Mahakam, and in the Berau and Nunukan districts. Nowadays, the Ma-
durese make up an estimated 5 percent of the population of Samarinda
and 3.6 percent of East Kalimantan as a whole.2 This makes them the
sixth largest ethnic group in East Kalimantan, after the Javanese with
nearly 30 percent, the Buginese with 18 percent, the Banjarese with 14
percent, the Kutai with 9 percent, and the Dayak with an estimated 5
percent (BPS 2001; Suryadinata et al. 2003).
Some of the early Madurese are now well-off and own land, houses,
cars, transport businesses, recycling firms, construction companies,
gambling dens, and brothels. They earned their fortune during the late
1980s and 1990s when the economy of Samarinda was booming as a
result of the increase in logging and mining activities. The majority of
the Madurese in Samarinda, however, have so far not been very success-
ful and remain poor. They are not highly educated (with illiteracy rates
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of 40 to 50 percent for male workers and even higher percentages for
women), but are known for being hard workers. This means that they
are higly desirable in demand as laborers in sectors where hard labor is
required, such as in the transport and construction sectors. Many por-
ters in the harbor and at the markets are Madurese, as well as road
workers, construction workers, garbage collectors, stonecutters, and
brickmakers. Others work as security guards, policemen, carpenters,
owners of repair shops, or hairdressers and barbers. The banana trade
and saté sector are dominated by the Madurese, as well as the majority
of the canteens at the university campus. In general, however, Madur-
ese migrants remain in the lower strata of the East Kalimantan society.
Four types of migrants
In East Kalimantan, four categories of Madurese migrants can be distin-
guished: seasonal migrants, semipermanent migrants, semipermanent
settlers, and settlers.
1) Seasonal migrants travel seasonally to and from Madura or Eastern
Java. They make up 40 to 50 percent of the brickmakers or stonecutters
in Samarinda and a large proportion of the laborers at construction
sites. Over three-quarters of them are male, and the others form mostly
couples without children. Preferably, they leave their dependants with
relatives in Madura, where life is cheaper and perceived to be safer. As
soon as some money has been earned, they send it to family members
or return home (savings from Rp 1 to 2 million (E 100-200) are consid-
ered as enough to return). These seasonal migrants work as wage la-
borers in construction, agriculture, brickmaking, and stonecutting, and
are mobilized by Madurese middlemen. They come from mainland East
Java or from Sampang and Pamekasan in Madura (including refugees
from West and Central Kalimantan) and travel to Kalimantan by boat.
Their length of stay ranges between three months to a maximum of
two years. These workers have the lowest incomes (gross individual and
family wages average between Rp 15,000-20,000 (E 1.50-2.00) per day),
which is still twice as high as what can be earned on Madura or main-
land East Java. It should be realized, however, that the prices for basic
goods in East Kalimantan are about 50 percent higher as well.
2) Semipermanent migrants. Among the brickmakers and stonecutters
in Samarinda, about one-third have worked in Kalimantan for over 20
years and they still return home nearly every year at Idhul Fitri. These
people can hardly be called seasonal migrants any more, as they have
lived most of their life in Kalimantan and only travel to Madura for
short periods in a year. Every year, as soon as their savings are used up
in Madura, they return to Kalimantan. Nevertheless, they regard them-
selves as living on Madura and as only temporary dwellers in Kaliman-
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tan. Some of these people own houses and sometimes cattle at home
on Madura and try to invest in them, but the majority have never been
able to accumulate any substantial property.
Average incomes of semipermanent migrants are often higher and
more stable than those of the seasonal migrants, but their economic ac-
tivities remain “footloose”. They work as wage laborers, sellers, or tra-
ders, and those who have been successful tend to invest their savings
mainly in Madura by buying land, cattle, a motorbike, or improving
their houses. Every year at Idhul Fitri they try to go home and visit rela-
tives and children living on Madura (girls tend to remain on Madura to
care for parents, and if enough money is available boys are sent to an
Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in the home area). If possible, the
semipermanent migrants send their remittances regularly to family
members, parents, and relatives in need of support or a loan. Semiper-
manent settlers differ from semipermanent settlers by their self-defini-
tion as a migrant (perantau) and their preoccupation with Madura as
place of original descent and final retirement. Many of the semiperma-
nent migrants began as seasonal migrants and never intended to work
very long in Kalimantan. They feel “forced to migrate” and tend to ex-
plain their presence solely in terms of economic necessity; “there is
nothing [to earn] on Madura”.
3) Semipermanent settlers can be quite successful. Some own profitable
businesses or trades and among them there are many entrepreneurs,
owners of brickmaking sites, subcontractors (borongan), and transpor-
ters. If money is available, they tend to visit Madura infrequently.
Among the semipermanent settlers are also people who are unwilling
or unable to return to their place of origin for a variety of reasons, such
as an unpaid debt, feud, or “trouble”. Usually they are couples – often
with children – or remarried couples who have started a new working
life in Kalimantan. Successful semipermanent settlers remit money reg-
ularly to support parents or relatives in Madura, but they tend to invest
in Kalimantan (in enterprises, trucks, land, social relationships, and so
on). As the years go by, ties with Madura get weaker, and if most of
their children prefer to live in East Kalimantan they never return.
Nevertheless, they all say they long to go back to Madura and they tend
to maintain a home there. These houses are used by relatives and
sometimes fall into disrepair due to neglect. Semipermanent settlers
want to make money in Kalimantan, where “money is cheap”, but still
dream of or plan a retirement at “home”. In practice, few dreams ever
materialize. Following the Central Kalimantan violence of 2001, this
dream has gained another dimension. Most of the semipermanent mi-
grants admit that their attitude towards Kalimantan has changed. They
no longer feel safe and long for a peaceful retirement. They doubt
whether they can ever live safely in Kalimantan.
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4) Settlers have simply chosen to stay in Kalimantan and do not wish
to return for a variety of personal, social, and economic reasons. They
do not own any property on Madura, or have sold their land and house
lots. For their adolescents, they have established Islamic schools (pesant-
ren) in Balikpapan and Samarinda. Among the permanent settlers there
are many who have lived there for two or three generations. They do
not feel special affection for their homeland and regard themselves as
natural inhabitants of the province. However, outsiders still view them
as distinctively Madurese.
Families of settlers live dispersed over Samarinda, except for a few
clusters where brickmakers and settlers bought land in a kind of
“chain”. The children of settlers tend to go to primary schools in the
neighborhood and education levels are higher than on Madura. Some-
times these children are even unable to speak Madurese. Settlers do not
wish to return and generally no longer own anything in their area of
origin. If they send any remittances, these are for emergency purposes
of faraway relatives or have a further symbolic function, such as the
building of a mosque or religious school. Following the violence in
West and Central Kalimantan, many settlers have tried to mix or assimi-
late with other population groups and tend to disguise their Madurese
descent. Returning to Madura would not have been an option due to a
lack of property and social relationships.
The seasonal migrants and semipermanent migrants make up three-
quarters of the Madurese in East Kalimantan. These categories of mi-
grants do not necessarily reflect social class, as especially in the third
and fourth category rich as well as poor people are found. Over 90 per-
cent of first-generation Madurese in East Kalimantan retain close ties
with their area of origin. News about family members and events in
Madura is constantly exchanged. This connectedness with Madura is
one of the reasons why the Madurese maintain their distinct ethnic
identity. It is the important cultural notion of wandering or traveling
(merantau) in search for money, rather than “settling”, that makes the
Madurese move away from Madura. Initially they all wished to return
and this idea of merantau did not motivate them to invest in Kaliman-
tan or to buy land. Only a few ever invested in land or immovable prop-
erty. This practice has been reinforced since the violence in West and
Central Kalimantan, when fear for further ethnic violence spread, and
more Madurese tried to accumulate property on Madura.
Madurese livelihoods
In this study, I have focused on three economic sectors of Madurese
migrant activity: brickmaking, stonecutting, and vegetable farming. The
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first two groups have been studied most intensively as they are highly
visible and known to be Madurese, while the last sector has been stu-
died by means of comparison.
Laborers in the brick sector live a squatter-like life in simple bamboo
houses on pieces of unused land, and can be found clustered along
most of the roads outside Samarinda. Madurese stonecutters can be
found in Batu Putih and Batu Besaung, a range of rocky hills to the
west and north of Samarinda. The third group of vegetable farmers are
hardly known as Madurese and can be found north and northeast from
Lempake (see fig. 2.1). They invest in land, fruit trees, cattle, and brick
houses.
The rough sector: brickmaking
In the 2003-2004 survey, my assistant and I found a total of 350 brick-
yards (serobong) providing a livelihood for an estimated 1,400 families.3
A serobong usually consists of a simple barn where bricks can be dried
and fired. Around the serobong, excavations, molding tables, firewood,
and simple barracks can be found. The land is usually rented or leased
to produce bricks. Only 15 percent of the entrepreneurs own the land
on which they work.
The average age of the brickyards surveyed was 4.7 years. Serobong
are regularly transferred to other locations when the clay is finished,
when conflicts occur, when lease contracts are terminated, or due to
house or road construction. Only when the land is owned by the owner
of the brickyard can enterprises remain longer in the same place. Dur-
ing the last two decades, brickyard locations slowly moved from the out-
skirts of the older city to outer areas as a result of Samarinda’s ongoing
urbanization.
About 40 percent of these brickyards were family-owned enterprises
without laborers, while the other 60 percent employed an average of six
laborers. Most enterprises are small and consist of one wooden shelter
(serobong) for drying and firing bricks, a few basic barracks for the work-
ers, and some simple production tools such as shovels and molds. On
average, each serobong has three teams of workers. A team, or kongsi, in-
cludes a husband and wife or two male workers. Many of these workers
are heavily indebted to the owner of the brickyard and can only return
to Madura when debts have been repaid. These forms of bonded, debt-
laden labor occur in about half of the cases. Sometimes couples bring
their children along, but more often the latter stay (and, in 75 percent
of the cases, so do their spouses) on Madura. Notwithstanding the sim-
ple production techniques, an estimated 50 million bricks were pro-
duced in 2003 in the Samarinda District, and about 3,500 people were
dependent on brickmaking as their first source of livelihood.
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Ninety-two percent of the brickmaking entrepreneurs as well as 58 per-
cent of brickmaking workers come from Madura. Eighty percent of the
entrepreneurs and 39 percent of the workers come from one village,
Geger, in the Bangkalan District, West Madura.4 Another 19 percent of
the workers come from other areas in Madura, while the other 40 per-
Figure 2.1 Map of Samarinda, East Kalimantan
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cent of the workers originate from Madurese-speaking areas in East
Java, with the largest proportion coming from Bondowoso (32 percent).
Although there are significant differences in speech and culture be-
tween people from Madura and eastern Java,5 other ethnic groups in
East Kalimantan view brickmaking as an exclusively Madurese occupa-
tion. It is called the “rough” sector, “only suited for strong, hardworking
people who can stand it” and for people who are not “refined” enough
to work in other sectors.
The economic activities and the ethnicity of the workers in the brick
enterprises are highly visible. Brickmakers are widely known to be Ma-
durese and their activities involve excavations, smoke, and regular heavy
transportation, which cannot be hidden. Entrepreneurs in this sector
face uncertainty due to fluctuating market prices and possible conflicts
with landowners and people in their vicinity over land and firewood. In
recalling these conflicts, both Madurese and non-Madurese people often
make references to ethnic issues. Since negative sentiments against the
Madurese have increased during the last couple of years, landowners in-
creasingly no longer want to rent or to lease land to the Madurese, or
they demand higher prices.
A local Banjarese leader commented: “We as original inhabitants
here have decided and say to all: ‘Don’t give any land to Madurese to
make bricks. Why should we help them to make money out of our
land? Let them buy it honestly.’” Not infrequently, Madurese entrepre-
neurs and workers are accused of land grabbing, violence, and criminal
activities. Although some Madurese are, or have been, involved in ille-
gal and illicit activities ranging from land occupation and gambling to
illegal logging, theft, and gang fighting, there are no indications that
Madurese migrants are more violent or criminal than other immigrant
groups such as the Buginese, Banjarese, or Butonese (Acciaioli 1999;
Nooteboom 2005a).
Compared to other sources of income in Kalimantan, wages and prof-
its in the brickmaking clusters are low and among the lowest wages
paid in the area. The gross earnings of teams of workers range between
Rp 15,000 and 35,000 (E 1.50-3.50) per day, depending on the number
of bricks made. Net earnings range between less than zero to
Rp 30,000 per team per day. As soon as a sum of Rp 1 or 2 million has
been saved, workers return to Madura or East Java. Sometimes workers
choose to send their profits home and continue working. On an aver-
age, workers stay in Kalimantan for 8 to 10 months, but working peri-
ods of up to two years is not uncommon. In general, wages are saved
by the owner of the brickyard, who also provides barracks to live in and
food, cigarettes, and drinks on credit. No wages are paid for helping
with the burning (3-4 times a year). However, food, drinks, and cigar-
ettes are then provided free. Net profits of serobong owners range be-
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tween Rp 500,000 to 2 million (E 50-200) per month, depending on
the number of workers and the prices of wood and bricks. About 15 per-
cent of the serobong owners have additional sources of income such as
trucks and trades.
Brickmaking is a dynamic sector. At the end of 2003, about ten per-
cent of the serobong operating that year had gone bankrupt or ceased ac-
tivities, while dozens of new serobong had popped up. Reasons men-
tioned for bankruptcies were mismanagement, heavy gambling, in-
creased production costs, a lack of reliable laborers or credit facilities,
and conflicts with landowners and suppliers. The number of default
payments by non-Madurese buyers had increased considerably since
the 2001 violence. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the total number
of serobong rose by five percent in the same period, while the total num-
bers of workers increased with more than ten percent. “We have no
other option,” a second-generation migrant sighed, “Even if I wanted to
return to Madura, I couldn’t. There is nothing for me over there.”
Windfalls and depressions
Firing the bricks is the culmination of all the economic activities of
brickmakers. It generates periodic cash flows for the brickmaking
households. After selling the bricks, debts can be repaid, remittances
can be sent home to Madura, new laborers sought, new stock prepared,
and relationships with neighbors, buyers and suppliers renewed. The
economic crisis and later the threat of ethnic violence affected different
links in this chain at different moments in time. In the following these
will be considered, as well as the differences in responses among seaso-
nal migrants, semipermanent migrants, semipermanent settlers, and
settlers.
Initially, after the 1997 crisis, incomes plummeted temporarily as
construction activities came to a temporary standstill. For a couple of
months there was hardly any demand for bricks, as investors refrained
from constructing buildings or houses. Many of the seasonal laborers –
especially those belonging to enterprises with larger numbers of work-
ers with less personalized ties between employer and employees – re-
turned to Madura where they expected to be more needed and more se-
cure in terms of basic needs. Of the semipermanent migrants, many
did not return to Kalimantan after their yearly Idul Fitri holiday. They
stayed in close contact with their employers, though. Most semiperma-
nent and permanent settlers are serobong owners and they did not want
to cease activities. Some (semi)-permanent migrants simply did not see
any possibility or any use in returning to Madura, as they had nothing
there. Most of the Madurese brickmakers received food and cheap rice
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from government officials as part of the national Sembako programs.
“Other ethnic groups pitied us and called us fellow countrymen.” Brick
producers shifted to more capital-extensive forms of production, cheap-
er kinds of wood – often gathered illegally in nearby forests – and the
recruitment of family members. As a result of the sharp decrease in the
number of laborers and in productivity, brick production decreased dra-
matically, but did not stop. Producers awaited better times.
These better times came after about six to twelve months. Higher ex-
port prices stimulated East Kalimantan’s export economy, building activ-
ities skyrocketed, and real brick prices tripled as laborers were few and
production could not meet the demand. “In those days, I was able to
pay all the expenses for my three remaining children and their families
in Madura and even buy a motorcycle myself,” Dapi, a semipermanent
settler and small entrepreneur, said. “Many of the workers who had
dared to stay opened a brickyard themselves.” Laborers were reluctant
to come to Kalimantan out of fear of taking high risks. The seasonal
and semipermanent migrants who had gone back to Madura missed
the opportunity to profit from this bonanza.
Semipermanent migrants with good contacts in East Kalimantan and
close relatives of serobong owners were among the first to return. After
repeated phone calls from successful relatives, and forced to leave be-
cause of a total lack of income-earning opportunities in Madura, or due
to large debts from tobacco production, finally large numbers of la-
borers came to East Kalimantan again. They came too late to profit. The
first bonanza was almost over. Due to the massive influx of laborers
and the subsequent increase in brick production, prices of bricks de-
clined by the year 2000.
As a result of declining opportunities in Kalimantan, seasonal mi-
grants from East Kalimantan as well as from Madura tried to enter Ma-
laysia – many of them illegally – where real wages were much higher
due to the increased exchange rate between the rupiah and ringgit.
Among these migrants, second- and third-generation children of Ma-
durese settlers were also found, as East Kalimantan served as a stepping
stone in the migration chain. Of the seasonal migrants from Madura,
only those with sufficient funds or loans could run the risk of capture
at the border. The poorest of the seasonal migrants went to Kalimantan.
While incomes of, and remittances from, laborers and settlers in East
Kalimantan stagnated – albeit at a much higher level than in Madura –
those of successful migrants to Malaysia boomed. In some cases, la-
borers were able to remit millions of rupiahs to Madura.
The pattern described above repeated itself after the ethnic violence
against the Madurese in 2001 in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, with the
difference that now most Madurese felt that their lives were directly
threatened, while other immigrant groups were not affected at all. At
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first, after the stories of the large-scale violence against the Madurese
became widely known, about a quarter of all seasonal migrants in Sa-
marinda panicked and fled. This time, insecurities and anxieties were
huge as fear of the further spread of violence was paramount. Semiper-
manent migrants in the city took some clothes and their gold jewelry
and flocked to the harbor to wait for a ship. Some of the permanent
and semipermanent settlers sold their assets at far too low prices and
sent their savings to Madura. The majority, however, stayed and awaited
further developments. Although some cases of provocation were re-
ported, the situation quickly calmed down after police officers and re-
gional elites made it very clear that they did not want any violence to
take place in East Kalimantan.6
This time, for the brickmaking entrepreneurs it was even more diffi-
cult to recruit new laborers, as the poor seasonal migrants did not dare
to take the risk of migrating to an area under threat of violence. The
perception of risk was high among potential migrants on Madura, as
they were confronted daily with horrifying stories about refugees from
West and Central Kalimantan. The massive attacks on the Madurese in
these provinces caused a cultural trauma which has lasted to the pre-
sent day. The Madurese say they do not feel safe in Kalimantan any
more. Those who decided to migrate did so because no other option
was left for them on Madura. Since the crisis in 1997 started, rural
wages in Madura have continued to stagnate, even though they are al-
ready among the lowest in Indonesia.
At first in 2001, semipermanent migrants again refrained from re-
turning after their holidays on Madura, while other ethnic groups re-
fused to work for a Madurese employer. As a result, most brickmakers
again had to rely on family labor and individual savings to keep their
production going. The amount of available family labor had decreased
as some brickmakers had decided to send their wives and children
home. A brickmaker who stayed commented: “We had neither capital
nor laborers. I tried to persuade close relatives on Madura to come, but
most of them refused repeatedly. Finally I ordered my two sons here to
help me. I did not want to abandon my brickyard here, as it was the
only property and means of livelihood I have.” Notwithstanding these
bold remarks, fear of violence among (semipermanent) settlers was
widespread. “I never made any trouble with my neighbors [of other eth-
nic background] so why should I fear?” “I wanted to go home – who
could we still trust now? But there is nothing else for me.” And so the
majority stayed. “We had to wait and see what happened.” Another re-
acted: “If we had left, they would have taken over all our property.” Still
today, the wounds of fear and trauma have not yet healed. Attitudes of
other ethnic groups towards the Madurese have become fixed and they
are more often depicted as troublemakers and problematic migrants.
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“Sometimes customers are very rude and arrogant towards us. Some-
times they do not pay. We do not fight back. What can we do? We Ma-
durese have lost our self-respect (harga diri) and cannot prosper here
any more.” The Madurese have changed their perspective on Kaliman-
tan. It is no longer a promised land of “cheap money” and ample busi-
ness opportunities.
Despite the fear of future violence and the increase in negative senti-
ments against Madurese brickmakers, new seasonal migrants from Ma-
dura started to pour into East Kalimantan from mid-2002 onwards. In
this period an increasing number of Madurese seasonal migrants who
had once worked as brickmakers also tried to migrate illegally to Malay-
sia. It has been estimated that hundreds of thousands of East Javanese
– including the Madurese – have been working illegally in Malaysia. As
a result, the amount of remittances sent to Madura from Malaysia ex-
ceeded those from Kalimantan during this period. In early 2003, how-
ever, Malaysia decided to close its borders to laborers and launched a re-
pressive policy to send back all illegal workers. Since then, the numbers
of seasonal migrants to East Kalimantan have further increased and the
price of bricks has been slowly dropping due to massive overproduc-
tion.
The hidden sector: stonecutting
There are two locations in the vicinity of Samarinda where stonecutters
work, Batu Putih and Batu Besaung. Most of these stonecutters are of
Madurese descent. In the large stone quarries in these rocky hills, a
dozen kilometers outside the city, men cut and female workers crush
rocks to sell for use in road building and construction work. The con-
struction sector in East Kalimantan has profited greatly from the decen-
tralization policies which allocated larger funds to the province. Much
has been invested in prestigious projects such as new roads, shopping
centers, and government buildings. The workers in the quarries live in
simple houses or sheds, and a huge social and cultural gap exists be-
tween the stonecutters and the people who live in the city. Most city
people do not know that so many of the Madurese live and work there
and the workers hardly ever enter the city.
Most of the work in the quarries is done with simple tools such as a
hammer, chisel, lever, and shovel. Day after day, women hammer small
rocks into pieces to be sold as gravel. Men work in the quarries or on
the face of sheer cliffs using sledgehammers, jacks, and levers. Fire is
also used to make the rock crack more easily. Sometimes middlemen
hire an excavator to remove sand and rocks and to make access roads
for trucks to enter. Some of the semipermanent migrants who once
came to make some money have become semipermanent settlers. They
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earn quite reasonable incomes now, but most of the newcomers live
barely above subsistence level, with workers in Batu Putih being slightly
better off than those in Batu Besaung.
Both areas are part of a low but massive mountain ridge which runs
from the southwest to the northeast of Samarinda. Batu Putih, closest
to the city, has the oldest quarries. About a hundred people work there.
Almost all of them come from one village in Sampang, Madura. Half of
the Sampang people have already been living on the mountain for one
or two decades. They are still semipermanent migrants and most work-
ers go back to Madura every year. Some brought their families with
them. About one-third have worked for more than 20 years there. All
expressed their hope to return and to buy some land or cattle on Ma-
dura. Only a few have ever managed to save enough money to leave.
The working conditions are harsh and earnings can be very low in
slack periods when construction projects stagnate and the weather is
bad. Incomes also depend on the workers’ experience and their location
in the quarry. The most favorable places are for those who have stayed
the longest. At the best spots, workers can earn up to Rp 100,000
(E 10) a day if it does not rain. On the other hand, newcomers are given
much less favorable locations and sometimes earn less than Rp 15,000
a day (E 1.50), which is not enough to meet daily expenditures, no mat-
ter how simply they live. As a result, newcomers often become indebted
to middlemen.
As in the brickmaking sector, houses, cash advances, and loans are
provided by employers and middlemen. About one-third of the tempor-
ary laborers are heavily indebted to these people and cannot return to Ma-
dura unless debts are repaid. Usually they pay off their debt with stone
while they take credit again to pay for daily expenditures. Things get
worse if laborers gamble away large sums of money or if they fall ill for a
long time. Some of these laborers have been indebted for over four years
without any hope of ever returning the loan. These forms of debt bon-
dage are quite common between the Madurese, but are seldom found
among laborers from other ethnic groups who work in the quarries. The
Madurese cannot easily walk away with their debt as the village of origin
and relatives are known and will be held responsible for the debt.
A few of the quarrymen have worked their way up to become trans-
porters, middlemen, or moneylenders, and have settled down in Samar-
inda. They say they aim for a future in Kalimantan. Two former la-
borers from Batu Putih own a small transport company and a few
others have become middlemen; they collect fees from trucks for the
owner of the quarry, recruit laborers, and give loans to workers in trou-
ble. These middlemen hardly ever go back to Madura.
The situation in Batu Besaung is not much different from Batu Pu-
tih, except for the larger numbers of laborers in Batu Besaung and the
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higher ethnic diversity. Despite this diversity, the Madurese still make
up the majority of the people. But here Madurese from all areas can be
found and many refugees from West and Central Kalimantan also work
there. Batu Besaung can be called the dustbin of Samarinda’s informal
migrant economy. If newly arriving migrants are not successful in find-
ing a job in construction or a trade in the city, they end up in the quar-
ries of Batu Besaung. As soon as they have found a job in the city or
earned enough to return to Madura, they disappear. I did not find any
permanent dwellers, although some returning migrants have worked
intermittently in the area for over five years.
Both Batu Putih and Batu Besaung are divided into about 20 blocks
owned by investors of different ethnic background such as Buginese,
Banjarese, and Chinese. These entrust one of the workers with collecting
fees from contractors’ trucks and wait for the money to come in. Every
truck pays a fee of Rp 10,000 (E 1) to the block owner while laborers re-
ceive Rp 35,000 for a load. The remoter the quarry, the lower the prices.
Especially in these remote areas, conditions for laborers are poor, some-
times without proper sanitation, shelter, and tools. If payments are late
or middlemen are unreliable, workers can come close to starvation.
Usually all risks are borne by the worker. Every year, a few people die in
the quarries due to accidents. If no savings or friends are available, they
are buried on the spot. In some cases (Chinese bosses), the owner of the
quarry paid for the repatriation of the victim to Madura.
Diversified impacts
In 1997, just after the monetary crisis (krismon), hit the country, all
construction activities came to a virtual standstill, along with earnings
in the quarries. Many of the seasonal laborers from the Batu Besaung
area returned to Madura. For a while, some workers from the city tried
their luck in the mountains, but there were hardly any buyers, espe-
cially not in the faraway places. Out of the semipermanent migrants in
Batu Putih who had the money to go to Madura, many did not return
to Kalimantan after their yearly Idhul Fitri holiday. The majority of per-
manent migrants did not leave for Madura and awaited better times.
Some of them used their savings, and most received cash advances
from their middlemen. They stayed in close contact with transporters to
sell stone whenever possible and did not want to leave or give up their
favorable locations.
In the older Batu Putih area, the local government provided a good
supply of food aid and cheap rice. This help was clearly facilitated by
the fact that one of the hamlet heads in the area was Madurese and he
depicted the quarrymen as being very poor. As a result, the semiperma-
nent laborers decided to stay and wait for better times, as did many of
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the seasonal migrants. They just continued working and accumulated
large stocks of stone. Laborers who had savings used some of their sav-
ings to stay alive and helped other Madurese as well. When construc-
tion activities started, these workers could sell their stocks at high prices
and experienced a windfall profit. Due to a shortage of stone since then,
and cooperation between laborers, middlemen, and transporters – of
whom the majority are Madurese – prices of stone could be kept high
and increasing costs of living due to rising prices could be met. For this
reason, up until now, prices have been good and the real wages of quar-
rymen have not dropped. As demand remains strong and production is
relatively stable (no one can cut more stone than he used to do and the
number of quarries near the city is limited), favorable prices can be
maintained. Some of the semipermanent migrants of Batu Putih have
managed to buy cattle, a house, or land in Madura. More important
than the continuity in income is the fact that the workers in the remote
quarries are relatively invisible and their livelihoods are not affected
much by the fear of violence and increased negative sentiments towards
the Madurese.
During the violence in West and Central Kalimantan, the quarries of
Batu Besaung became a favored hiding place for all sorts of people who
had to flee because of trouble elsewhere. At the end of 2001, dozens of
refugees from the violence of West and Central Kalimantan worked in
some of the most remote quarries at Batu Besaung.7 By the end of
2003, nearly all of them had disappeared as they slowly moved into
other sectors of the Samarindan economy or had received legal status
as an inhabitant, which means the obtainment of an identiy card (KTP).
The survey in the quarries showed that there can be many more rea-
sons for trouble, and for quarrymen, personal tragedies outweigh the
negative effects of the economic crisis and violence. Debts in Madura
are often mentioned among the reasons for working in Kalimantan.
These debts can be caused by excessive gambling (which seems to have
increased since the crisis), by misfortune, or by speculation in the to-
bacco trade. Elsewhere (Nooteboom 2003) I have described the high
risks taken in the tobacco trade by farmers and middlemen. In many
cases, tobacco trade was mentioned as the prime reason for indebted-
ness.8 One worker told me that he had lost Rp 100 million (E 10,000)
in 2003. After selling his house and land, he still had a debt of Rp 35
million (E 3,500). Fleeing to East Kalimantan was his only option. “I
will work until I can pay it back, otherwise I will never be able to return
to Madura,” he explained. Other reasons for finding a hiding place at
the quarries are problems due to involvement in extramarital relation-
ships and theft or other crime.
In summary: the violence in West and Central Kalimantan shocked
the stonecutting community. Many of the seasonal laborers decided to
62 GERBEN NOOTEBOOM
go home, while most of the semipermanent migrants decided to stay,
as they feared losing their prized spots. Refugees from areas of conflict
in West and Central Kalimantan enjoyed the anonymity of working in
the quarries and the company of fellow Madurese people far away from
urban crowds, bureaucracies, and police officers in whom they had lost
all confidence.
The safe sector: vegetable farming
Compared to the two sections described previously, the case of the clus-
ter of Madurese vegetable producers is somewhat unique. In East Kali-
mantan, the Madurese are seldom found in the rural areas – as com-
pared to West and Central Kalimantan – and there are no other clusters
of agricultural producers. Moreover, these migrants have prospered
since the sequence of crises in 1997 started.
Since 1983, about 150 Madurese people from the south of Malang
(East Java) have settled in this area.9 Originally two brothers, locally
known as the Giman brothers, came as rural laborers in search of land.
They had gambled away their father’s property in Malang and were very
committed to starting a new life and to regaining land. First they
worked as rural laborers in the Lempake area which was cleared by log-
gers and opened up for transmigration purposes. As land was abun-
dantly available, they were able to borrow some land and started plant-
ing. After a year, they returned to Malang to bring their wives to Kali-
mantan. Together they built a simple shed from logging leftovers, and
they planted food crops and chilies as an additional cash crop. The har-
vest was transported to Samarinda town in boats (proa) borrowed from
some Kutai neighbors. They got a very good price at the market and
were able to buy a hectare of land together. After this good start, they
slowly improved and bought land whenever something came available.
After only a couple of years they started to improve their house. “We
skimped on everything to be able to save. For years we only bought sec-
ondhand clothes, even at Idhul Fitri.”
On every return to Malang, they brought some more relatives or Ma-
durese laborers with them. After ten years, a road was opened and the
Giman brothers started to plant papaya for the urban market. With the
papaya they earned a modest, but stable income which enabled them
also to grow riskier crops such as tomatoes, chillies, and rambutan, and
to engage in trade.
At the moment of writing, the Giman brothers own four hectares
each and employ a dozen seasonal laborers from East Java. Besides
them, 40 relatives and fellow villagers have also established farms and
now there are over 150 Madurese-speaking people in the area. Not all
are as successful as the two first brothers, but all of them have a good
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and stable income, are able to send their children to school and have es-
tablished good relations with other ethnic groups in the area. Average
incomes range from Rp 5 million (E 500) per month for the most suc-
cessful producers and traders to Rp 1 million (E 100) for those who are
dependent on wage labor on their relatives’ farms. As farmers and tra-
ders, they have been keen on keeping good relations with other people
in the area, as they are the prime prerequisite for economic success.
Windfalls and depressions
During krismon, the vegetable farmers received top prices for their pro-
ducts and were not affected negatively at all. They produced a wide vari-
ety of products solely for the market in Samarinda and provided food
crops which remained in demand. Soon after the rupiah was devalu-
ated, the benefits of the improved terms of trade became felt in the ca-
pital of East Kalimantan. The oil, gas, mining, and timber sectors prof-
ited from the increase in export opportunities, and illegal logging flour-
ished in the political vacuum. When, after the fall of Suharto, some of
the large sawmills in Samarinda went bankrupt and illegal logging was
slowly curtailed, a boom in government revenues as a result of decen-
tralization policies continued to fuel the urban economy. Fruit, vegeta-
bles, and chillies remained in demand as domestic production in East
Kalimantan continued to be insufficient. The Madurese producers mo-
bilized more laborers from East Java in this period.
For the vegetable farmers, the violence in West and Central Kaliman-
tan came initially as a great shock. They had burnt their bridges in Java
and saw no opportunity to return. Moreover, they were very much in-
clined to stick to their land. As a response to the violence and the per-
ceived negative image of Madurese, they tried to build better social rela-
tions with their neighbors. Regularly they explained to me the impor-
tance of living in peace with their neighbors and told about their
activities to establish good relationships.
As head of the Madurese neighborhood, Pak Gimun, a horticultural-
ist and informal leader of the Madurese vegetable and fruit nurseries in
rural Muang Dalam, organized several peace ceremonies with Dayak
neighbors from forests nearby and their regional leaders. “We ate to-
gether, exchanged gifts, made music, and agreed not to start any hostili-
ties. I even paid them money.” They agreed to report any problem with
one of their people directly to each other to be settled. Remarkably, the
Buginese people, with whom relationships in this area are tense due to
fierce competition about land and the vegetable trade, were not invited.
As the urban economy of Samarinda was still booming, demand for
vegetables remained high. The vegetable producers continued to recruit
laborers from East Java predominantly from Situbondo, Bondowoso,
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Jember, Lumajang, Banyuwangi, and Malang areas.10 These laborers
were Madurese-speaking, but also mastered Indonesian or Javanese and
could hide their Madurese identity. “I did not want any laborers from Ma-
dura island. I did not want any trouble here,” Pak Gimun commented.
Although the majority of the farmers and some of the semiperma-
nent migrants and settlers in the other sectors adhere to accommoda-
tion strategies and could hide their identity as Madurese, not all in-
vested equally in friendly relations. In particular among farmers who
live in relatively isolated communities, many can be found who refrain
from contacts with other ethnic groups as much as possible. They tend
to avoid any interaction with outsiders and live and work within their
own communities. Food and goods are supplied by employers or com-
munity leaders who serve as brokers with the outside world.
Epilogue
During the 2001 FKPMKT and FORKAS (peace building) meetings in
Samarinda (Van Klinken 2002; De Jonge & Nooteboom 2006), the gov-
ernment organized a number of indigenous reconciliation rituals that
were supposed to be repeated at lower levels. Leaders exchanged pre-
sents and promised to settle individual conflicts between different eth-
nic groups through communication and in harmony. The rituals re-
mained very artificial, however, especially for Madurese who are not
used to this kind of ritual and, with the exception of Muang Dalam, this
example has never been followed by any Madurese leader. Besides en-
forcing dialogue and reconciliation, the government banned public re-
ferences to ethnic issues and instructed local leaders to perceive con-
flicts not as ethnic conflicts, but as individual cases between people.
Their slogan: “Don’t play the ethnic game, look at the individual,”11 be-
came known and used by almost all Madurese. To subdue negative sen-
timents and rumors about injustice, the government promised to estab-
lish and safeguard a fair judicial system. In practice, however, since
2001 negative sentiments against the Madurese have increased.
Towards the end of 2005, tensions rose sky high after the son of a
Dayak adat leader was stabbed by a Madurese security guard, with this
incident nearly provoking mass violence (see also De Jonge & Noote-
boom 2006: 470). Large numbers of Dayak warriors from all parts of
Kalimantan came to Samarinda to seek revenge. One day after the fight,
one Madurese brickmaker was murdered and another wounded.12
Again thousands of Madurese peddlers and laborers wanted to leave for
Madura at this point, although only a few hundred actually left. Fortu-
nately, no further violence occurred, with politicians, the military, and
the police making great efforts to prevent any escalation of the conflict.
The local mayor of Samarinda and the vice-mayor, who was a Dayak, as
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well as police and army representatives tried hard to reestablish the in-
tercultural communication forum (FORKAS) that had been used before,
and organized a large peacemaking ritual to calm the people down.
Although the symbolic power of intercultural communication and the
reconciliation ritual were significant, and might have been crucial in
curtailing the activities of militant ethnic leaders, for ordinary Madurese
migrants the dialogue had little meaning as they again did not feel re-
presented. In general, the position of the Madurese migrants deterio-
rated. Only the relatively prosperous and socially well-embedded vegeta-
ble farmers could maintain their secure position due to ownership and
control of their own resources. In all other sectors, for the Madurese it
became harder to do business and expand activities.
Although migrants’ investments in land and lease contracts in the
brick sector increased (especially after the end of 2002), as a result of
the violence there has been a general tendency towards investment and
savings in Madura. Many settlers no longer spoke of investing in land
and large houses, but preferred to save on Madura, or they only in-
vested in goods which could be sold easily (such as trucks, motorcycles,
or gold) in case of an emergency. Many also try – even harder than be-
fore – to get a family member to Malaysia or to one of the Gulf states.
Migration to Malaysia has become very difficult, however, and many
who tried to migrate became stranded in East Kalimantan and in parti-
cular in the northern district of Nunukan.
Paradoxically, at the same time, an opposite trend can be seen. As
land is hard to borrow or rent these days due to the increased negative
sentiments against the Madurese, Madurese families often buy or lease
land together. This leads to the establishment of more mono-ethnic en-
claves of Madurese farmers and brickmakers where seasonal workers
just come to work and save before going back to Madura. Among stone-
cutters , who live further from town, this isolationist tendency is even
stronger. This means that Madurese integration into the economy of
East Kalimantan is decreasing and more Madurese than before tend to
settle down (as they are forced to buy land). For the future, this might
lead to less tolerance and more tension, instead of less. So far, the pro-
vincial government has not been able to find a solution to the problem
of ethnic tension.
Conclusions
This chapter focused on those Madurese who were still able to migrate
and carve a livelihood out of the soil of East Kalimantan, one of the
richest provinces of Indonesia. It focuses on the differential effects of
the crisis on different types of Madurese livelihoods. It deals with brick-
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makers, stonecutters , and vegetable farmers in Samarinda District, East
Kalimantan. In this province, new regional ethnic elites benefit the
most from the decentralization process (Casson & Obidzinski 2002;
Van Klinken 2002), while other ethnic groups, including the Madurese,
tend to be increasingly excluded.13 Madurese migrants in Kalimantan –
relatively protected under Suharto’s reign – felt the negative conse-
quences of the crisis due to a stagnation of the rural economy in Ma-
dura, declining government contributions due to political changes, a
loss of migration destinations due to large-scale violence in West and
Central Kalimantan in 1999 and 2001, and Malaysia’s policy to curtail
the influx of illegal migrants.
Livelihood activities of the Madurese in Samarinda, the provincial ca-
pital of East Kalimantan, have been expanding since the Asian crisis hit
the country. Notwithstanding this expansion, the entrepreneurial cli-
mate for Madurese migrants has been deteriorating ever since 2001
due to social and economic instability as a direct result of the violent
conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan. The violence in West and
Central Kalimantan inflicted a deep wound and indirectly traumatized
hundreds of thousands of the Madurese. It was this crisis which had
the greatest impact on Madurese migrants.
The case of Madurese migrants in East Kalimantan helps us to see in
detail the dynamic processes of economic change, migration, and ethnic
tensions which occur between local populations and outsiders during
such a period of turbulence. For migrants, such periods are marked
mainly by the creation of new anxieties and insecurities causing ten-
sions at the local level with local populations who tend to adhere to con-
servative ideologies and “our people first” strategies. This process had
clearly negative impacts on Madurese livelihoods.
The Indonesian crisis, a composite of krismon, reform, decentraliza-
tion, and subsequent violence, has had short-term positive financial ef-
fects for Madurese brickmakers in Kalimantan but has weakened their
livelihood base in the long run. This effect not only took place in East
Kalimantan, but also in Madura and the eastern parts of Java due to a
change in the direction and value of remittances. After the monetary
crisis, at first the value of remittances from Malaysia increased sharply
and more people migrated to Malaysia. After the ban on illegal laborers
in 2003, remittances from Malaysia declined and East Kalimantan be-
came important again. But since 2003, the value of these remittances
has also been going down, as brick prices are declining due to overpro-
duction. The brickmaking sector is a clear example of an economic sec-
tor dominated by a single ethnic group of migrants that has been chal-
lenged by the opposition of local populations. In response, members in-
creasingly mobilize labor, capital, and resources from within their own
group.
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The stonecutters have been less affected in both a positive and a ne-
gative sense. They experienced neither special windfalls, nor many of
the deep depressions. Only recently, when migration opportunities have
become scarce, have some stonecutters tended to accept less favorable
quarries and are impoverished due to poor working conditions. Seaso-
nal laborers turn out to be more mobile in this sector. If not tied by a
prized location or debt, they can leave their tools and go back to Ma-
dura. Moreover, the systems of agreed-upon prices have protected their
livelihoods from the most negative consequences of the crises.
The situation of the vegetable farmers was the best. They continued
to make money during turbulent times. Moreover, they were the most
successful in establishing peaceful relation with other ethnic groups
and gaining prestige and a slightly better image than the Madurese in-
volved in the brickmaking and stonecutting sectors. As a result of these
good relations, and because of the focus on cash crops such as vegeta-
bles and fruit, their incomes grew considerably.
The impact of the crisis should, however, not only be expressed in
economic terms. The violence in West and Central Kalimantan has cre-
ated a deep wound and indirectly traumatized hundreds of thousands
of Madurese living in other areas. It is precisely this socio-psychological
aspect of the crisis which had the greatest impact on Madurese mi-
grants. It changed their life, their business opportunities, life chances,
and their attitude towards Kalimantan. Moreover, it shows us the unin-
tended consequences, or rather the collateral damage, of political
changes during turbulent times.
Notes
1 For a good overview of the conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan see: Davidson
and Kammen, 2002; Peluso and Harwell, 2001; and Schiller & Garang, 2002.
2 This is a rough estimate. The secretary of the KKMM (Madurese cultural association)
estimated the number of Madurese heads of household in the areas of Balikpapan
and Samarinda in East Kalimantan in 2002 at at least 35,000 (compared with 30,181
individuals as mentioned in the 2000 census for East Kalimantan as a whole). If we
realize that most Madurese people live in and nearby these two cities, and that about
half of these Madurese immigrants bring their families (average of two children) with
them (survey data), at least an estimated 87,500 Madurese people would be living in
East Kalimantan. This makes up 3.6 percent of the population (three times higher
than the official results of the 2000 census).
3 A GPS was used to locate the exact sites and to plot them on a map of Samarinda
(see map). (The map was been produced by Puslitbangwil-Unmul, the research center
for regional development, Mulawarman University, Samarinda.) Of these 350 serobong,
79 were surveyed in detail and 15 were visited more than once.
4 In Samarinda alone, an estimated 3,000 Geger people work and live, while in Balikpa-
pan, Bontang, and Melak another estimated 2,000 can be found (the majority in-
volved in brickmaking). The numbers of Geger people in East Kalimantan alone out-
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weigh those in Geger, Madura. Besides working in the brickmaking sector in East
Kalimantan, Geger men work (often illegally) in construction in Malaysia and some
are sailors or porters. A few Geger women work in Gulf countries as domestic help-
ers.
5 The Madurese language consists of two dialects, the eastern Sumenep type, and the
western Bangkalan, Pamekasan, and Sampang type, which differ in intonation and vo-
cabulary. Madurese-speaking migrants from the eastern part of Java speak the Sume-
nep type. In both speech and manner, the Sumenep Madurese are regarded as more
refined, while the Sampang are considered the “roughest”. The Madurese from Bang-
kalan are regarded as not very refined. Nevertheless, they look down on the Madurese
from eastern Java who speak the Sumenep (refined) version of Madurese.
6 I have described this elsewhere (Nooteboom 2004).
7 Most of the victims of the violence in West and Central Kalimantan were people from
Sampang district and who have been thrown out of West or Central Kalimantan.
Some fled to East Kalimantan directly, others came via IDP camps at Madura where
they were informed about the stonecutting work by relatives and friends. The situa-
tion in the refugee camps is difficult as generally not much work is available in Ma-
dura, let alone work available for newcomers.
8 During the post-krismon years, tobacco prices had plummeted on Madura, causing
bankruptcy for many of the small farmers and traders who borrowed large sums of
money.
9 The grandparents of these migrants came from Bangkalan in Madura and settled in
Malang during colonial times.
10 In the eyes of other ethnic groups, these people are Madurese and are treated as such,
but, according to those Madurese originating from Madura itself, they are neither Ma-
durese nor Javanese and generally are classified as lower in status by both the Madur-
ese from Madura and by other ethnic groups.
11 “Jangan main sampai suku, lihat individu.”
12 It is not certain that the Madurese was murdered by the Dayaks rather than by others
who wanted to further fuel the conflict.
13 An clear example of such attempts to exclude immigrant groups is the tendency to
curtail the influx of poor migrants from NTT, East Java, and Madura in Balikpapan.
Local authorities try to achieve this by organizing raids to check residence permits
(razia KTP).
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3 Livelihood Dynamics, the Economic Crisis, and
Coping Mechanisms in Kerinci District, Sumatra
Paul P.M. Burgers
In spite of episodes of severe stress, rural areas in Indonesia have al-
ways shown resilience by absorbing redundant labor, as well as new en-
trants to the labor force. Processes of shared poverty and specific redis-
tributive mechanisms levelled out shortages and surpluses in times of
severe livelihood stress (Geertz 1963; O’Malley 1977; Lont & White
2002; Touwen 2000). There is much evidence, however, that decades
of agricultural commercialization have altered these functions of rural
areas, as notions of shared poverty and other safety net functions ap-
pear to have gradually fallen into disuse (Missen 1970; Kahn 1980; Hin-
derink & Sterkenburg 1987). The mainly redistributive mechanisms
underlying or dominating livelihoods based on a subsistence-oriented
system of wet rice cultivation have been transformed into more indivi-
dualized and adapted forms of resilience. The Green Revolution in food
cropping is increasingly combined with cash crop agriculture and off-
farm employment. A crucial reality check of such resilience in rural
areas under “normal” conditions occurred when the economic crisis hit
the country in 1997, when large numbers of displaced workers from
the urban sector had to return to their rural homes, especially on Java.
As most studies were carried out at the macro level, and mainly focused
on Java, declines in the absorption capacity of what was considered an
already overburdened agricultural sector could indeed be observed. This
was aggravated by mounting pressures of rising prices for agricultural
inputs and crop failures caused by the prolonged drought induced by El
Niño. However, an increasing number of studies have revealed the lim-
itations of such macro-economic studies which produced an aggregate
picture inconsistent with realities on the ground. It became increasingly
evident that the crisis had taken different shapes, and had varied and of-
ten highly contradictory impacts on different rural regions, economic
sectors and among different social groups. The studies failed to recog-
nize the considerable diversity in people’s ability to cope and adapt to a
crisis by tapping into various markets and still existing (adapted forms
of) off-market opportunities, which did not always bring a deterioration
of livelihoods. Where commercial agriculture formed the major type of
livelihood, especially in the outer islands, farmers who planted export
crops, were getting windfall profits from the depreciation of the rupiah
against the US dollar. Usually, such increases in cash flows will allow
for a reinforcement of community reciprocity. These adapted forms of
redistributive arrangements through cash transactions may mitigate the
impacts of skewed entitlement and access to resources in general, and
to natural resources in particular, and therefore may offer important
ways to survive during an economic crisis. This is especially the case
for the poor and (near) landless, who are particularly vulnerable to
drops in income, increasing food prices, and rising unemployment and
underemployment brought about by crisis-induced events (Stringer
1999). Consequently, this may have bearings on both resource alloca-
tion and natural resource management. In order to fully understand the
impact of the entire process of social change and the creation of new
stability domains in livelihood resilience on natural resources, the after-
math of the crisis needs to be taken into account as well.
The mechanisms through which such global and national economic
or political shocks and severe stresses are translated into local impacts
and responses at the community and household levels are investigated
in relation to their resource management strategies in three villages in
Kerinci District, Sumatra, during the crisis and its aftermath (1997-
2003). A cross-system analysis has been made in three selected villages,
based on a number of similar and dissimilar characteristics. Similarities
concern biophysical conditions, predominant types of land use, and in-
digenous knowledge systems. In order to understand the interactions
between the national park and the village conditions, both research sites
are located in the buffer zone of the Kerinci Seblat National Park. Dis-
similar characteristics refer to different choices in upland crops, varia-
tions in land tenure systems, and different historical and contemporary
contexts at the regional, the community, and the household level; these
are crucial for understanding the variations in social organization and
different livelihood strategies, as well as for understanding the differen-
tial resilience of rural areas.
The setting and the study sites
Kerinci has always been known for its favorable conditions which sup-
port a livelihood around agriculture. Specialized rice farming has been
the major type of livelihood in the Kerinci Valley after Minangkabau mi-
grants from West Sumatra began clearing forest land for rice cultivation
several hundred years ago. Nowadays, specialized rice farming con-
tinues to be a major type of livelihood on the flat valley bottoms of the
district. However, in most parts of the district access to upland areas
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can be secured, whereby livelihoods are increasingly constructed around
the cultivation of commercial annual and perennial cash crops. Depend-
ing on the local biophysical conditions and preferences of individual fa-
milies, chilli has become the most important annual crop. It is culti-
vated during the establishment phase of both intercropped stands and
single stands of cinnamon trees (cinnamonium burmanii) or coffee trees
(coffee robusta). Rice cultivation remains however, an important fallback
mechanism to secure food needs. The existing specific sociocultural ar-
rangements in rice cultivation ensure access to rice cropping land be-
yond the limits of one’s own farm on a long-term basis, as well as on a
temporal basis in times of severe livelihood stress.
The three research villages are located in different parts of Kerinci
District (see fig. 1). At an altitude of about 500 meters, the rather iso-
Figure 3.1 Kerinci district and its position in Sumatra
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lated villages of Selampaung and Masgo are situated in the Gunung
Raya Subdistrict in the southern part of the district. The third village,
Pelompek, is situated close to Gunung Kerinci, the 4000-meter high
volcano in the northern end of the district, at an altitude of about 800
meters along the main road to Padang. The dilemma faced by all
households involves a trade-off between immediate subsistence needs
and the long-term aim of resilience in their livelihood. Livelihood resili-
ence in all villages can be achieved by combining rice cultivation with
upland field cultivation, where crop diversity contributes to a further in-
crease in livelihood resilience. In contrast to Selampaung and Masgo,
where forest-like structures or so-called agroforests combine annual
crop cultivation with coffee and cinnamon trees on a rotational basis,
Pelompek’s elevation and cool winds descending from Gunung Kerinci
temper the average temperatures, especially at night, and therefore re-
duce crop choices. Here, dispersed tree systems include various types
of commercial annual crops, while scattered cinnamon trees can be
found in the field and along field boundaries to improve microclimatic
conditions. Whereas most of the upland fields are under private owner-
ship, rice cultivation in Selampaung and Masgo is largely dominated by
kinship organizations, based on local regulations under the adat system
of the mainly ethnic descendants of the early settled Minangkabau.
Hence, the specific matrilineal organization of regulations determining
natural resource use in these communities. Instead of private owner-
ship, yearly access rights to rice-cropping land may be obtained by the
female members of the family on a rotational basis (known as gilir gan-
ti). A rice field managed under these arrangements is known as a sa-
wah giliran. In Selampaung, 61 percent of the survey households, com-
pared to 41 percent of the households in Masgo, indicated that they
have access to a sawah giliran. The lower figure in Masgo can be ex-
plained by the fact that most households in this village concentrate on
cash crop cultivation, as suitable areas for rice cultivation are severely
limited. However, many survey households continue to have access to a
sawah giliran in their home villages, usually on the flat valley bottom.
Within the boundaries set by adat regulations, people can manoeuvre
between the exploitation rights and the allocation of plots, not only di-
rectly under the giliran system, but also on land belonging to others
through sharecropping (the share stipulated by adat is fifty-fifty). Addi-
tional food security can be obtained by opting between local and high-
yielding varieties, the latter enabling two harvests a year but requiring
much more inputs. This flexibility is crucial for mitigating the skew-
ness in the distribution of means and needs between the different heirs
and co-villagers, and hence livelihood resilience, as it may help an indi-
vidual to overcome temporal vulnerability in food security. Similar shar-
ing mechanisms are also in practice in the upland fields, where share-
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cropping deals are similar to those for rice cultivation (i.e., on a fifty-
fifty basis for all annual and perennial crops). The original system pro-
vided sharecroppers with basic food items for survival during a period
of two to three years. Especially in the case of cinnamon trees, share-
croppers were able to build up savings in the form of standing stocks
of cinnamon trees by engaging in these deals. Pelompek holds a some-
what different position, in that this village was established by convert-
ing forestland into rice fields for the purpose of acquiring individually
owned sawahs. Here, 43 percent of the survey households indicated that
they hold their rice field in private ownership. This relatively low figure
is due to by a continuous influx of people focusing solely on upland
crop cultivation for their livelihood survival. However, even though
strong adat regulations are absent in this recent frontier settlement
area, this did not prevent the development of certain solidarity mechan-
isms among the relatively poor and homogeneous village population.
The concept of pinjam, or borrowing, of land for cultivating both the
rice fields and upland fields was developed here as a safety net mechan-
ism for those in search of livelihood security. The various market and
non-market safety net functions to increase resilience, and possibly also
the sustainability of the livelihoods described here benefited both local
residents and migrants. The true nature of livelihood resilience in the
research villages was put to the test at the height of the economic crisis
and exacted its worst toll.
Differential impacts of the crisis and its aftermath (1997-2003)
The apparent role of rural safety net functions together with the wind-
fall profits from agro-export commodities during the initial period of
the monetary crisis, or krismon, supported the idea that the agricultural
(export) sector could become the engine to lift Indonesia out of the cri-
sis (Daryanto 1999). However, Sunderlin et al. (2000) and Penot (2001)
have rightfully pointed out that such an aggregate picture is too simplis-
tic, as not all cash crops were benefiting from a depreciation of the ru-
piah against the US dollar. In addition, where livelihoods largely de-
pended on food crop cultivation, in particular rice, rising food prices
and remaining subsidies for rice initially brought increasing profits.
Especially in villages where respondents were getting windfall profits
from both rice cultivation and cash crop cultivation, the crisis was called
the krismon Jawa, or the Javanese monetary crisis. However, this all
changed after a few years, when cheap rice imports and non-subsidized
inputs for rice replaced the original context of rice cultivation, and when
prices of cash crops began to collapse as well. This underlines the im-
portant role of the rising rupiah prices for certain agricultural crops and
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inputs and their impact on livelihood resilience in the research villages
and therefore requires special attention.
The impacts of price developments in rice cultivation
In 1997, El Niño caused a severe drought and subsequent crop failures
at the national level, which made rice prices increase steeply. This was
aggravated by soaring prices of external inputs, as subsidies had to be
removed as part of the SAP programs initiated by the IMF. Macro-level
studies rightfully showed that this would cause serious constraints in
food security. In the research villages in Kerinci District, however, local
rather than the high-yielding rice varieties were most commonly
planted. In contrast to high yielding varieties, local varieties could be
grown without the use of external inputs and were much less affected
by the drought. In addition, local rice producers could still benefit, as
remaining stocks of subsidized inputs were sold at old prices (figure
3.2), enabling rice producers to benefit from the sale of rice; even when
rice stocks were released onto the market in Sungai Penuh by the local
BULOG agency to suppress the slowly rising prices. During the course
of 1998, expensive non-subsidized, imported inputs replaced the de-
pleted stocks. This marked a steep increase in costs for external inputs
and severely limited the benefits from rice cultivation, especially on the
Figure 3.2 Price developments of rice and most important external inputs (1996-
2001)
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valley bottoms where high-yielding varieties were most commonly
planted, and access to upland fields was limited. Many farmers were no
longer able to cover input costs, and yields in these areas therefore be-
gan to decline. In the market, prices for rice were driven up even
further, as an ever-increasing number of consumers now depended on
the purchase of rice for their subsistence. Instead of market penetra-
tion, the local BULOG agency began to distribute rice to poor villagers
in the valleys, who were among the first to be targeted for food assis-
tance.
The influx of additional family members displaced from work in the
urban sector, aggravated conditions in the overburdened food-crop sec-
tor in areas where the main type of livelihood was dependant on specia-
lized rice farming and made it increasingly difficult for the rural econo-
my to provide sought-after relief. The combination of these factors lar-
gely caused people to move towards areas and villages where access to
cash crop cultivation could be secured, and where windfall profits from
cash crops could easily cover subsistence needs and enable capital accu-
mulation. The prevailing flexibility of the upland farming system, and
in particular the underlying supportive social networks and the type of
social organization, allowed for rather easy access to cash crop farming
activities beyond the limits of one’s own farm.
Price developments in cash crop cultivation
During the krismon, the rupiah prices for all cash crops increased spec-
tacularly, although the magnitude of the profits was closely connected
with the value of the American currency. Figure 3.3 shows that prices
for cinnamon bark remained relatively modest, as increased production
from Vietnam and favorable trade deals between Vietnam and the US
depressed the prices for cinnamon from the mid-1990s onwards, which
Figure 3.3 Price developments in US dollars for experts of cinnamon (per kg) and
coffee (Lb)
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however in Indonesia were paid in rupiahs. In addition, the cinnamon
trade operates in a highly oligopsonistic market. This means that there
are only few, but major buyers available, which therefore are able to ne-
gotiate the price at a certain level, often related to a request for a certain
amount.
The depreciation of the rupiah against the US dollar allowed import-
ing countries to get good deals as they had ample bargaining power to
set the prices. By paying in rupiahs rather than in US dollars during
the krismon, favorable exchange rates for importing countries caused
further losses through continuing rupiah depreciations. These losses
were then trickled down to the local traders, finally ending up at rather
low price levels at the farm-gate level. Figure 3.4 shows that the out-
come of the various constraints in price setting for cinnamon were
translated into a relatively low price paid in rupiahs at the farm-gate
level.
The rather simple distinction into three different qualities for cinna-
mon bark (ka, kb, kc) in figure 3.4 is the same as that employed at the
farm-gate level by small-scale producers and middlemen, when cinna-
mon bark is sold and traded at the local market. Exporters usually dis-
tinguish at least six different grades of quality, mostly depending on
thickness, oil content, and cleanliness of the bark. The figure shows
that those who were able to sell the best quality cinnamon bark (ka)
were benefiting the most from the depreciation of the rupiah as the
Figure 3.4 Price developments in IndonesianRupiah formost common cinnamonqual-
ities (ka,kb,kc) and coffee in the KerinciDistrict permonth (1997-1998)
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price increased from about Rp 2000 in January 1998 to around
Rp 6000 in July 1998. The other grades did not go beyond the
Rp 4000 mark, but the advantages of multi-cropping began to show. As
the peak price for the best quality cinnamon bark occurred in August-
September 1998, it could partly compensate for falling coffee prices
during this time, which reached its peak of Rp 17,500 per kilogram in
the second week of June 1998, after which prices fell sharply (Dinas
Perkebunan Kerinci, 1998). These variations in peak periods of prices
in rupiahs for the various perennial cash crops allowed for high cash
generating opportunities among the households for a substantial pe-
riod of time, which sustained livelihood resilience. This was further
strengthened and extended when windfall profits for the annual crops
began to materialize as well.
Price developments for annual crops: chilli, potatoes, groundnuts, and rice
The cultivation of commercial annual crops constituted a third option
for income during the krismon. Although chilli is the most important
crop, groundnuts are a second common crop in the research villages.
In Pelompek, the cultivation of potatoes further augments profits at the
farm level (figure 3.5). However, according to respondents, potatoes can
only be planted once a year because of the crop’s high demands on soil
nutrients.
The local varieties of chilli that were planted in either Selampaung or
Masgo, required no or hardly any external inputs. However, in Pelom-
pek good yields on fields that were cultivated permanently with annual
crops, and especially with potatoes, could no longer be obtained without
the use of external inputs. But with subsidies still intact for external in-
Figure 3.5 Trend in Rupiah pries for the major commercial annual crops planted
(1995-2001)
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puts during the krismon period, considerable profits could be made,
thereby strengthening the resilience of the livelihoods in the research
villages. Similar to rice cultivation, especially the price of chilli started
to fall from early 2000 onwards, while the depletion of cheap stocks of
subsidized inputs gave way to unsubsidized, highly expensive imported
external inputs, leading to significant decreases in the profit margins.
This especially affected Pelompek, where the profitability of annual crop
cultivation highly depended on the use of external inputs.
This analysis shows that farming households initially were able to
benefit tremendously from a combination of factors, of which the high
rupiah prices for various cash crops at different intervals in combina-
tion with lasting subsidies for inputs were most important. The sudden
reversal of this situation in the aftermath of the krismon, however,
caused a large-scale deterioration in livelihood conditions, as profit mar-
gins severely declined due to falling crop prices and sharply rising input
costs. These contrasting periods allow for an evaluation of the dynamics
in livelihood resilience and sustainability caused by increasing pres-
sures on the national, regional and local institutional settings and the
community support mechanisms (such as sharecropping and land bor-
rowing concepts of reciprocal help) in the aftermath of the crisis. Var-
ious types of community support mechanisms define access to and con-
ditions of support. They play a crucial role in our full understanding of
the various responses and livelihood strategies developed by the indivi-
dual households beyond the realm of purely economic explanations
such as the changing profitability regimes of various crops.
Livelihood dynamics during the windfall period (krismon 1997-1998)
Changes in the price for the various commodity crops and the rather fa-
vorable conditions for rice cultivation during the period known as kris-
mon are paralleled by a remarkable and rather large scale movement of
people from both within and outside the district to particularly the up-
land areas in Kerinci. This can be explained by the continuing integra-
tion of people from Kerinci into wider multi-local and supra-local social
networks. News about how community support mechanisms and inter-
household transfers offered new opportunities to generate earnings in
the villages spread over vast areas. Under these favorable conditions,
landowners of both ricefields and upland fields tended to direct scarce
family resources towards the upland fields. Knowing the conditions in
areas where households manage both rice fields and upland fields, mi-
grants could see how landowners sought ways to rent out their rice
fields. In particular sharecropping deals were struck as a means of es-
cape from deteriorating livelihoods in their areas of origin. These often
were areas where specialized rice farming could not sustain a livelihood
80 PAUL P.M. BURGERS
above the level of survival. Direct access to livelihood survival was made
possible through increasing employment opportunities for paid farm la-
borers, because of the large flows of cash in the villages, while share-
croppers with upland fields could receive a two-year bonus in kind. Paid
labor opportunities were especially important for those in search of dai-
ly survival, as it enabled them to bridge the time between planting and
harvesting of crops such as rice and vegetables. However, in-migration
also appeared to be a matter of reaping as many benefits as possible
from finding access to agricultural land beyond the limits of one’s own
farm. Where vegetable cultivation allows for the accumulation of cash
in the short term, the accumulation of (sellable) assets in the form of
possible rice surpluses or cinnamon bark was also made possible by the
supportive arrangements of temporary access to cultivation areas of
other households, through pinjam or sharecropping arrangements. How-
ever, as Minangkabau adat prevails in two of the three research villages,
access to rice fields is first of all meant as a social security and sharing
mechanism among relatives or co-villagers. Access under these arrange-
ments may not be open to everyone. Our data support this, as most mi-
grants who became sharecroppers on a sawah giliran during the krismon
had at least similar sociocultural backgrounds with similar institutional
settings in relation to rice cultivation, and came mainly from the flat
valley bottom areas where Minangkabau adat still largely defines rice
cultivation (50 percent). Hence, the inclusion in wider social networks
in general, and kinship relations in particular, are most important for
rice cultivation in these two villages. In Pelompek, with private owner-
ship of rice fields, access under pinjam arrangements or renting is open
to anyone. A large majority of newly settled migrants (78 percent) indi-
cated that they came to Pelompek to cultivate rice. Those who were able
to get access to rice fields hoped to secure their food needs and to be
able to sell a certain surplus to obtain additional cash. To benefit as
much as possible from the favorable conditions, many of them fell into
or engaged in debts for planting high-yielding varieties (60 percent)
and accumulating as much rice as possible. These practices constitute
the middle path between a survival and an accumulation strategy, but
most households considered this simply as accumulating for the pur-
pose of survival only, as the rice would mainly be stored for home con-
sumption. The majority of settlers in the 1997-1998 period also partici-
pated in paid labor activities for their daily survival. Once survival was
secured, most of them would also try to find temporary access to up-
land fields, usually through sharecropping arrangements or pinjam, in
the case of Pelompek. These support mechanisms were said to be quite
easily accessible as well. Finding access to upland fields was much
more common, as only one fifth of all migrants coming into the re-
search villages during the krismon were searching for rice fields. This
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means that an overwhelming majority of 80 percent came to Kerinci to
find access to upland fields where windfall profits could be made from
the cultivation of annual and perennial cash crops. Higher mobility into
the uplands, however, may also have exerted increasing pressures on
natural resources in the upland areas.
The upland fields and associated tree cover
In the literature on the effects of the crisis and its aftermath, forest
areas have been identified as a main target for income generation or
conversion into agricultural land (Sunderlin et al. 2000; Casson and
Obidzinski 2002). The widespread influx of poor migrants into the up-
land areas of the research villages might similarly have induced forest
conversion and the loss of tree cover through large-scale harvesting of
cinnamon trees for at least two reasons. Firstly, because of the signifi-
cance cinnamon trees have in stabilizing livelihoods as a savings bank
that might be used for large-scale harvesting to cash in on their savings.
Secondly, in areas where coffee trees constitute the under storey, the
harvesting of cinnamon trees would generate a large cash income, due
to high rupiah prices while the penetration of sunlight on the coffee
trees allows them to bear coffee berries within one year. However, our
fieldwork during this period showed the contrary. The tree cover of cin-
namon trees remained largely intact. In-depth interviews revealed some
very rational behavior with respect to these dynamics. The main reason
was the fact that livelihoods were kept well above the level of survival
through these windfall profits obtained from almost every crop they
had planted, while daily and weekly cash could easily be obtained
through selling cinnamon bark from branches only or through wage
work. In Pelompek, where cinnamon trees are part of dispersed trees
systems, the cinnamon bark only serves the purpose of bridging the
gap between earnings from the sale of vegetables and costs of investing
in a new cycle of vegetable cultivation, when the income from vegeta-
bles is insufficient to cover these costs. With increasing prices for vege-
tables, however, this was not a problem. Without a real need for a large
sum of cash, the necessity to withdraw large savings for survival by cut-
ting down the cinnamon trees was absent. If large-scale harvesting did
occur, it was done to raise money for durable consumer goods, housing,
a pilgrimage to Mecca, or a journey to Malaysia in search of employ-
ment opportunities. In some cases, farmers would also sell their land
as well to cover these costs, but it was not very common during those
times. Another important reason was that most landowners owned
more than one plot. The most common practice was to work on a har-
vested cinnamon plot, either one of their own plots or as a sharecrop-
per. The income from chilli cultivation on these plots easily allowed
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them to survive, especially in combination with fields where coffee
and/or branches from cinnamon trees could still be harvested as well.
A group of 67 percent of the cultivators indicated that the land they
were cultivating belonged to others, and that they were either a share-
cropper or involved in pinjam arrangements during the year 1997-1998.
This turned out to constitute an effective accumulation strategy for
those who did not own land or landowners without enough land to sur-
vive. When in 1997-1998 a growing number of sharecroppers specifi-
cally wanted to combine survival strategies with a short-term accumula-
tion of cash, especially through vegetable cultivation, sharecroppers
themselves began initiating changes in the original sharing deals in or-
der to benefit from sharecropping as much as possible. There appeared
to be consensus among the landowners as well as sharecroppers that
the sharing arrangements should reflect the degree to which one of the
two parties invests in certain resources. Increasingly, sharecroppers
wanted to bring in all necessary inputs for vegetable cultivation and
forego the bonus, as long as they were allowed to keep the entire earn-
ings from the vegetable harvest. The input costs that were now being
borne by the sharecroppers were either covered by savings they had
raised from off-farm employment or by loans from friends or relatives.
Once the vegetable production started, the high earnings would enable
loans to be paid back easily. With most landowners mainly interested in
accumulating cash from harvesting cinnamon trees, they usually
agreed, providing that the cinnamon harvest would be split according to
the bagi tigo principle, or one-third for the sharecropper and two-thirds
for the landowner. The data for Selampaung support this change in ar-
rangements, as in 1997-1998 a large majority of the sharecroppers (69
percent) in Selampaung cultivated vegetables without any bonus or in-
puts from the landowner, receiving the full profit of the harvest instead.
In more remote Masgo, only 27 percent indicated to have pushed for-
ward these changes, which were limited to respondents staying close to
the road and the market. Physical distance to the market and difficult
terrain would still favor the receipt of a bonus for remote fields, as
usually the landowner would bring these items to them using a four-
wheel-drive car, or by renting a motorcycle (ojek). With respect to the
impact on forest cover, such high in-migration, however, may have in-
creased pressure on forest areas. There is a slightly steeper curve in for-
est conversion during the years 1997-1998, rising from 13,707 hectares
in 1997 to 14,170 hectares in 1998, after which it levelled off. House-
holds may indeed have invested in converting forest areas into cinna-
mon plantations. In-depth interviews revealed that these households
usually belonged to the richer segments, quite often returning migrants
from Malaysia with large amounts of savings, or local rich farmers.
Being well connected to local authorities, they could benefit from the
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chaotic situation in forestry management during this period, caused by
a vacuum in the enforcement of regulations which in turn was due to
the necessity to increase regional income under conditions of regional
autonomy.
The aftermath of the crisis (late 1998-2003)
After about one year of windfall profits for almost every agricultural
commodity planted in the upland areas, the situation began to change
from late 1998 onwards. The booming times reverted into a situation
where it became increasingly difficult to construct a livelihood above
the level of survival as prices of almost every crop started to fall. Declin-
ing prices were moreover caused by overproduction resulting from the
opportunistic planting and rehabilitation of previously abandoned per-
ennial cash crop gardens, mainly coffee, during the price windfall. With
chilli and coffee now flooding the markets, prices remained at a histori-
cal low for several years in the aftermath of the crisis. This period coin-
cided with the exhaustion of the stock of subsidized external inputs in
Kerinci, which were replaced by expensive imported external inputs so
that households increasingly faced constraints in adapting or switching
to other products and practices. With price adjustments for basic food-
stuffs lagging behind the rising costs of production, the falling profits
for their agricultural products drove home the harsh realities of the cri-
sis for both producing and consuming households in Kerinci.
Because in the initial phase prices for vegetables remained quite
high, especially survey households in Pelompek expressed satisfaction
about their situation. Potato prices were on the rise, while the local chil-
li variety still brought some profit. In Selampaung and Masgo where
most rejuvenated fields were now entering the phase of coffee cultiva-
tion, the sharp drops in coffee prices made it hard to survive, especially
for the many sharecroppers who had to split in half their already small
profits! The deterioration of cash flows further caused community sup-
port mechanisms such as paid labor and loans to vanish, thereby se-
verely limiting short-term survival. The only way out for many of them
was to abandon the land, and migrate out for reasons of mere survival.
During one of our fieldtrips in June 2001, in-depth interviews with sev-
eral key informants revealed that about 60 percent of the survey house-
holds working in the upland areas had left. This was confirmed by the
formerly very crowded market day on Saturdays, which was now com-
pletely deserted. Those traders remaining were either cultivating vegeta-
bles, which still continued to provide some income as well as meet the
demand for essential food crops, or were just waiting for the end of the
coffee harvest. Coping responses mainly consisted of out-migration, in-
itially to their home village to (re) turn to food production by planting
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local rice varieties with low external input. Here they either tried to get
their exploitation rights on a sawah giliran, or worked as a sharecropper
on other people’s rice field to supplement their subsistence needs. In
Pelompek, an increase in renting rice fields for cash could be observed
(usually the rent could be paid after the harvest). Shortages of cash to
keep their livelihood above survival level were accompanied by increas-
ing prices for rice caused by the decreasing supplies entering the mar-
ket, as villagers who did not want to sell their small food crop surpluses
had switched to local varieties, which require far less external inputs,
but can only be harvested once a year, reducing rice production by half.
The local BULOG office started interfering by bringing more rice into
the market, and consequently kept the price within affordable levels.
The OPK (Operasi Pasar Khusus), or special market operation, only
came into being from late September 1998 onwards, when the unfavor-
able conditions persisted and had used up all possible alternatives for
most households, including the use of various types of community reci-
procity. The survival of each individual household member was increas-
ingly at stake, and there was severe competition among the heirs to ob-
tain exploitation rights for the sawah giliran, which can only be secured
theoretically once in every four to five years. Under these conditions, it
does not seem surprising that many local residents and a substantial
number of migrants from outside the district began to move into the
upland areas of Selampaung and Masgo in search of sharecropping
deals for their survival. With good social networks extending into Kerin-
ci, substantial numbers of people coming from the Pesisir area in West
Sumatra and other areas where specialized rice farming was no longer
feasible, were mainly attracted to the research area to work as a share-
cropper because of the original bonus system. In contrast to what sur-
vey households perceived as handworks during 1997-1998, these new-
comers would only work as sharecroppers where the landowner pro-
vided them with a bonus of basic food items for at least two years.
During in-depth interviews with these newly arrived migrants, they ex-
plained to us, that if after two years prices of cash crops would not im-
prove, they would also simply abandon the land and seek other share-
cropping arrangements where they could get a similar bonus in kind
for their survival. Those remaining in the villages would continue to
find access to rice fields in one way or the other (e.g., through private
ownership), or belonged to the richer segments of the village popula-
tion, which had enough alternative, non-farm employment opportu-
nities to survive. For the majority however, the continuing “crisis situa-
tion” meant that survival increasingly depended on remittances from
migrated family members, mostly men, who had found access to off-
farm employment options outside the district. Out-migration as a survi-
val strategy became very common, and tended to become supra-regional
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and eventually even transnational in nature, particularly to Malaysia.
Under these hard conditions, it comes as no surprise that the way in
which natural resources and tree crops were being perceived and mana-
ged, was quite contradictory as compared to the dynamics and condi-
tions during the windfall period.
Dynamics in tree cover and forests during the aftermath of the crisis
In sharp contrast to the windfall period, the negative impact of falling
prices for tree crops forced many households who had planted these
crops to cut down both their coffee trees and cinnamon trees. On reju-
venated plots, vegetable cultivation would provide both food and cash,
as vegetables were still making some profits. The most common prac-
tice however, was the large-scale harvesting of cinnamon trees in order
to provide as much cash as possible for their own survival, but increas-
ingly also to finance trips out of the district in search of employment,
especially to Malaysia. Where the income from harvested cinnamon
bark was not sufficient to cover the necessary expenses, the land would
be sold as well. For a trip to Malaysia during 2000-2001, at least Rp 5
million, or about US $ 500, was needed. This amount included the
costs to get a one-month visa, travel and subsistence costs for one
month and payments to “job brokers” in Malaysia. Any additional cash
from the large cinnamon bark sales would allow the purchase of food
items and cover investment costs for a new agricultural cycle of com-
mercial annual crops to support the family members staying behind.
The persistent low prices for coffee resulted in the uprooting of coffee
trees, and the plots were often not replanted after rejuvenation. Figure
3.6 graphically illustrates these dynamics. In 1998-1999, cinnamon pro-
duction increased while coffee production decreased. The first wave in
large-scale out-migration and hence the decrease in tree cover provided
by cinnamon trees stopped in 2000 when the market was flooded with
cinnamon bark, which could no longer be sold. Later that year, cinna-
mon exporters slowly opened their doors again to this commodity, and
cinnamon export came again into full swing from 2001 onwards (ex-
plaining the increase in cinnamon production since that year).
Moreover, it was hardly surprising that households whose livelihoods
largely depended on their upland fields were also causing a continuous
decline of the tree cover in the buffer zones of the national park, as for-
est conversion for agricultural purposes here remained at a stable 3 per-
cent per annum, according to WWF officials in Sungai Penuh. This
may partly be explained by the fact that only the better-off households
are able to cover the costs of forest conversion. During our last field vis-
it, these costs would amount to Rp 5-10 million for 2 hectares, money
that was mostly needed for other purposes, such as going to Malaysia.
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What changed dramatically, however, was the rate of illegal logging.
During these hard times in Kerinci, businessmen from Padang in parti-
cular had no problem in hiring people who were living at the edge of
survival, and were willing to deliver hardwood from the national park to
them. Especially in Pelompek, where mechanisms such as sharecrop-
ping did not exist and the forest is relatively easily to access from the
road, illegal logging was an attractive option for many of the poorest
farmers.
Discussion and conclusion
The economic crisis and its aftermath seem to have severely tested the
diversified pattern of livelihood sustainability and its resilience at both
the household and communal levels. Furthermore, the crisis seems to
have blurred the distinction between market and subsistence types of
production, and between city and countryside. Our analysis has brought
to the fore some unexpected dynamics and patterns in livelihood re-
sponse mechanisms which can cope with and adapt to the effects of the
economic crisis at the local level, which were neglected by macro-eco-
nomic studies. During the windfall period, many families aimed at
strengthening their socioeconomic position by raising or mobilizing re-
Figure 3.6 Movements in production and planted area for cinnamon and coffee in
Gunung Raya and Gunung Kerinci subdistricts
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sources in a number of ways, ranging from strategies of mere survival
to accumulation strategies. The favorable conditions, mainly brought
about by the windfall profits, strengthened both the community rela-
tions of reciprocity and inter-household transfers. Increasing flows of
cash among large numbers of households enabled the poorer segments
of the population in particular to tap into widely available opportunities
of paid labor, and it also induced an increase in risk-taking behavior by
engaging in debts for investments in crop cultivation beyond the limits
of their own farm. Where rice cultivation was concerned, high-yielding
varieties were often planted to produce surpluses for home consump-
tion and possibly also for cash accumulation. Seeking options for rice
cultivation was a major pull factor for migration into Pelompek. In con-
trast to Pelompek, where access was open to anyone willing to pay rent,
access to rice cultivation in Selampaung and Masgo was largely struc-
tured according to kinship relations. Here, access was mainly limited to
farmers from within the district, and from areas with similar sociocul-
tural conditions in relation to rice cultivation. As for upland fields,
more risk-taking, commercial types of land management developed as
well. Sharecropping deals were based on negotiations, on who brings in
what types of inputs. By foregoing their bonus in kind, and in addition
covering the costs for vegetable cultivation themselves (often through
loans), sharecroppers wanted to reap the benefits from the entire yield
of annual crops in order to accumulate cash.
Accumulation of assets could be observed especially among the richer
segment of the farmers in the form of buying cinnamon trees with or
without the land for speculative purposes, based on the assumption that
in the near future the cinnamon bark would yield even higher profits.
Several households were even willing to sell their cinnamon trees to get
fast cash instantly for certain purposes, when the prices were high.
However, the large majority would not sell and the tree cover therefore
could largely remain intact, as all livelihood needs could easily be satis-
fied by cutting a few trees or reaping perennial crops, such as coffee or
annual cash crops.
The aftermath of the crisis, however, initiated a dramatic reversal of
the favorable conditions. Initially people could still rely on community
support mechanisms as a coping strategy and invest in the fallback me-
chanism of rice cultivation to secure food needs. With the harsh condi-
tions, community reciprocity and inter-household transfers eroded
quickly, as the survival of individual households was directly at stake.
Because of the growing demand, access to rice fields became severely
limited and for co-villagers only, especially in Selampaung and Masgo.
This further reduced survival opportunities for outsiders, like the Java-
nese immigrants, who had settled during the windfall period, and espe-
cially sharecroppers in the upland fields. These settlers now were not
88 PAUL P.M. BURGERS
only faced with dwindling meager profits from their cash crops, but
also had to split their harvests into two. These developments caused a
dramatic increase in out-migration from the district in search of em-
ployment elsewhere, not only by the temporary migrants, but also by
the local residents who followed soon after. Depletion of assets in the
form of selling stands of cinnamon trees or large-scale harvesting of
cinnamon bark provided cash to finance the job-finding trips and the
expenditures for the survival of the remaining family members. With
the persistingly harrowing situation, livelihood survival increasingly de-
pended on supra-local and transnational networks, particularly offering
opportunities in Malaysia (which were often illegal). Under these condi-
tions, a revival of inmigration towards the uplands from 2001 onwards
appears highly contradictory, but this was attributable to a further wor-
sening of the economic conditions, bringing forth the revival of old sup-
port mechanisms for upland cultivation. Newly arrived migrants ex-
plained that they were attracted to the upland areas to take advantage of
the original two- to three-year bonus system which covers basic needs
as a means of aid during the initial years of sharecropping. Better-off
farmers, who often had access to off-farm activities and owned large
tracts of land, were able to survive the slump in commodity prices and
remain in their villages. Moreover, they were usually willing to support
these new types of sharecroppers to rejuvenate their land with more lu-
crative crops. Rich landowners again were able to capitalize on the spe-
cific conditions during the aftermath of the crisis, by further accumulat-
ing land which was now being offered at relatively low prices, or by buy-
ing off their sharecroppers at bargain prices. Interesting enough, this
preempted large-scale encroachment into the forest, as rich landowners
could re-open recently acquired land for cultivation purposes. However,
the reopening of land or large-scale harvesting of cinnamon bark by the
poorer farmers in the aftermath of the crisis, entailed large-scale loss of
tree cover in the buffer zones. These developments made clear that
community support mechanisms in agrarian communities, such as
those existing in Kerinci, do not necessarily disappear with advancing
commercialization. They only tend to fade into the background, and
seemingly obsolete mechanisms of community support can spring back
into use, adapting to the specific circumstances of that time. Moreover,
the economic crisis showed that an exclusive focus on economic and
material aspects of cultivation practices does not exactly reflect the real
conditions of food security and livelihood sustainability in rural areas.
Households make use of complex combinations of various strategies,
including the tapping into off-market, community, and kinship-based
institutions to achieve and maintain livelihood sustainability.
Our analysis of the various response mechanisms, which, unlike the
vast majority of crisis studies, goes beyond the phase of krismon as
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such, has shown that the effects of external shocks and stresses may
move the sustainability of people’s livelihoods in rather unexpected di-
rections. The assumption that growing poverty automatically leads to
environmental degradation is open to debate, partly due to the degree
to which people are able to tap into various kinds of community sup-
port mechanisms, which persist in its original or adapted forms.
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4 The Economic and Ecological Crises and Their
Impact on Livelihood Strategies of Rural
Households in Yogyakarta
Muhammad Baiquni
Introduction
The Asian economic crisis that occurred in the middle of 1997 first
struck neighboring countries, but it turned out that the epicenter of the
shocks was in Indonesia. The wave of economic crises was made worse
by a simultaneous ecological disaster, namely, the appearance of a long
El Niño dry season that reached its peak in Indonesia. The long dry sea-
son directly affected the lives of small people. It was marked by forest
fires, damage to natural resources, a critical food situation, a decline in
nutrition and famine in a number of areas. Meanwhile, the economic
crisis affected financial institutions, banks, and large companies to the
point where they became bankrupt and closed down, which influenced
the lives of businessmen and workers in the modern economic sector
(Baiquni & Susilawardani 2002).
Within a short time the economies of neighboring countries had
been restored, but Indonesia faced a crisis that continued and was fol-
lowed by even worse social unrest and political turmoil. The economic
and ecological crises caused poverty and vulnerability to rise sharply,
especially among urban communities but with a spin-off in rural areas
at a later stage. According to National Statistics BPS, the number of
poor people rose from 18 percent to 23 percent in the period between
February 1996 and the beginning of the crisis in February 1997. It then
rose rapidly to 37 percent in September 1998. Shafiq Dhanani and Iya-
natul Islam (2002) give an even higher estimate, calculating the change
to have been from 29 percent in February 1997 to 44 percent in Sep-
tember 1998. Prices then gradually began to stabilize, with food prices
decreasing relatively, which brought the figure for poverty down to 34
percent in February 2000.
The crisis, however, did not always constitute a calamity of the kind
indicated by the bankruptcy of conglomerates, the closing down of large
factories, the dismissal of workers, and the increase in the number of
poor and vulnerable people. In rural areas there was a variety of symp-
toms, and some places actually obtained multiple advantages, especially
those villages that produced export commodities like cocoa, coffee,
cloves, and spices. It was reported that, during the period of the crisis,
large numbers of rural people in Sumatra and Sulawesi who planted ex-
port crops went to the cities after harvest to purchase new electronic
equipment, motorcycles, and cars, while the number of rural people
who went on the pilgrimage increased. Rural people who were still sub-
sistence-oriented also did not feel the crisis directly; in other words, the
impact of the crisis on rural areas was slower than in urban areas (Gér-
ard & Ruf 2001). Thus the agricultural sector in rural areas again be-
came an alternative that could absorb the unemployed who had been
discharged from urban industrial and services sectors, which were ex-
periencing a slump and bankruptcy.
The concept of resources covers a wide area and is something that is
dynamic, so there is a possibility that changes related to information,
technology, and organization can lead to a situation where something
that was originally considered to be useless becomes useful and valuable
(Reksohadiprodjo & Pradono 1988:6). On the basis of this concept, there
was a shift in the value of resources that essentially followed the laws of
market demand (economy) and the laws of scarcity or capacity (ecology).
This study focuses on the formulation of a problem that is presented
in the basic question: “How did village communities expand their liveli-
hood strategies during the crisis and how were management and utili-
zation of their resources improved towards sustainability?” This can be
broken down into these more detailed questions:
1. What were the effects of the economic and ecological crises in the
Yogyakarta countryside?
2. What were the household livelihood strategies in rural areas and
what was the response to the economic and ecological crises?
3. What was the impact of household livelihood strategies on the sus-
tainability of systems of rural resource management and utilization?
This study attempts to find answers to these questions by using a com-
bination of participatory rural appraisal and in-depth interview survey
methods. Quantitative and qualitative data were collected (Brannen
1997) in a participative way by involving part of the community together
with the researcher in a learning process (Chamber 1996; Fernandes &
Tandon 1993). The author then undertook the writing up of the process
and results obtained from the study.
The effects of the crises on the Yogyakarta countryside
The ecological crisis really represented a downward trend in the quality
of resources, particularly in soil fertility and water supplies, and was evi-
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dent in the steady decline in agricultural production. The economic cri-
sis that is referred to here is the crisis that occurred from the middle of
1997 onwards, marked as it was by a fall in the value of the rupiah
against foreign currencies, the bankruptcy of banks and big companies,
and a sharp rise in unemployment and poverty. The economic and eco-
logical crises referred to are the monetary crisis that occurred in the
middle of 1997 together with a water crisis caused by a long El Niño
dry season, which led to crop failure and a food crisis in several parts of
Indonesia. Ultimately, these two crises came together in a total crisis
that also included social and political aspects.
In the Yogyakarta (DIY) countryside, the ecological crisis in the form
of a long dry season was felt more directly as a disaster than was the
economic crisis. The occurrence of a long dry season really represented
a natural event that takes place in a cyclical way over a period of seven
to ten years, as had happened in 1987. As a consequence, many farmers
experienced big losses because of crop failure, which meant loss of ca-
pital and income during the planting season, which caused losses for
farmers. For farmers in upland areas like Gunung Kidul in particular,
the annual drought means that the period of food shortage occurs dur-
ing the dry season.
The ecological crisis also took place slowly and was marked by a de-
cline in environmental resources and sociocultural changes that were
related to the introduction of modern agriculture through the Green Re-
volution. Modern agriculture aimed to increase food production
through the use of high-yielding seed, technical irrigation, intensifica-
tion involving chemical fertilizers and pesticides, mechanical equip-
ment, and farm credit, which encouraged farmers to begin cultivating
rice intensively. After efficiency in agriculture had been achieved, new
problems arose because of the existence of advanced technology.
Among the problems that had to be faced were the absence of variation
in planting patterns, steadily declining soil fertility, and the lack of bal-
ance in the sawah (wet rice field) ecosystem, which led to the appear-
ance of pests and disease. More than that, as Shiva (1991) noted, there
were signs of the marginalization of women workers because of the
Green Revolution.
The mononculture of rice, which was planted three times a year with
relatively rare changes in cropping patterns, resulted in a steady decline
in soil fertility, especially since the use of artificial fertilizers and inputs
like insecticide and herbicide caused the soil to become “addicted” to
them. The excessive use of chemical fertilizers gave rise to poisonous
residue that settled in the soil, killing organisms and soil life and ulti-
mately reducing soil fertility. This in turn meant that the rice plants did
not grow well and hence output dropped.
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The very noticeable lack of balance in the ecosystem enabled com-
mon pests and plant diseases that could cause crop failure to appear.
One example is the plagues of rodents which often ran wild in the sa-
wah because creatures like snakes that once preyed on them had be-
come extinct, either because people hunted them or because of degrada-
tion of the sawah ecosystem. Another example is the wereng (borer) pest,
which had been dominant in the 1980s and which emerged again in
many places in rural DIY during the crisis. At that time the price of pes-
ticide rose dramatically, to the point where farmers reduced the amount
and frequency of use. The result was that outbreaks of pests and dis-
eases like wereng returned.
Coming together as they did, the dry season and the accompanying
economic crisis had an impact that was multiplied many times. The
creeping approach of the economic crisis in the countryside took place
gradually and rarely caused shocks that directly influenced household li-
velihood strategies. The economic crisis was clearly felt in the rise in
production and transportation costs and the increase in prices. It was
certainly heavy, but the majority of basic needs like food could still be
met by the household itself.
The economic crisis was only felt in villages several months later
when there was an increase in the cost of living, education, health, and
production inputs (after the fertilizer subsidy was removed), and when
oil-based fuel rose in price.
Added to this was the fact that family members who had originally
worked in the city were forced to return to the village because urban
companies had business difficulties and they had been dismissed. The
village became a place of shelter for those people who had been affected
by the impact of the economic crisis in urban areas and agricultural ac-
tivities became a kind of temporary “shock absorber” for workers who
had lost their jobs (Kutanegara & Nooteboom 2001). While awaiting an
improvement in conditions, they undertook reconsolidation with house-
hold members in the village.
The government introduced the JPS (social safety network) through a
number of programs in fields like food security, health, education, and
small and micro-economic undertakings. These programs were indeed
carried out but it would seem that the follow-up was not very success-
ful. Perhaps one temporary success of the JPS programs was that they
formed a precondition that encouraged the social stability needed to as-
sist the Indonesian nation in carrying out the 1999 general elections in
a more open and democratic fashion.
Ultimately the economic crisis was indeed felt in rural areas, where it
exerted an influence that extended to the household level. Many village
people, however, adopted an attitude of plainness and simplicity in their
lives that made the associated difficulties seem like ordinary happen-
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ings. On the whole, the economic crisis caused a slight shock or, more
accurately, a shake that gave rise to new dynamics in rural lives. It
would seem that the diversification that had emerged in the rural econ-
omy over the past few decades was able to preserve the resilience of the
rural economy. The responses of rural households to the crisis, how-
ever, showed variety. Each household had ways of responding in its live-
lihood strategy to the internal and external situation during the crisis.
These phenomena are interesting to examine in their connection with
the variety of resource conditions that exist in the five Yogyakarta vil-
lages selected for case studies.
Five village case studies
Socioeconomic and environmental characteristics
In order to obtain a greater understanding of how the dynamics of the
economy function and of the ways in which communities in different
ecosystems manage their resources, five villages were chosen as case
studies. The choice of the study villages was based on physiographic
variety and agroecosystems that in a simple way reflect upland villages,
irrigated villages, and combinations of the two.
Tepus village, which is located in karst hills, and Glagaharjo village,
which is on the slopes of the Merapi volcano, are upland villages. In
general, land use in these villages consists of dry fields (tegalan) that are
planted with annual food crops and mixed gardens containing perennial
crops. Besides that, there are rain-fed rice fields in which rice or other
food crops are normally cultivated in the wet season with secondary
crops in the dry season. Farmers cultivate several crops in rotation
using the tumpanggilir system as well as a variety of crops that are
planted together or intercropped on one stretch of land in a system
known as tumpangsari. The third village, also in a hilly area, differs
from the first two. Sidoharjo village is located in the Menoreh Range. It
is unique because it has dry and wet land, that is, it has tegalan used
for mixed gardens as well as terraced rice fields in which rice is
planted.
The two irrigated villages chosen for case studies are Tirtohargo,
which is situated on the coast, and Sendangrejo, which is in a lowland
area where rice is cultivated in irrigated fields throughout the year.
Although both are lowland villages, they have different micro ecosys-
tems. The agricultural land of Tirtohargo village was once a back
swamp of the kind frequently found behind coastal sand hills or beach
ridges, while the agricultural land of Sendangrejo village consists of part
of the Merapi volcanic alluvial foot plain. A general picture of the five
case studies is presented in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Profiles of five case study villages in the Special Region of Yogyakarta
Village
(Subdistrict
District)
Tepus
(Tepus,
Gunungkidul)
Glagaharjo
(Cangkringan,
Sleman)
Sidoharjo
(Samigaluh,
Kulonprogo)
Tirtohargo
(Kretek,
Bantul)
Sendangrejo
(Minggir,
Sleman)
Village typology Upland villages Combination Irrigated villages
Slope 25->40%
(steep and
very steep)
10-25%
(gentle to
rather steep
slopes)
15 - >40%
(rather steep
to very steep)
< 8%
(flat)
< 8%
(flat)
Physiography karst
topography of
Gunung Sewu
volcanic
slopes of
Merapi
undulating,
folded hills
alluvial coast,
back swamp
volcanic
alluvial plain
of Merapi
Original rock limestone volcanic
material
andesitic
breccia, sand-
stone, tuff
alluvial
material
sedimentary
volcanic
material
Soil type mediter-
ranean
regosol latosol regosol and
cambisol
regosol
Rainfall (mm) 1,750-2,000 2,500-2,750 2,250-2,500 1,750-2,000 2,000-2,250
Village area (ha) 28,555 7,950 13,745 3,620 5,980
% Farmland 93.1% 36.0% 58.2% 54.0% 73.1%
% Farm
households,
1993 census
92.4% 100% 100% 83% 86%
Major land use dry fields and
rain-fed rice-
fields
dry fields and
home lots
dry fields,
rain-fed rice-
fields,
terraced rice-
fields
back swamp
rice-fields and
dry fields
technically
irrigated rice
fields
Main economic
activities
dry-field
farming,
animal
husbandry
traditional
farm and
animal
husbandry
dry farming,
gardens,
animal
husbandry
subsistence
rice-growing
and
horticulture
subsistence
agriculture
and rice
cultivation
Accessibility
distance to
subdistrict
center
Distance to
district center
Distance to
Yogyakarta
low
5 km
22 km
48 km
low
3 km
18 km
23 km
low
5 km
42 km
24 km
high
4 km
14 km
23 km
high
5 km
15 km
14 km
Population in
2000 (people)
9,624 3,256 5,068 2,867 9,082
Population
density (people/
sq. km)
337
low
406
low
368
low
792
medium
1,519
high
Source: Atlas Sumberdaya (1990), agricultural survey (1993), economic survey (1996), and
primary data (1998, 2000, 2001)
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The demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of these rural
areas are closely related to expansion and development from within the
villages themelves as well as the expansion that has occurred outside
them. Data from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses show varia-
tions in the percentages by which farm households have changed. In
upland villages located relatively far from the city center, the changes
have not been very great. In Tepus and Glagaharjo the majority of
households are those of farmers. In Sidoharjo the same thing can be
seen; there have not been many changes and 90 percent of the house-
holds belong to farmers. In the two irrigated villages, which have easier
access to the city, the percentage of farm households is smaller and fell
between 1990 and 2000; in Tirtohargo the drop was from 89 percent
to 70 percent and in Sendangrejo from 82 percent to only 66 percent.
The changes that have occurred in the irrigated villages, which have
easier access to the city, show rapid diversification towards non-farm ac-
tivities (Rotgé & Rijanta 1996). Many of the better-off farm households
have expanded non-agricultural activities like trade and industry as well
as services. Among households with members who have enjoyed higher
education, some people have obtained work as government and private-
sector employees or else have developed their own businesses. Num-
bers of agricultural laborers and very small farmers have chosen em-
ployment outside agriculture as factory workers, construction workers,
odd-job laborers and intermediate traders or middlemen, or else have
established food stalls (warung). These changes have been encouraged
by more open market access and opportunities, particularly since work
as an agricultural laborer or small-scale farmer can no longer be relied
upon as a means to meet household needs.
Variations in livelihoods in each village show an economic diversity
that reflects assorted and different employment opportunities and the
availability of local resources. Basic jobs and additional jobs are some-
times combined and there are also people who have a number of jobs,
all of which they regard as their main job. For example, a farmer might
also have additional employment as a maker of handicrafts, or an agri-
cultural laborer may at certain times be employed as a construction
worker. In the wide sense, agricultural activities also include animal
husbandry, which generally constitutes an supplementary activity. The
raising of cattle and goats can represent savings for the farmer and can
also supply an additional agricultural input in the form of animal man-
ure. Expansion in animal husbandry in dry-farming villages can help to
reduce population pressure on the land. It can also be linked to conser-
vation and land improvement efforts involving inputs of animal manure
that are distributed to upgrade land in a critical condition. This practice
is common in Tepus, Glagaharjo, and Sidoharjo, which have upland
characteristics.
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Diversification in employment is particularly noticeable in villages
that have limited natural resources. Employment as a construction
worker, for example, is generally an additional job. Tepus, followed by
Sidoharjo and Glagaharjo, has a rather high proportion of construction
workers. This shows that dry-farming villages have the potential to sup-
ply a large number of construction workers. A combination of agricul-
tural and non-agricultural employment has developed as a means to
maintain livelihoods so as to meet daily needs. Households that have
sufficient capital undertake employment in trade as buyers and sellers
of farm produce and assorted goods and in the provision of services.
Cottage industries, which generally involve the processing of raw mate-
rials obtained from agricultural commodities to make finished or partly
finished goods, are common, particularly in the case of food products.
The non-farm work undertaken by poor households consists of con-
struction work or odd-job laboring, which is done in the village but in
some cases involves mobility back and forth to the city.
The contributions made by family members who work in a city or
even abroad can support the family in the village. Young rural people
show a strong interest in overseas employment. Even though in this
survey only one household member was found who had worked over-
seas, all research villages had residents employed abroad as overseas
workers (TKI). This indicates that rural people have interacted with the
outside world and points to basic changes in views about their own
economy. They do not depend on local resources alone since they are
beginning to access outside resources in order to provide an adequate
living for households in the village.
The role of institutional systems
The utilization and control of rural resources, in particular of land, are
still the foundation of rural household livelihoods. The distribution of
control over land in each village can reveal access to the main resource,
that is, to the availability and use of land. Control over land is closely re-
lated to ownership of land and the way in which the land is managed.
Institutional systems reflect these relationships and how a number of
related parties operate in the use of resources in farm and non-farm
systems in rural areas.
Control over irrigated land in Tirtohargo and Sendangrejo is relatively
limited on the whole, with average holdings around 0.2 hectares. In the
upland villages dry-field holdings range from 0.2 hectares to more than
1.0 hectare. Home-lots are important for the production of commodities
needed in daily life and also for the raising of large livestock and poul-
try, besides being the land on which houses and associated buildings
stand. In Tepus, houses are generally grouped together and stand close
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to each other, which means that home lots are small in area. In Tirto-
hargo, home lots are also relatively small, occupying as they do the san-
dy beach ridge land. They are planted with perennials like coconuts and
mlinjo. Unlike the situation in these two villages, home lots are larger
in Glagaharjo and Sidoharjo.
Access to these resources is analyzed by widening the understanding
of institutions in the context of control over land, work relationships
and trade in products. The institutions referred to are not always orga-
nizations with systematic administration but in this description they in-
clude patterns of work relationships which have already become social
traditions and whose rules are extremely flexible.
Land property rights are the basis for the development of a system of
control and management institutions in rural Yogyakarta. In general,
farmers do not yet have land rights that are legally standardized in the
form of certificates. The agricultural land controlled by farmers is be-
queathed from one generation to the next and is also bought and sold
among farmers in oral transactions that are recorded in the village of-
fice. The document that is usually held as an indication of control over
land is the so-called Letter C, which is officially stamped in the land re-
gistration book in the village office.
Today’s individual rights originated from a number of management
and control sources. Yasan land was land that was operated by farmers
and came from the clearing of forests or the enrichment of ownerless
land. Individual ownership rights originating from yasan land contained
the understanding that efforts had been made to clear land with forest
status, while attempts had been made to enrich the land or make it fer-
tile, and control over cultivation or development had been carried out
until it became productive.
Individual ownership rights can also have their origin in what was
formerly known as gogolan land, that is, community-owned land that
was shared out permanently or in turn for cultivation. Originally this
was traditional-law land that could not be bought or sold because it was
common property, but changes introduced after ratification of the Basic
Table 4.2 Average control over various types of land (in square meters)
Type of land use Tepus Glagaharjo Sidoharjo Tirtohargo Sendangrejo
Irrigated land 859 0 2,901 1,730 2,708
Dry fields 8,840 3,244 1,998 50 0
Dry land 4,831 0 0 0 0
Gardens 0 380 681 0 0
Home lots 574 1,474 2,552 440 862
Total area of land controlled 15,104 5,098 8,132 2,220 3,570
Source: Primary data, 1998 and 2000 surveys
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Agrarian Law of 1960 altered its status to land with individual property
rights; those rights were given to the most recent cultivator. Titisara
land is village-owned agricultural land that is usually sharecropped out
or rented out in a routine way through an auction. This land is often re-
ferred to as village treasury land, and as such is regarded as a village as-
set that can be cultivated by local farmers, the purpose being to produce
development funds and routine funds for management of the village.
Bengkok land is village-owned agricultural land allocated to village offi-
cials, in particular the village head, as recompense for the performance
of their duties and obligations while they are in office. In general, this
land is located in the fertile, strategic part of the village, for which rea-
son it can influence the industriousness of village officials.
The various types of land ownership can affect the structure of insti-
tutions related to control over and the operation of agricultural land. On
the whole, the most common are sharecropping and rental; the mortga-
ging system is no longer found in the research villages. Sharecropping
is the system of land control and management encountered most often
in the study areas and is particularly common in the irrigated villages.
The motivation behind sharecropping varies. Farmers who own large
holdings usually undertake sharecropping to reduce the burden of care
and labor that has to be given to agricultural activities, in view of the
fact that wealthy farmers usually have non-farm activities. For land-
owners who work as village officials and public servants or private em-
ployees without time to cultivate the land, sharecropping is often used
as a means of managing their assets.
Sharecropping is also frequently linked to the availability of labor,
which is increasingly scarce in the village, even though prevailing wages
are relatively high by comparison with the value of the rice that is pro-
duced. Landowners whose holdings are not large enough for the owner
to manage them himself with paid labor prefer sharecropping, which is
a simpler system that has proved to be sustainable. Sharecropping as
observed by Geertz (1963) can also function as a system of poverty shar-
ing between those who have sufficient land and those who do not.
Tenant-cultivators are not only small farmers. There are also well-off
farmers who have capital and cultivate agricultural land intensively. The
intensive use of irrigated land for horticultural crops requires sufficient
land to obtain extra output. For that reason, farmers use the sharecrop-
ping system in conjunction with landowners who choose not to culti-
vate their own land. This situation encourages tenant-cultivators to meet
the economic requirements of wet rice cultivation by working their own
land and at the same time also cultivating land that is not their own
property on a sharecropping basis.
In addition to sharecropping, a land rental system also exists among
farmers, especially on land that is cultivated intensively with commer-
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cial crops. The rental system enables lease-holders, who are usually big
farmers, to manage the land according to the principle of profit maxi-
mization. In operating rented land, big farmers or farmers from other
villages manage it in a way that yields a profit in the shortest possible
time or during the period of the agreement. Big farmers tend to plant
commercial crops and to apply very high chemical inputs so as to ob-
tain the maximum output. A large profit can be obtained if the scale of
the undertaking is intensive, both in the area of land and in the form of
management.
The conclusion from this analysis of institutions related to land con-
trol and management is that some farmers prefer sharecropping to the
rental or mortgaging of land. Sharecropping allows for closer links be-
tween the landowner and the tenant-cultivator in deciding how the land
is to be managed. Unlike sharecropping, rental enables the tenant-culti-
vator to work the land on the principle of profit maximization. If this
means a very high input of chemicals to ensure maximum output, he
will use them in order to get the most from the land during the rental
period. The risk of land degradation after the agreement has finished is
the responsibility of the landowner.
Changes in livelihood strategies and responses to the crisis
Studies of livelihood strategies are fundamental to understanding
household responses to the crisis. The term “livelihood” is defined as
the capacities, assets, and activities needed to support household mem-
bers. The term includes a wider interpretation than mere income or
employment opportunity, because “livelihood strategy” covers complex
relationships between capabilities, assets, and activities and environ-
mental conditions, technological developments, and social dynamics
(Singh & Gilman 1999; Ellis 2000; Titus 2003; Start & Johnson 2004).
Livelihood strategies were studied in five villages that have different
agro-ecosystems and resources. Environmental conditions, resources,
and community and household dynamics displayed different combina-
tions of relationships between a variety of components and choice of li-
velihood strategies. The discussion of spatial diversity and social stratifi-
cation in each unique household provides an understanding of the vari-
ety of livelihood strategies and responses of households at the time of
the crisis.
Three livelihood strategies
The household livelihood conditions and strategies in this study have
been grouped into three types, namely, survival, consolidation and accu-
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mulation strategies (White 1991). To determine the strategy adopted by
each household, three aspects were examined, namely, its capabilities,
assets, and activities. “Capabilities” refers to the pattern of resource use,
which is seen in the availability of labor, capital, and technology. Besides
this, there is the use of local and external resources that are integrated
to support capabilities. The capabilities of a household are reflected in
its level of income and in its willingness to take risks.
“Assets” are related to ownership of and access to resources and to
the relationships that enable access to be gained. Assets cover tangible
things like land, machinery, and production equipment but also take
the form of things that are not visible such as skills and social status in
the community, which become apparent in context.
The term “activities” refers to productive undertakings intended to
fulfill basic needs and, if possible, to bring about an increase in welfare.
The success of activities is reflected in the level of profit and income,
which is very much determined by the scale of operations, the intensity
of capital, the use of technology and the existence of skills. The criteria
outlined above have been arranged in a table that identifies profiles of
household strategies (annex).
Households with survival strategies
Households with survival strategies tend to own very limited land and
other capital assets, which means that in seeking employment members
depend on their own labor and on the limited skills that they possess.
On the whole, their jobs and social status are relatively low and the in-
come that they receive is inadequate. Survival households tend to maxi-
mize the use of their resources, especially labor, in addition to their
own limited land and capital, to meet their needs at a subsistence level.
Thus they are capable of meeting their basic needs only over the short
term.
The important characteristic of these households is their expenditure
pattern, which is dominated by the fulfillment of basic food needs.
These are frequently the major item in the household budget. Survival
households often cannot afford to make social contributions, but in-
stead they provide labor for various social activities such as weddings,
funerals or mutual-assistance undertakings to construct public facilities.
On the whole, the possessions of these households are limited to a
small, simple house. Some own a very small piece of productive agricul-
tural land but many are landless. For that reason they are often forced
to look for multiple jobs and hence many of their members work as
agricultural or construction laborers. In brief, they sell their labor and
do whatever that comes up. The access of survival households is also
limited; even if they are able to obtain access, they do not have suffi-
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cient assets and capabilities to reach out for that access and take the risk
of starting a new undertaking.
Households with consolidation strategies
On the whole these households have sufficient land and capital assets
to meet subsistence needs. They also have a higher social status than
those with survival strategies. Their income, too, is greater and is some-
times based on diversified agricultural and non-agricultural activities,
which means that they have more additional income regularly or in cer-
tain seasons. Sources of income are located not only in the village itself
but also in the city in the form of trade undertakings or commuting for
employment reasons. Daily needs have been adequately met, while
shopping for secondary and tertiary requirements exceeds shopping for
primary necessities.
Since these households have already exceeded fulfillment of their ba-
sic needs, they are freer to meet other appropriate needs such as educa-
tion, health, transportation, and recreation. Consolidation households
generally own a motorcycle and have complete household equipment,
including a radio and a color television. The assets that they possess, be-
sides being the means of production, are also the means of fulfilling
secondary and tertiary needs more comfortably. These households can
afford to expand and consolidate by developing resource use with med-
ium and long-term objectives in mind.
Consolidation households whose members are still young and dy-
namic have the capacity to push their undertakings to the limit so that
they increase, by comparison with households whose members are al-
ready old or retired. Nevertheless, their capacity to take risks is limited
because of their limited production surplus and working capital. As a
consequence, consolidation households depend on income sources
other than their own agricultural activities.
Households with accumulation strategies
These households have greater capacity, assets, and ability to meet
needs. Using all of their capacity, they are able to accumulate capital
and to improve their welfare to a higher level than households in the
other groups. Productive activities yield a rather large surplus and are
oriented towards the long term in order to extend their access to re-
sources and increase their capacity to accumulate capital. If they make
investments, accumulation households are driven by motivation to in-
crease profit and accumulate capital within a certain time.
The accumulation strategy is characterized by control over large land
resources and a lot of capital. Even so, not all of their assets and capital
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are operated by the households themselves; some are rented out or op-
erated on a profit-sharing basis by other households, especially survival
households. Thus the social and economic networks of accumulation
households are wider than those of others and their social status is
higher.
Accumulation households are very responsive to external changes,
whether they represent an opportunity or pose a threat. These house-
holds are also quite daring in taking risks by responding quickly to a
changing external situation. They also have the courage to make long-
term investments, provided that the latter are profitable in their calcula-
tions. This willingness to invest is evident in their tendency to shift in-
vestments from the agricultural sector to the more dynamic and profit-
able non-agricultural sector, even though the risks are greater.
Patterns of strategy change in the crisis period
Changes in the livelihood strategies of rural households in facing the
economic crisis are interesting phenomena to study. This research is
based on data that were collected by the household survey method at
the beginning of the crisis, that is, in June and July 1998; the survey
was then repeated after a period of five years using the in-depth review
method with retrospective questions in April and May 2003. The people
who were interviewed in depth came from 60 households, which made
it possible to examine the pattern of coping responses of the three liveli-
hood strategies, namely, accumulation, consolidation, and survival.
The various dynamic changes that occurred during the five years be-
tween 1998 and 2003 as presented in table 4.3 show that changes in li-
velihood strategies were not very striking in total number. But when
they are examined more closely, it is clear that rural households were
quite dynamic in maintaining and increasing their strategies. The dy-
namics of these strategy changes were influenced not only by the eco-
nomic crisis. A detailed examination reveals the influence of the house-
hold’s life cycle, both in those households that experienced a rise and in
those that experienced a fall in the ability of household members to car-
ry out their livelihood strategies.
The number of households with an accumulation strategy fell from
twelve to ten, with the drop occurring mainly in Tepus, Sendangrejo,
and Glagaharjo. The other two villages, Sidoharjo and Tirtohargo, which
have horticultural commodities and perennial tree crops, experienced a
rise in the number of households with an accumulation strategy. This
was made possible by the fact that during the crisis, the prices of horti-
cultural and perennial products rose.
A drop also occurred in the number of survival households from 28
to 25. The phenomenon of a fall in survival households during the eco-
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nomic crisis can be explained by the fact that a number of households
succeeded in overcoming the crisis and moving up by changing their
strategy from survival to consolidation. The number of households with
a consolidation strategy actually rose from 20 to 25
In Sidoharjo some households were in fact able to raise themselves
from consolidation to accumulation strategies, but the number of survi-
val households remained the same. Many of the residents of Sidoharjo,
which is relatively remote, had a combination of agricultural and non-
agricultural activities. Their simple lifestyle is reflected in their houses
and furniture, which are made from local materials. The most striking
example of their attitude was the effort they made to educate their chil-
dren to the highest possible level. They also had wide social networks,
which is revealed in the fact that there were household members of pro-
ductive age who worked in the city and there were even some who had
sought work abroad. These people sent money back to the village regu-
larly to support family members.
In Tirtohargo there was an increase in the number of accumulation
and consolidation households and a reduction in survival households.
This village enjoyed the rise in horticultural prices during the aftermath
of the economic crisis. Besides that, horticultural farmers (specifically
those growing onions and chilli) received support from policies adopted
by the Bantul District government through price stabilization and im-
provements at harvest time. Farmers are usually disadvantaged by the
price manipulations of middlemen who function as operators in a free
market system, for the prices of farm products fall at harvest time. Im-
provements in the position of farmers, which were supported by these
pro-farmer public policy innovations, offered hopes of betterment for
producers in Bantul.
Tepus is in an infertile karst area with low natural resource productiv-
ity. The majority of the households are at the survival strategy level,
which is evident in the simple houses and furniture and in the people’s
occupations, which generally involve farming and the raising of live-
stock on barren land. During the crisis some of the households adopted
Table 4.3 Changes in livelihood strategies in rural households during the 1998-2003
crisis
Strategy Year Tepus Glagaharjo Sidoharjo Tirtohargo Sendangrejo Total
Accumulation 1998 4 2 1 1 5 12
2003 1 1 3 2 3 10
Consolidation 1998 2 4 6 5 3 20
2003 5 5 4 6 5 25
Survival 1998 6 7 5 6 4 28
2003 6 6 5 4 4 25
Source: 1998 survey and 2003 in-depth interviews
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a survival strategy, while some that had originally been accumulation
households fell back to a consolidation situation. On the whole, daily
earnings are obtained from agricultural activities, while a small number
of households catch fish and shrimp in coral reefs and along the beach
in certain seasons. Income from animal husbandry is obtained over a
period of years. Livestock function as savings that are used to cover
large expenses such as children’s education, house construction, medi-
cal treatment for a sick member of the household, circumcisions, and
weddings.
Sendangrejo is a “rice-granary” village in which rice can be planted
three times a year. Agricultural activities had already experienced a
lengthy period of stagnation due to the fact that holdings are small and
rice is not a sufficiently profitable crop. During the crisis most of the
households adopted a consolidation strategy. Some of them had for-
merly been accumulation households but had dropped down to the con-
solidation level. The resources of this village are no longer capable of
accommodating the increasing population density, as a consequence of
which the incomes and livelihoods of the village people are really sup-
ported by the urban economy. Village access to Sleman District and
Yogyakarta City is quite good. Besides the good condition of the road,
there is also very good rural transportation. For that reason, many
people in the village are well-off, as they work in the city in the non-
agricultural sector. They commute daily, leaving their homes in the
morning and returning in the afternoon. Much of the agricultural land
owned by the group of people who are employed in the non-agricultural
sector is rented out or else is worked jointly on a sharecropping basis
with local small farmers and agricultural laborers.
Glagaharjo is a village of mixed gardens on the slopes of Mt. Merapi.
Most of the households operate at the survival level. During the crisis
there was an increase in the number of households that undertook con-
solidation. Some of them were once accumulation households but the
crisis forced them to change their strategy to that of consolidation. Re-
turns from mixed-garden farming and from animal husbandry are not
sufficient to improve their quality of life. Farmers cultivate an assort-
ment of crops in their gardens and they are not attracted to monocul-
ture. As a consequence of maintaining the mixed-garden ecosystem,
some household members have to do non-agricultural work either in
the village or in the city.
The responses of households in coping with the crisis
There was considerable diversity in the responses of households with
different livelihood strategies in the way they handled the crisis. In this
research a number of response variables was examined. These have
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been divided into two types, namely, the consumption responses and
the production responses adopted by households during the crisis. The
term “consumption responses” refers to the tendency for resource use
and the use of finances (costs) to rise or fall to cover household needs.
“Production responses” are the various tendencies for resource use and
the use of finances (costs) to rise or fall in order to yield products.
Consumption responses
The various elements or variables constituting the consumption re-
sponses are presented in table 4.4 and figure 4.1. The values shown in-
dicate the relative frequency of positive and negative responses for each
of the elements. The consumption responses of households with an ac-
cumulation strategy show that all elements have positive values. This
means that these households increased their expenditure on consump-
Table 4.4 The value of elements related to consumption responses
CE EH EP IL HS LP
Accumulation strategy 0.60 0.90 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.60
Consolidation strategy -0.22 0.17 0.43 -0.22 -0.43 0.26
Survival strategy -0.70 -0.07 0.52 -0.74 -0.85 0.78
CE = consumptive expenditure (rising or falling)
EH = educational and health expenditure (rising or falling)
EP = employment pattern (diversification or specialization)
IL = income level (maximizing or maintaining)
HS = household savings (rising or falling)
LP = labor participation (rising or falling)
Figure 4.1 The value of elements related to consumption responses
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tion because they could in fact afford to pay the higher prices. One in-
teresting phenomenon is the fact that in all three household types,
efforts to mobilize the participation of labor have a positive value and
that during the crisis the mobilization of members of accumulation
households appeared to rise rapidly. Among survival and consolidation
households, a high level of household labor participation was normal,
whereas it was only in a crisis situation that accumulation households
required household members to work more than in ordinary times.
Expenditure on the consumption of food, energy and transportation
increased, as did expenditure on education and health, which are basic
household needs. This rise in household consumption expenditure was
also accompanied by an increase in income, which means that the need
for greater consumption expenditure could be offset by additional in-
come acquired by expanding diversification, increasing labor use, or
making the management of resource and capital assets more effective.
The consumption response of consolidation households shows varia-
tions in the fall and rise of a number of related elements. Expenditure
on basic needs like food, energy, and transportation tended to fall or be
reduced but educational and health needs could not be reduced, or in
other words they experienced a slight rise. On the whole, the level of
household income also fell, which means that, although there was a
nominal rise, income was still not sufficient by comparison with needs.
Household savings also fell as a consequence of the price rises that had
to be met while the crisis continued. In order to cover their needs, these
households expanded efforts to mobilize more labor than before the cri-
sis. Besides that, among consolidation households that had previously
been survival households, a number of young households displayed pro-
gressive dynamics. At the same time, the fact that some consolidation
households had previously been accumulation households reflected the
life cycle of family heads who were getting older or who had retired.
The consumption response of survival households on the whole in-
volved difficulties, which are reflected in the negative value of elements.
These households had to reduce certain consumption expenditure, in-
cluding expenditure on basic needs in the form of food, energy, and
transportation but they made real efforts to keep their children at school
and to meet health expenses. Survival households also tried to push
ahead through diversification in their undertakings, but all they had to
offer was their labor. Labor mobilization increased both in the amount
of working time and in the participation of more family members, but
income levels remained low. In fact, there was a tendency for household
savings to decline sharply, which meant that these households experi-
enced difficulty in meeting the requirements of life during the crisis,
despite the fact that they economized on consumption expenditure and
mobilized labor more actively.
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Production responses
Table 4.5 and figure 4.2 offer insight into the relative frequencies and
directions of the productive responses to the crisis. Production re-
sponses in general had positive values and there was a rise in both in-
puts and outputs. Production inputs, that is, capital and the necessary
technology, certainly increased greatly, becoming more expensive than
before the crisis. Production outputs also tended to rise, the result
being that households could afford to cover their needs during the cri-
sis. The types of crops and commodities that were produced became in-
creasingly varied, which revealed a steadily rising trend towards diversi-
fication in business activities. Overall, efforts to economize on farm in-
puts and to increase the use of the household’s own labor before
employing hired labor were also apparent. Attempts to market products
Table 4.5 The value of elements related to production responses
Strategy type LIp CI P0 TC/P SM MC IL0
Accumulation -0.10 0.30 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.60 0.60
Consolidation -0.30 0.35 0.52 0.26 0.57 -0.04 -0.52
Survival -0.93 -0.41 0.33 0.41 0.30 -0.26 -0.59
Lip = labor input/input of hired labor (rising or falling)
CI = capital input/capital including technology (rising or falling)
PO = production output (rising or falling)
TC/P = types of crops or products (rising or falling)
SM = share (production) for the market (rising or falling)
MC = marketing channel and destinations (expanding or decreasing)
ILO = investment in land and other production means
Figure 4.2 The value of elements related to production responses
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also rose, in connection with the increasingly wide market network as a
form of increased access, ability to reach markets and the determination
of rural producers to have direct access to markets or consumers.
Accumulation households tended to reduce hired labor in both their
agricultural and non-agricultural production activities, while inputs of
capital and all other production elements tended to rise during the cri-
sis. Attempts to diversify increased in the context of efforts to share bur-
dens and risks while they were in a crisis situation. Almost all house-
holds increased the volume of production and expanded their efforts to
reach wider markets. They did this to offset market needs and growing
consumer demand for rural products as substitutes for imported agri-
cultural products. In addition, efforts to reach markets were intended to
reduce dependence on middlemen by selling directly to markets or con-
sumers. Accumulation households were also able to increase capital in-
vestment to raise production and investment in the form of household
assets.
Consolidation households showed a trend similar to that apparent in
accumulation households but the positive values were lower, meaning
that only certain households were able to increase capital input, produc-
tion volume and the types of commodities or goods that they produced.
Expansion in market networks generally remained the same as it had
been originally, whereas production investment and investment in the
form of house improvements or the purchase of jewelry declined,
which meant that these households gave priority to meeting basic needs
and additional secondary needs that were related to greater production.
Survival households tended to use their own labor and to make a
drastic reduction in hired labor to carry out production. Their ability to
increase capital was insignificant because these households spent more
money to cover basic necessities, as was indicated in trends in con-
sumption responses. Survival households appeared to try to raise pro-
duction volume in order to meet or cover their consumption needs.
The fact that they also undertook employment in odd jobs of any kind
(srabutan) was also noticeable. The rise in the use of their own labor
and in efforts to increase the amount or volume of production was the
means by which they continued to survive. Attempts to expand market
networks in general experienced a drop that was related to limitations
on direct mobility to markets. Survival households also displayed a fall
in capacity to invest in land or production assets or in household assets.
Conclusions
The rural areas of the Special Region of Yogyakarta have great diversity
both in environment and in the culture of the people, and this diversity
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has created development dynamics that are also diverse. The manage-
ment of rural resources has experienced changes that were triggered by
both development and the impacts of economic and ecological crises.
The following findings are presented as the conclusions drawn from
this research:
1. Rural structural changes have occurred with the shift in activities
from agricultural to non-agricultural undertakings. These changes
have been linked to the fact that the economic value of farming is
not to the advantage of farmers who own small holdings. Changes
can also be traced to rises in the cost of farm inputs and the farm
gate prices of agricultural products, which are often held down by
the market and by government policies.
2. At the beginning, the economic crisis was not a very great problem
by comparison with the ecological crisis, when a very long dry sea-
son and the appearance of crop pests and diseases created difficul-
ties that were felt directly by the rural communities. The long dry
season caused crop failures, which were followed by a rapid rise in
prices. At first the economic crisis was not felt very much by the
rural communities. It was only felt one year later, when the govern-
ment did away with the fertilizer and pesticide subsidies and when
many unemployed people returned to their villages.
3. Community institutions that are based on social relations of reci-
procity (mutual assistance) and on more businesslike systems in
agricultural and non-agricultural production, can function as safety
networks for people in times of crisis. Some of these institutions
indeed have helped to lighten the burden, especially for survival
households.
4. Changes in livelihood strategies over the five years since the 1997
crisis have not been very great in rural areas. There are variations
between villages and between household strategies, the pattern
showing a reduction in the number of survival households, a rise in
the number of consolidation households and a fall in the number
of accumulation households. Upland villages were more sensitive to
the economic and ecological crises, in particular the long dry sea-
son. This pattern can be seen in Tepus and Glagaharjo villages,
where a number of accumulation households fell to the consolida-
tion level.
5. In the context of the life cycle, young households were more dy-
namic in pushing their businesses forward in order to meet the
needs of life. Mature households showed experience and caution in
expanding their businesses and taking risks, while households with
old and retired persons appeared slow in their responses to changes
during the crisis. Many old households experienced a decline in
economic dynamics to the point where some were able to survive
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but quite a few declined (the real “losers”). Young and mature
households with consolidation strategies and with viable types of re-
source use sometimes showed a tendency to move up and become
accumulation households, and more often, or at the very least, were
able to maintain their livelihoods during the crisis period (the “win-
ners”).
6. In coping with the crisis, the response of many rural households
was to alter their consumption patterns by reducing the quantity
that they consumed and replacing certain items wirh commodities
of lower quality and price, or by economizing. The response pattern
of accumulation households revealed efforts to use assets more in-
tensively and to expand diversification in businesses and market
networks, while consolidation households reduced their production
inputs. Consolidation households showed a tendency to try to econ-
omize in consumption by reducing unnecessary expenditure, but
they could still afford to meet basic needs and a few supplementary
needs. Survival households responded by reducing many aspects of
consumption and raising work productivity or increasing the num-
ber of working hours.
7. The reduction in the quantity of farm inputs in the form of chemi-
cal fertilizers and pesticides and their replacement by organic fertili-
zer enabled land to be improved in a natural way. The shift from
undertakings that depend on agricultural resources to undertakings
that combine resources using technological and capital inputs with
non-agricultural activities may reduce the pressure upon land. But
the introduction of technological inputs at the same time also in-
vites vulnerability stemming from dependence on oil-based fuel
and technological supplies whose prices continue to rise constantly.
Apart from this aspect, it can also marginalize agricultural laborers
and other workers who are not skilled in using the technology.
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Annex
Profiles for classifying households in the research sample
Strategy types Capabilities Assets Activity types
LF EL RI CP AP AE SN OS CT SL JP
Accumulation  þ þ þ +  þ þ þ þ þ
Consolidation þ    þ þ     
Survival þ          
LF = Labor force commitment of household
EL = Educational level (average of household)
RI = Risk-taking capacity (for investment in production)
CP = Control of production means (land, machines, cattle)
AP = Access to production factors (land, credit/loans including share cropping/labor
arrangements)
AE = Access to alternative (non-farm) employment opportunities
SN = Social status/social networks (or social capital)
OS = Operational scale of main enterprise/activity
CT = Capital/technology intensiveness of main activity
SL = Level of required skill of main activity
IP = Income-generating capacity of main activity (profitability)
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5 Livelihoods and Coping Responses to the Crisis
in Four Villages with Different Farm Systems
in the Special Region of the Yogyakarta
Agus Sutanto
Introduction
The economic crisis that started in the middle of 1997 exerted an im-
pact that showed great local variations and socioeconomic differences.
Effects that differed and were even contradictory could be found be-
tween rural and urban areas, between sectors such as industry and agri-
culture and between levels of analysis, for example, meso and micro.
Economic indicators for the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) were
found to be negative in the direct effects caused by the crisis. In the
pre-crisis period (1993-1996) the average rate of economic growth in
the DIY economy had been 7.8 percent per year. By the end of 1997,
however, growth had fallen to 3.5 percent. Attempts to overcome the cri-
sis in the short term were not successful. In fact, according to Statistics
Indonesia (BPS), the figure for growth in DIY in 1998 fell drastically to
minus 11.8 percent. Signs of improvement began to appear in the fol-
lowing year (1999), when economic growth was 1.0 percent. By 2000
the figure had risen to 4 percent (BPS 2002).
It is interesting that there was no significant jolt in social and house-
hold welfare indicators. The findings of an analysis of the National So-
cioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) during the crisis years of 1997 and
1998 reveal, for example, that expenditure on food and non-food items
was relatively stable. Fears that the school drop-out rate would rise sig-
nificantly turned out to be unfounded. Similarly, nutrition levels among
the community were barely affected by the crisis and even showed a
tendency to improve. Five-year data revealed that the total protein en-
ergy deficiency (KEP) figure for children under the age of five declined
between 1993 and the end of 1997, indicating that the number of chil-
dren lacking protein intake was steadily decreasing. On the whole, com-
munity health was not greatly influenced by the crisis, and stocks of
medical supplies were declared to be sufficient until the end of 2000.
In 1997 the labor absorption capacity of the agricultural sector had de-
clined to around only 39 percent, while that of the services sector had actu-
ally risen to approximately 41 percent. In 2000, however, the agricultural
sector once again absorbed 43 percent of the DIY labor force. According to
BPS (2002: 83), this increase was likely due to the fact that some of the
workers who had moved out of agriculture had been forced to return to
their place of origin. Those who had been working in the city and had then
returned to the village were mainly workers who had been dismissed
(PHK). On their return they again took up work in the agricultural sector.
In Bantul District the number of workers recorded as returning to
the region because of dismissal due to the crisis was 4,330 up to Sep-
tember 1998 and consisted of 3,052 men and 1,075 women. In Gu-
nungkidul District the total figure for the number of those who had
been dismissed was even greater, being 5,201 up to June 1998. In the
absence of monitoring and recording, however, there is no source of
data for the type of work done by those who returned to their place of
origin, which means that the BPS assumption that they returned to em-
ployment in agriculture has not been confirmed. The SUSENAS analy-
sis concludes that in the field of labor the number of household mem-
bers who were employed rose from 39.7 percent to 60.2 percent.
In-depth interviews carried out by the Center for Population Studies
at Gadjah Mada University (UGM) in October 1998 do not support the
statement that workers who had been dismissed returned to agriculture.
Most of these workers felt reluctant to take up farming after being em-
ployed in the non-agricultural sector in an urban area. Even the project
to create job opportunities in the building of infrastructure through the
intensive labor system (padat karya) did not receive much response.
The reasons were that the work was only temporary, the working hours
were too long, and the wages were considered to be inadequate. Those
people who had received severance pay used the money as business ca-
pital, for example, to undertake retail selling in their homes or to set up
a small shop (warung) on the side of a road.
In the agricultural sector the economic crisis had already caused farm
inputs to become increasingly expensive and in fact it was hard to ob-
tain seed of any kind except rice seed. Chemical inputs, both herbicides
and pesticides, became more expensive by the day (Gérard & Ruf
2001). Even so, farmers did not really feel the rise in the cost of these
inputs because of the government system of stocks and subsidies. In
Gunungkidul, for example, in October 1998, when the planting season
began, supplies of fertilizer were relatively sufficient. There were
12,000 tons of urea fertilizer, 1,500 tons of SP, and 1,000 tons of KCI
in storage sheds. There were a few weaknesses in the distribution sys-
tem, which caused market prices to rise by around 25 percent. The pro-
duction of agricultural commodities was not disrupted by the crisis and
the Agricultural Service in Gunungkidul noted that, in comparison with
the 1996-1997 period, the production of rice, soybeans, and corn actu-
ally rose during the crisis.
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It would appear that landowning farmers were not seriously hit by
the crisis. In fact, they often gained advantages from the rise in prices
for their agricultural products. In particular, those who grew perennials
(such as cashew nuts, coffee, and cocoa) obtained a rather large profit.
Hence they did not really feel the increase in commodity prices that
was a consquence of the crisis. In fact, according to Gerard and Ruf
(2001), a number of agricultural commodities (including fish) that were
intended for export brought a good profit, thanks to the crisis which
had led to depreciation in the value of the rupiah. Those who appeared
to be most affected were agricultural laborers and tenant-cultivators
(Anonim1998:2). The wages that they received did not rise in propor-
tion to the cost of inputs. Besides that, the commodities that they
planted were intended for subsistence purposes and so they did not en-
joy the increase in agricultural commodity prices.
At the micro level, it was generally said that the reason that the im-
pact of the crisis was not felt very greatly by rural people was the flex-
ibility and resistence of rural areas in coping with it. The main charac-
teristic that supported the superior response of rural areas was their
self-reliance or low degree of dependence on external factors and their
ability to meet their own needs (Tukiran dan Sutanto 1999).
It has been assumed that the impact of the crisis varied with locality
because of the prevailing diversity in socioeconomic and agro-physio-
graphic conditions. For that reason wider research of a comparative nat-
ure is needed. The objective of the present study is to examine varia-
tions in livelihoods and responses to the crisis in areas with different
production patterns and different agricultural resources.
Research method
The present study took in four districts in the Special Region of Yogya-
karta, namely, Sleman, Bantul, Kulonprogo, and Gunungkidul. Each
district is represented by one sample research area at village level. Re-
search areas were selected in such a way that they would be representa-
tive of different agro-physiographic conditions and different modes of
agricultural production. It was assumed that these differences would
produce different livelihood situations and different responses to the
crisis. The characteristics of the research areas are shown in table 5.1.
Respondents were the heads of farm families. A stratified sample
was taken based on the two main variables, namely, intensity in the use
of inputs and household income. In the use of inputs a distinction was
made between two categories, those above and those below the average.
Household income was divided into three classes. Low income was in-
come below the average (x) – 1/2 sd (standard deviations). Medium in-
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come was income ranging between ( < x – 1/2 sd) and (x + 1/2 sd), and
high income was income whose value was (> x + 1/2 sd).
Input intensity was used in sample stratification on a basis of the fol-
lowing considerations:
– The use of inputs depicts intensity of production and level of agri-
cultural commercialization. The higher the value of the inputs, the
more intensive and the more commercial farming was considered
to be.
– During the crisis period, agricultural inputs constituted a variable
whose availability and price were assumed to be the least stable.
The same applied to the prices of commercial commodities in the
market.
The use of these two variables produced a six-cell matrix (2  3) that in-
dicated the type of respondents. In each cell (type) there were two re-
spondents, which meant that each research village was represented by
12 sample respondents. The total sample consisted of 48 people, who
were interviewed in depth in 2003. The focus of the research was on
the three main elements related to the crisis, namely, the livelihood si-
tuation, livelihood strategies, and coping responses.
Table 5.1 Agro-physiographic characteristics of the research areas
Number Name of area Physiography Mode of agricultural
production
1. Wonokerto village,
Turi subdistrict,
Sleman district
Volcanic slope,
fertile soil with irrigation
throughout the year in
northern part of DIY
Commercial agriculture,
intensive organic inputs,
low labor input
Dominance of mono-
horticulture: snake fruit
(salak) plus small areas of
rice and chili
2. Giriasih village, Panggang
subdistrict, Gunungkidul
district
Gunung Sewu karst,
southern limestone hills,
dry and rain-fed
Mixed farming with upland
subsistence food crops
and commercial perennials
(agro-forestry)
3. Sidoharjo village,
Samigaluh subdistrict,
Kulonprogo district
Menoreh Hills, fairly fertile
uplands, rain-fed in
western part of DIY
Mixed farming with upland
food crops and
commercial perennials
(cloves, coffee, vanilla,
rice, and chili)
4. Tirtohargo village,
Kretek subdistrict,
Bantul district
Alluvio-volcanic foot plain
and fertile coastal area
with irrigation throughout
the year in southern part
of DIY
Commercial agricultural
commodities with
intensive inputs Lowland
rice and horticulture (chili
and onions)
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The livelihood approach
In facing changes in their livelihood situation, households developed
certain strategies that might differ from those adopted by other house-
holds. Some households felt that these changes tended to make their
situation worse, to the point where the strategy adopted was to try to
survive, that is, a survival strategy. Other households that might perhaps
have obtained opportunities and advantages because of the changes
developed accumulation strategies.
Besides changes at the household level, changes in the livelihood
situation were also experienced by the enterprises or economic activity
units conducted by the household. A number of enterprises profited
and obtained opportunities because of the changes. These businesses
were able to develop a strategy of expansion in undertakings (expansio-
nist). On the other hand, a number of businesses with different charac-
teristics perhaps came out losing as a consequence of the changes. They
developed strategies of survival and reduction in the scale of their un-
dertakings (survival-contractionist).
The differences in these strategies can be explained through the li-
velihood approach. The livelihood concept has not yet obtained a
scientific transliteration that is widely recognized in studies of poverty
and welfare in Indonesia. This is understandable in view of the fact
that this field of studies developed only in the 1990s. In dictionaries,
livelihood is frequently equated with means of living, which is inter-
preted as the source of earnings or of life. The livelihood concept,
however, covers more than that. Livelihood is understood as a poten-
tial totality, possessed by the household, which covers at least the ele-
ments of assets, capacity, and activities that form the means of life.
In general, livelihood is defined as assets, capabilities, and activities
required for constructing the means of living (Ellis 2000; White et
al. 2002).
In this study livelihood at the household level covers the assets that it
owns, its capabilities, and its degree of needs satisfaction.
The element of assets covers ownership relations and access to
resources, which in this study are indicated by the following variables:
– ownership of land, machines, and implements
– access arrangements: renting and sharecropping, etc.
– social status and skills
The element of capabilities is represented by the pattern of resource
use, which consists of a number of indicative variables, including:
– level of income and income security
– expenditure on consumptive items
– savings
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– labor participation
– the use of capital and technology
The element of needs satisfaction is defined by three main variables:
– coverage of basic needs or subsistence level
– room for wealth accumulation
– social safety networks
With the assistance of these determinant variables, the data obtained
from in-depth interviews with respondents could be compiled to reveal
the livelihood situation of households. Households were then classified
into three types of livelihood situation: better-off households, reasonable
households, and shortage households.
Variations in the livelihood situation of farm households in four
agricultural systems
The discussion in this chapter is intended to determine the livelihood
patterns and changes in those patterns in four villages with different
agro-physical conditions and systems of agriculture.
Livelihood situations in farm households in Tirtohargo village
Tirtohargo village is situated on a stretch of fertile, alluvial, coastal
plain. Agriculture is possible throughout the year with the support of a
good irrigation system. The village is located around twelve kilometers
to the south of the city of Yogyakarta. Farming in Tirtohargo is commer-
cial in nature and there is high intensity in the use of manufactured in-
puts. The main crops that are cultivated are onions, chilli, and rice.
Using the livelihood approach, three situations can be distinguished
among farmers: the better-off, the reasonable, and the shortage situa-
tions, as shown in table 5.2.
Farmers classed as better-off have relatively large holdings of irrigated
rice land (sawah), which are on average more than 0.6 hectares in area.
Control over land tends to make holdings larger. The additional land
can come from purchases or the renting-in of arable land owned by the
village. Assets in the form of production equipment consist at the very
least of one water-pumping unit and a sprayer. Since the quantity of rice
produced in one planting season far exceeds the consumption needs of
the family, the greater part of output is sold. The participation of family
labor in the agricultural production process is limited, for these house-
holds tend to rely on paid labor.
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At the very least, wealthy households in the “onion” village of Tirto-
hargo own one motorcycle and one color television. On the whole, they
have valuable goods that are not generally owned by village people, such
as refrigerators, gas stoves, and VCD players. Ownership of consump-
tive goods in these households also tends to increase both in type and
in quantity. The houses of this group are different in physical appear-
ance from those around them, as they have been renovated with more
modern designs or else are two-storeyed. Apart from expenditure on
consumptive goods and house improvements, agricultural income is
also used for investment in things like livestock and agricultural pro-
duction equipment. Social networks of a subsistence nature like rice,
health, and educational programs provided for poor people are not rele-
vant for these households.
Farm households classed as “reasonable” in Tirtohargo own produc-
tion assets that enable them to meet their needs. Their land assets (sa-
wah) range between 100 ru and 200 ru (1,400 to 2,800 square meters).
They own adequate agricultural equipment and generally have a sprayer
Table 5.2 Livelihood situations in Tirtohargo
Livelihood elements
& variables
Livelihood situation
Better off Reasonable Shortage
I. Assets
Land >0.6 ha - expanding 0.14-0.28 ha stable < 0.2 ha, landless
Machinery, tools,
implements
water pump, sprayer sprayer none to borrow/rent
Social status skills moderate to high moderate low to moderate
Access
arrangements
own land, renting
out
own land, sale,
renting
renting
II. Capabilities
Level of income high moderate low
Expenditure-
consumptives
moderate to high moderate to high low to moderate
Saving high, in cattle,
machine
moderate, in cattle low, in cattle
Employment status owner-manager owner-operator tenant laborer
Labor participation high, paid labor
dominant
moderate,
combination family-
paid labor
low-moderate ,
family labor
dominant
III. Needs satisfaction
Wealth high, contrast reasonable low
Basic needs
coverage
exceeding sufficient insufficient
Social network not relevant for
subsistence
for investment for food, education
Source: Primary data 2003
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but not necessarily a water pump. The participation of household mem-
bers in agricultural activities is fairly high, but they also employ paid la-
bor. Laborers are used primarily for activities that would be hard for the
family to handle alone, especially soil preparation and harvesting.
The rice produced by households of this type in Tirtohargo is enough
for staple food sufficiency over a period of one year. The profits from
the commercial cultivation of onions and chilli cover the household’s
non-food economic needs. Additional work undertaken by the house-
hold involves independent economic activities, in particular trade (in
chickens, farm produce, or assorted retail goods). The social networks
used by these households are mainly those connected with production
investment like the farm credit program (KUT).
Households in the “reasonable” category have a minimum of one
cow and own a color television. Their houses are permanent in struc-
ture and floors have been hardened or plastered with cement. These
households do not have any financial difficulties. They can put aside a
part of their income as savings, in the form of either goods or livestock,
with which to rent agricultural land, purchase goods that represent sec-
ondary needs, or renovate their houses.
“Shortage” households do not have any land assets or else they con-
trol a small area of land which they cultivate with simple, limited pro-
duction equipment. The limitations of their production assets make it
difficult for them to improve their socioeconomic position. On average,
the land that they control is less than 2,000 square meters in area. In
status, most of the land that is not their property is rented from the vil-
lage treasury or is office land allocated to village officials.
Households in this group do not have any expensive agricultural
equipment like sprayers and water pumps. They borrow or rent such
equipment from other farmers, neighbors or relatives. They endeavor
to reduce expenditure on paid labor. Family labor has a major role in all
stages of farming, from soil preparation, planting, application of fertili-
zer and pest and weed eradication, to harvesting. Expenditure on paid
agricultural labor for the preparation of land for rice cultivation is una-
voidable and it requires the rental of a hand tractor, including a person
to operate it. All production is consumed by the household itself. Be-
cause the size of holdings is small, the output of rice is frequently in-
sufficient for family requirements over a year. The household often has
to buy additional rice with the money earned from the cultivation of
onions or chilli. These households feel that they have been helped by
the introduction of the social safety network in the form of distribution
of cheap rice to poor families.
The members of shortage households in the onion village of Tirtohar-
go earn additional income mainly by laboring, for example, as agricul-
tural laborers and construction workers. Ownership of valuable goods is
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extremely limited (to a radio). Household furniture is simple; instead of
a set of table and chairs, they have only a long table and sofa. House-
hold ownership of these goods remained virtually unchanged between
the two research periods. This is understandable because the scale of
priorities in meeting needs placed more emphasis on productive as-
pects so as to increase income than on the purchase of consumptive
goods. Hence, if there is a little surplus income, households tend to
save it in the form of investment goods, particularly livestock. A further
consequence of the low income of these households is that efforts and
opportunities to improve their houses are also limited. The houses of
families in this category still have earth floors and unplastered walls
and often do not have their own bathroom and WC.
The shortage group has fragile resistance. Any additional burden of
responsibility will worsen their economic situation. For that reason two
main trends can be distinguished within the group: a trend towards im-
provement and a trend towards decline when faced with the burden of
responsibilities in life. Households that tend to improve are those in
which which the burden becomes steadily smaller, usually because chil-
dren have finished their education or are even working and hence do
not need parents’ assistance. Although they are working, the children of
these households cannot yet help their parents in the short term be-
cause their income (for example, from employment as shop assistants)
is inadequate. The households whose situation tends to decline are
those in which the burden of family responsibilities increases. Young
families whose children are just entering junior high school (SMP) face
higher educational costs. For that reason this group of households
found the social network in the form of educational subsidies very help-
ful during the crisis period.
Livelihood situations in farm households in Giriasih village
Giriasih village is located on a stretch of land in limestone hills that are
infertile and have limited water supplies. The village is situated approxi-
mately 16 kilometers to the southeast of Yogyakarta. Agriculture in this
village consists of a mixture of food crops, secondary crops, and peren-
nials. The main orientation in the cultivation of food and secondary
crops is towards the household’s own consumption. Cash is obtained
from the sale of firewood (especially acacia) and building timber (in par-
ticular teak and sonokeling).
As shown in table 5.3, the better-off households have large land assets
that average more than 1 hectare and include a minimum of 2,500 square
meters of rice land (sawah). These households have increased their land
assets by purchasing land from other farmers. In Giriasih, most of the
farmers who have sold land are those who moved to places outside the re-
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gion or even outside the island. The farm equipment that wealthy house-
holds own is more complete. In addition to a plow and harrow, they have
a sprayer and a thresher. They own at least two cows. Some of their live-
stock are entrusted to other farmers for share-breeding.
In the agricultural production process these households use paid la-
bor for the care (weeding) and watering of crops. Of total rice output, a
minimum of 600 kilograms is used for their own needs; the remainder
represents a surplus. Accumulation households have sufficient capital
to be able to afford to cultivate tobacco, which requires a rather large in-
put of capital for paid labor and crop maintenance as well as for the
purchase of water. In addition to cattle, these households have savings
in the form of high-value stands of teak trees.
Unlike better-off households in the other research areas, ownership
of consumptive goods and stylish houses is not striking. In general, bet-
ter-off households have a color television, but many households in the
reasonable category also have color televisions. Similarly, their houses
do not stand out or differ from those of other households. Differences
Table 5.3 Livelihood situations in Giriasih
Elements & variables Livelihood situation
Better off Reasonable Shortage
I. Assets
Land >1 ha, expanding moderate, expanding small
Machinery, tools,
implements
sprayer, thresher thresher traditional
Social status skills high, teacher, formal moderate, social
activist
common
Access
arrangements
provider share-
breeding
owner share-
breeding
share-breeder
II. Capabilities
Level of income moderate to high moderate low
Expenditure-
consumptives
moderate moderate low
Savings in cattle, land,
teakwood
possible in cattle through share-
breeding
Employment status combination formal
type
self employing-family laborer
Labor participation paid - dominant family - prime family
III. Needs Satisfaction
Wealth high to normal normal poor
Basic needs
coverage
better quality-normal normal low quality-less
Social network remittances to
children
for education,
investment
for food, education
Source: Primary data 2003
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lie in the greater size of their houses and in the larger storage tanks
that they own to catch rain water. Their food consumption patterns re-
veal better quality food items, including eggs and sometimes meat or
chicken, especially on market days. Meat or chicken are purchased
when the wife takes farm products to market.
During the crisis period these households sent remittances to chil-
dren living in urban areas. Besides money to buy materials worth mil-
lions of rupiah, remittances also took the form of building materials or
finished furniture.
The “reasonable” (cukupan) category, which is the middle group in
the socioeconomic strata in the research villages, is found in greatest
numbers in Giriasih. The land assets of these households consist of
both dry fields and rice land and can produce enough to meet the
household’s staple food needs for one year as well as its financial needs
for daily expenses. If the season is good and harvests are successful,
there is still some rice left over from the rice that they have stored. This
rice can be sold to buy fertilizer in the following planting season. On
the whole, these households can set aside a part of their income as sav-
ings. When savings are sufficient, they can be used to raise the house-
hold’s socioeconomic position, to improve the house, to increase live-
stock, or to purchase consumptive goods like a radio or a TV.
Family labor is the main type of labor used in land cultivation by these
households but they also employ paid labor at least for land processing
and harvesting. Family labor is concentrated on crop care, involving tasks
like weeding and the application of fertilizer. Households in the “reason-
able” category have the opportunity to experience gradual improvements
in their socioeconomic status. They own at least one cow and also under-
take the share-breeding of cattle owned by wealthy farmers.
Some of the reasonable households in Giriasih can afford to renovate
or make brick walls for their houses. In general, these households own
a TV or are saving up to buy one. On average they already own a radio
and cassette player as well as standard home furniture like a set of
chairs with a table, a large cupboard, and a buffet cupboard. Their con-
sumption patterns are a little better than those of “shortage” households
in the sense that family members no longer consume cassava and but
eat rice three times a day with additional food of fairly good quality (soy-
bean curd and soybean cake, as well as eggs). Reasonable households in
Giriasih make use of social networks primarily to cover educational
costs. A small number use these networks for animal husbandry. The
sources that they use include farmers’ loans and savings groups, the
farm credit program (KUT), revolving credit associations (arisan), and
remittances.
“Shortage” households in Giriasih can be recognized from the fact
that they cannot afford to purchase drinking water in the dry season.
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The cost of one truckload of water for domestic use, which lasts around
ten days, is Rp 25,000. Members of these households are forced to walk
some distance, descend into caves (luweng) to collect water from under-
ground streams, and then carry it back home. Most have one or more
members employed as agricultural laborers. Women from these house-
holds, when working as laborers, even undertake hoeing for field pre-
paration and gather grass as livestock fodder.
The sawah assets owned by these households are so small that rice
output is insufficient for household consumption. They depend on fa-
mily labor for cultivation of their land. The agricultural equipment that
they own is generally of the traditional type and consists of a plow and
harrow. They still combine rice and cassava in their pattern of food con-
sumption. For that reason the social security network (JPS) in the form
of rice for poor families has helped them with their subsistence needs.
In addition, they receive remittances from household members working
elsewhere outside the area.
These households have no livestock of their own but share-breed ani-
mals owned by wealthier farmers. The poor quality of their houses is
apparent in the earth floors and the absence of a WC. They do not own
any valuable goods or furniture except for a hammock, a cupboard, and
a sofa.
Livelihood situations in farm households in Sidoharjo village
Sidoharjo is one of the villages in Samigaluh Subdistrict in the District
of Kulonprogo. It is located in the Menoreh Hills, some 21 kilometers
to the west of Yogyakarta. Unlike Giriasih, which is situated in an up-
land area in infertile limestone hills with limited water resources, Sido-
harjo has relatively fertile upland agricultural land as well as sufficient
water for both agricultural and domestic needs.
As table 5.4 shows, the better-off households in Sidoharjo have much
in common with the better-off households in the other research areas.
They own large land assets, with holdings averaging 1 hectare or more.
These holdings have become larger through purchases. In managing
their land, they depend on paid labor. The participation of household
members is relatively limited. Sources of household livelihoods involve
combinations with the non-agricultural sector and in particular with the
formal services sector (teachers, village officials, or office-holders),
which also gives these households high social status in the community.
With these patterns of job combinations, households are not physically
involved in agriculture. On the whole, they already own rather expen-
sive agricultural equipment, such as sprayers and threshers. In addition
to using the equipment themselves, they also lend or rent it to other
farmers.
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The better-off households in Sidoharjo can choose commodities of
greater commercial value. In addition to commercial crops like cloves,
cacao, coffee, and vanilla, they cultivate horticultural crops like chilli
and snake fruit (salak) and also manage cattle commercially. The types
of cattle that they choose are those of high sale value. They plant ele-
phant grass for green fodder and mix it with concentrate to improve the
growth of livestock.
In the pattern of enterprises, which is commercial in its characteris-
tics, the economic situation of better-off households differs greatly from
that of surrounding households in such things as the ownership of mo-
torcycles, color TVs, and houses, which are bigger and finer and are
equipped with better furniture. The social safety networks for subsis-
tence purposes are not relevant to these households. They make use of
social networks from formal sources like employees’ cooperatives or vil-
lage banks to improve their businesses.
The households most commonly found among the people of Sidohar-
jo are those in the “reasonable” category. They have sufficient produc-
tion assets to ensure that their household needs are met. The holdings
owned by this group range from 0.25 to 0.5 hectares. Land use is not
concentrated merely on fulfillment of basic food supplies, because food
needs over a one-year period are supplied from one planting season.
Hence in the second planting season they can cultivate secondary crops
like peanuts, soybeans, and corn for sale.
The main source of labor is the household. Paid labor is used for soil
preparation, planting, and harvesting. Family labor is used for pest era-
dication, the application of fertilizer, and weeding. These households
own traditional farm equipment in the form of plows and harrows.
Sprayers can be borrowed. In this group there are households that have
experienced an increase in their business undertakings and so they can
save and increase their investment or production assets. Additional in-
vestment is mainly in livestock (goats or cattle) or in additional produc-
tive land, which involves, for example, the rental (or sharecropping) of
village land or land allocated to village office-holders.
Many of these households have additional employment apart from
farming. Unlike the better-off households, whose non-farm work is gen-
erally in the field of formal services, these households have extra non-
formal jobs that involve self-enterprise, like trade, repair shops, artisans’
work, or cottage industries (for example, the making of geblek cakes and
koro bean-curd cake). With these characteristics, “reasonable” house-
holds have a relatively good socioeconomic situation that is evident in
the structure of houses, which are usually brick or half-brick and owner-
ship of TV sets and adequate household equipment (a set of chairs,
large cupboard, and buffet cupboard). They have social networks invol-
ving remittances from overseas workers (TKI), which are used to fi-
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nance education, and agricultural inputs through the farm credit pro-
gram (KUT).
“Shortage” households in Sidoharjo are characterized by their lack of
land assets. They depend on land that they sharecrop or rent, or on the
assistance of parents. Rented sawah enables them to meet the house-
hold’s subsistence food requirements over a period of one year. For that
reason, the commodities produced on the rented land are more likely to
be food crops, that is, rice, corn, and cassava. The sharecropping system
generally found in Sidoharjo is of the one-fifth type, that is, three-fifths
of the output is used as production capital and the remaining two-fifths
is divided between the landowner and the cultivator. The level of depen-
dence on agricultural land for basic needs is rather high, which means
that, if crop failure occurs, food self-sufficiency is disturbed. That is
why people said that the social network in the form of cheap rice for
the poor has been beneficial.
Table 5.4 Livelihood situations in Sidoharjo
Elements & variables Livelihood situation
Better off Reasonable Shortage
I. Assets
Land 1 ha, expanding 0.25 ha-0.5 ha
expanding
landless,
sharecropper
Machinery, tools,
implements
sprayer, thresher/
rent out
traditional tools
owned
none or limited
simple tools
Social status skills high, teacher/civil
servant
intermediate farmer low, landless farmer
Access
arrangements
owner/renter,
manager
owner-operator laborer, share-
cropper/breeder
II. Capabilities
Level of income high, secure moderate, stable low, insecure,
fluctuate
Expenditure-
consumptive
high (education,
housing)
moderate
(investment)
low (in basic needs)
Saving possible, in
education/land
in cattle-share-
breeding
none
Employment status high, incl. formal
sectors
self-employed laborer
Labor participation paid labor-
dominant/prime
family-dominant family wage work
III. Needs satisfaction
Wealth rich-normal normal/fair poor
Basic needs
coverage
exceed better quality sufficient difficult, low quality
Social network not relevant for
subsistence
for education-
investment
for food/subsistence
Source: Primary data 2003
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These households have only their labor. They do not own even agri-
cultural equipment like plows or harrows, which they borrow or rent.
Virtually the whole process of land cultivation is carried out by house-
hold members. The paid labor of women is used only at rice-planting
and harvesting times. Because of their limited income from the share-
cropping of land, members of survival households combine farming
with employment as laborers of various kinds, such as agricultural la-
borers or laborers who transport timber (glidig-glondong). In the dry
season there is much felling of trees and so there is great demand for
laborers to carry wood. During the wet season they are busy in agricul-
ture, where many farmers need their labor. In addition to laboring,
these households also try to supplement their income by share-breeding
livestock owned by neighbors or wealthier farmers.
The absence of ownership of production assets and the lack of pro-
ductive employment causes the socioeconomic situation of these house-
holds to be low. This is apparent in the physical state of their houses,
which have bamboo walls and earth floors. Ownership of valuable
goods is very much at a minimum and consists merely of a radio and
limited household furniture such as a sofa for guests, a hammock, and
a simple cupboard.
Livelihood situations in farm households in Wonokerto village
Wonokerto is one of the villages in Turi Subdistrict in the District of
Sleman. The land of this village is part of a fertile volcanic foot plain
and is relatively well watered. The village is situated about 16 kilometers
to the north of Yogyakarta. It has good access to communication nodes,
means of transportation, and regional markets.
The households in the “better-off” category in this village (table 5.5)
can be recognized by the size of their agricultural holdings, which are
more than 0.5 hectares in area. They have obtained these larger hold-
ings by purchasing land. Snake fruit is their main commodity. The pro-
cess of conversion of sawah to snake fruit gardens has taken place very
rapidly. Only a few landowners still use their land for rice growing. On
the whole, they are waiting for sufficient capital to convert their land.
The participation of labor from better-off households in agricultural ac-
tivities is relatively limited and involves mainly supervision of the work
of agricultural laborers.
In agricultural equipment they do not differ from other farmers be-
cause the cultivation of snake fruit requires only simple implements.
Furthermore, the laborers who are employed usually bring their own
tools. They differ, however, from other households in the intensity of
use of inputs because of the size of their holdings. The average amount
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of compost that they use is more than 10 truckloads whose value is ap-
proximately Rp 2 million or more per year.
As is the case in the other research villages, there is a tendency for
better-off households to have a combination of occupations, with non-
farm employment in the formal services sector as teachers, public ser-
vants, or employees in private businesses. Besides the fact that their
economic situation is good, these households also have good social sta-
tus within the community. Their better economic situation can be seen
in their ownership of possessions that are not common among the
community such as cars, refrigerators, gas stoves, and VCDs, as well as
houses that are large and modern in their architecture. Hence the sub-
sistence-oriented social security network is not relevant to these house-
holds. They even assist with business capital and send remittances to
their children.
“Reasonable” households own snake fruit gardens of less than 0.5
hectares but the income that they receive is more than sufficient to cov-
er household needs and so none of them belong to the “shortage” cate-
gory. These households also depend on the employment of paid labor,
especially for the application of fertilizer at least twice a year. They dif-
fer from the better-off households in the fact that family labor still plays
a role in cultivation, particularly in the daily pollination and harvesting
of fruit.
The adequacy of the earnings of these households from snake fruit
cultivation is apparent in their ownership of at least one motorcycle per
household as well as a colore television. A few of these households cook
on gas stoves but generally they use kerosene stoves, with only a very
small number still relying on firewood. Their houses generally have per-
manent brick walls, but a small number are not yet plastered. Other
households are currently renovating their houses to make them more
modern in style
Unlike better-off households, those in the “reasonable” category tend
to combine agriculture as a source of income with non-agricultural
work but not in the formal services sector. Most of their non-farm work
is supplementary and consists of non-formal services like trade, driving,
or brokerage.
In general, they still depend on agriculture for household income, of
which at least 60 percent comes from the cultivation of snake fruit. So-
cial networks are quite important in financing production. They can be
formal in nature like the village bank or personal like fruit traders.
Changes in livelihood situations
As a coherent system, livelihood elements contain dynamic concepts
and leave the way open for changes. Between the two research periods
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(1998-2003) in the four villages, village household livelihood situations
generally remained stable. Changes occurred only on a limited scale
and barely touched on the different livelihood elements. The changes
occurring in the five-year period that are presented in table 5.6, can be
divided into two types, namely:
1. The type involving shifts in category, that is, households which
changed after experiencing a significant improvement that placed
them in a higher category or after undergoing deterioration that
shifted them down to a lower category.
2. The improvement/deterioration type, that is, households that, de-
spite experiencing an improvement or deterioration in their liveli-
hood situation, did not change their livelihood category because of
that improvement or deterioration
As table 5.6 shows, there is at least one instance of a change in liveli-
hood category in each village. In Giriasih there was an improvement in
the number shifting from a shortage to a reasonable situation. In the
commercial horticulture area of Tirtohargo there was a greater change,
with an increase in better-off households and a reduction in shortage
households. In Sidoharjo there was a drop in the number of better-off
households. This is traceable to increasing age, which caused household
Table 5.5 Livelihood situations in Wonokerto
Elements & variables Livelihood situation
Better off Reasonable
I. Assets
Land >0.5 ha < 0.5 ha
Machinery, tools/
implements
as required normal
Social status skill high (incl skilled-jobs) common (farmer)
Access arrangements easy, no sharecropping owner, no sharecroppers
II. Capabilities
Level of income high moderate
Expenditure-consumptive high in transport (car) moderate (motorcycle)
Savings high-various types possible-moderate level
Employment status combination, formal jobs combination, self-employed
Labor participation wage labor dominant family labor + wage labor
III. Needs Satisfaction
Wealth highly identifiable significant
Basic needs coverage exceed considerably exceed, moderate level
Social network not relevant for subsistence moderately relevant
(investment)
Source: Primary data 2003
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members to reduce farm activities and withdraw from participation in
agriculture. In the salak-producing village of Wonokerto there were rea-
sonable households that shifted to the better-off category, yet this shift
was accompanied by the fall of several better-off households to the rea-
sonable category. Thus the overall composition remained the same. In
Wonokerto the change occurred because of the presence of an increase
in land assets that were bought from non-farm income savings (cross-
investment). Additional land assets for the cultivation of snake fruit led
to an increase in income and a significant change in the livelihood ele-
ments that were observed, to the point where the households in ques-
tion moved up to the category of well-off families. On the other hand,
the fall in another household was caused by the loss of a non-farm asset
in the form of a vehicle that was sold because the household could not
afford to cover maintenance costs.
Variations in cases were found in the improvement type. Improve-
ment because of external factors was revealed, for example, in the case
of a respondent in Giriasih who obtained severance pay from urban em-
ployment. This money was then invested in the purchase of livestock
and was also used as business capital for trade in timber. Although the
Table 5.6 Changes in livelihood situation 1998-2003 in four villages in the special
region Yogyakarta
Village Livelihood
1998
Livelihood 2003
Better off Reasonable Shortage Total
N % N % N % N %
Giriasih Better off 3 25.00 - - - - 3 25.00
Reasonable - - 7 58.33 - - 7 58.33
Shortage - - 1 8.33 1 8.33 2 16.67
Total 3 25.00 8 66.67 1 8.33 12 100.00
Tirtohargo Better off 3 25.00 - - - - 3 25.00
Reasonable 1 8.33 4 33.33 - - 5 41.67
Shortage - - 1 8.33 3 25.00 4 33.33
Total 4 33.33 5 41.67 3 25.00 12 100.00
Sidoharjo Better off 3 25.00 1 8.33 - - 4 33.33
Reasonable - - 7 58.33 - - 7 58.33
Shortage - - - - 1 8.33 1 8.33
Total 3 25.00 8 66.67 1 8.33 12 100.00
Wonokerto Better off 3 25.00 1 8.33 - - 4 33.33
Reasonable 1 8.33 7 58.33 - - 8 66.67
Shortage - - - - - - - -
Total 4 33.33 8 66.67 - - 12 100.00
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household is still in the reasonable category, this injection of external
capital brought about an improvement in the elements of its livelihood.
Improvements because of internal factors are revealed in the onion-pro-
ducing village of Tirtohargo as a result of a reduction in the burden of
responsibilities (consumptive expenditures). This was possible because
children had completed their education or were already working.
Although the household was still in the survival category, this respon-
dent was able to increase his investment in livestock. Apart from the
fact that its burden had decreased, the change in this household was
also made possible by the flow of remittances to the family. In Sidohar-
jo improvements occurred in the form of additional land assets and di-
versification in employment in the form of establishment of a kiosk in
the market. The main source of the improvement was the combination
of profts from agriculture and remittances. Besides these cases, better-
off households in each village on the whole experienced improvements
in their livelihood situation. Their incomes exceeded their needs and so
they were able to save and invest. This was apparent in their increased
assets of production land and investments in livestock and production
equipment. This increase took place through either reinvestment of
business profits or reinvestment of non-agricultural income.
The livelihood strategies of farm households
Farm households differ in their production orientation. Even for the
same livelihood situation, production orientation can be different. One
household might perhaps feel satisfied with the situation it has already
achieved, while another might still wish to broaden and advance its en-
terprises. To learn how farm households differ in seeking and utilizing
these opportunities for change, the farm household livelihood strategies
approach is used. Strategy, according to the dictionary, is a concept that
was originally used in military circles (Ahmadi 1990). The word is often
taken to mean the same as tactic or method to reach a certain goal or a
procedure that contains within it choices to achieve a certain objective
after costs or sacrifices have been calculated. This concept was then fre-
quently used and expanded in various fields while still keeping to the
basic principle. By identifying livelihood key variables, the strategies of
farm households can be differentiated into three categories, namely, ac-
cumulation, consolidation, and survival strategies.
Accumulation households are those that are oriented to an increase
in income and profit through a widening of and increase in production
assets and commercialization and efficiency in their business activities.
For that reason this type of household tends to be progressive in nature,
to be a risk-taker and to be expansionist. Consolidation households tend
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to feel relatively satisfied, to protect the stability of their production and
socioeconomic assets and to give priority to security and sufficiency in
meeting household needs. They tend to be conservative and to avoid
risk. Survival households are characterized by maximization in the use
of their economic resources so as to meet basic household needs in the
face of the limitations of their economic assets. These limitations and
the demands of daily needs make these households avoid risks and in-
novations. Maximization in the use of resources, especially of labor, can-
not raise survival families to a better standard of living. Table 5.7 pre-
sents the categories and characteristics of farm households based on
their livelihood strategies.
From this table it can be seen that there are significant differences in
livelihood variables between household strategy groups in the four re-
search villages. The households with a survival strategy have minus (-)
Table 5.7 Livelihood variables and incidence rates by type of strategy
Category UL UCT ULER MO CAPA OLM AA SS ASST BN WA NEED
I. Giriasih
Accumulation 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consolidation 0.25 0.13 0.37 0.37 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.37 0.25 0.37
Survival 0.00 -1.0 -1.0 0.00 -0.5 0.00 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
II. Sidoharjo
Accumulation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.80
Consolidation 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.33 0.50 -0.17 0.08
Survival -1.00 -1.0 0.00 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.00 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
III. Tirtohargo
Accumulation 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consolidation 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.13
Survival -0.25 -0.75 -0.25 0.0 -0.25 -0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.75 -0.375
IV. Wonokerto
Accumulation 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75
Consolidation 0.375 -0.125 -0.125 0.50 0.25 0.125 0.25 0.00 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.25
Note:
CAPA (capabilities: patterns of resource use):
UL = use of labor
UCT = use of capital/technology
ULER = use of local/external resources
MO = market orientation
ASST (assets: ownership, relations, access to resources):
OLM = ownership of land/machinery
AA = access arrangements (renting, sharecropping, etc.)
SS = social status/skills
NEED (need satisfaction):
BN = coverage of basic needs/ subsistence level
WA = room for wealth accumulation
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values for a number of variables. This points to a decrease or reduction
in those variables so that the household can maintain fulfillment of ba-
sic needs. This is more obvious in the two upland villages, Giriasih and
Sidoharjo, as it means that opportunities for survival households are
more limited in these two areas than in the lowland villages. In the case
of production assets and access to production activities in these two vil-
lages, a decline has occurred. The reason is that the cost of renting land
has risen while the capacity of the household to pay that rent has re-
mained relatively fixed. Survival households endeavor to maximize the
use of family labor and to reduce expenditure on wages for paid labor.
The fall in their business assets has an impact on production, which is
more focused on satisfying subsistence requirements. The table shows
that survival households tend to experience a drop in capacity to meet
household needs.
Unlike the survival strategy, which tends to involve deprivation, accu-
mulation households experience a strengthening in assets, activities,
and prosperity. These three elements form a dialectic combination. A
rise in production land assets needs more workers and an input of capi-
tal and technology that is also rising. The result is greater output that is
market-oriented in nature. Increases in products and sales lead to an
increase in income, which opens up scope for the accumulation of
wealth.
Livelihoods and the life cycle
The type of household strategy and response to the crisis cannot always
be explained by the livelihood situation alone. Many differences can be
explained only in terms of specific stages in the life cycle of rural
households. It is assumed that stages in the life cycle have their own
impact on the vulnerability or resilience of the household. One life-cycle
stage differs from other stages in level of consumptive needs and ex-
penditure. For example, in a young family, that is, a family with chil-
dren who are still in primary school, the cost of education and care of
children is not as great as in a more mature family whose children have
already completed their primary education. Even so, children do not al-
ways imply costs. In mature and old families, children can even become
family workers and thus a production factor.
In the data presented in this study the life-cycle concept has been
adapted from Chayanov’s life-cycle classification (cf. Titus 2003). The
life cycle is divided into four categories. Young couples are those whose
children are of primary school age. Mature couples are husbands and
wives whose children are at a higher educational level than primary
school. Old couples are husbands and wives whose children no longer
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attend school. Cross-generational couples are families that consist of
grandchildren, father-mother, and grandparents, or only grandparents
and grandchildren.
As table 5.8 shows, the categories of cross-generational couples and
mature couples are dominant and include mainly consolidation house-
holds. In general, cross-generational couples and families represent an
interesting life-cycle stage in the study of the crisis because they are not
found in Chayanov’s classification. The stages in this cycle illustrate
specific sociocultural responses. In Giriasih and Sidoharjo, numbers of
school-aged children were found who had been left with their grandpar-
ents while their parents remained in the city or even went overseas.
Table 5.8 Livelihood strategies and life cycles in four villages in the special region
Yogyakarta
Life cycle Accumulation Consolidation Survival Total
N % N % N % N %
TIRTOHARGO
Young couples - - 1 25.00 1 25.00 2 16.67
Mature couples 3 75.00 2 50.00 2 50.00 7 58.33
Old couples
Cross-generational couples 1 25.00 1 25.00 1 25.00 3 25.00
Total 4 100.00 4 100.00 4 100.00 12 100
GIRIASIH
Young couples - - 1 12.50 - - 1 8.33
Mature couples 1 33.33 1 12.50 - - 2 16.67
Cross-generational couples 2 66.67 6 75.00 1 100.00 9 75.00
Total 3 100.00 8 100.00 1 100.00 12 100.00
SIDOHARJO
Young couples - - - -
Mature couples 1 20.00 3 50.00 1 100.00 5 41.67
Old couples 1 20.00 1 16.67 - - 2 16.67
Cross-generational couples 3 60.00 2 33.33 - - 5 41.67
Total 5 100.00 6 100.00 1 100.00 12 100.00
WONOKERTO
Young couples 1 25.00 3 37.50 4 33.33
Mature couples 2 50.00 4 50.00 6 50.00
Old couples 1 25.00 1 8.33
Cross-generational couples 1 12.50 1 8.33
Total 4 100.00 8 100.00 12 100.00
ALL VILLAGES
Young couples 1 6.25 5 19.25 1 16.67 7 14.58
Mature couples 6 37.50 9 34.61 3 50.00 18 37.50
Old couples 3 18.75 2 7.69 5 10.42
Cross-generational couples 6 37.50 10 38.46 2 33.33 18 37.50
Total 16 100.00 26 100 6 100.00 48 100
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This approach is an attempt to cope with the high cost of living, educa-
tion, and care of children in urban areas. With the same level of expen-
diture for a child’s living costs, the money is more than sufficient if
spent in the village as a remittance. These remittances are larger if the
source of income is overseas employment.
There are indications that those people who adopt this strategy are
mainly from consolidation households, which is understandable in view
of the fact that the children of accumulation households are generally
successful in employment elsewhere and therefore do not need to trou-
ble their grandparents. By contrast, survival families do not have the ca-
pacity to facilitate the education and care of their children.
On the whole, cross-generational families are dominant in Giriasih
but far less common in Wonokerto. This can be taken to mean that in
areas of commercial farming the level of family welfare is already quite
good and so households can encourage married children to live inde-
pendently.
In Giriasih the migration of young, educated people is common and
hence labor is scarce. The trends towards aging and depopulation in
Giriasih are evident in the number of senior couples who live alone.
This has had an impact on land utilization. In Giriasih there are three
types of agricultural land, namely, valley land (ngare) for rice cultivation,
terraced land above the valleys (pereng) for secondary crops, and land
above the terraces for the cultivation of trees (alas). Because of the
shortage of labor, the pereng land is no longer planted with crops but is
left to the cultivation of trees for timber purposes. Meanwhile, farming
is increasingly concentrated on rice land in the valleys. The conse-
quence of aging and depopulation has been a reduction in population
pressure on agricultural land. In time, this trend will open up opportu-
nities for reforestation in Giriasih.
The impact of the crisis and coping responses
Variations in the impact of the crisis
As stated in the introduction, the economic crisis caused a rise in the
cost of inputs and the prices of farm produce in rural areas. Profit or
loss as a result of the crisis was determined by the ratio between agri-
cultural production costs and the prices paid for agricultural products.
The greatest price increases occurred in the case of chemical materials
such as herbicide and pesticide, which meant that farmers tended to re-
duce their use of these two components. Fertilizer prices also went up
but the proportion by which they rose was less than the increase in agri-
cultural commodity prices. Besides that, the system of advancing sup-
plies of fertilizer through the KUT credit program lessened the burden
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for farmers and put the brakes on price fluctuations in the market.
More than that, the crisis had a further effect in that it caused a rise in
the prices of consumptive goods needed by the household. In this case
the heavy burden resulting from the crisis was felt not by the land-
owner but by the cultivator, and particularly by agricultural laborers and
tenant-cultivators whose income from agriculture did not undergo an
increase proportional to the changes in the prices of consumptive com-
modities.
The summary given in table 5.9 of the findings of in-depth interviews
shows that a distinction can be made between the direct and indirect in-
fluences of the crisis. Each type of effect can be applied to production
aspects and also to consumption. The impact of the nature and scope of
the crisis was felt differently, depending on the farm livelihood category
and the characteristics of the household’s life cycle. For that reason
there are differences between those who gained and those who lost be-
cause of the crisis, that is, between winners and losers.
Apart from this, the effects of the crisis were like links in a chain.
The crisis that was felt in cities had an impact in villages. Cases in Gir-
iasih and Sidoharjo show that, to cope with the effects of the urban cri-
sis, parents left children with grandparents in the village. The rise in
the cost of living and of education in the city was overcome by transfer-
ring the burden to the village. With relatively regular remittances, chil-
dren were able to continue their education in the village. The care of
children was also entrusted to grandparents in cases where parents
were employed as overseas workers.
Another effect that was borne by the village occurred in cases where
urban workers were dismissed (PHK). In Giriasih there were two cases
of workers who had been dismissed from employment in a city com-
pany and who went back to the village during the crisis. In both in-
stances the people concerned returned to agriculture. Although in this
case the scale is small, this is in keeping with the BPS assumption that
the agricultural work force increased as a consequence of dismissals.
Nevertheless, remittances also operated in the opposite direction as a
consequence of the crisis, that is, from the village to the city. This hap-
pened in Giriasih, where two accumulation families sent timber for
building purposes to their sons in the city. At the time of the crisis,
building materials in urban areas became very expensive, especially
when the timber in question was teak wood.
Coping responses
The coping responses of households are the short-term responses
which they make as a reaction to an unexpected crisis or to sudden
shocks that could shake their livelihood system.
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A distinction can be made between consumptive and productive cop-
ing responses. Consumptive responses are basically directed towards
ensuring income and sufficiency in consumptive needs. In these re-
sponses there are choices that differ for each of the household liveli-
hood categories. They include the following variables:
– labor force participation: increase – decrease
– employment: specialization – diversification
Table 5.9 Variations in the impact of the crisis
Nature of
impact
Aspects
affected
Form of impact Winners-losers
Negative Positive
Direct
Production Increases in input
prices, esp.
chemicals
(herbicide-
pesticide), and in
production costs:
rental of
equipment and
workers’ wages;
increases in cost
of public services/
facilities: fuel,
transportation and
electricity
Increases in
commodity prices
(greatest in cash
crop commodities,
horticulture,
livestock)
Survival
households in
increasing trouble
because of lack of
capital;
a tendency for
accumulation
households to
make gains
Consumption Increase in prices
of consumptive
goods
Low dependence,
substitution
Survival
households have
social safety
networks
Indirect
Production Tax increases,
decline in
community’s
purchasing power
and demand for
products,
reduction in
business demands
Investment of
severance pay
(PHK) and
additional labor
Accumulation
households face
constraints
because markets
are weak;
survival
households are
not greatly affected
because of their
subsistence
orientation
Consumption Increases in cost
of education and
child maintenance
Remittances to
and from urban
areas
Depends on life
cycle
characteristics and
the migration of
household
members
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– income: maximization – reduction
– savings: accumulation – depletion
– cash-money: lending – borrowing
– consumptive expenditure: increasing – decreasing
– education and health expenditure: increasing – decreasing
Production responses are directed towards optimizing the level of pro-
duction and profit by weighing up the different means of covering of
food needs, marketing opportunities, and business risks. Depending on
the typology of enterprises, productive responsives can cover:
– scale/area: expansion – reduction
– capital: investment – disinvestment
– commodities: specialization – diversification
– production orientation: commercialization – subsistence
– inputs: increase – decrease
– labor: increase – decrease
– production/yield: increase – decrease
– assets in the form of land, cattle, and machinery: increase –
decrease
Both types of coping responses are expressed as net frequency indices
varying between 0 and 1 in either a positive or negative direction, de-
pending on the dominant response pattern displayed by the respective
types of households (see tables 5.10 and 5.11)
Consumptive responses
SUSENAS data for the 1997-1998 period show a rise from 39.72 per-
cent to 60.2 percent in the proportion of people who were working. On
the one hand these figures can be understood as showing an improve-
ment in the regional economy to such an extent that more labor could
absorbed. On the other hand it could also be assumed that the increase
in jobs occurred in the informal sector. The reason is that it was the for-
mal sector that reduced jobs and even dismissed workers.
Labor participation shows differences due to the impact of the eco-
nomic crisis. Labor participation in agriculture can take the form of an
increase in numbers because of a decline in the capacity of the urban
economic sector to absorb labor. An increase in numbers, however,
does not mean an increase in paid labor. A rise in wages, although not
as great as the increase in commodity prices, can actually mean a reduc-
tion in the use of paid labor. This means that increases or decreases
can depend on needs and financial capacity.
As can be seen from table 5.10, in the more commercial agricultural
areas like Tirtohargo, Sidoharjo, and Wonokerto, labor participation, in
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particular that of family labor, tended to decrease in accumulation
households. Accumulation farmers in Tirtohargo tended to shift from
being owner-operators to being owner-managers. The rise in commod-
ity prices and income provided scope for them to rely more on agricul-
tural laborers. Because of the shortage of paid workers, members of ac-
cumulation households in Giriasih were forced to do agricultural work,
although they undertook only minor jobs.
In contrast with accumulation families, farmers in the survival cate-
gory endeavored to maximize the use of their own labor to ensure
household income. In Giriasih, women in the survival category also un-
dertook hoeing in the preparation of agricultural land. In other places
this is rare because work of this kind is normally done by men. The im-
pact of the crisis in agriculture is also the spin-off from the crisis in ur-
ban areas. The severance of work relationships in the city caused people
to return to work in agriculture. Those who had capital from their sever-
ance pay were able to make investments. In Giriasih, respondents from
consolidation households who had been dismissed from employment
as shop attendants in Yogyakarta again took up work as farmers and
Table 5.10 Consumptive coping responses of farm households by livelihood strategy
in four villages in D.I. Yogyakarta
LP ES IM S L/B CE EH
TIRTOHARGO
Accumulation -0.33 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.75
Consolidation 0.75 0.50 0.25 -0.25 -0.25 0.50 0.25
Survival 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 -0.50 0.25
GIRIASIH
Accumulation 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.67 -0.33
Consolidation 0.00 -0.62 0.12 0.25 -0.37 0.37 -0.13
Survival 1.00 -1.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 -1.0
SIDOHARJO
Accumulation -0.40 -0.80 1.00 0.80 0.00 0.80 -0.40
Consolidation 0.17 -0.33 0.33 -0.17 -0.33 0.83 0.33
Survival 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
WONOKERTO
Accumulation -0.20 -0.60 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.80 0.60
Consolidation 0.57 -0.14 0.14 0.29 0.00 0.71 0.29
Survival
L/B = lending/borrowing of money
LP = labor force participation
S = savings accumulation/depletion
ES = employment specialization/diversification
CE = cons. expenditure rising/falling
IM = income maximization/reduction
EH = saving on education and health
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used their severance pay to buy land, livestock, and stands of teak trees.
Other respondents from survival families were dismissed from factories
in Jakarta and returned to work as agricultural laborers. In Sidoharjo
and Giriasih, the participation of accumulation family labor fell because
many workers had migrated overseas as TKI.
Specialization or diversification in work was practiced in different
ways by different household strategy groups. The impact of the crisis
on employment can be the reverse, depending on the level of income
that is obtained. In commercial agriculture the rise in commodity prices
encouraged accumulation households to undertake more specialization
in their work. By contrast, survival households tended to prefer diversi-
fication in work because most undertook production for subsistence
purposes, which meant that a rise in commodity prices did not influ-
ence their income. Specialization in work was determined by the degree
of commercialization and intensity in production. In areas where agri-
culture is more intensive and more commercial like Tirtohargo and Wo-
nokerto, accumulation households tended to specialize in agricultural
work. Intensity in agricultural activities needs greater inputs of time
and management, which leaves virtually no scope for a combination of
jobs. Although agriculture in Wonokerto is also commercial, the pro-
duction pattern in snake fruit cultivation is less intensive by comparison
with that in Tirtohargo, and, for that reason, accumulation farmers were
less specialized. The combination of jobs that they undertook involved
either formal occupations or employment based on capital and self-reli-
ance (entrepreneurship), which give high returns. These jobs included
work as employees in the private sector, traders, sellers of noodles and
meat-balls (bakso), and brokers.
In contrast with accumulation households, survival households were
generally less specialized. Unlike accumulation households, they under-
took diversification and combination of jobs in the types of employment
that yield inadequate returns, like laborers who carry timber, carpenters,
and the like.
Income maximization as an effect of the crisis did not occur evenly.
Accumulation households are characterized by efforts to maximize in-
come because they own business assets and have access to business op-
portunities and sources of income. The impact of the crisis, which
caused the prices of food crops and livestock to rise, gave them addi-
tional business capital to increase their incomes. As the table shows, ac-
cumulation households in the four villages tended to obtain opportu-
nities to maximize profits as a consequence of the crisis. The rise in
the prices of commercial agricultural commodities was also strength-
ened by the growth in needs during the holiday period and the Idul Fi-
tri public holidays. Attempts to maximize income included the pur-
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chase of arable land and livestock and also of agricultural equipment
for rental purposes.
Survival households are the opposite of accumulation households.
They lack the capability to maximize income because of the low level of
their assets and the weakness of their access to income sources. Survi-
val households did not benefit from the crisis that caused commodity
prices to rise because they concentrated on the cultivation of subsis-
tence food crops. Even though the prices of food crops rose, they did
not sell their products.
Increased savings occurred during the crisis period in accumulation
households rather than in households that adopted other strategies, the
reason being differences in asset ownership and production orientation.
The crisis had an impact on increases in income, particularly among ac-
cumulation households. These households increased their savings in
various forms, depending on the character of the region. Savings can
be in the form of money, which is saved or put aside, jewelry, livestock,
land as a business asset, and other goods. In Giriasih, savings also take
the shape of stands of teak trees in agro-forestry areas.
The pattern among consolidation households is not very clear. Some
experienced an increase in savings, even though the amount was far
smaller than in accumulation households, while others reduced their
savings in the face of the crisis. On the other hand, survival households
experienced a drop in savings, especially in livestock. They sold the ani-
mals, thinking that the high prices brought about by the crisis would
cover their daily needs.
Lending and borrowing in the four research villages tended to be-
come increasingly less common. Perhaps this happened because of the
availability of institutions that supplied loans in rural areas such as aris-
an groups, cooperatives, the farm credit program (KUT) and so on. An
arisan group is an informal rotating credit association, and based on
regular contributions of small savings from the members. Thus it was
easy to obtain immediate cash for sudden needs to the value of
Rp 100,000 in Giriasih. Accumulation households did not experience
any financial difficulties. In the four research villages the access of
some of these households to loans from the village unit bank was quite
easy. In fact, in Wonokerto bank officials often visited accumulation
households to invite them to borrow from the bank, although the
households already had sufficient capital and did not need loans.
Survival households obtained loans from various sources, especially
less formal sources, like neighbors, traders, the arisan, savings and loans
groups, and the like, which have more flexible ties. Advance loans for
production inputs through the KUTprogram were rarely used by survival
farmers. In Sidoharjo, survival households did not dare make use of this
program because they feared that, if their crops failed, they would be
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trapped in debt. During the crisis period, survival farmers tended to
economize in their use of inputs. In this matter of loans the proportion
of consolidation households that borrowed was higher than that of survi-
val households. The reason was that survival households often did not
dare to borrow because of uncertainty in sources of income to repay the
loan. Consolidation households, however, were willing to borrow because
they had assets or financial resources that could be used to repay loans.
The increase in income as a consequence of the crisis was generally ex-
perienced by accumulation households. In Sidoharjo the prices of com-
mercial commodities like cloves, coffee, and vanilla underwent a substan-
tial rise. Nevertheless, this increase was felt specifically by accumulation
farmers since not every household produced those commodities. Survival
households tended to give priority to the cultivation of sawah through the
sharecropping system. The same applied to producers of chilli and onions
in Tirtohargo and snake fruit in Wonokerto. Apart from the impact of the
crisis, the rise in prices was strengthened by the occurrence of public holi-
days and other holidays. As a consequence, consumptive expenditure in-
creased for the accumulation group. An increase in consumptive spend-
ing was also apparent among consolidation households, although the pro-
portion by which it rose was smaller than in the case of accumulation
households. Consumptive expenditure among survival households
tended to fall as they sought to economize. Survival households felt that
they benefited from the social safety net that provided cheap rice.
In the case of consumptive expenditures for education and health,
the effects of the crisis did not show a definite pattern, as table 5.10 re-
veals. It can be assumed that, apart from the existence of the social
safety net in social and health matters, the life cycle also exerted a cer-
tain influence. In older households whose children already had their
own families and no longer lived with parents, educational and health
costs dropped quite significantly. In young households expenditure on
education and health rose, although not very greatly because costs for
children of school age were relatively small. In mature households ex-
penditure on education and health generally rose.
In the case of elderly couples expenditure was smaller on the whole
because children already had their own households or at least had com-
pleted their education. Old couples were frequently asked to mind chil-
dren in Jakarta. They were also often asked to look after grandchildren
who were entrusted to their care by the parents because expenses in the
city went up as prices rose. In this case there was a transfer of crisis im-
pact from the city to the village as part of the livelihood strategy.
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Productive responses
It is likely that expansion in scale and/or area occurred among certain
household groups. The crisis had an impact on income, which rose be-
cause the sales value of commodities also rose. It was accumulation
households that mainly felt the benefits. On the whole, they expanded
the cultivated area and scale of their farm undertakings. In Tirtohargo,
increases in area and scale were undertaken by the young group be-
cause of the intensive nature of farming and the high labor input. Older
accumulation households tended not to be expansionist. An increase in
area was most dominant in Giriasih, where the age of farmers is irrele-
vant because of the less intensive nature of agriculture. Besides that,
most of the land that was purchased was community forest land that
did not require much care.
As table 5.11 shows, expansion in the area and scale of agricultural
undertakings was not as great among consolidation households as it
was among accumulation households. In Giriasih, buying and selling
transactions on the whole included a shift in ownership status. In other
Table 5.11 Productive coping responses by relative incidence and livelihood strategy
in four villages in D.I. Yogyakarta
SA N S/D M/S CI LI PO A
TIRTOHARGO
Accumulation 0.33 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00
Consolidation 0.60 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.75
Survival 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.30 -0.30 0.25 1.00
GIRIASIH SA IN S/D M/S Ci Li Po A
Accumulation 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consolidation 0.25 0.25 -0.25 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.37 0.50
Survival 0.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SIDOHARJO SA IN S/D M/S Ci Li Po A
Accumulation 0.80 0.60 0.20 0.80 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.80
Consolidation 0.50 0.50 -0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.83
Survival -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00
WONOKERTO SA IN S/D M/S Ci Li Po A
Accumulation 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80
Consolidation 0.29 -0.14 1.00 1.00 0.00 -0.14 0.14 0.29
SA = scale/area expansion or reduction
CI = capital inputs increase/decrease
IN = investment/disinvestment
LI = labor inputs increase/decrease
S/D = specialization/diversification of products
Po = production output increase/decrease
M/S= market/subsistence orientation
A = asset expansion (land, cattle, machines, transport)
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areas, additions to scale and area were of a temporary nature and in-
volved non-private land that usually consisted of village and office land.
The tenancy system in Sidoharjo was based on one-fifth sharecropping.
In Tirtohargo and Wonokerto, which are commercial farming areas, the
rental of land occurred and was based on money.
Survival households tended not to undertake an increase in scale. In
Sidoharjo there was even a reduction in scale and in the area of rented
land, the reason being that households could not afford the necessary
production costs as a consequence of the crisis. The proportion that ex-
perienced the greatest increase was in Tirtohargo, yet the scale of in-
crease was small and on land that was not of good quality.
The strengthening of investment in agricultural production varied
somewhat from one area to another. Investment covered the purchase
of farm equipment like sprayers and water pumps in Tirtohargo, invest-
ment in land and livestock in Giriasih and Sidoharjo, and investment in
land and transportation in Wonokerto.
A change in investment occurred on a smaller scale among consoli-
dation households than it did among accumulation farmers. In Tirto-
hargo, investment was mainly in agricultural equipment like sprayers
and water pumps. The same was true in Sidoharjo, where investment
was made in draft animals, plows, and harrows. On average, investment
in Giriasih was relatively smaller than among accumulation households.
Some households even lost their investments when they felled trees for
sale because they needed money. During the crisis, for example, there
was one instance of a wedding, the cost of which took the whole of the
household’s savings in the form of stands of teak.
Specialization and diversification in agricultural production are deter-
mined by profits and the commercial orientation of production. Accu-
mulation households tended towards specialization in production.
There would appear to have been a tendency towards specialization as
production became increasingly commercial in orientation, as happened
in Tirtohargo and Wonokerto. By contrast, in Giriasih the agricultural
approach of accumulation farmers was not specialized and was adoptive
towards new kinds. The crops that were chosen were those that experi-
enced a rapid rise in prices in times of crisis, such as ginger in Giriasih
and snake fruit in Sidiharjo. Thus the crisis had an effect on the adop-
tion of the types of commodities whose prices had undergone substan-
tial increases.
In the more commercial areas and particularly in Wonokerto, the pro-
duction pattern of consolidation households tended towards specializa-
tion. The same was true in places like Tirtohargo that were a little defi-
cient in resources, whereas in upland Giriasih and Sidoharjo the trend
was towards diversification. In Tirtohargo, where chilli and onions were
cultivated for sale, there was a high level of commercialization. Rice is
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usually grown to meet household needs among consolidation and survi-
val farmers. For accumulation farmers, rice is a “default” commodity,
because in the wet season, land is submerged and difficult to drain,
which makes it impossible for onions and chilli to flourish.
Survival households applied a more diversified production pattern in
order to supply their basic household needs. In Tirtohargo, besides
growing rice, chilli, and onions, consolidation households also planted
other food crops like lentils and corn.
Production orientation (market or subsistence) revealed a different ef-
fect stemming from the crisis. On the whole, accumulation households
had a commercial or market orientation and they made efforts to reach
wider markets. The sale of snake fruit in Wonokerto, for example, was
expanded through outlet kiosks located on the roads leading in and out
of Yogyakarta and through marketing outside the region. In less com-
mercial areas like Sidoharjo and Giriasih, accumulation households
marketed their products themselves. Wives took on an additional job as
traders or else they opened kiosks in the market.
Survival households tended to be subsistence oriented. Although a
rise occurred in the prices of agricultural commodities, they had neither
a surplus to sell nor the capacity to undertake selling. In Giriasih, the
effect of the crisis was an increase in commodity prices. The price of
dried cassava (gaplek) went up almost three times, rising from Rp 250
to Rp 725 per kilogram, while corn went from Rp 500 to Rp 1,500. But
survival households tended to keep their products as food reserves, in
addition to stores of rice.
Investment capital was also affected by the crisis. The capital invested
in inputs by accumulation households went up because of the crisis-in-
duced price rise, especially for the various types of pesticide. Neverthe-
less, these farmers continued to buy it, whatever the price. The cost of
purchases was made a little lighter by the farm credit program, which
provided advances for agricultural inputs. Consolidation households re-
duced their use of inputs to the point where the need for investment ca-
pital remained the same. These households gave greater priority to con-
tinuity and security in undertakings in other sectors like education and
to the need for consumptive goods. A fairly large increase in investment
occurred among consolidation households in Tirtohargo in the form of
agricultural equipment (water pumps) and livestock.
The capital invested by consolidation households tended to remain
the same. The rise in the prices of inputs did not cause much disrup-
tion in villages like Sidoharjo and Giriasih, where intensity in the use
of inputs was not very high. Furthermore, in these two villages the role
of the farm credit program gave sufficient assistance through advances
of farm inputs. In villages where there was high intensity in the use of
inputs, a reduction in capital investment occurred. The same pattern ap-
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peared in the use of labor, whereas the response of survival households
to the crisis was to reduce the use of inputs and paid labor. Survival
households did not dare use the credit advances from the farm credit
program because they felt worried about the installments they would
need make in order to repay the credit.
The crisis affected labor inputs in agriculture in the level of wages
and also in the availability of laborers. The input of paid labor on the
land of accumulation households tended to rise. Part of this increase
was traceable to the fact that family members reduced their work in agri-
culture, while part was due to expansion in the scale of undertakings.
Consolidation households responded by maintaining the situation as far
as labor inputs were concerned. Consolidation households in Wonokerto
in fact reduced their use of paid labor, while consolidation households
in Tirtohargo did the same, as long as the production process was not
disturbed. On the other hand, survival households tended to increase fa-
mily labor participation in order to obtain additional income or to reduce
production costs. They did this because, while the crisis had an impact
in the form of the increased prices of goods, they themselves did not en-
joy the increased value of agricultural commodities.
Agricultural yields and production also proved to have been influ-
enced by the crisis. Unlike the assumption that agricultural production
must have experienced a drop because of the high cost of inputs, statis-
tical records show that production of rice, soybeans, and corn actually
rose. Data from the four research villages have also shown that there
was a rise in production, although it was mainly accumulation house-
holds that experienced the increase. This increase occurred primarily
because of expansion in the area under cultivation. The accumulation
households that did not expand the scale of farming were mainly those
that had begun to withdraw from agricultural activities because of ad-
vanced age.
Consolidation households made a different response in the matter of
farm output. They tended to safeguard consumption needs and to re-
main at whatever production level they had previously achieved. In-
creased production occurred mainly in Tirtohargo. The response of con-
solidation households that experienced an increase was a little better
than that of survival households; nevertheless, it was not large by com-
parison with accumulation households. Most of these households
tended to ensure that production remained stable.
Changes in the area and scale of agricultural undertakings had an im-
pact that was not in proportion to the production of survival house-
holds, because it was not accompanied by increased investment or by a
reduction in invested capital, as happened in Tirtohargo. On the whole,
there was no increase in production as a response from survival house-
holds.
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An increase in household assets occurred because of increased in-
come as a result of the rise in commodity prices. This increase was ex-
perienced mainly by accumulation families and took various forms. In
Giriasih, increased assets were in the form of land because people who
moved from the area sold their agricultural holdings. In Tirtohargo, the
increase in assets consisted mostly of agricultural production equip-
ment like sprayers and water pumps. In Sidoharjo, the additional assets
were mainly livestock, while in Wonokerto additional assets took the
form of vehicles for transportation purposes, with a small proportion in
the form of land.
In a number of accumulation and consolidation households in Giria-
sih and Sidoharjo there was a reduction in assets, but this was not a di-
rect consequence of the crisis. The reduction occurred, for example, in
the contribution and transfer of timber to the city for construction of an
adult child’s house. This was done because of the high price of building
materials, especially wood, during the crisis. In other words, there was
a remittance flow that was the reverse of the conventional pattern, in
which it is generally understood that remittances always originate in the
city and go to the village, rather than the other way around.
Conclusions
The following conclusions might be drawn from the proceedings ana-
lyses:
1. The crisis clearly varied in its impact on agriculture. There was a di-
rect effect connected with the structure of production in the form of
an increase in the price of inputs and an increase in selling prices
for agricultural commodities. The profit or loss accruing to the
farmer depended on the intensity of use of inputs and the level of
commercialization of production. The greatest profit was obtained
from commodities for which the use of inputs was not very inten-
sive but which had high commercial value. Apart from the “terms
of trade” between agricultural inputs and products, profit was also
counterbalanced by the rise in the prices of other comsumptive
goods.
2. The system of intensive commercial horticulture was most vulner-
able to the crisis because it faced an increase in the cost of inputs
and a fall in the purchasing power of the community. The system
of subsistence food crops combined with agro-forestry or perennials
has proven to be more resistant to the impact of a crisis. The sys-
tem of commercial production of perennials or commercial horti-
culture whose production inputs were relatively small and consisted
of organic matter actually benefited from the crisis because the cost
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of inputs remained relatively fixed while the value of the (exported)
commodities rose.
3. The effects of the crisis also varied with the livelihood strategies of
farm households. Accumulation households gained greater profits
because of higher commodity prices, whereas survival households
tended to be weakened by the crisis. Because of their limited assets,
the latter concentrated on subsistence food crops, which were fre-
quently not sufficient for household consumption over a period of
one year. These households also could not benefit from the rise in
the value of some food commodities while they still had to bear the
burden of increased costs for production inputs (sometimes bought
with side incomes from non-farm jobs).
4. Besides demonstrating rural resilience, the crisis also strengthened
the function of villages as a buffer between the urban community
and the local economy. In certain cases, the crisis gave rise to a flow
of remittances from the village to the city in the form of both
money and materials. The rural situation offered a solution for
households that felt the pressure of the crisis in the city, for they
were able to transfer the burden to the village, that is, by moving
children and entrusting their schooling to grandparents living in
the village. Apart from this, the village also became a buffer for the
city by absorbing workers who had been dismissed from jobs in the
urban formal sector.
5. Accumulation households were not always characterized by expan-
sionism in farming. Some of them tended to be conservative and to
withdraw from intensification in agricultural production because of
advanced age. Households were able to move from the survival to
the consolidation category because their children had become inde-
pendent. For that reason changes in livelihood category sometimes
occurred not because of changes in livelihood aspects but because
of the life cycle.
6. The crisis had a differential effect on the choice of agricultural com-
modities. Farmers in Sidoharjo and Giriasih adopted new commod-
ities like snake fruit and ginger, for which there was a substantial
price increase during the crisis period, whereas other farmers in
commercial areas felt no need to change the commodities that they
had been cultivating, or were caught in rigid food crop systems that
were difficult to transform without high investments.
7. The combination of agricultural and non-agricultural employment
represents a flexible livelihood situation. Accumulation households
often had other non-agricultural occupations that tended to be of a
formal nature (employment as public servants and private employ-
ees), while consolidation households tended to have additional work
that was self-enterprising (in trade, cottage industries, and broker-
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age) and survival households did extra work as manual laborers
without capital (that is, as timber-carrying laborers, agricultural la-
borers, and construction workers). With this type of job combina-
tion, survival households benefited the least during the crisis be-
cause their real wages as laborers remained relatively fixed.
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6 Livelihood Strategies, Responses to the Crisis,
and the Role of Non-Agricultural Activities in Five
Villages in the Special Region of the Yogyakarta
R. Rijanta
Introduction
The connection between livelihood systems and coping strategies at var-
ious social levels and in various types of economies and regions has be-
come an important issue in the discussions on the effects of the eco-
nomic crisis in Indonesia. Strategies to handle the crisis as a part of
livelihood strategies are defined as the efforts of households or indivi-
duals to manage their natural capital, physical capital, economic capital,
and social capital in earning a livelihood through attempts to control de-
creases, to find solutions to constraints and to utilize the opportunities
that appear in daily life (Davis 2003 and 2004; Chambers 1989; DFID
1999). Non-agricultural activities play an increasingly important role as
a consequence of the growing strength of the processes of regional inte-
gration, commercialization, and diversification (cf. Niehof 2004). In a
situation of crisis it is necessary to know whether the non-agricultural
sector offers adequate flexibility or opportunities as one means of over-
coming the crisis (cf. Gordon 1999; Barrett et al. 2001, Lanjouw & Lan-
jouw 2001; Wandschneider 2003; Davis & Bezemer, 2003 and 2004).
The purpose of the present study is to make a contribution to this
discussion from a socio-spatial perspective. The research was underta-
ken in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) and includes urban and
rural villages. It focuses attention on differences in livelihood strategies,
the impact of the crisis, strategies to deal with the crisis, the dynamics
of livelihood strategies, and the role of non-agricultural activities as part
of the household’s livelihood strategies during the crisis period.
The research was carried out in two stages, in 1998 and 2003. The
first stage was undertaken at the beginning of 1998, at a time when
the Indonesian community had not yet felt the worst effects of the cri-
sis. A return visit was made to the villages in 2003, when respondents,
who had been chosen in a purposive manner to represent all house-
hold levels, were interviewed. The number of respondents was reduced
rather drastically, but interviews were of an in-depth nature and in-
cluded retrospection concerning household changes over the preceding
five years.
Interviews focused on asking what changes had occurred in the
household’s economic activities and demographic structure during the
five-year period. Analysis was done by means of cross tabulation and in-
dexing in order to simplify the presentation of each variable in liveli-
hood strategies and dynamics over space and time. Part of the analysis
results have been presented visually through tables, making it easy to
examine them in order to observe the patterns of household responses
and dynamics. Interpretation of the tables has been done with the assis-
tance of field notes from in-depth interviews and with the help of cer-
tain relevant theories.
The setting of research villages
The variations in the agroeconomic conditions of DIY have been simpli-
fied into four categories: the upland area with extensive dry farming,
the upland area with intensive dry farming, the lowland plain with in-
tensive rice cultivation, and the lowland plain on which non-rice crops
are cultivated and irrigated rice fields (sawah) are not the dominant
form of land use. In addition to these four types of regions and villages,
a fifth research village has been added to represent villages on the ur-
ban periphery. The characteristics of each of the research villages have
been generalized below.
Tepus village represents the agroeconomic type in which an upland
area has agricultural activities of an extensive nature that depend on
rainfall. This type produces subsistence commodities like secondary
crops, firewood, handicrafts, and building materials. It represents the
part of DIY that is most backward and most isolated from the center of
economic activities. Out-migration and circular migration are the most
common forms of population mobility. Diversification in village life is
greatly limited by the low population threshold and physical isolation
from the center of the regional economy.
Wonokerto village is located on the slopes of Merapi volcano in the
District of Sleman. This village was chosen to represent an upland
agroeconomic area with intensive agricultural activities. The commer-
cial commodities that are produced include snake fruit, cloves, cocoa,
vegetables, mushrooms, and spices as well as firewood, handicrafts,
and building materials. Population movement from this village to the
nearest town is undertaken to obtain production inputs, to handle mar-
keting and to obtain social, economic and commercial services. Labor
shortages are a problem at the present time, right when commercial
and intensive expansion of the agricultural sector is leading to a rise in
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community welfare. The explosion of investment in the agricultural sec-
tor has improved livelihoods substantially. This can be seen from the
appearance and quality of housing materials, the self-reliant capacity of
the community, ownership of motor vehicles, capacity to pay for higher
education, the frequency of pilgrimages by members of the community
and fulfilment of various tertiary needs. Expansion in livelihood diversi-
fication in this village was triggered by the simultaneous diversification
and commercialization of agriculture.
The intensive sawah area is represented by Srimulyo village in Piyun-
gan Subdistrict. Rice is the most important crop as a source of subsis-
tence, income, and employment. Technically irrigated sawah form the
basis of agricultural activities in this agroeconomic region. The charac-
teristics and nature of livelihood diversification in this village differ
greatly from those in other villages, specifically in the allocation of re-
sources and the relationship between the agricultural and non-agricul-
tural sectors at the household level. This relationship is increasingly
complex if the proximity of the village to the city of Yogyakarta is taken
into account. In this village, commuting to Yogyakarta is an important
part of livelihood strategies involving non-farm activities. It has been
postulated that villages based on wet rice cultivation can develop a high
degree of diversification because of the regularity in time allocation in
agriculture as a result of the use of irrigation (cf. Braay, 1986).
Brosot village was selected to represent the non-intensive lowland
agricultural type. Sawah are not the dominant form of land use in this
agroecological region, where the agricultural sector relies on the cultiva-
tion of perennials, with annuals grown on home lots (pekarangan) and
dry fields (tegalan). Only a few village people own sawah land, part of
which is located outside the village. Given the limited agricultural re-
sources of the village, diversification in livelihoods towards the non-
agricultural economy is a necessity if people are to meet subsistence re-
quirements. The variety in livelihood diversification in this village has
been determined by its relative location and its history as a subregional
economic center since colonial days. Village industrial activities in the
form of food processing rely on markets in the local area, which has a
high population density, or else on markets in Yogyakarta, which are ea-
sily reached by good public transport services.
In morphological terms, Maguwoharjo village is a part of the city of
Yogyakarta, although administratively it is an autonomous village in Sle-
man District. Agricultural activities are still to be found in certain parts
of the village, where food crops, including vegetables, are produced for
sale in Yogyakarta. Economic and spatial transformation has occurred
extremely rapidly and is marked by the emergence of urban-oriented
forms of land use and by the appearance of non-farm economic activ-
ities. One aspect has been the rapid change in the local people’s eco-
LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES, RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS 155
nomic activities as the non-agricultural economy becomes increasingly
important due to large-scale service activities.
By comparing the background, structure, process and consequences
of rural diversification in the four rural villages with Maguwoharjo as a
control, it is possible to obtain a full picture of the diversity in house-
hold responses to the crisis. Similarly, the dynamics and varieties of rur-
al diversification in the rural villages can be understood more clearly be-
cause contrasting comparisons are available.
Livelihood conditions and household strategies
Types of livelihood conditions
The conditions and strategies of household livelihoods in the present
study are differentiated into three types, based on the influence of
household livelihood variables that cover household assets, activities,
and capabilities (Ellis 2000; Davis 2003; Start & Johnson 2004). Assets
or capital are represented by the natural conditions of the village (natur-
al capital), ownership of land, machinery, production equipment and
the work place (physical capital), human resources within the house-
hold (human capital), social networks (social capital), and financial capi-
tal. These assets are mobilized by the household through various activ-
ities that use certain strategies in the context of achieving the house-
hold’s livelihood objectives.
From the analysis of household activities, assets, and capabilities,
three types of household livelihood situations can be distinguished in
the research area, namely, a mere survival situation, a consolidation si-
tuation, and an accumulation situation. The table in annex 1 gives a
generalized description of the characteristics of each household in the
three livelihood situations. The results of the study show a consistent
pattern in which the majority of households in all villages fall into the
consolidation category. Approximately half of all households are in-
cluded in this category, while, of the rest, about a quarter are accumula-
tion households and a quarter are in the survival category (table 6.1).
Households in the mere survival situation tend to own very limited
assets and to be involved in economic activities of low productivity and
social status. In meeting subsistence needs they work hard to maxi-
mize the use of both land and non-land household resources. For that
reason they can achieve only the short-term objectives of life. The
most important characteristic of this group is its expenditure pattern,
more than 50 percent of which is dominated by foodstuffs. These
households, which tend to have a relatively large number of members,
consist of people of both productive and non-productive age, but com-
position is unbalanced. They participate very little in social obligations
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and many make use of local, informal social networks in solving liveli-
hood problems.
The households in the survival situation belong to extremely small
farmers who combine farming with non-agricultural work that is not
very lucrative. Landless households that depend entirely on non-agricul-
tural activities also constitute an important part of this group. Survival
households have a heavy demographic burden and experience uncer-
tainty in obtaining income, which means that they are chronically in
debt within their social network, and many of them are the target of the
government’s social security programs.
Consolidation households have sufficient land and non-land re-
sources to enable them to meet their subsistence needs. Households in
this category have a rather high social status and lucrative non-agricul-
tural work, which enables them to undertake consolidation to achieve
medium-term and long-term objectives. This is reflected in their low ex-
penditure on foodstuffs, but relatively large outlay on education, basic
health services, energy, and transportation. Households in the consoli-
dation situation utilize resources in reaching medium-term and long-
term goals through the local, non-local, and more formal social net-
works. Although consolidation households have control over rather lim-
ited assets, they can achieve a standard of living above subsistence
needs. The consolidation strategy that they undertake involves efforts to
maintain the living standards that they have already attained but with-
out putting aside long-term objectives through investment in their chil-
dren’s education or the construction of production facilities and the
purchase of land.
The increase in educational costs has made most of the consolidation
households redefine their priorities between meeting children’s educa-
tional requirements and meeting other needs. Consolidation house-
holds have a fixed source of income at a level above subsistence, but
Table 6.1 Classification of the household livelihood situation in the five villages,
1998 and 2003
Livelihood situation
Name of village Accumulation Consolidation Survival
1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003
Brosot 3 3 5 6 4 3
Maguwoharjo 3 3 5 4 4 5
Srimulyo 3 2 6 8 3 2
Tepus 3 1 5 6 4 5
Wonokerto 2 3 6 6 4 3
Total 14 12 27 30 19 18
Source: Survey data, 1998 and 2003
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they have to bear the cost of the education and health of children of
school age.
Accumulation households have strong control over abundant re-
sources in the form of land and non-land assets as well as access to in-
formation about prospective business opportunities. Livelihood diversi-
fication is intended to expand and strengthen the basis of the house-
hold economy. This group has control over a large amount of land. The
basis of the economy of households in this category consists of medium
or large-scale non-farm undertakings involving large capital or employ-
ment that requires expertise and has high social status, which makes
their income also high. The households in this group are quite respon-
sive to change and are progressive in grabbing opportunities to improve
their situation despite high risks. The household expenditure pattern is
dominated by non-primary and non-food needs, such as energy, higher
education, and modern health services. Their social network is utilized
to obtain non-economic advantages. This group does not make use of
its social network to overcome financial problems.
Households with accumulation characteristics adopt long-term mea-
sures similar to those of consolidation households but with greater in-
tensity and capital support. They respond to crisis conditions by invest-
ing in cash crops, production equipment, and the construction of places
of business. Another matter that distinguishes accumulation from con-
solidation households is the more advantageous demographic setting of
the former. The household head is usually of mature age, with children
who are already grown up. Some have grandchildren living with them.
Income obtained from non-agricultural sources is used to carry out
further accumulation. For other households in the accumulation cate-
gory, the non-farm economy is the main source of livelihood, while
agriculture tends to be carried out as a secondary activity or to be
handed over to other people through sharecropping (Hart 1980; Evans
& Ngau 1991). They control land as a form of accumulation to obtain
social status or for long-term speculation.
The characteristics of livelihood strategies between villages
If the variations between the research villages are examined, a number
of interesting trends can be found in household livelihood strategies.
Even in a crisis situation, there are still a few households that are able
to undertake accumulation in several different forms. The rural house-
holds able to undertake accumulation in meaningful amounts were
found in the villages of Brosot, Maguwoharjo, and Wonokerto, which
are discussed below.
Accumulation in Brosot was done through non-farm activities in re-
sponse to the need for goods and services that originally came from the
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city. Among these urban goods and services that are now provided in
the village are furniture, certain building materials, household equip-
ment, food for special celebrations, and services like beauty salons and
computer rental for schoolchildren. The crisis, which had caused the
prices of manufactured goods to rise, apparently provided an opportu-
nity for well-off households to supply substitutes for certain goods and
services. Among the most noticeable services provided by local house-
holds are catering and food processing for ceremonial meals and par-
ties. Since the crisis certain kinds of food for parties have been supplied
by local households that have the necessary capital and skills. These op-
portunities have encouraged the households concerned to persevere ser-
iously in the catering business by investing in the purchase of cake-
making utensils and party equipment. Other households have underta-
ken accumulation through telecommunication services in the form of
communication kiosks (wartel). The households that own a telecommu-
nications business also have a strong base in the form of agricultural re-
sources. In size their holdings are around 1 hectare of sawah with a
home lot of 0.5 hectares, which is large by the standards of these vil-
lages and of Java. The share percentage with the government for wartel
has already decreased and the business has been less profitable since
the crisis. Apart from that, there has also been a relaxation in the per-
mit system for the establishment of new wartel. Nevertheless, since the
crisis there has also been an increase in the number of customers for
international communications because many families have members
who are employed as Indonesian workers (TKI) in Kuwait, Saudi Ara-
bia, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, and Brunei. Because of an increase
in the number of TKI from surrounding villages, the increase in de-
mand for telecommunication services can be said to be a further conse-
quence of the crisis that brought profits to those households that owned
telecommunications businesses.
Meanwhile, the Brosot households in the consolidation category have
endeavored to maintain their standard of living and their economic ac-
tivities primarily by undertaking specialization in the non-agricultural
sector. It appears that non-farm activities were the final course by which
consolidation households could maintain their lives as before. A similar
situation prevailed among survival households, which tended to hold
down consumption and to maximize the use of family labor in order to
achieve subsistence. The pattern of operations of non-farm activities
that they adopted became more aggressive in reaching marketing loca-
tions in distant places. This is particularly relevant in the case of makers
and sellers of ice cream in this village.
The Maguwoharjo households that undertook accumulation are the
owners of lodgings for university students. The crisis provided a big
economic opportunity for local people who owned boarding accommo-
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dation. Several regions outside Java that are students’ places of origin
experienced a boom in income from export commodities, for most of
these commodities underwent a significant rise in their rupiah value, to
the point where both smallholders outside Java and the owners of stu-
dent accommodation in Yogyakarta regarded the crisis as a blessing.
By contrast, survival households in Maguwoharjo also maximized
their use of family labor and reduced the quality of their daily food,
without reducing the frequency of meals. A number of survival house-
holds employed all members of the household, including women and
children who normally did not work. A pattern similar to the behavior
of survival households in the city was also found among consolidation
households, even though they had more adequate assets and activities.
The households that were able to undertake accumulation in Wono-
kerto were those that owned large land holdings and grew commercial
crops. As the prices of non-rice agricultural commodities rose, the
farming households in this village earned greater profits that far ex-
ceeded their subsistence needs. This was followed by a shift in the pat-
tern towards the fulfillment of “prestige” status requirements such as a
four-wheeled motor vehicle and electronic goods. Investment in non-
agricultural activities represented accumulation efforts that were based
on a surplus from the agricultural sector. Many of the accumulation
households in Wonokerto sent children to higher education institutions
or undertook the pilgrimage to Mecca on a personal arrangement
through the exclusive channel, which costs approximately US $3,700
per person.
Meanwhile, consolidation households in Wonokerto generally also
had a combination of rather small agricultural activities, plus non-agri-
cultural activities that were likewise not very large. At the same time,
survival households in this village were primarily those that did not
own agricultural land and were dependent on marginal non-farm activ-
ities or employment as agricultural laborers as their main job.
The Dynamics of livelihood strategies by agronomic region
The diversity in resource use at the regional level makes an important
contribution to explanations of the variety in changes in livelihood con-
ditions in DIY, since the crisis produced changes in livelihood condi-
tions between villages that varied with the type of resource use. Most
households experienced stagnation in livelihood conditions between
1998 and 2003 (table 6.2). The households that experienced degrada-
tion are generally found in villages with urban characteristics, villages
based on wet rice cultivation, and villages dependent on dry farming.
Besides this, promotion in livelihood strategies was found in villages
with commercial agriculture and non-sawah villages on the plain.
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In the village on the urban periphery, stagnation in household living
conditions as a consequence of the blow inflicted on the urban econo-
my during the crisis gives an indication of how small the benefits of
the economic boom from the rental of accommodation were for the ma-
jority of the people. Some households that were able to survive in stag-
nation utilized the linkages that emerged from the existence of rental
accommodation to work as suppliers of goods and services for students.
The competition among service providers to take over public space in
the vicinity of rented accommodation gave rise to new phenomena as
trespassing on public space for economic activities grew stronger.
The lowland non-rice village reveals the presence of households that
experienced stagnation in livelihood strategies to the greatest extent, fol-
lowed by those that experienced promotion or degradation. Households
that underwent stagnation in non-rice rural areas depended mainly on
the non-farm economy, which experienced the strongest spin-off from
the crisis. The majority of households in this village relied upon the
non-farm sector, which was stagnant, because their economic activities
had been disturbed by the weak purchasing power of the community.
The collapse of the bridge linking Yogyakarta and Bantul exacerbated
the condition of the village economy as a consequence of the rise in the
cost of transportation to obtain inputs and to handle marketing.1
Meanwhile, in the lowland non-rice village the households that mana-
ged to achieve accumulation were those that succeeded in finding com-
mercial opportunities for the provision of goods and services which had
originally been obtained in the city and whose prices had soared at the
time of the crisis. The ability of households to capture opportunities to
supply substitutes for goods once obtained in the city at proper prices
enabled a number of households operating in the field of catering and
party food to undertake accumulation. The same success was achieved
by households that ran telecommunications kiosks as the use of these
kiosks had undergone a boom since the crisis, which occurred together
with the increase in the number of people from surrounding villages
working overseas as migrant workers.
Besides this, producers of tahu (tofu) and tempeh (soybean cake) also
enjoyed large profits at the peak of the crisis. There was a drastic but
Table 6.2 Changes in livelihood conditions by economic basis of villages, 1998-2003
Change Urbanized Lowland non-rice Lowland rice Dry upland Wet upland
Degradation 16.7 8.3 25.0 33.3 16.7
Stagnation 75.0 75.0 66.7 58.3 41.7
Promotion 8.3 16.7 8.3 8.3 41.7
Total (N) 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Survey data 1998 and 2003
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temporary rise in demand for products made from tahu and tempeh, as
these products were able to replace other necessary sources of protein
that were usually brought from the city, in particular fish, meat, eggs,
and chicken. After the peak of the crisis was over, however, it turned
out that members of the community no longer restricted consumption
but returned to the normal situation, which meant that consumption of
tahu and tempeh also fell to normal levels. The same was also true of
goods that had previously been brought to the village from the city, for
they too were again available as they had been before the crisis. The
jump in demand for tahu and tempeh at the peak of the crisis was only
a short-term phenomenon.
The lowland rice villages experienced the strongest spin-off from the
crisis. Villages whose economic basis is the cultivation of irrigated rice
(sawah) represent an important part in agricultural development under-
taken by the government in the context of achieving national self-suffi-
ciency in rice production through a number of interventions. The eco-
nomic crisis forced the government to reduce tariffs on imported food-
stuffs in stages and to do away with various subsidies on agricultural
inputs. For that reason the households of the majority of extremely
small farmers and the landless in these sawah-based villages fell into
the category of stagnation and degradation.
Among the community group that operated in the field of commer-
cial trade in agricultural produce, there were actually indications of the
presence of a promotion in livelihood strategies. Traders in agricultural
commodities were able to increase their margin of profit because the
rise in purchasing prices at the community level was still smaller than
the increase in price that could be obtained from large city traders, who
had direct contact with overseas markets.
Households in upland areas of dry and marginal farming also experi-
enced great stagnation and degradation as a result of the reduction in
or removal of subsidies by the government. Households in these vil-
lages were able to undertake agricultural activities in a viable way be-
cause production inputs received big subsidies. The increase in the
prices of agricultural inputs for farm households in the dry-farming re-
gion was felt to be the cause of a drop in the output of various com-
modities. As a consequence, most of the households in this region ex-
perienced degradation or stagnation in their livelihood strategies in the
aggregate sense.
The role of activities related to the cultivation of secondary crops in
the agricultural system of this region is undergoing a significant de-
cline. The fact that many of the younger generation have left their vil-
lages to work in urban areas has disturbed agricultural activities be-
cause it makes the shortage of labor in the planting season more acute.
This has encouraged a shift in the planting pattern from one in which
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annuals are dominant to one in which perennials that produce wood
and various fruits are important, as well as grass for use as livestock
fodder. Those who work in urban areas more often make village invest-
ments in the animal husbandry subsector (cattle and goats) by utilizing
the grass and the limited labor that is available.
Although the dynamics of life since the crisis in this region of mar-
ginal farming are very high, the products are not yet able to raise or
maintain the position of households at a higher living standard. Most
of the households exist in a position of stagnation or degradation in liv-
ing conditions. Changes of a positive nature, such as the increasingly
inexpensive supplies of water for domestic needs or for cultivation pur-
poses, have not yet been able raise the quality of life significantly for
the majority of community members.
As a whole, the commercial agriculture area on the slopes of Mt.
Merapi is a region that is undergoing a boom in farm production
through agricultural intensification and diversification. The commercial
agriculture developed by the community no longer involves production
of rice as the basic foodstuff, which means that the effect of a rise in
the price of inputs can be compensated for by high-value commodities
whose price is not set by the government. Nevertheless, up to 2003,
most of the households were still in a position of livelihood stagnation,
but another section of the community actually experienced promotion.
Those who have undergone promotion are households with a strong
agricultural resource base in the form of fields of high-value commer-
cial crops that are in full production. The households of farmers who
grow salak pondoh (a special type of snake fruit) accumulate very large
amounts of income every year to the point where they can afford to
meet the needs of life at a level far above the average. The capacity of
accumulation households to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, purchase
four-wheeled vehicles, and pay for their children to do tertiary studies is
an easily pictured example of the success of accumulation households.
In this region of commercial agriculture the community group that is
forced to experience degradation consists of those who own no land
and whose survival depends on work as agricultural laborers or as odd-
job laborers. Agricultural wages here are certainly slightly higher than
in other regions. Even so, in a situation like that of today, where there
has been a rise in the various necessities of life, agricultural laborers
constitute the most vulnerable group and have the greatest chance of ex-
periencing a degradation in livelihood strategies. Nevertheless, degrada-
tion in livelihood strategies has also occurred in this region as the result
of a household member’s serious illness, treatment of which took all
the household’s assets, which were originally quite large.
Table 6.3 shows that households that have undergone degradation
and promotion tend to be found in rural villages, whereas those that
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have experienced stagnation are more common in urban areas. This
strengthens the preliminary suspicion that the open nature of the non-
farm economy in cities has caused most households to experience stag-
nation or to be degraded to worse livelihood conditions. Besides that,
the small variety of open-access resources available in urban areas is
also an important cause of this situation. By contrast, the fact that some
rural households experienced promotion of a percentage higher than
that in urban areas can be explained by the relatively closed nature of
the village economy and the availability of natural resources to which
access is still open. This includes activities outside agriculture that can
replace urban economic activities which were increasingly constricted at
the peak of the crisis.
The crisis and its impact on livelihood strategies
Responses to the crisis
The responses of the rural community to the crisis can be divided into
two types, namely, consumption responses and production responses
(Titus 2003). Consumption responses can be examined from changes
in the level of labor force participation, the extent of diversification or
specialization in employment (including the role of population mobi-
lity), increases or decreases in income, rises or falls in the amount of
savings, the borrowing or lending of money, and rises or falls in con-
sumption expenditure in the context of maintaining the quality of life.
Production responses represent one kind of reaction to the crisis and
are reflected in both the agricultural and non-agricultural production
processes carried out by a group of people living in one household. Pro-
duction responses are approached through such indicators as the lack
of expansion in scale and work region, investment or disinvestment,
specialization or diversification, production orientation to meet market
or subsistence requirements, and the intensity of use of capital inputs
and labor inputs. Households in the different livelihood strategy cate-
gories have responded in a combination of different ways to the crisis
that is still continuing in Indonesia at the present time. The following
Table 6.3 Changes in livelihood conditions in rural and urban villages, 1998-2003
(percentages)
Location Degradation Stagnation Promotion Total
Rural villages 20.8 56.3 18.8 100.0
Urban villages 16.7 75.0 8.3 100.0
Total (N) 12 38 10 60
Source: Survey data, 1998 and 2003
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section discusses the results of an analysis of household consumption
responses and production responses based on the livelihood conditions
that they have achieved.
Consumption responses
Households with survival strategies
A general picture of all respondents in the present study shows that
there have been different patterns of response to the crisis situation
among households in accumulation, consolidation and mere survival
conditions. Survival households tended to intensify the level of partici-
pation of their labor force, specifically for economic activities that were
carried out at their own risk (LP). They tended to undertake employ-
ment specialization in just a few activities (IS), with the result that in
crisis situations they did not dare or else did not have the ability to take
the risk of attempting diversification. This same group of survival
households also experienced a fall in savings, which they had held in
various forms such as jewelry or livestock (poultry and cattle) (SI). For
that reason, survival households were forced in matters of urgency to
make use of their relatively narrow social network (LB) to borrow
money or jewelry from a number of people. One matter experienced
specifically by households that depended on survival strategies was the
occurrence of both absolute and relative increases in expenditure on
daily consumption necessities (CE) (table 6.4).
Households with consolidation strategies
Consolidation households undertook intensification in their labor force
participation at a lower level than did survival households (LP). This
group responded to the crisis by undertaking selective specialization in
low-risk economic fields rather than by attempting diversification (ES).
Many consolidation households actually reported a rise in income in
nominal terms but their purchasing power still fell drastically (IM).
Table 6.4 Scores for consumption responses by livelihood strategy, 2003
Strategies LP ES IM SI LB CE
Accumulation 0.154 -0.154 0.077 0.231 0.385 0.000
Consolidation 0.258 0.258 -0.032 0.000 0.129 0.742
Survival 0.313 0.125 0.125 -0.125 0.250 -0.063
Average 0.279 0.154 0.086 0.068 0.229 0.378
LP : labor participation SI : a rise or fall in savings
ES : specialization in activities LB : borrowing or lending of money
IM : income maximalization CE : consumption expenditure
Source: Survey data, 1998 and 2003
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They therefore attempted to maximize income in various ways. Some of
the households in this category experienced a drop in the amount and
type of their savings, which consisted of money in the bank, livestock,
and jewelry (SI). The consequence was that some of them borrowed
money from the bank to meet certain urgent needs (LB). Consolidation
households also experienced a relative increase in expenditure on the
food that they needed for consumption purposes (C).
Households with accumulation strategies
In general, labor participation in households that undertook accumula-
tion was rarely increased and was far below the average for consolida-
tion households (LP). These households could afford to send their chil-
dren to higher-level schools and made up their need for labor with
hired workers. In addition, accumulation households accommodated
their relatives in their economic activities not to expand production but
rather with the intention of helping the latter. In carrying out their eco-
nomic activities during the crisis, accumulation households acted some-
what conservatively by just maintaining what they had hitherto
achieved. The tendency towards diversification (ES negative) reflected
the houshold’s capacity to go in for more profitable activities of a non-
farm nature. Maximization of income was not their main motive at the
time of the crisis (IM). Their motivation was not excessively focused on
attempts to maximize income but was a little more relaxed, consisting
as it did of efforts similar to those made by consolidation households.
Thus in general there were no systematic attempts on the part of most
accumulation households to undertake income maximization by, for ex-
ample, reducing labor in order to increase income or by adopting other
efficiency measures (IM). The amounts and types of savings held by the
accumulation group were also sufficiently stable at a fixed or increased
position. This was far better than the average situation, which tended to
decline (SI). Even though their assets in savings and other forms tended
to be reported as fixed, this group did not borrow from the bank to
maintain their standard of living or to expand their businesses. On the
contrary, several persons from the same village borrowed money from
these households (LB). The group of accumulation households also
tended to maintain their high standard of living, which they continued
to enjoy during this period by maintaining their consumption pattern
(CE constant).
Production responses
On the whole, households in all villages in the research areas showed a
tendency to expand their scale and work area slightly, to carry out a little
investment in production assets and to undertake diversification in pro-
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duction; they also showed a very slight tendency to expand market or-
ientation and to increase the use of capital inputs and labor inputs
rather strikingly. On the whole, they responded to crisis conditions in a
very conservative manner, meaning that they avoided high failure risks
and concentrated on low-risk activities in an intensive manner that in-
volved as much utilization of their own labor as possible. They avoided
large capital investments in an attempt to prevent greater losses because
people could still see many uncertainties that could not be easily be ig-
nored. A description of the production responses made by the different
types of households according to their livelihood strategies is given in
table 6.5.
Households with survival strategies
The production responses of survival households in all villages in the
research areas tended to involve an expansion in business region in the
context of efforts to achieve wider market reach, but they did not intro-
duce any increase in business scale to reduce risk (SA). Investments
were rarely made in the means of production and did not occur in large
amounts as a consequence of the great uncertainty that prevailed in
business circles (IN). This group of households actually tended to un-
dertake diversification so as to spread risk within a portfolio of more li-
velihoods so that failure in one field would be compensated for by suc-
cess in other fields (SD). Besides that, there was a strong tendency
among this group to strengthen market orientation, especially in the
case of non-farm activities undertaken by those households that had a
subsistence base in agriculture (MS). Although there was a strong or-
ientation towards diversification and market orientation, capital inputs
tended to be very low (CI) whereas labor inputs were quite high (LI).
This last point indicates that in the context of survival there was strong
exploitation of human resources within households that did not own ca-
pital assets.
Table 6.5 Scores for production responses by livelihood strategy, 2003
Strategies SA IN S/D MS CI LI
Accumulation 0.154 0.000 -0.154 -0.077 0.000 0.231
Consolidation 0.484 0.065 0.258 0.129 0.581 0.258
Survival 0.375 0.188 0.125 0.125 0.188 0.375
Average 0.390 0.123 0.156 0.105 0.369 0.303
SA : increase in scale of business or region of operation
MS : market or subsistence orientation
IN : investment or disinvestment
CI : capital input
S/D : specialisation or diversificationLI: labor input Source: Survey data, 1998 and 2003
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Households with consolidation strategies
The responses of this group differed somewhat from those of the other
two groups in expansion in scale and business region, diversification in
production, market orientation and the use of capital, which was rather
high. The production responses of consolidation households in all re-
search villages showed a tendency towards expansion in scale and busi-
ness region (SA) but households did not make large investments as
they anticipated a continuation of the high level of uncertainty in eco-
nomic circles (IN). Nevertheless, the consolidation households tended
to undertake diversification in order to reduce risk of failure in the non-
diverse system of livelihoods (SD). Their behavior also tended to
strengthen market orientation primarily for non-farm products (MS)
through the use of high capital inputs (CI). This indicates that the beha-
vior of consolidation households in capturing opportunities that arose
at the time of crisis actually resembled accumulation behavior. In addi-
tion, the input of household labor that was made was also rather high
(LI). In a normal situation, all of this is the behavior of the accumula-
tion group, but in a crisis situation it was in fact the consolidation
group of households that made rather progressive efforts. This was very
probably triggered by long-term household targets that obliged them to
struggle hard in facing the many uncertainties that appeared. Besides
that, their life-cycle position, which was young to middle aged with
many productive household members, perhaps also constituted a push
towards the occurrence of this difference.
Households with accumulation strategies
The production responses of households with accumulation strategies
in all of the research villages tended to be conservative, with little or no
expansion in scale and business area as a response to uncertainties in
the economic environment during the crisis period and the lack of pres-
sure to go after new opportunities (SA). This was along the same lines
as their decision not to make new investments in order to avoid the risk
of big losses (IN). Their specific behavioral response to the crisis situa-
tion can be seen from their tendency to undertake specialization by re-
taining activities that they had already mastered (SD = negative). In ad-
dition, the accumulation households also tended to maintain market or-
ientation or to reduce it slightly (MS). Their conservative behavior at the
time of crisis is also apparent in the low input of capital (CI), while the
rather high labor input was obtained from relatives and neighbors who
needed work (LI). From this description it can be seen that accumula-
tion households generally acted more conservatively in facing the crisis
than did those in a consolidation position.
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The response of non-agricultural households to the crisis
Consumption responses
In general, non-farm households showed stronger responses to the cri-
sis than did farm households. This applies in particular to the involve-
ment of labor. Non-farm households responded with long working
hours for non-farm activities (LP). Labor from these households was
specialized in the work that they had done before the crisis (ES). Specia-
lization in farm households was directed towards meeting subsistence
needs (IM = negative), whereas in non-farm households it was underta-
ken in the context of maximising income (IM = positive) (see table 6.6).
Non-farm households usually experienced a sharper drop in assets
than did farm households and the crisis was more damaging to the live-
lihood systems of non-farm than farm households (SI = negative). Non-
farm economic activities were obviously more affected by the spin-off.
In meeting their daily needs, the two groups displayed contrasting dif-
ferences. It would seem that non-farm households were more capable
of giving financial loans (LB = positive) than were farm households.
Even so, this does not mean that rural diversification through non-farm
employment is able to increase the resilience of the household econo-
my. Rather, it appears to be caused more by the existence of a wish to
assist neighbors who are in need. At the same time it reflects the fact
that there is a relatively more flexible supply of ready cash in non-farm
than in farm households. The non-agricultural activities that are con-
ducted by non-farm households at any time involve the use of cash for
transactions. Hence there were greater opportunities for these house-
holds to lend out money.
The consumption responses that very clearly differentiated non-farm
from farm households were those related to expenditure for consump-
tion purposes (CE). Non-farm households were still able to maintain
consumption, even though prices underwent an increase to the point
where their expenditure rose. The high level of economic resilience of
certain types of non-farm household enabled them to maintain the qual-
ity of life of their members through fulfillment of their consumption
needs.
Table 6.6 Scores for consumption responses by type of household, 2003
Type of household LP ES IM SI LB CE
Farm households 0.067 0.267 -0.067 0.067 0.133 0.133
Non-farm households 0.311 0.111 0.089 -0.044 0.244 0.422
Total households 0.283 0.133 0.050 0.000 0.217 0.367
For an explanation of notation in the table, see table 6.4
Source: Survey data, 1998 and 2003
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Production responses
Expansion in marketing region or scale of operations has a higher posi-
tive value for non-farm than for farm households (SA). The reason is
that the characteristics of non-farm work frequently require interaction
with other regions. This interaction does not occur in the case of farm
households because their activities are local and immobile in nature.
There was no striking difference in level of investment between the two
groups of households, the figures being positive but not too large (IN)
(see table 6.7).
While non-farm households undertook specialization in their work,
farm households undertook diversification in the types of commodities
that they produced in order to reduce risk. Farm households tended to
be oriented towards the fulfillment of subsistence needs (MS = nega-
tive), whereas non-farm households tended towards commercialization
(MS = positive). The difference in the responses of the two groups of
households to the crisis is seen clearly from expansion in capital and la-
bor inputs (CI and LI). The farm households had a greater wish to un-
dertake investment in every field than did non-farm households. The
latter tended to be more cautious in making investments because of the
presence of uncertainties in the business world. Meanwhile, farm
households undertook investment and agricultural diversification so as
to maintain their subsistence requirements and food sufficiency.
A distinction can be made between two manners or modes of opera-
tion in non-farm activities, namely, those modes that are activity-based
and those that are establishment-based. An analysis, in which all farm
households were omitted, was made of all non-farm households. Hence
the relationship between the mode of operation and both consumption
and production responses and the production modes of non-farm activ-
ities could be explored more accurately.
Consumption responses and modes of operation in non-agricultural work
On the whole, non-farm households that are establishment-based tend
to mobilize labor in a way that does not differ from that of activity-
based, non-farm households (LP). Nevertheless, establishment-based,
Table 6.7 Scores for production responses by type of household, 2003
Type of household SA IN SD MS CI LI
Farm households 0.200 0.067 0.267 -0.133 0.467 0.400
Non-farm households 0.444 0.044 0.111 0.200 0.267 0.222
Total households 0.400 0.083 0.133 0.117 0.333 0.283
For an explanation of notation in the table, see table 6.5
Source: Survey data, 1998 and 2003
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non-farm households can manage their assets freely in the business
units concerned. On the other hand, the activities of non-farm house-
holds do not allow much space for the individual actors to make deci-
sions about the allocation of resources. Decision-making is done by lea-
ders who make decisions for non-agricultural workers within the estab-
lishment in a centralistic manner. The majority of activity-based, non-
farm households operating in services and trade have many indepen-
dent workers (table 6.8). Thus their productivity is not greatly influ-
enced by additional labor.
Non-farm, establishment-based households acted rather conserva-
tively in diversifying, whereas those that were activity-based carried out
specialization by concentrating on the non-agricultural activities that
they had usually undertaken (ES). The latter were more oriented to-
wards income maximization, whereas establishment-based households
adopted an attitude that approached a non-response (IM). In order to
obtain a large profit (income maximization), establishment-based, non-
farm households must commence with a rather large investment, and
so their low profit in a time of crisis constitutes their main excuse for
low investment.
Among activity-based non-farm households, savings still experienced
a slight increase by comparison with the situation in establishment-
based non-farm households (SI). During the crisis the former were
more fortunate than the latter because their services were more in de-
mand than the goods produced by establishment-based households. As
it turned out, attempts among establishment-based households to save
their businesses absorbed significant expenditure, which caused a drop
in their savings. Among activity-based households, matters of this kind
were not the responsibility of the individual, which meant that for this
type of household the fall in savings was not as bad as it was among es-
tablishment-based households.
It would seem that the two groups of non-farm households continued
to have an important role as sources that could lend money to other
people in the village. The presence of a positive index (LB) indicates that
the giving of credit was an intrinsic part of their activities in trade and
the rental of rooms and houses as well as in retail activities and other
services. Hence the non-farm households were still able to withstand
Table 6.8 Consumption responses by basis of non-agricultural production, 2003
Production basis LP ES IM SI LB CE
Activity-based 0.28 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.28 0.36
Establishment-based 0.28 0.16 0.04 -0.08 0.20 0.44
For an explanation of notation in the table, see table 6.4
Source: Survey data, 1998 and 2003
LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES, RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS 171
the upheaval of the crisis. For that reason it is not surprising that these
two groups of non-farm households experienced a similar pattern in ex-
penditure on consumption (CE).
Production responses and modes of operation in non-agricultural work
With the exception of non-farm households in Maguwoharjo, establish-
ment-based non-farm households adopted a somewhat conservative atti-
tude in increasing the scale of their operations and the scale of their
business region, whereas activity-based non-farm households displayed
striking efforts to expand their business region (SA). This is in accord
with the previous explanation that activity-based households concen-
trated on existing work, while establishment-based households tended
not to make investments during the crisis period (IN) (see Table 6.9).
The variety of businesses conducted by establishment-based house-
holds tended towards stagnation without any attempt towards diversifi-
cation, while activity-based households ranged between specialization
and diversification (SD). Establishment-based households found it hard-
er to make changes because the capital that they had already invested
would be useless if they undertook diversification in subsectors far
from what they were currently doing. The difficulty of forming a large
amount of new capital also hindered diversification efforts on the part
of establishment-based non-farm households (IN).
The production orientation of establishment-based non-farm house-
holds tended to be directed a little more towards the market (MS) but
did not differ significantly from the response of activity-based house-
holds. The non-agricultural activities that have remained land-produc-
tion-based from the crisis up to the present time are time-tested, non-
farm undertakings for which it is difficult to find new markets or new
locations. The response to the use of capital inputs tended to be stron-
ger among establishment-based households than among activity-based
households. It appears that the commercial orientation of establish-
ment-based households was accompanied by the use of existing capital
goods (CI). By contrast, labor input tended to be greater among activity-
based households in accordance with the nature of their services (LI).
Table 6.9 Production reponses by basis of non-agricultural production, 2003
Production basis SA IN SD MS CI LI
Activity-based 0.52 0.24 0.04 0.28 0.08 0.20
Establishment-based 0.36 -0.08 0.16 0.04 0.48 0.32
For an explanation of the notation in the table, see table 6.5
Source: Survey data, 1998 and 2003
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Conclusion
Variations in the livelihood situation of rural households in DIY were
still determined by their agroeconomic setting. In a crisis situation one
system of resource use proved more flexible than other systems and
hence the responses that were produced also varied at the household le-
vel. Households that had the protection of sufficient assets tended to be
able to maintain and even undertake accumulation when the opportu-
nity was available, although there was a tendency for accumulation
households also to act rather conservatively. Consolidation households,
however, were more aggressive in responding to crisis conditions be-
cause they had long-term needs and targets that had to be protected
from the crisis.
Similarly, there were significant differences in response among agro-
ecological zones. Villages with commercial agriculture had a tendency
to respond positively to crisis-induced changes. The increase in prices
for agricultural commodities obviously brought more income to villages
with commercial farming. For that reason, in villages of this kind there
were still opportunities for the promotion of livelihood conditions. Ur-
ban villages and subsistence-agriculture villages experienced the oppo-
site trend in their responses. The open economic system that prevailed
in the city caused many households in urban villages to experience stag-
nation and degradation. Similarly, the subsistence nature of subsis-
tence-agriculture villages became stronger, as is shown by the number
of households that underwent stagnation and degradation in their liveli-
hood situation. Meanwhile, in these two types of village promotion in
the livelihood situation was rarely found.
Non-farm households tended to respond in a better way to the crisis
than did farm households because they had a more flexible and varied
economic basis. The former gave their full attention to the economic ac-
tivities that they had already mastered, whereas the latter undertook di-
versification to protect their subsistence needs. Establishment-based
non-farm households had greater flexibility in the reallocation of re-
sources to make changes in their businesses, but they did not have the
flexibility to undertake diversification because the fact that much of
their capital had already been invested in certain types of production
was a constraint on diversification. On the other hand, activity-based
non-farm households typically focused on the non-agricultural under-
takings that they had previously been doing. Meanwhile, efforts towards
diversification outside non-farm activities do not appear to have been
significant.
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Annex
Description of household characteristics in five villages by livelihood condition
and strategy, 1998-2003
Variable Survival Households Consolidation Households Accumulation Households
Assets 1. Land holdings are too
small or they are
landless, so there is
no possibility of
investment or
expansion
2. Have no savings but
may own small
livestock
3. Balance between
number of productive
and non-productive
household members
is not advantageous
4. Transport for family
mobility consists of
bicycles, old
motorcycles or
motorized and non-
motorized public
transport
5. Rarely own goods for
secondary and tertiary
needs
1. Land sufficient to
meet only subsistence
needs
2. Savings in the form of
large livestock or
money, sometimes in
the bank
3. Balance between
number of productive
and non-productive
household members
is sufficiently
advantageous
4. Transport for family
mobility consists of
good-quality
motorcycles and
public transport
5. Own sufficient goods
for secondary and
tertiary needs
1. More than enough to
meet subsistence
needs
2. Savings in the form of
money in the bank
3. Balance between
number of productive
and non-productive
household members
shows no pattern but
the household can
employ other people
for both production
and domestic needs
4. Private transport
vehicles, sometimes
more than one
5. Own many goods for
secondary and tertiary
needs
Activities 1. Employment as farm
laborers or tenant
cultivators combined
with inferior non-farm
work of low social
status
2. Very high pressure on
productive labor,
often leading to
extreme occupational
multiplicity involving
many activities that
are not very
productive
1. Subsistence farm
undertakings as main
or part-time activity
combined with non-
farm work of medium
social status
2. Rather low pressure
on productive labor,
occupational
multiplicity still occurs
with sufficiently
productive non-farm
activities
1. Above-subsistence
farm activities as a
part-time activity
combined with non-
farm activities of high
social status
2. Low pressure on
productive labor;
occupational
multiplicity occurs
with very productive
non-farm activities as
a means of
accumulation
Capabilities 1. Difficulty in meeting
primary needs like
food, clothing, and
proper housing
2. Consumption
expenditure held
1. Primary needs like
foodstuffs, clothing,
and housing already
met adequately
2. Involved in debt for
activities of a
consolidation nature
1. Primary needs easily
met, clothing and
housing more than
adequate
2. Involved in debt with
official financial
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Variable Survival Households Consolidation Households Accumulation Households
down by restricting
themselves
3. Often involved in
chronic debt for
primary needs
4. High dependency on
social networks to
meet financial
demands for certain
urgent necessities
5. Low consumption of
electricity, low
expenditure on health
and education with
orientation towards
obtaining local
services
or small-scale
investment
3. Minimum
dependency on social
networks to meet
financial demands for
certain urgent
necessities
4. Fairly high
consumption of
electricity, relatively
high expenditure on
health and education
with orientation
towards obtaining
regional services
institutions for
investment purposes
3. Have an important
role as benefactors in
difficulties in the
surrounding social
network
4. Very high
consumption of
electricity, very high
expenditure on health
and education with
orientation towards
obtaining regional-
national services
Strategy
characteristics
1. Meeting household
needs in selective,
conservative, and
minimum ways
2. Obtaining subsistence
income on the
principle of caution
through extreme
diversification
3. Mobilizing all human
household resources
to achieve short-term
objectives
1. Meeting all household
needs selectively in
keeping with long-
term objectives
2. Obtaining income to
attain long-term
household objectives
and able to take a
little risk
3. Mobilizing household
resources in a
selective and
optimum way in
sectors that clearly
offer good long-term
prospects
1. Meeting all household
needs, almost without
exception
2. Obtaining income to
achieve long-term
objectives by taking
risks
3. Mobilizing household
resources especially in
the form of capital,
but employing labor
from outside the
household
Source: Generalization of household survey data, 1998 and 2003
Note
1 The collapse of the Brosot bridge was really the cumulative effect of the crisis and re-
gional autonomy, which occurred at the same time. Exploitation of sand on the upper
slopes of Mt. Merapi involved the use of heavy equipment, which had become very
popular since regional autonomy was introduced; this meant that the quantities of
sand that were washed down and could be removed on the lowlands became increas-
ingly smaller. At the time of the crisis, sand excavators needed more sand in order to
meet their needs. The consequence was that sand was excavated close to the founda-
tions of the bridge, a section of which later collapsed. The revenue collected from
sand excavation was only Rp 300-400 million per year, but the cost of reconstructing
the bridge was estimated at around Rp 4 billion. So far the damage done to the bridge
has not been repaired.
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7 The Effects of the Crisis on Livelihood Systems
in “Rurban” Areas: Case Studies in the Special
Region of the Yogyakarta
Djarot S. Widyatmoko
Introduction
In the middle of 1997 an economic crisis swept over most of the coun-
tries in the Asian region. The crisis was triggered by a weakening of the
currencies of these countries to the US dollar. For Indonesia, the impact
of the crisis was far worse than it was for other Asian countries (Sun-
derlin 2001). Although a restoration of the situation became apparent
in the middle of 1999 (when economic growth started to move slowly
upwards while inflation was held down), a return to the pre-crisis situa-
tion was still far from expectations. Quite a number of studies have
been made of the behavior of the economic crisis in Indonesia and its
impact on economic, social, and political dynamics at various scales of
observation, both national and regional and also local. The general con-
clusion that can be drawn from these studies is that the economic crisis
caused the level of poverty (both absolute and relative) to rise, and
large-scale unemployment, high inflation (which led to a fall in the pur-
chasing power of the community) and sociopolitical unrest and tension
to increase. The most obvious consequence of the crisis was the fall of
the “New Order” regime of President Suharto in May 1998 and the be-
ginning of government decentralization with the introduction of regio-
nal autonomy in 1999.
On the whole, most of the studies concerning the economic crisis
have been carried out in urban areas and have looked at its impact on
the lives of urban communities. The reason is that many economists
believe that the economic crisis, as it occurred in Indonesia, repre-
sented a part of the dynamics of economic globalization, which gave ur-
ban areas (especially the large cities) the function of links in the global
flow of commodities and funds. Economic globalization (in its present
meaning) was triggered by the 1974 oil crisis, which caused industries
that were controlled by multinational corporations (MNCs) in developed
countries to become inefficient and to experience losses because of very
high production costs. This was followed by a flow of industrial and fi-
nancial resources from developed countries to certain developing coun-
tries as an extension of the hands of MNCs abroad. Indonesia, as a de-
veloping country, was no exception. As an oil-producing country, Indo-
nesia indeed obtained advantages from the oil crisis, a fact that also en-
couraged Indonesia to become more open to the penetration of foreign
capital. Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s Indonesia imported a
lot of capital goods and allocated a large part of the money obtained
from the sale of oil to the expansion of urban infrastructure as part of
the attempt to attract foreign capital. For this reason it is to be expected
that Indonesia’s high economic growth in the pre-crisis period con-
sisted of growth in urban areas (primarily in the country’s large cities).
It also meant that the consequences of the economic crisis were un-
doubtedly worse in urban areas. Apart from this, the economic crisis in
urban areas can also be traced to the urban-biased policies of the New
Order government. This bias can be seen from the size of the govern-
ment’s development and routine budgets, which gave more attention to
the economic development of urban than of rural areas. In particular,
the large cities that were centers of industrial development and financial
services were favored.
Unlike most studies, this article focuses more on the influence or im-
pact of the economic crisis on livelihood systems in “rurban” areas, that
is, rural areas that are currently undergoing the process of urbanization.
More specifically, in these areas a mixture of urban and rural livelihoods
is taking place. Because of their position as transitional areas between
the city and the village, they are more vulnerable to the effects of an eco-
nomic crisis than are rural areas. The reasons for the selection of “rur-
ban” areas as research locations lies not only in the fact that very little re-
asearch has been undertaken in such areas but also in the fact that the
present article constitutes one part of a much wider PhD study of the im-
pact of the crisis on rural resource use and livelihoods in Indonesia.
As is generally recognized, each community group has had a differ-
ent experience of and response to the economic crisis. This difference
seems to be primarily linked to the system of resource use and the live-
lihood system (Titus 2003). For example, farmers and non-farmers
(those engaged in trade, household industry and similar occupations)
will respond to a crisis in different ways and according to different pat-
terns. Even within a community of farmers there are differences, de-
pending on the type of land use (for example, between growers of irri-
gated rice and those who cultivate non-irrigated land). These differences
can be caused by differences in the inputs that are needed, market or-
ientation, price mechanisms and the like. The extent to which a com-
munity or a household in a “rurban” area is able to overcome the crisis
that it experiences would appear to be influenced not only by the char-
acter of its system of resource use but also by social aspects that influ-
ence access to and allocation of the necessary resources. The role of in-
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stitutions, for example, represents a social aspect that is often regarded
as exerting great influence on the level of community access to land,
employment, income and the like.
Research settings
Within this framework of analysis, settlements can be divided into three
types, those in urban areas, those in “rurban” areas, and those in rural
areas. Since the present study concerns livelihood systems and house-
hold responses to the effects of the crisis in “rurban” areas, four villages
have been chosen that are representing different subtypes within the ur-
ban category. The “rurban” corridor is represented by Maguwoharjo vil-
lage and the interior “rurban” by three villages, each of which has cer-
tain characteristics, namely, Trimurti (a center of household industry),
Temonkulon (a subdistrict capital where irrigated rice cultivation is pre-
dominant), and Ponjong (a subdistrict capital where dry farming or dry-
field cultivation dominates). Peri-urban areas are not included because
these areas already have the characteristics of urban areas. The spatial
location of these four villages can be seen from figure 7.1, which is fol-
lowed by a brief description of each village.
Maguwoharjo village
The village of Maguwoharjo is situated in Depok Subdistrict in the Dis-
trict of Sleman. On the whole, most of the topography is flat but one
section consists of a river valley (as usual, the position of this area is
lower). This village, which lies approximately eight kilometers to the
northeast of the center of the city of Yogyakarta, is closer to the city than
the other three sample villages. As it is the closest to the city of the four
villages, urban influences have been felt very strongly here, especially
Figure 7.1 The location of the research area
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since the North Ring Road (Jalan Lingkar Utara) began to function in
the early 1990s. The North Ring Road has been the lubricant that has
hastened the process of suburbanization in the village, especially in the
central and northern parts, which had previously remained barely
touched. Agricultural land (in particular irrigated land and dry fields),
which made up the general scenery before the 1990s, is now gradually
being replaced by buildings (private houses, houses-cum-offices, and
general housing complexes), offices (education, government, and so on)
and public facilities. Even medium-scale factories can be found here.
This last development reveals that the land to left and right along the
North Ring Road has changed into a complex of shops that resemble
the development along the Solo Road.
Changes have occurred not only in the physical appearance of land
but also in the people. Today it is common to meet newcomers from
outside the village. Some have settled here permanently while others
are living here only temporarily (on the whole the latter are students
from other regions). Their activities are generally urban-based and so
the connection with Yogyakarta City is more intensive than in the pre-
vious period. The presence of these newcomers has also exerted influ-
ence on the original people of the village. An increasing number of ori-
ginal residents no longer depends on agricultural activities for their liv-
ing. They prefer to go in for trade, to rent out houses or rooms to
students, to work as employees in shops (hotels and restaurants), and
even to work as unskilled construction laborers (because the frequency
of house construction in this village is high).
Trimurti village
Trimurti village is the capital of Srandakan Subdistrict in the District of
Bantul. It is situated in the southern part of the research area, approxi-
mately 20 kilometers south of the city of Yogyakarta. The village also
plays a role as the gateway for traffic between Bantul District and Ku-
lonprogo District in the south. Hence it is a very busy place: there is
heavy traffic in goods and people from before sunrise until late at night.
Since the Kaliprogo Bridge was damaged four years ago, the flow of
traffic has been somewhat less; there are no signs of the bridge being
repaired.
As a village on the side of a large river estuary (the Kali Progo), Tri-
murti is relatively flat, having a slope of less than 8 percent. The soil
consists of alluvial materials. Nevertheless, it is not an agricultural area,
even though the physical condition of the land would enable it to be
used for farming. Only a very small proportion of village residents
earns a livelihood from farming; agricultural land is very limited and
most is now used for housing and household industries. One of the
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most striking features of the village is the high proportion of village re-
sidents who are involved in household industries. The best known is
the making of tahu (bean curd). There are, however, many other house-
hold industries in the village such as the production of food, brooms
and even furniture (cupboards, chairs, and the like). Management is
generally of the traditional kind; production is small-scale and usually
involves only family members. Other forms of work that are fairly
dominant in the village are trade and employment as laborers.
Temonkulon village
Temonkulon is one of the 15 villages that make up Temon Subdistrict in
the District of Temon; Temonkulon is the subdistrict capital. It is situ-
ated in the western part of the research area, 20 kilometers to the
southwest of the town of Wates (the district capital) or 45 kilometers
from the city of Yogyakarta. The physiography of the village is that of an
alluvial plain and on the whole the topography is flat (especially in the
southern part). The small remaining part, especially in the northern
part of the village, is somewhat undulating, with a slope between 8 and
15 percent. With alluvial soil and an annual rainfall of 2000 to 2250
millimeters, the village is very much suited to a system of wet agricul-
ture or an irrigated rice-field system.
Most of the people of Temonkulon village are engaged in agriculture
as farmers (owners or tenants) or as agricutural laborers. The physical
conditions of the area, which enable irrigation to be used intensively,
have made this village a significant producer of rice. Where land cannot
be irrigated, dry fields that are planted with a variety of crops such as
bananas, cassava, and coconuts have generally been developed. Most of
these products are sold; only a small part is consumed by the household
itself. Agricultural production in this village would also appear to have
encouraged post-harvest undertakings. This is apparent in the engage-
ment of a number of households in the hulling of rice and soybeans.
Because of its position as a subdistrict capital, Temonkulon has fairly
complete service and trade facilities. There is a rather large community
health center (puskesmas) that is capable of providing health services for
the area. Similarly, there are complete educational facilities from kinder-
garten level to senior high school as well as banks, telephone kiosks,
and other such things. The expansion in telephone kiosks is worth ex-
amining as it shows that contact between the village and other places is
quite intense. The results of field observations indicate that numbers of
village people have migrated elsewhere in search of work. Besides that,
the presence of public facilities also represents a source of livelihood
outside agriculture (more than one-third of the people of Temonkulon
village work outside the agricultural sector).
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Ponjong village
Like two of the other research villages, Ponjong is also a subdistrict ca-
pital, in this case the capital of Ponjong Subdistrict in the District of
Gunung Kidul. The village is located in the eastern part of the research
area, about 45 kilometers from the city of Yogyakarta. It is a hilly area,
with slopes between 8 and 40 percent. As a part of the Gunung Sewu
series of hills, the soil in this village is Terra Rossa, which has devel-
oped from the parent material of limestone. In color, soils range from
red to yellow. In the wet season these soils become extremely sticky,
while in the dry season they crack extensively, which means that many
types of crops are unsuitable for this village. The general land type
found in the village consists of dry fields (tegalan), which are planted
with various kinds of crops. Unlike other karst areas, Ponjong village
has a significant stretch of wet-rice fields (sawah). The reason is the pre-
sence of a spring that originates in an underground stream and gushes
up with a reasonably strong flow throughout the year. The local people
have constructed ponds to store the water, which is used to irrigate sa-
wah and for daily needs.
The shortage of irrigated land and the fact that some land is unsuited
to agriculture, together with the low access of the village to the city has
caused many people to migrate elsewhere or to look for work outside
the agricultural sector. Field observations show that many household
members have tried their luck in Jakarta and put aside a part of their
earnings to send back to the village. In addition, there are many people
who are engaged in trade or who work as laborers. Some even do do-
mestic work.
As a subdistrict capital, Ponjong has fairly adequate facilities and in-
frastructure. There are roads that link the village with other subdistrict
capitals and with the district capital, and transportation in the form of
minibuses and ojek (motorcycles that carry passengers) and other vehi-
cles are also available. Other facilities, like schooling from kindergarten
to senior high school, a community health center and even a doctor’s
private practice, can be found in the village. The existing market is quite
busy, especially from early morning until midday, and several shops
and kiosks have appeared along the main road of the village. All of
these things indicate that the process of urbanization has commenced
in this village.
The effects of the crisis
The discussion of the impact of the crisis on livelihood systems in this
article is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the gener-
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al impact that occurred in all the research villages, while the second sec-
tion looks at more specific effects in certain villages. This second sec-
tion really offers evidence indicating that livelihood systems and house-
hold (and regional) resource systems had significant influence on
household responses to the occurrence of the crisis.
The general impact
At the time when this study was carried out, the crisis had already en-
tered its fifth year (the end of 2002), which meant that a number of
events had taken place during the preceding period. Even so, it can be
said that in general the crisis began to be felt in the “rurban” area after
the first six months (around the beginning of 1998), at a time when fac-
tory-made consumer goods started to disappear from the market and
were hard to obtain. In addition, the prices of these goods were very un-
stable (rising and falling very quickly) due to the instability of the ex-
change rate of the rupiah against the US dollar. At that time there was
outstanding “panic and unrest” within the community. Economic activ-
ities seemed to come to a halt and people did not know what to do.
Many shops and stalls (warung) ceased operating, probably for two rea-
sons: first, the owners put off buying manufactured goods until prices
stabilized, and second, they closed down or became bankrupt, especially
those shops and stalls that depended largely on manufactured and im-
ported goods because these goods were scarce or else prices had be-
come “crazy”.
Besides that, the consequences of employment severance (PHK),
which had taken place in urban areas, had started to appear in the re-
search area, although the nature and severity differed somewhat in the
various research villages. In Maguwoharjo, for example, unemployment
due to PHK was caused more by delays in housing construction (by
both developers and private owners) and in other service sectors (like
shops and other service companies that no longer operated) that were
located in or close to this village. Unemployment due to PHK in the
other three research villages (Trimurti, Ponjong and Temonkulon) re-
presented the “spin-off” from the dismissal of workers in big cities
(mainly Jakarta). The direct impact on the communities in the research
villages was reflected in two things. First, there was a change in con-
sumption patterns and a rather drastic fall in the quality of people’s
diets. The price rises and scarcity of factory-made consumer goods
(especially imported items), which were then followed by a sky-high rise
in the prices of the nine basic necessities (sembako), caused the commu-
nity to cease (or reduce) consumption of manufactured goods (such as
electronic goods and the like) for secondary purposes “temporarily”; in
cases where such goods were urgently needed, people preferred to use
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locally manufactured products. The same was true in meeting the need
for basic commodities. Second, there was an increase in criminal ac-
tions such as theft and looting in all the research villages. Inability to
meet the daily needs of life led unfortunate sections of the community
(in particular, young, productive people who had lost their source of in-
come) to take short cuts of a negative kind.
This unstable situation continued for the next six months, together
with the political instability that ended with the “fall” of the New Order
government led by President Suharto (and obviously that of President
B.J. Habibie). After a new president (President Abdurrahman Wahid)
was elected, a new chapter began in the government of Indonesia. The
development policies of the new government in the monetary and other
fields succeeded in controlling stability in many sectors. Nevertheless,
at that time the purchasing power of the community had really reached
its lowest point: the prices of consumer goods (both manufactured and
non-manufactured) and of services doubled, while sources of household
income remained the same or even decreased among certain segments
of the community (such as rice-growing farmers as a consequence of
the removal of subsidies for agricultural inputs). Two government poli-
cies (related to the crisis) were introduced that had a direct impact on
community life in the research area, namely, the social safety net (JPS)
programs and the removal of subsidies, in particular the subsidy for
fuel (energy) and the subsidy for agricultural inputs. These two policies
had very contradictory effects. Leaving aside the many forms of misuse
that occurred, the JPS programs on the one hand helped the poorer
groups in the community with education, health care and the provision
of cheap rice (which is better known as raskin, meaning “rice for the
poor”), yet on the other hand the removal of the subsidies for fuel and
agricultural inputs pushed the costs of production up.
Together with greater stability in national, macro-level economic con-
ditions (at a time that was also marked by the transfer of government
authority from the hands of Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati Soekar-
noputri), the atmosphere of “uncertainty” began to fade. The wheels of
the economy began to turn again, economic growth took place and in-
flation was held down, added to which the beginnings of social security
were created. Thus it can be concluded that a situation of “shock and
stress” had indeed occurred in the “rurban” area of the Special Region
of Yogyakarta, but had prevailed from the beginning of the crisis for the
following two years. After that, the majority of people no longer re-
garded the situation as a crisis (that led to panic and unrest) and soon
returned to their customary pattern of life “like now”. The pattern “like
now” to which they referred is a life characterized by high costs trace-
able to the rise in the prices of basic necessities, which more than
doubled by comparison with the pre-crisis period, and to the high cost
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of inputs and the growth in laborers’ wages. The rise in the cost of la-
borers’ wages forced household industries that were not too large to uti-
lize more household labor. For example, children helped with the pro-
duction process while wives sold goods at local markets.
The local impact
Maguwoharjo village
The crisis actually constituted the trigger that encouraged people to uti-
lize “local resources” to increase their sources of income by selling part
of their agricultural land and their home lot. Field observations indicate
that almost all agricultural land originally owned by local people had
changed hands to new dwellers and institutions. In this village (and sur-
rounding villages) there are more than three rather large universities
and a number of senior high schools, both general and vocational. Be-
sides that, its strategic location, excellent access to the city center and
competitive land prices have made this area the main target for both
housing developers and wealthy individuals (many of whom came from
places outside the city of Yogyakarta). Already two “elite” housing com-
plexes (Taman Cemara I and II, which together contain more than 100
house units) have been constructed in the village, and one more is now
being built (it would appear to be rather large, with 200 units including
house-shop (ruko) buildings).
The people of Pugeran hamlet generally have several alternatives to
add to their income from the sale of land and the construction of
houses: first, they can build additional rooms or new houses for rental.
People who do not own a wide home lot usually choose to expand the
main house by adding on a number of rooms (usually between four
and ten); however, those with a large home lot prefer to build new
houses. Second, another alternative is to open a small restaurant or a
general store. These warung are usually part of the main house or, if se-
parate, are at least on the same house-lot. Third, there is the provision
of consumer services like laundries, barber shops, and beauty salons.
Fourth, there is trade in building materials. The number of families in-
volved in small businesses is not great, however, possibly because rela-
tively large capital is needed for such undertakings. Finally, there is the
construction sector which offered work to small “contractors”, artisans,
or building laborers.
The number of households involved in occupational multiplicity is
significant. The combination of a basic job and the renting out of
rooms or houses is the most commonly encountered pattern of sources
of household income, besides a basic job and a warung (a small restau-
rant or general store). There are many multi-spatial households in this
village. For example, the household head works as a public transport
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driver, the wife is a vendor in the market and an adult child runs a
warung in the family house. Household patterns of this kind require
further study.
Trimurti village
One striking feature of this village is that it has no agricultural land. In-
deed, it has been well known for many years as one of the centers of
the tahu industry in Bantul District. Many households have long been
engaged in this industry and the number has increased since the crisis.
Interviews with local people and observations in the field suggest that
there are at least two reasons for the increase in the number of house-
holds involved in tahu production. The first is the shift in community
diet back to tahu and tempe (soybean cake) since the crisis as a conse-
quence of the sharp rise in the cost of meat and eggs, which has in-
creased the demand for tahu and tempe. The second reason is related to
the first. This is the only business activity that can be undertaken by
people who have been retrenched and have returned to their place of
origin. Evidence in the field indicates that most of the new tahu busi-
nesses are run by individuals who have returned to the village.
The present consequence of the great increase in tahu production is
that supply now exceeds demand. Since tahu is a perishable product
that must be sold on the day when it is made, the producers have
adopted two strategies, namely, a reduction in production and expan-
sion in their marketing regions. These two strategies appear to have
been favored by two different groups. Small producers prefer to reduce
production because attempting to reach markets outside the area is use-
less and causes losses, whereas the larger producers are happy to in-
crease output and to widen their marketing network. Interviews showed
that they sell most of their output in Beringharjo Market (Yogyakarta).
Socio-community institutions have played a very significant role since
the crisis, especially informal institutions at the hamlet level such as
the Neighborhood Association (Rukun Tetangga or RT) and family ties.
One example is the arisan, or rotating credit group common within the
RT, which has proved very effective in overcoming the socioeconomic
problems faced by its members. If a member of the household falls ill,
it is this institution that is first asked for assistance.
The social safety net programs also appear to have produced signifi-
cant benefits, especially the rice assistance or raskin program and the
health assistance program (better known as the “health card” program).
The raskin program greatly helped as it sold rice below the market
price. Whereas the market price was between Rp 2,500 and Rp 3,000
per kilogram, the raskin price was only Rp 1,000 per kilogram. This
program, however, was intended only for the poor (or the very poorest)
and each family received only 10 kilograms of rice per month.
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Temonkulon village
Field observations show that the land that comprises the home lot plays
an important role in the household economy at the present time (espe-
cially for the “survival” group) where the availability of “cash-money” is
very limited due to the crisis. The economic function of the home lot
has two aspects in that it provides items for the daily diet and it is also
a form of savings for sudden, unanticipated needs (such as illness and
contributions to kampong celebrations) and long-term necessities (such
as the education of children, children’s wedding celebrations, and the
celebration of major religious days). In the first case products usually
take the form of vegetables and tubers, while in the second case they
are generally commercial commodities like coconuts, cocoa, and bana-
nas or else livestock like goats or cattle. In recent times people have pre-
ferred to raise goats rather than cattle because cattle prices are currently
very low (possibly because imported beef, mainly from Australia, has
flooded the market).
The high cost of living that has resulted from the doubling of the
prices of basic necessities by comparison with pre-crisis prices, from
the high cost of agricultural inputs because of reductions in farm subsi-
dies and from the increase in agricultural laborers’ wages, which have
almost doubled, have caused households to fall into a worse abyss of
poverty. Meanwhile, the thing that hurts them even more is the low sell-
ing prices offered for their agricultural products (especially rice) in the
market. Their dependence on middlemen from the city is greater at the
present time than it was before the crisis, when more transactions took
place at the farm gate than in the market. This is due to a number of
things, such as the large increases in transportation costs, which are
not commensurate with the increase in the selling prices of their pro-
ducts, the fact that the proportion of their yield that is sold is smaller
than before the crisis, to the point where there is a trend towards a re-
turn to a subsistence pattern, and finally, the fact that market prices do
not differ very much from farm gate prices. At the time of the main
harvest the prices of agricultural products fall and for this reason farm-
ers prefer to store their crops and sell them later when they need cash.
As an area from which workers used to depart, this village has ob-
viously accepted back people who lost their jobs, especially in Jakarta
and its surroundings. Since most of these people were employed in the
formal sector (as factory workers) and since the social networks in the
informal sector in this village are limited, many of them have chosen to
remain in the village. On the whole they have undertaken two activities,
namely, opening a warung and renting agricultural land (especially sa-
wah). This has undoubtedly in itself formed a burden for the village.
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Like in Trimurti, local social institutions have played an important
role in coping with the crisis; not only in cases of death and illness, but
also for getting assistance in purchasing agricultural inputs.
Ponjong village
Geographical factors appear to have had a significant influence on the
people of this village during the crisis and up to the present time. These
factors include the long distance of the village from the city of Yogyakar-
ta, the rough topography of the area, and the dependence of the produc-
tion process on the climate. These factors, together with the crisis,
caused three basic problems which the people of Ponjong are in the
midst of facing, namely, the doubling of the prices of basic necessities
(in fact, of virtually all goods) by comparison with pre-crisis prices, the
increase in the cost of transportation (because the cost of fuel and spare
parts for vehicles also rose, while the topography is difficult and the vil-
lage is located a long way from Yogyakarta City), and agricultural yields
are now uncertain (the prices of agricultural inputs like fertilizer, seed,
and pesticide have risen sharply and climatic patterns are unpredictable).
At the beginning of the crisis, that is, one or two years after it started,
many village people “returned home” because of dismissal from employ-
ment, which created problems. One problem was social unrest such as
theft of wood from the forest and the occupation of state land. These dis-
turbances have now declined, however, and many of those who returned
to the village have gone back to the city, utilising existing social networks.
The people of Gunung Kidul are well known for their urban social net-
works, especially among people involved in the informal sector.
As in other places, urban-related village activities (primarily for sec-
ondary needs) experienced a decline and in many cases ceased. An ex-
ample from this village is the household furniture industry, which no
longer exists. A different situation is found with agro-industrial activ-
ities, for example, the corn-crisps industry. It would seem that there has
been rapid growth in the output of this industry since the crisis. This
development is closely related to the general change that has occurred
in community eating patterns, for people now purchase secondary food
products that are cheaper and hence more affordable.
Again local social institutions have played a very significant role since
the crisis, for example, both at the hamlet level such as the Neighbor-
hood Association (Rukun Tetangga or RT) and through family ties. If a
member experiences some difficulty such as illness, crop failure, or
house construction, well-established informal social systems begin to
function. It is interesting to examine the following example. One conse-
quence of the crisis that affected small farmers has been the nominal
rise in agricultural wages, which have almost doubled. This increase
has been a heavy burden because the value of farm output has barely
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changed (and has even undergone falls at harvest time). So what have
small farmers done? They have formed groups of around five to ten
people who work on the dry fields of each group member in turn with-
out any form of payment. This approach has proved quite effective be-
cause their holdings are not too large (less than one hectare).
The Impact of the crisis on household livelihood systems
The distribution of households in the research area by type of livelihood
system (accumulation, consolidation and survival households) is shown
in table 7.1. Household livelihood systems in “rurban” areas are deter-
mined through evaluation of three major aspects, namely, the house-
hold’s capabilities, its assets and its activities. Capabilities concern the
pattern of resource use while assets are linked to ownership of and ac-
cess to resources; activities are evaluated from the type and status of
each household member’s occupation. These three major aspects are
then expressed as seven criteria that are divided into 15 variables. De-
tails of how this has been calculated for each of the research villages
can be seen in appendix 1. From the analysis of in-depth interviews with
sample households, only 20 percent are classed as accumulation house-
holds, 42 percent are consolidation households, and the remaining 38
percent are survival households.
The following discussion gives an in-depth explanation of the results
of the analysis of livelihood systems in each of the research villages.
This approach has been adopted because the composition and nature of
the systems in each village show specific characteristics.
General responses to the crisis
Based on the classification of livelihood systems, household responses
to the crisis reveal variations. In the present article the responses that
are examined are divided into two types, consumption responses and
Table 7.1 Distribution of sample households by village and type of livelihood sys-
tems at the time of research (end of 2002)
Accumulation Consolidation Survival Total
Maguwoharjo 3 6 3 12
Trimurti 1 7 4 12
Temonkulon 4 3 5 12
Ponjong 2 4 6 12
Total 1
(20.83 %)
20
(41.67 %)
18
(37.50 %)
48
(100.00 %)
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production responses (see Titus 2003). Consumption responses are re-
lated to six variables, namely, labor participation (LP), specialization or
diversification of undertakings within the household (ES), an increase
or decrease in income sources (IM), an addition to or reduction in
household savings (SV), the extent of debts (LB), and the increase or de-
cline in the household’s consumption expenditure (CE). Production re-
sponses refer to variables such as the expansion (or reduction) of pro-
ductive land (SA) and investments (IN), diversification or specialization
in production (SD), changes in business orientation (market orientation
or a return to subsistence) (MS), the extent of capital input (CI), and la-
bor input (LI). Further clarification of the response variables and the
method of calculating them and evaluating results can be seen in ap-
pendix 2.
Household responses to crisis phenomena in all research villages for
response variables are summed up in figure 7.2, where the curves on
the left side represent consumption responses and those on the right
indicate production responses. It is clear from the figure that both the
consumption and production response patterns for all types of house-
hold livelihood system (accumulation, consolidation, and survival) show
significant differences for most of the response variables. An exception
occurs in the case of labor participation (LP), where all types show the
same positive response (although it is not very high). This reflects the
fact that on the whole the crisis encouraged more sample households
in the research area to involve more household members in earning fa-
mily income. Survival households utilized more household members in
Figure 7.2 Household consumption and production responses to the crisis by
strategy type
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various types of work (ES) than did accumulation and consolidation
households, even though their income (IM) underwent a sharp decline
during the crisis. Most of the consolidation households, although not as
many as survival households, also experienced a fall in family income
(indicated by values of the curve below zero). This indicates that the
type of work undertaken by consolidation and survival household mem-
bers in an attempt to increase household income consisted mostly of
jobs that brought low or very low returns (such as agricultural wage la-
bor, “odd-job” work, construction work, and domestic employment).
Meanwhile, the opposite was the case with accumulation households;
the number of household members who were employed was small but
returns to labor were high.
The great skew in levels of family income between accumulation
households and the other households had direct consequences for the
other three consumption response variables, that is, savings (SV), debts
(LB), and consumption expenditure (CE). Figure 7.2 indicates that accu-
mulation households showed a positive response to these three vari-
ables, while on the other hand survival households had a negative re-
sponse and consolidation households had a negative response for two
variables (SV and LB) and a neutral response for CE. This proves that
during the crisis many accumulation households were able to increase
family savings (indicating that household income was higher than
household expenditure), while the majority of consolidation and survi-
val households had to “eat into” their family savings (for example, by
selling some of their jewelry or livestock). Nevertheless, this does not
mean that all accumulation households escaped the effects of a scarcity
of “cash money” and the high cost of consumption goods and services
during the crisis. The low positive responses to the variables LB and CE
show that many accumulation households still required loans or else in-
curred debts to meet their daily needs. In other words, there were still
many accumulation households that experienced a “deficit” in the
household budget as a consequence of high consumption expenditure.
A situation of this kind was usually encountered in accumulation
households that still had the burden of educational costs for children,
especially those attending senior high school or doing tertiary studies.
Turning now to production responses, three aspects warrant atten-
tion. First, accumulation and consolidation households have positive re-
sponses to the six production variables, although these responses are
not very high. Survival households, however, have greater variations in
their responses: there are neutral responses to land (SA), negative re-
sponses to investment (IN), type of production (SD), and business or-
ientation (MS), and positive responses to the two last variables in figure
7.2, namely, capital input (CI) and labor input (LI). The positive re-
sponse to capital input in survival households might appear to be an
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anomaly, yet in reality it is not necessarily so because they had to make
this input in order to maintain a living. Even to maintain production at
a subsistence level, those whose agricultural land is barely big enough
to live from, still had to increase their inputs, although this meant sacri-
ficing a part of the income that they obtained from other sources. The
addition of capital inputs was obviously very limited, in view of the fact
that their resources were also limited. On the whole, this situation
shows that among accumulation and consolidation households many
were more capable of expanding their production land (SA), increasing
their investment (IN) and production, and extending their marketing
reach (MS) than were survival households. Secondly, the rather high ne-
gative response (-0.83) for business orientation (MS) among survival
households is a strong indication that the majority of these households
reverted to a subsistence pattern of life. Finally, accumulation, consoli-
dation, and survival households all have a positive response to capital
input (CI) and labor input (LI). In figure 7.2, the curve for consolidation
households is higher than the curves for the other types of household,
which means that the proportion of households that added or expanded
capital input and labor input is greater. The positive response to these
last two variables shows that to expand or maintain its life during the
crisis a household had no choice other than to involve more capital and
more labor in its business. This does not apply, however, to accumula-
tion households as their use of inputs had already reached a high level
before the crisis.
The local impact on livelihood systems
Maguwoharjo village
As table 7.1 has shown, half of the households that were surveyed in
this village belong to the consolidation category, while of the other six
households three are accumulation households and three are survival
households. This composition by livelihood system is different from
what it was at the beginning of the crisis (1998), when six households
belonged to the survival group. This means that three of the 1998 survi-
val households have moved up and become consolidation households
(see table 7.2), which means that some of the people in a “rurban” area
close to a large city actually benefited from the phenomena associated
with the crisis.
Field survey findings show that the increase in status was due to
three things. The first is the consolidation of the household’s physical
assets. As has been explained above, money from the sale of agricultur-
al land or part of the home lot was used to create more productive
sources of income, such as rooms or houses for rent, food stalls, or
general stores and the like. The second is a change in occupation. This
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is related to the first change, that is, from farming to other employment
in trade or construction work (in the case of the sample households one
person who had been an agricultural laborer became a vendor of mung
bean porridge). The third is a multiplicity of income sources; because
many opportunities were available, each household had more than one
source of income.
In this study the changes in the livelihood systems that were exam-
ined were caused not only by the crisis. An examination was also made
of the rise and fall of household status in one kind of livelihood system,
whether it was caused by the crisis or by factors outside the crisis. The
last two columns of table 7.3 show that five sample households had ex-
perienced a non-crisis change (higher or lower) during the previous five
years. In general there are three reasons for these changes, namely, the
status of employment, household demography (specifically the house-
hold’s life cycle), and health. Changes due to employment status were
generally related to an improvement in the career of the household
head during the five-year period. Changes traceable to the household’s
life-cycle can be positive (better, increasing) or negative (worse, declin-
ing). The case of Mr. Purwosuratman is an example of positive change.
Athough he had already entered pension age, the welfare of his family
increased because five of his six sons and daughters already had their
own families and led independent lives, while the youngest son had just
graduated from university and was working in Jakarta. With the help of
his wife, he established a food stall in his house yard and has been able
Table 7.2 Changes in livelihood strategies in Maguwoharjo Village, 1998 and 2003
Family name LS 2003 LS 1998 Changes in livelihood systems?
Due to other factors Due to the crisis
Alif accumulation accumulation yes (higher, career)
Sabar accumulation accumulation no no
Suwarman accumulation accumulation yes (higher, career)
Arjonangun consolidation survival yes (consolidation
of physical assets)
Dulroyat consolidation survival yes (change in job)
Jumino consolidation consolidation Yes (lower,
demography)
Purwosuratman consolidation consolidation yes (higher,
demography)
Satimin consolidation consolidation no no
Walidi consolidation survival yes (income
multiplicity)
Budi Prayitno survival survival yes (lower, health)
Ny. Dasiyem survival survival yes (change in job)
Adijarkasi survival survival no no
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to adopt two foster children who are still in primary school (SD). The
case of Mr. Jumino is a negative example. As a low-ranking public ser-
vant, he finds it quite difficult to pay for the education of his child, who
is now approaching adulthood.
Finally, there are changes caused by the health of the head of house-
hold. The chronic illness of Mr. Budi Prayitno, for example, has pre-
vented him from working (previously he was an agricultural laborer).
Thus, family income depends on the earnings of his wife, who sells in
the local market, added to which there is the rent from three of the
rooms in his house. By comparison with their life before the crisis, this
family has clearly experienced a somewhat drastic decline, even though
they originated from the survival group of households.
A detailed description is now given of the character of each type of li-
velihood system in Maguwoharjo village. As already noted in the metho-
dology section of this chapter, the criteria for evaluation of each kind of
livelihood system are based on the elements of capabilities, household
assets and fulfilment of needs. Accumulation households in Maguwo-
harjo are dominated by public servants, especially “newcomers”, rather
than by people who originated from this village. In addition, they gener-
ally have more than one source of income, although not always from
two or more different occupations. Therefore, on the whole the accu-
mulation group in this village has had a constantly rising level of wel-
fare. This can be seen from their steadily increasing control of house-
hold assets in the form of goods and houses as well as money savings.
Their increase in prosperity is generally not related to the crisis but has
been due to a better position on the employment ladder. Interviews also
showed that the very high rise in the prices of daily necessities over the
past five years did not affect the consumption pattern of the accumula-
tion group in this village.
Consolidation households represent the largest group in this village.
They come from a number of occupations, ranging from self-employ-
ment (like shoe repairers, keepers of food stalls, and vehicle drivers)
and low-level public servants (like security guards, night watchmen, and
office messengers) to retired public servants. Most of those in the con-
solidation group originated from this village, but there are several
households that moved here from elsewhere. Like the accumulation
group, they also usually have more than one source of income but with
different combinations. The Arjonangun family, for example, has at
least four income sources: the first is the husband’s earnings as a shoe
repairer (with his own kiosk in the city of Yogyakarta); the second
source is profits made by the wife, who, with the help of their children,
has established a food stall and general store in the yard of their house;
the third source is the rental of rooms to university students; the fourth
is a household industry making crisps from the skin of livestock (kru-
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puk rambak). This family is a good example of a multi-occupational or
multi-spatial household.
The level of welfare of consolidation households is certainly not as
high as that of the accumulation group. With this group, security of in-
come is generally only moderate because of its somewhat fluctuative
nature: if the family is fortunate (for example, in finding tenants for its
house or rooms), income is large enough but if it is unlucky, income
can drop sharply. Since the size of the income that they receive is not
fixed, their level of welfare is somewhat vulnerable to change. In addi-
tion, labor participation is rather high, although it mostly involves fa-
mily members rather than wage labor. From field observations it seems
that the level of welfare of this group has tiers. The highest is occupied
by households that no longer have the burden of educational expenses
for children (as is the case with the Purwosuratman family), while on
the other hand the lowest welfare tier is occupied by families that still
have to pay educational costs for children, especially those who have
reached senior high school or the tertiary level. This shows that the
household’s life cycle has a very significant influence on the level of
welfare in consolidation households.
The survival households in this village are those with a single parent
(a widow), a household head of advanced age, or a household head who
has experienced some misfortune (such as chronic illness). Income
sources for households in this group are both limited and sometimes
uncertain, which makes income security very low. On the whole these
households do not have significant physical assets for productive activ-
ities. Their situation is even worse if their children are still of school
age.
Trimurti village
Only one of the twelve households selected as the sample for the in-
depth survey is in the accumulation category, while seven are consolida-
tion and the rest survival households (refer back to table 7.1). The small
number of accumulation households points to the fact that it is difficult
to expand the household-based tahu industry in this village. The large
number of consolidation households actually confirms this statement; it
would seem that there is tough competition among households engaged
in the industry. Table 7.4 shows that there has been no change in the
types of livelihood system over the past five years apart from changes in
quality in the livelihood systems group. In the consolidation group, for
example, two households have undergone a change in quality. Even so,
the change has not been caused by the crisis. The Harso Suwito family
experienced a drop in quality because of the high cost of medical treat-
ment for the wife, who was seriously ill (and has now passed away),
while on the other hand, the Ngatijan family experienced an increase in
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quality because most of the children had already graduated from tertiary
studies. In the survival group, the only change that occurred involved a
fall in quality, which was related to the effects of the crisis, that is, the
burden that had to be borne as a consequence of the increase in the
prices of basic necessities without a comcomitant increase in sources of
household income.
As in the case of Maguwoharjo village, the classification of a house-
hold in this village by livelihood system frequently ran parallel with the
number of family members still attending senior high school or doing
tertiary studies. As already noted, the fact that educational expenses at
this level are borne entirely by the parents is a very heavy burden for
the majority of families. Interviews revealed that household outlay on
education had already reached more than half of their routine expendi-
ture. In fact, at certain specific times such as the beginning of the new
school year, savings in the form of cash or possessions (usually livestock
like goats and cattle) had to be allocated to this purpose. A detailed de-
scription is now given of each kind of livelihood system, based on cap-
abilities, household assets, and the fulfillment of needs.
Accumulation households in Trimurti are represented only by the Se-
tyo Marwoto family, which is engaged in the tahu industry. This family
illustrates the situation of a tahu-producing household that has achieved
success (even though the number of such households in this village is
very small). Tahu production is a very intensive undertaking in terms of
the high level of labor participation, which is the reason why those
households engaged in the industry have only one source of income.
Although there may be other sources, they are related to the tahu busi-
Table 7.3 Changes in livelihood strategies in Trimurti Village, 1998 and 2003
Family name LS 2003 LS 1998 Changes in livelihood systems?
Due to other factors Due to the crisis
Setyo Marwoto accumulation accumulation no no
Marso Utomo consolidation consolidation no no
Lasimin consolidation consolidation no no
Harso Suwito consolidation consolidation yes (lower, sick wife)
Mujiman consolidation consolidation no no
Ngadino consolidation consolidation no no
Ngatijan consolidation consolidation yes (higher,
demographic factors)
Wagiyo consolidation consolidation no no
Markuat survival survival no no
Gimin survival survival yes (lower,
living costs >)
Amat Mangun survival survival no no
Samijo survival survival yes (lower,
living costs >)
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ness. The Setyo Marwoto family, for example, use their home lot to
raise pigs, because the residue from the production of tahu provides
good feed for pigs. In running his business, Mr. Setyo Marwoto in-
volves all the members of his family, as well as eight wage laborers. The
division of labor is such that the husband, children, and wage laborers
are occupied in the production process, while the wife sells the finished
product in markets. Since the household’s output of tahu is rather large,
it reaches not only local markets but also the Bantul market and the
Beringharjo market in Yogyakarta. Nevertheless, the income security of
this family is classed as medium, because income stability depends very
much on the stability of the prices for the inputs and outputs required
in this industry. At the beginning of the crisis, the household had to
cease production because the price of soybeans (which are imported)
rose sharply.
Although their level of welfare is not as high as that of the accumula-
tion households in Maguwoharjo village, the Setyo Marwoto family is
classed as prosperous in this village. Its position is further supported by
the fact that the family no longer has the responsibility of educating
children. Over the past five years no change occurred in the family con-
sumption pattern but two new motorcycles can be seen in the house for
family transportation purposes. In addition, there is also a color televi-
sion that is less than one year old.
The seven consolidation households in this village have three kinds
of primary occupation. The first is production of tahu, although their
businesses are not as large as that owned by the Setyo Marwoto family.
The second kind of occupation is the public service and the third is
teaching. The two families in the last group have other additional
sources of income. For example, the Lasimin family has opened a gen-
eral store, which the wife and children look after, while in the case of
the Ngatijan family both husband and wife are teachers in a state
school. The income security of this consolidation group is lower than
that of the accumulation family, even though it can still be described as
adequate. As was noted above, the factor that prevents them from being
placed in the accumulation category is the large consumption expenses
that they still have to pay for the education of their children.
The survival households in this village are those of marginal families
who do not possess household assets for productive activities. Mr. Mar-
kuat, for example, works as a truck driver, transporting goods for a
building materials store in Bantul town, while his wife runs a sewing
business in their house. As their two children are in their late teens (17
and 15 years), it can be imagined how much money they have to spend
on education. The same applies to the family of Gimin, who works
every day as a carpenter. Although the wife helps by selling tahu in the
local market, it is difficult for this family, which has three children (two
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adults and one less than five years old), to improve its level of welfare.
The Amat Mangun family, which is engaged in the small-scale tahu in-
dustry, is in the same position, as is the Samijo family, which makes
rope from palm tree fiber (ijuk).
Temonkulon village
Table 7.1 showed that of the twelve sample households in this village,
four were in the accumulation category, three in the consolidation cate-
gory, and five in the survival category. Not many changes occurred in
the type of livelihood system during the recent five-year crisis period.
As can be seen from table 7.4, only one household experienced a
change, namely, that of the Sugito family, which moved from consolida-
tion at the beginning of the crisis to accumulation at the present time.
Even this change is traceable not to the crisis but to the stage in the fa-
mily’s life cycle, for they not longer have the burden of children’s edu-
cational expenses. Most of the existing changes occurred in each kind
of livelihood system, that is, there was a drop in quality. Table 7.5 shows
that this change was caused by phenomena associated with the crisis,
namely, the rise in the prices of basic necessities and, in the specific
case of farmers, the increase in farm inputs and the low selling prices
for agricultural products. More details are now given of each kind of
livelihood system according to capabilities, household assets and the
fulfillment of needs.
Table 7.4 Changes in Livelihood Strategies in Temonkulon Village, 1998 and 2003
Family name LS 2003 LS 1998 Changes in livelihood systems?
Due to other factors Due to the crisis
Suyatno accumulation accumulation no no
Jujur accumulation accumulation no no
Muhdahlan accumulation accumulation yes (lower,
agricultural inputs >)
Sugito accumulation consolidation yes
(demographic
factors)
Sujendro consolidation consolidation yes (lower,
agricultural inputs >)
Hadi Sunaryo consolidation consolidation no no
Suwarjono consolidation consolidation yes (lower,
cost of living >)
Kasan Mujiono survival survival no no
Sudarman survival survival yes (lower,
cost of living >)
Kasiro survival survival no no
Kasan Muhtadi survival survival no no
Hadi Pranoto survival survival no no
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Accumulation households in this village are dominated by village offi-
cials, public servants, and teachers. On the whole they have more than
one source of income. Employment combinations within this group
consist of both husband and wife working as teachers or village offi-
cials/teachers also engaged in farming. A fairly significant source of
supplementary household income is the cultivation of commercial crops
on the home lot. This is an agricultural area and village residents gener-
ally have large home lots (250 to 750 square meters). The income secur-
ity of these households is quite high, from the point of view of the size
of their income and their low level of consumption expenditure. In the
case of those who own large stretches of sawah (such as the Muhdahlan
family) labor participation is high. On the whole, they no longer make
use of household labor but prefer to employ wage laborers from outside
the village. The reason that they gave for employing laborers from an-
other village is that they generally regard the use of such labor as more
efficient because the number of man-hours is greater. The welfare level
of accumulation households in this village can be said to be greater and
more secure than that of accumulation households in Trimurti. If this
is linked to the pattern of household consumption, it appears that there
are not many significant differences by comparison with the pre-crisis
situation.
There are no striking differences between accumulation and consoli-
dation households in composition of employment and types of house-
hold assets. Besides the fact that the latter own smaller sawah holdings,
the differentiating feature is their position in the household’s life cycle.
As was found in the other research villages, households that have de-
pendent children approaching adulthood encounter difficulties in rais-
ing their level of welfare.
Survival households in this village usually have a single source of in-
come, as landowning farmers (with limited holdings), tenant farmers,
agricultural laborers, and “odd-job” laborers. As in the other research
villages, this group is the largest in the village community as a whole.
Because the prices of basic necessities are increasingly beyond their
reach, many of these households have gone back to the use of their
home lot as a source of daily food. Even more than that, the home lot is
also used as a source of family savings in the form of cattle or goats.
There are strong indications that they have returned to a subsistence
pattern.
Ponjong village
Only two of the twelve households chosen as the sample for the in-
depth survey are classed as accumulation households, while four are
consolidation and the remaining six are survival households. Not many
significant changes in classification took place over the five-year crisis
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period, as table 7.6 shows. Most of the changes occurred in the quality
of each group. In the case of the accumulation group, there was an in-
crease in quality in the corn-crisps industry. Marketing of the products
of this industry is no longer just local in scope but is already regional
and even national, for regular sales to Jakarta and Medan are already
being made. In the consolidation group a decline in quality occurred in
activities related to transportation. This stems from the fact that opera-
tional costs underwent a large increase. Within the survival group many
households experienced a fall in quality because they could no longer
afford the increases in the price of goods, especially those goods con-
nected with basic needs.
Households in the accumulation group usually have more than one
source of income, for example, employment as a village official and as a
farmer, or as a teacher and an entrepreneur in agro-industry. The conso-
lidation group generally consists of farmers who own rather large land
holdings, or have some other occupation such as that of a driver or a
primary school teacher owning a small amount of non-irrigated land or
a home lot. In this group, wives or other family members usually also
supplement household income, for example, by selling in a market or
establishing a stall of some kind in their house. The survival group
usually consists of agricultural laborers, tenant farmers, farmers with
extremely small holdings and people with other occupations such as dri-
vers or owners of businesses that became bankrupt (like a saw-milling
business).
Table 7.5 Changes in livelihood strategies in Ponjong Village, 1998 and 2003
Family name LS 2003 LS 1998 Changes in livelihood systems?
Due to other factors Due to the crisis
Kamismiyadi accumulation accumulation yes (higher, additional
turnover)
Tukiman S. accumulation accumulation no no
Jamal Wajiri consolidation consolidation no no
Sakino consolidation consolidation yes (lower,
operational >)
Siswowiharjo consolidation consolidation no no
Sukino consolidation consolidation yes (higher,
demographic)
Imam Bukori survival survival yes (higher,
demographic)
Jarwo Utomo survival survival yes (lower, prices >)
Legiyo survival survival yes (lower, prices >)
Ngatijo survival survival no no
Suwitorejo survival survival no no
Jumidi survival accumulation yes (furniture
orders < )
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One aspect that warrants attention in determining livelihood systems
in this village is the number of family members still in high school or
university. As already noted, the cost of education at these levels is
borne fully by the parents and for the majority of village people this is a
heavy burden. Interviews revealed that household the outlay on educa-
tion can be more than half of the household’s routine expenditure. At
certain specific times such as the new school year, savings in the form
of money or goods (usually livestock like cattle or goats) have to be used
for this purpose.
Since the prices of basic necessities are increasingly beyond their
reach, many households (especially from the survival group) have gone
back to using their home lot as their main source of daily food. They
have gone even further and also use the home lot for the raising of cat-
tle or goats as a form of family savings. There are strong indications
that during the crisis they reverted to a subsistence pattern.
Crop failure is a major disaster for the daily lives of survival house-
holds. In this village crop failure is more frequently caused by devia-
tions from the normal climatic pattern, as happened this year, whereas
in earlier times it was traceable to other factors such as attacks by ro-
dents. In the post-crisis period, however, this never occurred. For these
households, factors causing crop failure were more of a worry than the
economic crisis. Why so? Because the economic crisis affected only
their financial position, whereas crop failure meant the loss of their
whole livelihood.
Conclusions
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the present
study is that the economic crisis certainly had a significant impact on li-
velihood systems in “rurban” areas. Nevertheless, the intensity and nat-
ure of that impact varied greatly, depending on space and time. In gen-
eral, the effects of the crisis began to be felt in all research areas six
months after “panic” occurred at the national level. Virtually all villages
experienced a shortage of goods and money as well as a profound atmo-
sphere of uncertainty. Changes in the diet of the community (which ob-
viously declined to a lower level) and criminal actions (theft, burglary,
and illegal logging) were common. Instability in the system of govern-
ment at both central and regional levels led to an atmosphere of
“stress”, while “panic” became more evident among the community.
This situation continued for the next six months, until a new president
was elected in a democratic manner. Even so, the calmness that now ex-
isted among the communities in the research areas as a consequence of
the political stability could not restore the situation that had prevailed
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before the crisis. The reason was that the capacity of these communities
to continue with their lives had reached its lowest point: there was no
longer any capacity left to expand (a person was fortunate if he could
just maintain his life). Even new government policies did not greatly
help, while in some cases they actually caused further hardships for the
community, especially those policies connected with removal of the fuel
subsidy and subsidies for agricultural inputs.
A condition of “shock and stress” certainly occurred in the research
area, but this happened at the beginning of the crisis and lasted for only
the next two years. After that, the majority of the people no longer re-
garded the situation as a crisis (which gave rise to panic and unrest)
and they became accustomed to a pattern of life ‘as it is now’. The pat-
tern referred to is one characterized by high living costs that stem from
the higher prices for basic necessities (which are more than twice those
of the pre-crisis period), the high price of inputs and the increase in the
wages of laborers. The increase in wages forced household industrial
undertakings that were not too large to make greater use of the labor of
household members.
The study has also revealed the existence of significant differences in
impact between villages and between strata within communities in the
research areas (like those revealed in livelihood systems). In the case of
differences between villages, for example, it would seem that commu-
nities in villages close to the city (Maguwoharjo) adapted more easily to
the crisis than those that were relatively far from the city (for example,
Ponjong and Temonkulon). The most striking adaptation was the utili-
zation of local resources as sources of income and a means of maintain-
ing a living. “Rurban” communities on the outskirts of the city pre-
ferred to use their home lots as centers for service activities such as the
renting out of houses or rooms, stalls, and stores, or other services that
were related to the nature of Yogyakarta as an educational city. In the
case of “rurban” communities that were somewhat distant from the city,
more households used their home lots as sources of daily food and sav-
ings (in the form of livestock or in some other form) in order to be able
to meet both sudden and long-term needs.
In addition to distance from an urban center, the coping capacity of
households in this “rurban” region was very much influenced by the
main type of household resources (for example, small-scale irrigated-
rice holdings or small-scale agro-industrial undertakings) and the type
of relationship with the urban economy. Farm households that grew
food crops found it easier to shift to the subsistence level than did
households engaged in agro-industry or those that owned no agricultur-
al land at all (for example, those employed in the tahu industry in Tri-
murti village). Apart from this, migrant workers who came from the in-
formal sector and who returned home to their hamlet (including do-
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mestic workers) obtained employment again more quickly in cities
(especially Yogyakarta) than migrants who had been employed in the
formal sector (in particular factory workers). Usually they returned to
the city after they had worked for a while as agricultural or “odd-job” la-
borers in their village of origin (Kutanegara and Nooteboom, 2002).
The same was true of the differences that occurred between community
strata. The accumulation group was able to withstand the disruption
more easily than households in the survival group, who existed in a
“barely alive” condition. Even more so, survival groups in villages far
from a city apparently returned to a subsistence pattern of the type that
had prevailed in “the period before development”. This also encouraged
institutions of a customary and traditional nature such as arisan groups
and mutual assistance at hamlet level to play a role once again. These
institutions became “the final resort” for survival households in obtain-
ing social, economic, and political protection.
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8 Economic Change, the 1997 Crisis, and
Livelihood Sustainability in Two Horticultural
Communities in South Sulawesi
Marja Rijerse
This chapter is based on research conducted in Lembanna and Kam-
pung Baru, two small rural communities in the municipality of Buluta-
na, situated in the highlands of the upper Jeneberang Valley in Gowa
District, South Sulawesi. The research was conducted at the end of
2003 with the objective of unravelling the impacts of economic changes
on livelihood conditions in various types of households, by paying spe-
cial attention to the role of the economic crisis that started in 1997 and
that affected large parts of Indonesia. Special consideration was also gi-
ven to the analysis of changes in the main systems of local resource use
and the sustainability aspects of these changes. As households tend to
respond in different ways to developments in their external conditions,
the research attempts to identify the extent to which their responses
were attributed to the last economic crisis or by other, more long-term
type of developments. In order to understand the changes and choices
made by households between 1997 and 2003, some background infor-
mation on the communities is presented first. The following section
deals with the local setting and it examines several major changes
brought on by external developments.
The research villages
The villages of Lembanna and Kampung Baru are part of the municipal-
ity of Bulutana, situated at the foot of the Mount Bawakaraeng (2830
meters), in the eastern part of Gowa (see fig 1). The area is character-
ized by a tropical mountain climate with a short dry season and a long
wet season. Bulutana has abundant water sources and the flatter areas
of land can remain waterlogged throughout the year. Because of the am-
ple availability of irrigation water, the households in Lembanna and
Kampung Baru were not badly affected by the El Niño draught in 1997.
The community of Lembanna was established relatively recently by
people from Batulapis and Tompolo Pao, in a resettlement effort in-
itiated in 1932 by the king of Gowa and the Dutch government. The
main reason for their migration was scarcity of land and water. During
the last decades, the area has changed from a backward region in which
the households were mainly engaged in subsistence farming (maize,
passion fruit, and some extensive cattle breeding on the grasslands) to a
highly commercialized vegetable belt. This agricultural revolution can
be traced back to the introduction of European vegetable crops by Hajji
Ulyah, a pioneer farmer from Java, starting in the 1980s. The fertile vol-
canic soil, combined with adequate rainfall and low average tempera-
tures, created favorable circumstances for horticulture of mainly tempe-
rate vegetables, such as cabbage, beans, carrots, tomatoes, peas, leek,
and potatoes. These crops were profitable because of a rise in the mar-
ket prices due to expanding urban markets, the recent economic crisis
and El Niño effects in other parts of Indonesia. The production output
of these new types of crops was much higher in terms of quantity and
value as compared to maize. The increased productivity and profitability
of agricultural activities have had a clear positive impact on the econom-
ic growth of the region. This growth is closely connected to the in-
creased demand for horticultural crops by urban dwellers and those in
Figure 8.1 Location of the research villages in South Sulawesi
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the middle class with a high living standard. Almost all of the vegetable
crops were cultivated for the urban market in Makassar and Malino or
for onward-export to Kendari (Eastern Sulawesi), East Kalimantan, and
even Malaysia. Lembanna and Kampung Baru were therefore able to in-
tensify their (trading) relations with other cities and beyond. As the
transport infrastructure and trading chains have improved, there were
more incentives for households to diversify their horticultural crops and
to engage in non-agricultural activities, such as trading or running a
shop next to their house.
One of the major externally induced developments in the research
area has been the increasing commercialization of agricultural produc-
tion. On the one hand, commercialization of land use has been benefi-
cial for households because the increased prices for vegetables resulted
in higher income levels and better living conditions. On the other hand,
commercial agricultural production depends to a large extent on access
to various inputs and poor households lack sufficient capital to make
these expensive investments. Furthermore, the prices of all inputs have
increased markedly, especially after the peak of the crisis in 1999.
Usually the richer households were in a better position to cope with the
rising prices for inputs than the poorer ones.
Both communities now enjoy prosperity and signs of increased
wealth are evident. Electricity has been available in Kampung Baru
since 1997 and in Lembanna since 2000. The housing conditions have
improved considerably and are quite good now. Most houses are built
of bricks with newly laid cement floors, window frames, and corrugated
iron roofs. Moreover, many houses have durable consumer goods such
as TV sets and modern furniture.
Changing resource use and livelihood conditions
Most of the households in Lembanna and Kampung Baru depend on
agricultural activities. In 2003, the households in the sample cultivated
a total of 8,395 ares (one are is 10.10 square meters) of land, comprising
horticultural land, kebun (mixed forest garden), and sawah (irrigated rice
field). While Lembanna and Kampung Baru are located at an altitude
unsuitable for sawah, some households owned sawah land in the lower
parts of Bulutana. Horticulture is the most profitable of the three types
of land use. The cultivation of kebun crops (coffee and passion fruit)
was easy to combine with horticultural crops, because the former is not
labor intensive. Usually coffee and passion fruit trees were planted near
the house or along the boundary of plots of horticultural land to protect
the soil.
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Vegetable farming has considerably improved the living standards of
the farmers. Most households saw their production output rise, due
mainly to the use of increased amounts of higher quality inputs, such
as better seeds, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides. The agricultural in-
comes of many households increased correspondingly, which also im-
proved the opportunities for these households to undertake other forms
of investment and non-agricultural activities. Therefore, this rapid rural
development has also stimulated local economic diversification.
Unequal distribution of suitable land is a common feature in Lem-
banna and Kampung Baru. Large tracts of fertile land were generally
owned by wealthy farmers. Fifteen of the 33 sample households culti-
vated 25 to 100 ares, eight households between 123 and 200 ares, six
households between 200 and 400 ares and four households cultivated
between 600 and 1700 ares of land. While the majority of the land was
owned and cultivated by the same household, 43 percent of the land
was sharecropped. Sharecropping takes place when land is owned by
one household and rented to other households for cultivation. There
are several types of arrangements with landowners:
– In sharecropping (bagi hasil for the cultivating farmers and bagi ha-
silkan for the landowning household), the landowning household
decides which crops are cultivated, and provides the cultivating
farmer with inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. The
landowner also often arranges the marketing of the crop. In return
he receives a portion of the harvest. For sawah this is half of the har-
vest, and for horticultural crops it is two-thirds. The reason for the
difference is that sawah is said to be more labor intensive.
– There is also a credit-based type of sharecropping (kapital bagi hasil).
The only difference with normal bagi hasil arrangements is that the
cultivating household remains the owner of the land. Both kapital
bagi hasil and bagi hasil arrangements were more commonly carried
out among poorer households.
– Land can also be rented from other landowning households
through cash payment (sewa). In this case, the household renting
the land decides which crops are cultivated, and provides their own
inputs, and retains all of the harvest. Figure 8.2 shows how the land
that is cultivated by the sample households is distributed between
horticulture, kebun, and sawah, and between the various types of ar-
rangements between owners and cultivators. It shows for example
that sharecropping is practiced on almost all of the sawah land,
while the kebun is almost always cultivated by the owner.
Since land and land-based resources are primary livelihood resources, it
is critical that farmers have access to, control over, and ownership of
land. According to the heads of the communities, many households
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would like to expand their land area, but such possibilities in Lembanna
and Kampung Baru are limited. Both communities are surrounded by
forestland, and there is disagreement over whether households are al-
lowed to cultivate it. The farmers believe that the person who opens up
and cultivates communal land (hutan negara) becomes the owner. How-
ever, according to the Forestry Department it is forbidden to fell trees
or to appropriate a piece of land in hutan negara. This dispute was yet
unsolved when the research ended in 2003.
Livelihood strategy groups
The livelihood of a household is affected by a number of factors, such
as its capabilities, needs, ambition, and opportunity. Some of these fac-
tors are due to deliberate and strategic behavior of the household, but
many decisions reflect adaptations to ever-changing circumstances.
“Adapting” means making permanent changes to the livelihood strat-
egy. Livelihood strategies, which are considered to be long-term, are de-
fined as “the way households deal with opportunities and limitations”
and they are directly related to the external context, the availability of
household resources (labor capacity, land and capital) and the house-
hold’s goals and priorities. Coping responses are short-term responses
to specific shocks and stresses. It is often difficult to make a clear dis-
tinction between livelihood strategies and coping responses (Zoomers
1999).
Figure 8.2 Distribution of land according to type of land use and arrangement be-
tween owner and cultivator (%)
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Two functions of livelihood can be identified: production and con-
sumption. The production function is also called “enterprise”, and re-
fers to such aspects as cultivating land and making investments in in-
come-generating activities. The consumption function has a close rela-
tionship with the production function and is aimed at securing income
opportunities and satisfying the consumption needs of household mem-
bers. There are several types of livelihood strategies, which can be
further divided into enterprise and household strategies. Every house-
hold in control of production means was analyzed according to both an
enterprise strategy and a household strategy by comparing its situation
in 2003 with that before the crisis, in 1997. This approach enabled us
to group livelihoods together according to their enterprise strategy or
their household strategy characteristics. In this research the typology
consists of three types of enterprise strategies as defined by Lösch, Fus-
sillier, and Dupraz (1991) and three types of household strategies as de-
fined by White (1991). Each type of strategy shows how households
cope with shocks and stresses in their livelihood conditions. In the fol-
lowing sections different types of enterprise strategies are discussed
with additional comments about their related household strategies.
Marginal-defensive enterprise strategy
Households with a marginal-defensive enterprise strategy generally are
constrained by minimal access to resources such as land, capital, and
knowledge. They have no possibility to increase the scale of their enter-
prise. Households with this type of strategy tend to minimize their risks
(Lösch, Fussillier & Dupraz 1991).
In this research, eight households were found to apply a marginal-de-
fensive type of enterprise strategy. These households cultivate small
pieces of land with an average size of 50 ares. Most of them cultivate
only sharecropped land. All households cultivate horticultural crops and
five households also cultivate kebun crops, generally on only one or two
ares of land. All households use inputs such as fertilizers, in most cases
provided by the owner of their sharecropped land. The households with
this type of strategy only use family labor for cultivating the land. These
findings correspond with the theoretical assumptions on the main char-
acteristics of a marginal-defensive type of enterprise strategy. A few
households in this group also performed a second type of activity.
Usually this was to earn money by working on someone else’s land.
There was one household that kept some goats.
Five of the marginal-defensive households practiced a survival house-
hold strategy, while three households followed a consolidation house-
hold strategy. The income of most of these households is below subsis-
tence level, which is closely reflected in their expenditure pattern. In
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general, households with a survival strategy needed to borrow money
for basic household expenditures. The households with a consolidation
household strategy were focusing on maintaining their standard of liv-
ing. In the section 4.3 on coping responses, attention is paid to their re-
sponses on the consumption side.
Consolidating-conserving enterprise strategy
Similar to households with a marginal-defensive strategy, all households
practicing this type of strategy experience limitations, mainly caused by
lack of land or limited access to resources, while all the capital they gen-
erate is needed to continue their entrepreneurial activities, and there-
fore, is not sufficient to accumulate savings. These households also
tend to minimize their risks (Lösch, Fussillier & Dupraz 1991).
Fifteen households in this sample applied a consolidating-conserving
type of enterprise strategy. The size of the pieces of land that are culti-
vated by households in this group differ greatly. The largest land area is
650 ares and the smallest land area is 25 ares. The majority of the
households cultivate both horticultural and kebun crops. Most house-
holds cultivate their own land. While four households own sawah land,
three of them allocate it to sharecroppers, because it is located too far
away for them to cultivate it themselves. Almost all of the households
in this group use only family labor. Among the households with a con-
solidation or accumulation type of household strategy, however, five em-
ployed external workers.
The resource bases of the households in this group are very diverse
and five households have a non-agricultural activity as their main in-
come source. Apart from cultivating their land, other activities consist
of running a shop, carrying out trading activities, taking care of cattle,
and earning wages as a tea plantation worker, a construction worker, or
a driver. Households employing a consolidating-conserving enterprise
strategy in this research tend to own more cattle than those practicing
other strategies. Apart from the initial purchasing cost, keeping cattle is
an activity that needs little additional capital investment. Therefore, it is
common among households that are focused on the continuation of en-
trepreneurial activities and that do not have the objective of capital accu-
mulation. On the other hand, four households have opened a shop dur-
ing the crisis period. This does not seem to correspond with the theore-
tical assumptions on this strategy type. However, almost all households
in the sample, including the households in this strategy group, enjoyed
bigger profits. These households preferred to continue their agricultural
activity, thereby having enough money to invest in a shop.
Out of the fifteen households with a consolidating-conserving enter-
prise strategy, five employed a survival strategy, nine a consolidation
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strategy and one practiced an accumulation household strategy. House-
holds that applied a survival household strategy sometimes had to bor-
row money and reduced their expenditures on consumer goods in order
to secure the continuation of their entrepreneurial activities. For house-
holds with consolidation or accumulation household strategies, the in-
come levels were sufficient to meet the needs of the household. Only
one out of the nine households following a consolidation or accumula-
tion household strategy has been able to purchase durable goods and a
few have made improvements to their houses.
Expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy
Households which apply this strategy type usually have access to suffi-
cient production means such as capital, land, knowledge and education
to enable them to accumulate capital. The aim of many households
using this type of strategy is to maximize production and profit, which
is reinvested in their income-generating activities. Moreover, most of
the crop yields are sold at the market (Lösch, Fussillier & Dupraz 1991).
Nine households in this research applied an expansionist-innovating
enterprise strategy. All households cultivated horticultural and kebun
land, and three of them also owned sawah land. Most households that
followed an expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy gave their land
in sharecropping to other households. Sometimes they also cultivated a
part of their own land themselves. Almost all of them owned one or
more machines, such as pesticide sprayers, water pumps, or a car for
their trading activities. Six of these households, moreover, employed ex-
ternal workers.
The number of income-generating activities of households in this
group varies between one and four. Many of the households were also
engaged in trading. Four households had a non-agricultural activity as
their main income source. These activities included a shop, trading,
and working as a field manager on the tea plantation.
Three of the households employing an expansionist-innovating enter-
prise strategy practiced a consolidation household strategy, while six of
them had an accumulation household strategy. Not surprisingly, all nine
households had a sufficiently strong resource base. Households with a
consolidation household strategy preferred to invest in their economic
activity rather than spend their money on household consumption.
Households with an accumulation household strategy had sufficient
money to increase both household and enterprise expenditures.
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Adapting and coping responses of the local households
Although this research concentrated mainly on the changing production
activities of households, it also looked at changes in their consumptive
behavior. Various types of responses and adaptations can be identified
with respect to resource use, such as changes in the use of capital and
labor inputs, expansion of cultivated area, specialization or diversifica-
tion of employment and production activities, overexploitation or aban-
donment of resources, and commercialization of production versus re-
treat into subsistence. This section describes the responses by each en-
terprise strategy group concerning diversification, the use of capital and
family labor as well as some responses on the consumption side. For
each of these adaptations and coping responses, attention is paid to the
driving forces behind the different types of strategies. These forces can
be divided into those that result from pull factors (taking advantage of
new opportunities, for example the increased prices for horticultural
crops) versus those resulting from push factors (coping with rising
prices for inputs and consumer goods).
Diversification
One hypothetical household coping response to a crisis is to diminish
risks by diversifying production. Diversification can act both as safety
net for the rural poor and as a means of accumulation for the rural rich.
In this research, a distinction has been made between on-farm diversifi-
cation (the cultivation of more types of crops), and income diversifica-
tion, which can be both off-farm and non-farm. Off-farm diversification
refers to the increase in the number of activities of a household within
agriculture (for example to become a wage worker on someone else’s
land). Non-farm diversification refers to engaging in non-agricultural
income sources, such as non-farm rural wage employment (e.g., a dri-
ver) and non-farm rural self-employment (e.g., a trader or shopkeeper).
In Lembanna and Kampung Baru, almost two-thirds of the sample
households had started cultivating new types of crops (on-farm diversifi-
cation) and one-third embarked on new types of income-generating ac-
tivities (income diversification). This tendency towards income diversifi-
cation is possibly caused by the fact that households now need more
money for buying the expensive inputs (push factor). At the same time
households benefited from the rising prices for their crops, which en-
abled them to invest in non-agricultural income generating activities
(pull factor). The main non-agricultural occupations in Lembanna and
Kampung Baru were: trader, tea plantation worker or small shopkeeper.
In table 8.1 the first, second, and third income-generating activities of
the 33 sample households are presented, ranked according to the
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amount of income per income-generating activity. The table shows that
six households are engaged in only one activity, 19 households carry out
two different types of income-generating activities and eight households
perform three or more types of income-generating activities.
This type of diversification can be seen as a long-term strategy. The
communities were already moving into commercial production before
the crisis started. The high prices for pesticides and consumer goods
made it necessary to find additional income-generating activities. At the
same time, high prices for the crops resulted in higher income levels,
which enabled households to invest in new income-generating activ-
ities. Each of the enterprise strategy groups has been analyzed to ascer-
tain whether there were differences in the way they had diversified.
The first group is formed by households adopting a marginal-defen-
sive enterprise strategy. Most of the land they work is sharecropped.
The dependency relationship between them and the owners of their
land had a strong impact on the ability of these households to improve
their livelihood conditions. On-farm diversification was only possible
with the involvement of the landowner who provided them with inputs.
The households with this type of enterprise strategy had few opportu-
nities to start new types of income-generating activities, as they had lim-
ited access to capital. The household members who started working
after 1997 usually performed the same type of activities which other
working household members already carried out in 1997.
For this group it is not possible to determine whether the on-farm di-
versification is a pull or a push factor. They needed to make sharecrop-
ping arrangements because they could not afford to buy the expensive
inputs themselves, which can be considered as a push factor (coping
Table 8.1 Number of households with first, second, and third income-generating ac-
tivities
First activity Second activity Third activity
Agricultural activity 24 12 6
Only horticulture 3 2
Horticulture and kebun 16 3 2
Horticulture and/or kebun and sawah 2 4 1
Wage worker 3
Cattle keeping 3 3
Non-agricultural activity 9 15 2
Shop 2 5 1
Tea plantation 4 3
Trader 3 3
Construction worker/driver 4
Owner of a rice huller 1
Source: Household questionnaire 2003
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with the crisis). On the other hand, this was the only way to take advan-
tage of the increased prices for their crops, which is a pull factor. The
commercialization of households following a marginal-defensive enter-
prise strategy does not correspond with the theoretical assumptions on
this strategy type which implies that most of the production output is
consumed by the household itself, while it tends to refrain from risk-
taking activities.
The second group is formed by households that applied a consolidat-
ing-conserving enterprise strategy. The main difference with the former
group is that most households in this group cultivate their own land
and therefore can make their own decisions. Most households with this
type of enterprise strategy have started cultivating more kinds of cash
crops (on-farm diversification) and obtained higher profits. The rising
prices for vegetables and coffee made it attractive for households to cul-
tivate these cash crops, which clearly is a pull factor. Many of these
households have also started new types of income-generating activities:
some opened a shop, and in other households, members started work-
ing on the tea plantation. It is probable that they needed additional in-
come sources to afford the expensive inputs needed for this highly com-
mercialized type of horticultural farming (push factor). At the same
time, more capital was available for investing in (new) production
means such as a shop, because of the higher farm outputs and the in-
creased profits (pull factor).
The last livelihood strategy group is formed by households that apply
an expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy. The objective of these
households is to make a profit, which they reinvest in their activities.
Almost all of these reinvestments were made in an existing type of ac-
tivity, instead of starting a new type of income-generating activity. This
is in contrast with the households in the former strategy group. The
reason for this limited tendency towards income diversification was that
most of them already had a non-agricultural activity before 1997. For
some of them this was even their main income source. Moreover, by in-
creasing the scale of an existing activity, for example by buying more
land, households have been able to achieve advantages of scale.
Although most of the households already cultivated several types of
cash crops before the crisis, many households had started with the culti-
vation of new types of crops (on-farm diversification). Usually they only
added one or two new types of crops. This was done not only to in-
crease profitability, but also for ecological purposes. Carrots are said to
combat cabbage diseases, so they are intercropped with cabbage. Such
diversification therefore can be considered as a push factor. The other
driving forces behind the changes carried out by these households
usually are pull factors, such as taking advantage of the increased prices
for the crops and the extended consumer market.
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Use of capital and labor
One of the main research objectives was to determine how the crisis
had affected the resource use of households. As this research was con-
ducted in rural communities, the main resource for most households
was land. As landownership and land use have already been discussed
in the previous sections, we shall focus here on the use of the two next
important resources, capital and labor. Both will be studied in conjunc-
tion with the respective livelihood strategy groups.
As explained before, households with a marginal-defensive type of
enterprise strategy often were strongly influenced by the dependency re-
lationship between them and the owners of their land. The households
employing this type of enterprise strategy lack capital, which limits their
ability to improve their livelihood conditions. Therefore, investing in
land or machinery, or starting new types of income-generating activities
are not possible without external help. However, households in this en-
terprise strategy group rarely borrow money for their enterprise, be-
cause they usually prefer to make sharecropping arrangements in which
their landowner provides them with HYV (high-yielding variety) seeds,
fertilizers, and pesticides. Therefore they do not need additional capital
for purchasing their inputs. These sharecropping arrangements can be
identified as pull factors, since they enable the households to cope with
the crisis. On the consumption side some households with this type of
enterprise strategy did borrow money, but this will be dealt with in a se-
parate subsection on the consumptive responses.
Many of the marginal-defensive households do not make full use of
their own labor resources. In some households, one or more members
aged between 15 and 70 did not work. In most cases, these were young
women (daughters or wives) who were engaged in housekeeping. It is
surprising that these households did not respond to the crisis by in-
creasing the number of working household members. A possible reason
is that the level of education of most household members was insuffi-
cient to give them access to better-paid non-agricultural occupations,
and that there were no more jobs available in for example the tea plan-
tation. Furthermore, lack of capital to start their own non-agricultural
activity is also a restriction. Therefore, most household members who
worked, did so on their own land or on land owned by others.
Households with a consolidating-conserving enterprise strategy need
all the capital they can generate to secure the continuity of their entre-
preneurial activities. Therefore, most of these households are unable to
accumulate capital. Still, four out of fifteen households using this type
of strategy have been able to increase their use of capital during the cri-
sis period. Half of them invested in new types of income-generating ac-
tivities such as a shop and trading activities and the others used the ca-
216 MARJA RIJERSE
pital to increase the scale of their existing activities. The increased avail-
ability of capital can be identified as a pull factor, because these farmers
could take advantage of the increased prices for their crops since the
crisis. None of these households, therefore, had borrowed money for
their entrepreneurial activities.
Households applying a consolidating-conserving type of enterprise
strategy also appeared to make good use of the labor that was available
in the household. Many members who reached working age during the
crisis period, for example, started working on their own land or as a
wage worker on the tea plantation. In other households, the wife started
shopkeeping. The way in which these households make use of their la-
bor can be considered both as pull- and push-induced factors. By start-
ing a new income-generating activity, the household is better able to
cope with the rising consumer prices and input prices. At the same
time, making reinvestments in non-agricultural activities is taking ad-
vantage of the increased income from crop yields with a view to longer-
term investments.
In contrast to the former enterprise strategy types, households adopt-
ing an expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy tend to reinvest most
of their profits to expand production. More than half of the households
using this type of enterprise strategy have increased their use of capital
since 1997, but only one of them used it to increase the number of in-
come-generating activities. Most of the households, moreover, preferred
to invest in their existing activities. The households were able to in-
crease their use of capital, because their income levels had increased
considerably during the crisis period, due to both higher production
output and greater profits from the crops. These are both related to the
crisis through rising prices and the expansion of the consumer market.
Reinvestment of crop earnings can therefore be identified as a pull-in-
duced process.
In some households using an expansionist-innovating enterprise
strategy, fewer members had to work, because the profits of their agri-
cultural activities had risen considerably and additional sources of in-
come were no longer required or could be covered by attracting wage la-
bor. Most changes in the use of labor, therefore, were related to the life-
cycle phase and changing household composition.
Responses on the consumption side
The production and consumption of a household are closely connected
with each other, but the behavior on the production side of a household
does not always mirror the behavior on the consumption side. A house-
hold might, for example, reduce its expenditures on consumer goods
(survival household strategy) in order to be able to invest on the enter-
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prise side (expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy). However, 20
out of the 33 sample households showed a similar behavior both in
their enterprise and household. This is not surprising, because when a
household for example intensifies the production of cash crops, part of
the additional income often will be used to pay for the increase in the
household’s expenditures. In this section, the responses on the con-
sumption side are analyzed for each type of household strategy.
Most households which practiced a marginal-defensive type of enter-
prise strategy also employed a survival household strategy, and for most
of them the income level in 2003 was insufficient and had deteriorated
since 1997. Most of these households reported that this was mainly due
to the high consumer prices, which they attributed to the crisis. Their
deteriorated income position meant that they had to use their savings
and incur greater debt by buying more goods on credit or by borrowing
from family members, while reducing their expenditures on consumer
goods. Some households even had to take their children out of school
in order to reduce costs as a short-term measure, despite their aware-
ness of the long-term benefits of education for the development of their
children. None of the households had been able to improve their house
or to buy consumer durables between 1997 and 2003. These changes
in expenditure pattern can be considered as coping responses to push
factors, because they represent short-term adaptations to crisis condi-
tions. A reduction of the expenditures on consumer goods also corre-
sponds with the hypothetical assumptions on survival household beha-
vior. The appendix table at the end of this chapter shows the various
strategy combinations of all households in the research.
Almost half of the sample households in this research applied a con-
solidation household strategy. While most of them also followed a con-
solidating-conserving enterprise strategy, there were also some combi-
nations with the other two enterprise strategy types. Households using
a consolidation household strategy focused on maintaining their stan-
dard of living. This does not necessarily mean that their income level
had not changed since 1997. Since the cost of living had risen, the
households needed higher incomes just to buy the same household
items. Therefore, some of these households, especially those employing
an expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy, reported that their in-
come level had improved during the crisis period and so enjoyed a
higher level of income than in 1997.
The group of households employing this strategy experienced
changes in the use of savings, in saving and borrowing which were
caused by the high price levels for both crops and consumer goods. The
prices increased because of the crisis and because of the expanding con-
sumer market for vegetables. The high prices for the crops enabled
some households in this category to save money between 1997 and
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2003. Some of them saved because they anticipated more financial pro-
blems due to the crisis, but other households had to borrow money due
to rising prices for inputs and consumer goods, or even had to use their
savings to buy food.
For most of these households the changes in the expenditures on
consumer goods, however, were small. Some increased their expendi-
tures, but these usually can be attributed to the life-cycle phase of the
household. When the number of household members for example in-
creased during the crisis period, it is likely that more will be spent on
consumer goods. Only a few households adopting a consolidation
household strategy were able to renovate their house or buy durable
goods.
Out of the seven households following an accumulation household
strategy, six practiced an expansionist-innovating and one a consolidat-
ing-conserving enterprise strategy. This implies that these households
have mostly experienced positive developments during the crisis period,
that is, both in consumption and production. The income position of all
of these households has clearly improved since 1997 and has been
strongly affected by the crisis. The increased profits can be explained by
the same two reasons as for the previous household group, but were re-
inforced by advantages of scale, and better crop yields through the use
of higher quality inputs.
Most of these accumulative households have been able to save more
money during the crisis period than before 1998. None of the house-
holds had to borrow money. One household has been lending less
money to other households than before 1998, because of concerns that
the indebted households would not be able to repay the loan. Most
households in this group also spent more money on all types of consu-
mer goods, but frequently this was caused by a growing number of
household members. Moreover, all households renovated their houses
during the crisis period and many also bought durable goods such as a
TV set. Again these increased expenditures correspond with the as-
sumptions underlying the accumulation household strategy.
The sustainability of the livelihood strategies
A sustainable livelihood is usually defined as the capability of people to
make a living and improve their quality of life without jeopardising the
livelihood options of others, either now or in the future (Singh and
Wanmali 1998, p. 1). The sustainable livelihood approach identifies not
only the types of assets households use, but also analyzes how existing
livelihoods are affected by new technologies such as the introduction of
new types of high-yielding varieties of crops and seeds, and by social
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and economic issues. In this research, four different aspects of sustain-
ability have been distinguished (Eijkemans 1995, pp. 53-55; Chambers
and Conway 1992, pp. 7-8):
1. The ability to cope with and recover from shocks and stresses;
2. Economic effectiveness, ensuring an adequate level of productivity
and income generation;
3. Ecological integrity, ensuring that livelihood activities do not irrever-
sibly degrade natural resources within a given ecosystem;
4. Social equity, which suggests that promotion of livelihood opportu-
nities for one group should not foreclose options for other groups,
either now or in the future.
Coping ability and economic effectiveness
All households have to make decisions with respect to these aspects
and households in every strategy group give different priorities to them.
However, most households will primarily focus on surviving shocks
and stresses. In Lembanna and Kampung Baru, many households have
been able to benefit from the crisis and therefore it was not experienced
as a real shock. However, some households, especially those which ap-
ply a marginal-defensive enterprise strategy, have had difficulties in cop-
ing with the stresses brought about by the crisis. These households
mainly focused on surviving in the short-term, and the sustainability of
their livelihood was heavily influenced by the fact that they had limited
access to land, capital and knowledge. Most of them cultivated share-
cropped land according to kapital bagi hasil, which enabled them to start
cultivating cash crops. However, the cultivation of sharecropped land
denotes a strong dependency relationship with the owner, because it is
the owner who decides which crops the sharecropper will grow while
he receives two-thirds of every harvest (a disproportional reward which
affects social equity in a negative sense). The marginal-defensive house-
holds therefore tend to generate little surplus and income, which makes
them more vulnerable to stresses and shocks. They clearly have suffered
the most from the high prices for consumer goods and inputs, which
they usually tried to overcome by reducing household consumption ex-
penditures and by borrowing money.
Households using a consolidating-conserving enterprise strategy
mostly generated sufficient surplus and income to maintain their pro-
duction level and, consequently, were better able to cope with shocks
and stresses. They generally cultivated their own land and, therefore,
could fully benefit from the increased profitability of the cultivation of
cash crops. They also were able to focus more on economic effective-
ness, because their increased income levels (caused by increased pro-
duction output and a higher profitability) allowed them to make invest-
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ments in (new) types of activities. More than half of the households in
this category engaged in risk-spreading through new types of income-
generating activities, which made them less vulnerable to external dis-
turbances or shocks. At the same time, additional income sources were
needed to continue production at the same level, because the produc-
tion costs, such as the inputs, had become far more expensive since
1997.
Not surprisingly, the expansionist-innovating households were best
able to cope with shocks and stresses, because their resource base and
income position were already strong before the crisis. Like the house-
holds with a consolidating-conserving strategy, they paid most attention
to the economic effectiveness of their activities, because their aim is to
accumulate capital. All of these households have been able to benefit
from the crisis and almost all of them had improved their income posi-
tion since 1997. Many of these households have reinvested capital in
their ongoing activities: some have bought land, others opened a shop
or bought new machinery for their agricultural activity or a car for their
trading activities. Most investments, however, were made in the main
types of activities that the households already performed for some time,
because new types of income-generating activities require more invest-
ments for the same returns and also often involve higher risks.
Ecological integrity
Before analysing the ecological integrity of the resource use by the sam-
ple households, some comments should be made about a number of
ecological developments that occurred in the research area. Recently
some serious environmental problems have become evident in Lemban-
na and Kampung Baru. The growing number of people forced house-
holds to live in land areas that are ecologically more fragile; this inevita-
bly contributed to the further degradation of land. Some progressive
farmers have adopted the Javanese way of vegetable farming from Hajji
Ilyas and have built terraces to prevent soil erosion, but many slopes
are still unterraced.
Another aspect of land degradation is soil exhaustion, which is
caused by the highly intensive cultivation of the land. The sowing den-
sity per beddengan (rows in which the crops are planted) has increased
considerably. Moreover, most households cannot afford to leave their
land lying fallow before a growing season, because the income earned
from the production output is direly needed to buy new inputs. Many
farmers reported that their land required increasing amounts of fertili-
zer inputs to keep production output at the same level. The excessive
use of fertilizers1 and pesticides clearly has a negative impact on both
the biotic environment and the health of producers and consumers.
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Recently a number of crop diseases have appeared and some have be-
come more prevalent in Lembanna and Kampung Baru. These are clear
indications of a decreasing sustainability of the land use. A cabbage dis-
ease (akar gadah) emerged in 1996. It is a mold bacterium which putre-
fies the seeds and roots of the cabbage, as a result of which the plants
cannot grow. The disease has already destroyed the cabbage harvests of
many households in spite of the fact that the local farmers group
(kelompok tani) had given training and advice on the prevention of the
disease.
Marginal-defensive households tend to pay little attention to the en-
vironment. This is partly due to the fact that they cannot join the local
farmers group where information on sustainable land use is given. In
addition, they are obliged to use the chemical inputs that they receive
from their providers or landowners. Most households have increased
the use of inputs when they started cultivating crops for the market in-
stead of crops for their own consumption which need fewer inputs.
However, as the directly affected land areas are very small, the overall
ecological sustainability of the village land has not suffered too much
from the intensified cultivation of cash crops by these households.
Although the households using a consolidating-conserving strategy
have a better access to information on more sustainable ways of using
the land, only few of them effectively used this knowledge. The ecologi-
cal sustainability of the land use practices by these households has de-
clined considerably, because all the households increased their use of
chemical inputs in order to intensify the cultivation of cash crops. Some
of the households already reported decreases in their production output
when they used constant amounts. This indicates that the soil has be-
come dependent on the use of ever-larger amounts of inputs for main-
taining the same level of productivity.
Households employing an expansionist-innovating strategy were ex-
pected to be more aware of environmental issues, because in general
they are more highly educated and have better access to information.
Therefore, they should have a better understanding of the importance
of a well-balanced and sustainable type of land use in the longer term.
In this research, the facts about the ecological integrity of these house-
holds proved to be somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, some
households indeed have adopted good environmental practice, for ex-
ample, using biological control measures to combat the cabbage dis-
ease. This involved the introduction of natural predators instead of pes-
ticides and intercropping carrots with cabbage. On the other hand, the
use of very large and increasing amounts of fertilizers is still strongly
entrenched in their approach to cultivating cash crops.
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Social equity aspects
The last aspect determining the sustainability of livelihood strategies to
be analyzed concerns their social impact. For marginal-defensive house-
holds, the dependency relationship with the owner of their land appears
to have deteriorated since 1997. As explained before, the households de-
pend heavily on the landowners, because it is the latter who provide the
inputs and the information about the use of pesticides as well as arran-
ging the marketing of the crops. Such dependency does not seem so-
cially sustainable, because the households are now more vulnerable to
exploitation by the landowners and are not able to make their own deci-
sions. In case of external shocks and stresses this may easily backfire
on both the environment and the existing social relationships.
Households following a consolidating-conserving or expansionist-in-
novating strategy mainly cultivate their own land and therefore are not
engaged in this kind of dependency relationship with other households.
Some of them are engaged in trading and have increased the scale and
profitability of these activities. The increased profitability of these activ-
ities does not automatically have a negative impact on other households.
However, it was mentioned by some households that the traders have
taken a bigger share of the farm gate price since the crisis. This leaves
less for the farmers, and consequently leads to a decline of social equity.
Considering that especially expansionist-innovating households own
ample production means and assets, these would be the only ones that
could really maintain a certain level of social equity in the entire com-
munity. However, as they seem to be most interested in the accumula-
tion of their own wealth, it seems justified to conclude that they will
continue to earn profits at the expense of other households (i.e.,
through trading and sharecropping).
Some rich households have increased the land area that they allotted
to sharecropping, with the consequence that more households now
have become dependent on these landowning households. This is the
only way for most poor households to cultivate land and earn an in-
come, but since the landowning household receives a two-thirds share
of the harvest, this skewed relationship with owners prevents the share-
cropping household from accumulating enough wealth for a sustainable
livelihood. The expansionist-innovating households will always keep
control of the production assets, which blocks the road to social mobi-
lity. Thus the richer households have grown richer since 1997, while
the poorer households have gained very little. Some consequences of
this widening gap between the poor and rich households are discussed
in the next section.
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Institutional changes and local policy programs
Policies, institutions, and social processes play a vital role in achieving a
sustainable livelihood. According to Ellis (2000, pp. 38-39), institutions
are the formal rules, conventions, and informal codes of behavior that
impose constraints on human interaction. The role of institutions is to
reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to human interac-
tion. The institutions should enable the community to mobilize and allo-
cate resources more easily through the control of household claims.
Firstly, this section pays attention to changes in a local type of unpaid la-
bor exchange and to social relations between various groups of house-
holds. Secondly, some government projects and programs will be dis-
cussed, which also had an impact on the resource use of the households.
In Lembanna and Kampung Baru a traditional system of mutual un-
paid help has been developed where one household will assist another.
This is known as kio-kio’. A reason for taking advantage of kio kio’ could
be insufficient money to pay wage workers or, when households are
short-handed and unable to meet labor demand during harvesting and
planting seasons. Generally, only small-scale and poor farmers engage
in kio-kio’, because the richer farmers can afford to hire wage workers.
Since the crisis and advancing commercialization, people seem to
have become more self-centered as everyone tries to become richer or
at least maintain his relative position. This trend was also observed in
the changing mutual helping system with the heads of the communities
now supporting paid forms of kio-kio’. Their opinion was that people
are only able to improve their social economic position when they have
money and thereby become less dependent on others. Therefore, ac-
cording to them, everyone should be paid for the activities they per-
form.
Another institutional change in the research villages was found in
the way in which some of the traders withdrew surpluses from other
households. This change is related to the increased prices for inputs.
Many marginal-defensive and even some consolidating-conserving types
of households did not have sufficient money to purchase the more ex-
pensive inputs. The expansionist-innovating households, which have
good access to capital, however, could easily afford these inputs and
therefore could start a trading business. It was commonly observed that
these traders provided poorer farm households with inputs, for which
these households paid after harvest by ceding a large part of their har-
vest (sometimes arranged in kapital bagi hasil arrangements). In this
way, the households became bound to the traders and feel obliged to
deal exclusively with this trader for the marketing of their surplus
crops. Although this kind of bagi hasil arrangements often are the only
opportunity for the poorer households to commercialise and improve
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their production, these arrangements are especially profitable for the
providing and trading households. The sharecropping households be-
come more vulnerable to the decisions of their providers as they are not
able to make their own choices with respect to the type of crops and in-
puts they use or the marketing channel.
Good governance is crucial to the achievement of livelihood sustain-
ability. In the research area various programs and projects have been
implemented. At the provincial level, kelompok tani (cooperative local
farmer groups) were established in 1997. This bottom-up approach was
a result of the Otonomi Daerah, the regional autonomy and decentraliza-
tion policy. One is free to become a member of these local farmer
groups and to use the machinery that is collectively owned. The kelom-
pok tani does not provide or sell fertilizers and pesticides, because all
households have their own relations and agreements with traders. In
the kelompok tani information is exchanged, discussions are held and
proposals for projects are formulated. These projects aim at improving
the productivity and efficiency of their agricultural activities. However,
households that do not cultivate their own land cannot join the kelompok
tani, because they are not able to make their own decisions on land use.
This excludes the very poor and landless farmers who, as a result of this
exclusion, depend mainly on the provision of information and inputs
by the owners of the land that they are cultivating.
Another bottom-up project is DAFEP (Decentralization of Agriculture
and Forestry Extension Project), which started in 2000. This project is
subsidized by the World Bank and is also a cooperation with the TPH,
the Food Crop and Horticulture Department. DAFEP is an FMA project
(Farmer Managed Extension Activities), which has been developed by
the Department of Agriculture of Indonesia. The purpose of this pro-
gram is to foster the empowerment of the farmers and to improve their
economic activities. The project itself is generally aimed at supplying
farmers with information about the use of resources, for example, on
cultivation techniques. No direct funds or physical help are provided. In
Kampung Baru, a project has been implemented in which a demonstra-
tion was given by field extension workers (PPL) about the use of HYV
seeds for potatoes.
There are also special projects focusing on the sustainability of land
use, such as the “field schools” (see box 8.1). Courses are given in
which farmers are taught how to minimize the use of inputs and man-
age crop diseases. The increased attention for more sustainable types of
land use is a move in the right direction, but unfortunately only a few
farmers use the knowledge gained in the courses, because they have be-
come used to applying large amounts of chemical inputs. In addition,
most farmers do not (or are not able to) read the instructions provided,
which also tends to perpetuate the misuse and overuse of the inputs.
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Another weak aspect of these projects is that the courses at the field
schools are only accessible to members of the kelompok tani. Of course
there is no guarantee that all projects are effective in the sense of opti-
mal resource allocation, or that they are fair in terms of access rules ap-
plied to different types of farmers. But the programs should at least aim
at the participation of the various groups presented in the community,
varying from poor to rich farmers, as each farmer has his own capaci-
ties, perceptions, needs, and opportunities.
Summary and conclusions
This chapter presented the main results of a study on the impact of eco-
nomic changes on livelihood strategies in two horticultural commu-
Box 8.1: Field schools
Since May 2003, projects have been implemented to improve land
use. An Australian organization for Forestry, Fishery, and Agriculture
(AFFA) provides the funds and cooperates with a non-governmental
organisation Yayasan Field Indonesia Jakarta. The project, which in-
volves field schools, is called Sekolah Lapang Pengendalian Hama Ter-
padu and aims at preventing crop diseases by monitoring the crops.
In Lembanna there is a field school for cabbage cultivation and in
Kampung Baru there is one for potatoes. The field schools advise
against the use of excessive chemical inputs and recommend the
use of organic fertilizers instead. However, many farmers are of the
opinion that the use of chemical inputs is much easier, since they
can be used in smaller amounts. For example, one needs 100 kilo-
grams of chicken manure instead of 10 kilograms of chemical fertili-
zers for the same area of land. Therefore, only a few farmers actually
used their newly gained knowledge. Furthermore, there are no sanc-
tions against excessive use of chemical inputs.
Over a period of four months, a lesson is offered once a week, parti-
cularly on the use of pesticides and insecticides. The first part of the
lesson takes place in a classroom and, in the second part, every
farmer inspects his own crops. The key objective of the project is
that the farmers start cultivating their cabbage without using any
chemicals. Every week they examine ten cabbages from every bedden-
gan (row in which the crop is planted). Only when the average num-
ber of rotten or diseased cabbages per beddengan exceeds five, can
they start using chemicals to prevent the disease from spreading.
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nities in South Sulawesi. The research addressed the extent to which ex-
ternal conditions have had an impact on the resource use systems of
rural households, their livelihood strategies and their sustainability.
Both Lembanna and Kampung Baru have recently undergone strong
economic development. Most of the households in the area have be-
come more prosperous and almost all households are now engaged in
the cultivation of commercial horticultural crops. This agricultural “re-
volution” has been supported by the increasing prices for vegetables
(also due to the inflation as arising from the economic crisis) and by
the improved infrastructure.
Some institutional changes in the research area have also had an im-
pact on the type of resource use of the households. There have been a
number of local projects that stimulated the cultivation of horticultural
crops. Credit projects had been developed to enable households to bor-
row money for buying seeds. In addition there were field schools in
which household members were taught to use their land in a more effi-
cient and sustainable way. However, not all households could profit
from these projects. The credit and extension projects were only accessi-
ble to households that cultivated their own land, thereby excluding the
poor and landless households.
In this research, several types of long-term livelihood strategies have
been distinguished, which indicated the way in which a household made
use of its resources and how it acted on the consumption side. There are
both similarities and differences in the way the various types of house-
holds have responded to the changes in external conditions. All house-
holds have intensified the cultivation of different types of cash crops
(on-farm diversification) and commercialized their production. The ris-
ing prices for vegetables made it attractive for households to engage in
the cultivation of cash crops. These changes in production, however, re-
quire access to capital. The households practicing a marginal-defensive
enterprise strategy type lacked money for the necessary investments
(such as buying HYV seeds) and consequently were dependent on other
households for the provision with land and inputs. Many of them, there-
fore, participated in (credit-based) sharecropping arrangements.
A clear difference between the various types of enterprise strategies
can be found in non-farm diversification. Most households using a mar-
ginal-defensive type of enterprise strategy had insufficient money to
start new types of income-generating activities. Households employing
an expansionist-innovating type of enterprise strategy also hardly started
new types of income-generating activities. Instead, the latter type of
households reinvested in ongoing activities and, therefore, have been
able to increase their profitability through advantages of scale. In con-
trast, almost all of the households adopting a consolidating-conserving
enterprise strategy started new types of income-generating activities,
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such as shop-keeping and working on the tea plantation. Possibly be-
cause here the additional sources of income were sorely needed to af-
ford the expensive inputs. This type of income diversification also tends
to create a more sustainable livelihood, because the households become
less vulnerable to shocks in one of their other resource use systems.
On the consumption side, especially the households following a sur-
vival household strategy had suffered from the high prices for consu-
mer goods. Many of them had to borrow money so that they could buy
consumer goods. Some of these households had to reduce their house-
hold expenditures and even took their children out of school. The
households applying a consolidation household strategy usually had suf-
ficient money to meet the needs of the household and did not show
many changes in their expenditure pattern. The accumulation house-
holds, which generally enjoyed an improved income position, could in-
crease their household expenditures on basic as well as durable consu-
mer goods, and on improvements to their houses. At the same time,
many of them had been able to increase their amount of savings.
It has become clear that the net impact of the crisis in these horticul-
tural villages had resulted in an upward shift in most of the enterprise
and household strategies. In this research special attention has been
paid to the driving forces behind the different types of strategies. These
forces have been divided into those that result from pull factors versus
those resulting from push factors. It can be concluded that most of the
developments that occurred in households following a consolidating-
conserving or expansionist-innovating type of strategy can be classified
as pull factors. They have been able to profit from the rising prices for
vegetables by increasing their cultivated land area or by on- and non-
farm diversification. The developments that occurred in the marginal-de-
fensive households on the other hand are generally related to push fac-
tors. They lacked the capital to cope with the increased prices for inputs
and often solved this problem by engaging in kapital bagi hasil arrange-
ments, buying consumer goods on credit and using up saved money.
Another major topic of interest in this research was the sustainability
of the livelihoods. Four different aspects of sustainability have been dis-
tinguished: the ability to cope with and recover from shocks and stres-
ses, economic effectiveness, ecological integrity and social equity.
Households practicing different enterprise strategies give different prio-
rities to these aspects. The marginal-defensive households often can
only concentrate on coping with and recovering from the high prices.
The more prosperous the households are, the more attention they will
pay to the economic effectiveness of their activities. Many households
following a consolidating-conserving or expansionist-innovating type of
enterprise strategy have made investments in their enterprise to im-
prove their profitability.
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In Lembanna and Kampung Baru, most households seem to pay little
attention to the ecological integrity of their resource use. Most of them
still focus on short-term developments. However, since the production
output of the land of some households started to decrease, some of
them have connected this with the overuse and misuse of inputs and
realise that this problem has to be solved in order to secure survival in
the long run. These households, however, are still a minority.
Issues of social equity obviously get the least attention. Most house-
holds choose the accumulation of personal wealth above community in-
terests. The increasing cultivation of cash crops by many households in
the area has made it attractive for the wealthier households to start trad-
ing in inputs. The expansionist-innovating households started providing
the inputs to poorer households and in return received a part of their
harvest. As a result of trading in inputs, the expansionist-innovating
households also started trading in crops, which further increased their
profits. In addition to these trade arrangements, sharecropping (bagi ha-
sil and kapital bagi hasil) arrangements were made, which also were the
most profitable for the providing households, because they received
two-thirds of every harvest. It seems likely that the expansionist-innovat-
ing households in the long term will continue to own the assets and
will benefit the most from the work of other households. It is generally
not considered a socially sustainable condition when a small number of
households can make vital decisions for the majority of other house-
holds, especially when the latter households are less well-informed
about crops, marketing and prices. On the other hand, this might be
the only possibility for the poorer households to cultivate the lucrative
cash crops.
Finally, there is an important task for the government to give sustain-
ability a more prominent place. Projects should not only pay attention
to the improvement of productivity, but also to stability and sustainabil-
ity of the resource use. The existing projects already are a step in the
right direction, but the fact that landless households can not profit from
these projects is a barrier to equal socioeconomic chances. Re-greening
projects and restrictive legislation for the cultivation of steep slopes also
depend on government interventions which can make households
aware of the importance of more sustainable types of land use. How-
ever, the final decisions on sustainable resource use lie within the
power of the farmer, who has to find the right balance between produc-
tivity, sustainability, stability and social commitments.
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Annex
Strategy combinations of all households in the sample
loca-
tion
SE sc.
1997
SE sc.
2003
SE gr.
1997
SE gr.
2003
Resource base Lifecycle
phase
Enterprise strategy Household
strategy
K.B. 6.33 4.33 1 1 Horticulture and kebun 2 Marginal-defensive Survival
K.B. 5.99 5.31 1 1 Horticulture and kebun 4 Marginal-defensive Survival
L 6.33 5.33 1 1 Only horticulture 5 Marginal-defensive Survival
K.B. 6.33 6.67 1 1 Only horticulture 4 Marginal-defensive Survival
L 5.87 6.87 1 1 Horticulture and kebun 5 Marginal-defensive Survival
L 5.33 5.33 1 1 Only horticulture 2 Marginal-defensive Consolidation
K.B. 4.33 6.33 1 1 Horticulture and kebun 4 Marginal-defensive Consolidation
K.B. 10.99 10.97 2 2 Horticulture and kebun 5 Marginal-defensive Consolidation
L 5.67 7.67 1 2 Horticulture and kebun 4 Consol. -conserving Survival
K.B. 8.13 8.81 2 2 Mainly non-agricultural 5 Consol. -conserving Survival
K.B. 7.00 9.89 1 2 Horticulture and kebun 2 Consol. -conserving Survival
K.B. 10.33 10.33 2 2 Mainly non-agricultural 4 Consol. -conserving Survival
L 10.65 13.66 2 3 Horticulture and kebun 6 Consol. -conserving Survival
L 11.33 8.33 3 2 Horticulture and kebun 6 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
L 7.57 8.57 2 2 Only horticulture 3 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
K.B. 10.33 10.29 2 2 Horticulture and kebun 5 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
K.B. 7.99 10.99 2 2 Mainly non-agricultural 2 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
L 9.99 10.99 2 2 Horticulture and kebun 4 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
L 9.20 11.20 2 2 Horticulture and kebun 5 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
L 11.33 11.50 3 3 Mainly non-agricultural 5 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
K.B. 13.67 15.67 3 3 H and/or keb. and saw. 3 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
K.B. 14.41 18.41 3 3 Mainly non-agricultural 5 Consol. -conserving Consolidation
K.B. 9.07 10.36 2 2 H and/or keb. and saw. 2 Consol. -conserving Accumulation
L 7.67 9.26 2 2 Horticulture and kebun 4 Expans.-innovating Consolidation
L 11.00 9.33 2 2 Horticulture and kebun 5 Expans.-innovating Consolidation
K.B. 8.51 11.66 2 3 Mainly non-agricultural 3 Expans.-innovating Consolidation
L 7.33 6.85 1 1 Horticulture and kebun 2 Expans.-innovating Accumulation
L 7.33 7.33 1 1 Horticulture and kebun 2 Expans.-innovating Accumulation
L 13.23 13.23 3 3 Horticulture and kebun 2 Expans.-innovating Accumulation
K.B. 13.56 13.41 3 3 Mainly non-agricultural 4 Expans.-innovating Accumulation
K.B. 13.24 14.60 3 3 Mainly non-agricultural 2 Expans.-innovating Accumulation
L 15.35 15.36 3 3 Mainly non-agricultural 4 Expans.-innovating Accumulation
– Location: L. is Lembanna, K.B. is Kampung Baru
– SE sc.: social economic score, based on eight factors. Important factors are: the primary
occupation of a household, the educational level of the head of the household, the level
of income, and use and ownership of land. This score has been analyzed for all
households both before and after the crisis.
– SE gr.: social economic group, households are divided into three groups according to
their SE score.
– Life-cycle phase. The six life-cycle phase groups in this study are:
1. Newly formed households that consist of two young adults who do not yet have
children.
2. Young households that consist of two young adults and children up to 14 years old.
3. Young households that consist of two adults and children older than 14 years who do
not work yet.
230 MARJA RIJERSE
4. Households in which the children are starting to work.
5. An extended family in which different generations work, live, and consume together.
6. Older households in which the number of members is declining because of children
starting their own household. Sometimes only two older members remain.
– Resource base: saw. = sawah; H = horticulture; keb. = kebun.
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9 Krismon Yang Selamat: The Crisis Impact
on Livelihood Strategies in Desa Parigi,
South Sulawesi
Mascha Singeling
Introduction
The economic crisis in Indonesia, named krismon, started in 1997 and
soon evolved into a total crisis named kristal (krisis total). The dramatic
fall of the exchange rate of the rupiah triggered multiple effects of eco-
nomic destruction which caused social unrest and ethnic conflicts and
thus created instability all over the country. Unlike other Asian coun-
tries such as Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia, which recovered quite soon
from the crisis, Indonesia still had not completely recovered from the
economic crisis as of 2006, and was even hit by a new wave of natural
crises.
Despite the negative connotations of the word crisis, many research-
ers argue that this crisis did not affect all households to the same ex-
tent, or negatively (White, Titus & Boomgaard 2002). Some research-
ers, for example, conclude that a number of households even benefited
from it. Some people saw their incomes decline, whereas others experi-
enced a dramatic increase in their income, especially during the peak of
the crisis in 1998. The reason why some households were able to bene-
fit from the crisis while other households experienced dramatic nega-
tive effects is an interesting question that still needs to be answered
here. In the meantime, a lively debate has emerged about the consider-
able differences in impacts and responses among the various types of
communities, sectors, locations, and social strata of the households in
Indonesia (cf. Lont & White 2003). This debate goes beyond the eco-
nomic crisis of 1997-1998, as it also examines the wider implementa-
tions for poverty reduction in general.
This article presents the main findings of a study conducted on the
impact of the economic crisis on livelihood strategies and resource use
of the households in desa (village) Parigi (South Sulawesi) and aims at
contributing new insights to the debate by examining the long-term cri-
sis impact at the desa level. Before analyzing the crisis impacts, however
we shall first present a short discussion of the village used for this
study, and its livelihood systems.
The local context: Desa Parigi
Desa Parigi is situated in the uplands of the central Jeneberang valley
along the main road from Makassar to Malino and consists of three set-
tlements called dusun. Two dusuns are situated along the roadside in the
valley while one dusun is located in the more isolated mountains. Ac-
cording to the Profil Desa Parigi (statistics of desa Parigi), this desa was
inhabited by 924 households and had a total population of 4098 people
in 2001/2002. Farming is the main source of income of about 94 per-
cent of the population. However, non-farm activities are also ubiquitous
and usually are used to supplement farm incomes.
The land use in Parigi is mainly characterized by a mixture of rice
cultivation on both rain-fed and irrigated rice fields, called sawah, dry
food crop cultivation on tegalan fields and perennial cash crop cultiva-
tion in so-called mixed forest gardens or kebun campuran. The latter
type yields cash crops such as cocoa, cloves, coffee, vanilla, palm sugar,
and coconut, some of which are exported. These different land-use
types were all cultivated under various landownership agreements. Lack
of land ownership is hardly encountered in this upland village, but un-
equal access to quality land is a common feature.
The local government has tried to stimulate agricultural development
in desa Parigi through several projects. In 2001 a re-greening project
was implemented in the upland dusun of Asana to reduce the risks of
landslides and increase the level of commercialization of farmers at the
same time. Farmers received free kebun seeds like cocoa, coffee, rambu-
tan, and durian as well as fertilizers and pesticides from the govern-
ment. In 2003 a vanilla introduction project was implemented. The gov-
ernment donated the expensive vanilla plants and farmers were in-
structed how to cultivate it.
Besides economic and political influences the agricultural sector of
Parigi was also affected by recent natural processes. Indonesia experi-
enced severe El Niño drought spells between February and April 1997
and in the years following it experienced some lesser El Niño impacts
as well, which were also felt by many farming households in Parigi.
A livelihood strategy analysis
The work presented here builds on a methodology developed by Lösch,
Fusillier, and Dupraz, which differentiates between household and enter-
prise strategies. Depending on the asset conditions of people, the institu-
tions, structures, and processes influencing them, and the vulnerability
context under which they operate, people will develop livelihood strate-
gies that provide them with the best livelihood outcomes, (cf. Perez Izadi
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quoted in Cahn 2002). The type of strategy that was developed is as-
sumed to be directly related to the type of household and its resource
base, that is, the socioeconomic position of the household and its life-cy-
cle phase determining its assets, capabilities, and needs (White, Titus &
Boomgaard 2002). Livelihood strategies may change as the external en-
vironment (over which people have little control) changes (Cahn 2002).
Enterprise strategies may refer to production decisions like intensifi-
cation or extensification, specialization or diversification, scale or output
expansion or reduction, commercialization or subsistence orientation,
technological innovation or stagnation.
Household strategies may pertain to the increase or decrease of
household consumption expenditures, labor force participation, speciali-
zation and/or diversification of income sources, depletion of savings or
saving money, borrowing or lending money, and so on.
Despite the fact that the decisions are made by the same people, and
that some overlap exists between the two kinds of strategies, there are
some trade-offs between the two kinds of strategies which make it inter-
esting to examine them separately. For example, households might re-
duce their household expenditures in order to expand their enterprise
activities or need to sell some of their assets used for their enterprise in
order to pay for medical bills.
According to the different sets of strategy criteria used and the house-
holds’ success in maintaining or improving their livelihoods, their stra-
tegies may then be classified as accumulation, consolidation, or survival
types of strategies (White 1991); the enterprise strategies could be clas-
sified as expansionist-innovating, consolidating-conserving, and margin-
al-defensive strategies (Lösch, Fusillier & Dupraz 1990).
In our research, all thirty-one sample households of Parigi were indi-
vidually assigned a specific enterprise and household strategy, where-
after the households were classified into groups according to their en-
terprise and household strategy combinations. Then in each of these
groups a range of responses to the economic crisis have been analyzed.
In order to understand these enterprise responses, a number of vital
household characteristics have been taken into account such as the so-
cial economic status of households, their life-cycle phase, and their
main type of resource use or livelihood.
After the households had been classified in terms of the enterprise
strategy characteristics of Lösch, Fusillier, and Dupraz (1990) it ap-
peared that twelve households could be classified as having conducted
an expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy, fourteen conducted a
consolidating-conserving strategy and five households conducted a mar-
ginal-defensive type of enterprise strategy. Table 9.1 presents the four-
teen households applying an expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy
with their respective characteristics and classifications.
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The second column represents the socioeconomic group to which the
households belonged in 2003. The households were divided into three
different socioeconomic groups. Number one represents the lowest
socioeconomic group and number three the highest socioeconomic
group.
According to the modified classifications based on White (1991) and
Ellis (2000) six of these households conducted an accumulation house-
hold strategy and the other six had conducted a consolidation household
strategy at the same time.
According to Lösch, Fussilier, and Dupraz (1990) entrepreneurs who
apply expansionist-innovating enterprise strategies have access to en-
ough resources to accumulate capital. These entrepreneurs usually have
access to one or more production factors like capital, land, knowledge,
and labor which enable them to produce large surpluses. But, the fact
that households with a consolidating strategy are included in this cate-
gory shows that not all of them are affluent households.
Fourteen of the thirty-one sample household conducted a consolidat-
ing-conserving enterprise strategy in 2003. The classifications to which
these households belonged and the household strategies they conducted
are presented in table 9.2.
Table 9.1 Households with expansionist-innovating enterprise strategies, Parigi 2003
HH.
Nr.
SE
Group
L.C.F Main resource use Enterprise strategy Household
strategy
7 3 2 non-farm expansionist-innovating accumulation
1 3 2 non-farm expansionist-innovating accumulation
20 3 3 non-farm expansionist-innovating accumulation
5 2 2 irrigated sawah & kebun
without tegalan
expansionist-innovating accumulation
29 3 5 irrigated sawah & kebun
without tegalan
expansionist-innovating accumulation
18 3 5 rain-fed sawah & kebun
without tegalan
expansionist-innovating accumulation
4 3 6 non-farm expansionist-innovating consolidation
9 2 3 irrigated sawah & kebun
without tegalan
expansionist-innovating consolidation
6 2 4 irrigated sawah & kebun
without tegalan
expansionist-innovating consolidation
26 2 5 irrigated sawah & kebun
& tegalan
expansionist-innovating consolidation
22 1 5 rain-fed sawah & kebun
without tegalan
expansionist-innovating consolidation
30 3 4 rain-fed sawah & kebun
without tegalan
expansionist-innovating consolidation
Source: Household survey Parigi, 2003
HH Nr. = Household number, SE Group = Social-economic group, L.C.F = Life cycle phase
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Households applying a consolidating-conserving enterprise strategy
usually do not have the means to accumulate much capital. The surplus
that is generated is mainly needed to continue the entrepreneurial activ-
ities. The main aim of the consolidating-conserving strategy is securing
the continuation of ongoing activities. Consequently, risk spreading and
minimizing is one of the main characteristics of this strategy group.
In total three combinations of enterprise and household strategies
are presented in this enterprise strategy group. Two of these households
conducted an accumulation household strategy, while eight of these
households conducted a consolidation household strategy and five even
conducted a survival household strategy. This means that the two
households which applied an accumulation strategy had a more ad-
vanced household strategy than warranted by their enterprise strategy.
In the long run this may cause serious money problems. The four
households applying a survival household strategy are doing exactly the
Table 9.2 Households with consolidating-conserving enterprise strategies, Parigi
2003
HH.
Nr.
SE
Group
L.C.F Main resource use Enterprise strategy Household
strategy
2 2 4 irrigated sawah &
kebun & tegalan
consolidating-conserving accumulation
3 2 5 rainfed sawah &
kebun & tegalan
consolidating-conserving accumulation
14 1 2 non-farm consolidating-conserving consolidation
17 1 2 non-farm consolidating-conserving consolidation
15 3 3 non-farm consolidating-conserving consolidation
11 1 6 irrigated sawah & kebun
without tegalan
consolidating-conserving consolidation
8 1 2 irrigated sawah & kebun
without tegalan
consolidating-conserving consolidation
24 2 4 rain-fed sawah & kebun
& tegalan
consolidating-conserving consolidation
23 2 5 rain-fed sawah
& kebun & tegalan
consolidating-conserving consolidation
31 2 2 rain-fed sawah & kebun
without tegalan
consolidating-conserving consolidation
28 1 2 irrigated sawah & kebun
without tegalan
consolidating-conserving survival
27 2 5 irrigated sawah & kebun
& tegalan
consolidating-conserving survival
12 1 4 rain-fed sawah & kebun
without tegalan
consolidating-conserving survival
21 2 2 rain-fed sawah & kebun
& tegalan
consolidating-conserving survival
Source: Household survey Parigi, 2003
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opposite. These households are minimizing their household expendi-
tures and using this capital to keep their enterprises running.
In total five households conducted a marginal-defensive type of enter-
prise strategy. Not surprisingly, all these households also conducted a
survival household strategy during the same period. The classification
characteristics of these five households are presented in table 9.3.
Entrepreneurs with only a minimal access to resources of land, capi-
tal, and knowledge obviously have no other choice than to apply this
strategy. They can only focus on the survival of their household mem-
bers and their activities. In order to survive, these households some-
times even need to resort to sell their assets or borrow money.
In the next section we shall try to unravel the main impacts of the cri-
sis on these different strategy groups as well as the specific responses
which they have developed.
Impacts of the crisis on local livelihoods and entrepreneurial
strategies
The economic crisis of 1997 mainly affected the peasant society of Pari-
gi through strong changes in market prices. On the one hand the in-
creases in market prices affected farming enterprises positively because
market prices, for example of kebun export products, increased but on
the other hand prices for fertilizers, pesticides. and household consu-
mer goods and services also increased, which had a negative effect. Ta-
bles 9.4 and 9.5 show the major changes in market prices for agricul-
tural products and inputs during the period 1997-2003.
The economic crisis affected the farmers’ livelihood strategies in
many different ways. According to Angelsen and Resosudarmo (1999)
the effect on their livelihoods depended on their vulnerability which
was mainly determined by three factors; types of crops planted, size of
holdings, and available alternative sources of income.
Table 9.3 Households with marginal-defensive enterprise strategies, Parigi 2003
HH.
Nr.
SE
Group
L.C.F Main resource use Enterprise strategy Household
strategy
19 1 3 non-farm marginal-defensive survival
13 1 6 non-farm marginal-defensive survival
16 1 5 non-farm marginal-defensive survival
10 2 4 irrigated sawah
& kebun & tegalan
marginal-defensive survival
25 1 4 rain-fed sawah
& kebun & tegalan
marginal-defensive survival
Source: Household survey Parigi, 2003
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This section of the chapter will focus on the main enterprise responses
of the households in desa Parigi when confronted with the economic
crisis. This will be done by looking at the main enterprise responses as
summarized by Mula (1999). According to Mula, households which are
confronted with crisis situations may take resort to the following re-
sponses in their entrepreneurial behavior:
– commercialize their production or retreat into subsistence produc-
tion,
– intensify or extensify their production by increasing or decreasing
the use of labor, capital, or land,
– specialize or diversify their enterprise activities and production.
Commercialization and subsistence production
Because prices for export crops during the onset of the economic crisis
increased more than prices for crops for the local market, export-or-
iented farmers could be expected to have gained, whereas farmers pro-
ducing for local markets might have been worse off (Angelsen & Reso-
sudarmo 1999).
Table 9.4 Prices (in Rupiah) for kebun, sawah, and tegalan products in 1997,
1999, and 2003
1997 1999 2003
Coffee per liter 5,000 6,500 3,750
Cocoa per liter 3,000 10,000 3,500
Patai per kilogram 1,500 7,000 4,000
Rambutan per kilogram 1,500 10,000 5,000
Vanilla per kilogram 20,000 125,000 165,000
Banana per bunch 650 1,750 1,125
Rice per liter 1,300 2,250 1,450
Soybeans per liter 200 4,000 1,850
Corn per liter 500 750 1,000
Peanuts per liter 500 7,000 4,500
Cassava per ten pieces 100 2,250 1,000
Source: Interviews with traders, Parigi 2003
Table 9.5 Average prices (in Rupiah) for fertilizers in rupiah in the area of Parigi
Fertilizers 1997 1999 2003
Urea 18,000 30,000 78,000
STS 7,500 15,000 80,000
K 20,000 25,000 105,000
ZA 12,000 15,000 65,000
Source: Interviews Bulutana, 2003
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This was also the case in desa Parigi were export crops are mainly
produced in the kebun system. Despite the fact that the prices for kebun
export crops had begun to decline slightly after the crisis reached its
peak in 1999, kebun prices were still much higher than before the onset
of the crisis and also were much higher than prices for other agricultur-
al crops.
Market changes were anticipated by intensifying the production of
commercialized kebun crops like cocoa, coffee, rambutan, durian, and
mango and by diversifying the production of kebun crops by introducing
new crops such as vanilla.
Overall it can be said that the economic crisis has increased the level
of agricultural commercialization in Parigi. Almost all the households
were able to increase their kebun production. Even some households
which applied marginal-defensive enterprise strategies were able to in-
crease their investments with money generated by non-farm wage-work
activities or with seeds supplied through the re-greening project.
Other households which applied marginal-defensive enterprise strate-
gies however, were not able to increase their investments in the kebun,
because they simply could not raise the money or because their time
was mainly spent on non-farm wage-work activities of a survival type.
Sample households only retreated into subsistence production when
non-farm activities had become their main source of income and farm
activities were just a way to supplement their household food source. So
contrary to Mula’s (1999) hypothesis, increasing subsistence production
was not a very common coping response among the sample households.
The economic crisis did not only raise the level of commercialization
of the farm activities of households, but also the commercialization le-
vel of their non-farm activities. Households, which already owned non-
farm enterprises before the crisis, anticipated the market changes by ex-
panding their trading or merchandising activities or by starting new
non-farm activities, shops or rice-processing sheds. These households
all belonged to the highest socioeconomic group and applied an expan-
sionist-innovating enterprise strategy in combination with an accumula-
tion household strategy.
Other households which did not yet own non-farm resources also
started to engage in non-farm activities in response to the economic cri-
sis. In some of these cases households which applied expansionist-inno-
vating or consolidating-conserving enterprise strategies could benefit
from the rising market prices for kebun products and decided to rein-
vest these profits into new non-farm enterprise activities, like opening a
small shop. It seems therefore that on the one hand profits generated
by farm activities were reinvested into non-farm activities, while on the
other profits generated by non-farm activities were reinvested into farm
activities.
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Intensification and extensification of production
As already mentioned above, commercialization of production in desa
Parigi was often accomplished by intensifying production in the kebun.
According to Angelsen and Resosudarmo (1999) intensification of pro-
duction (farm or non-farm) can be seen as a response to both high vul-
nerability and low vulnerability. When confronted with economic crisis
conditions households might either intensify their production in order
to benefit fully from the rising market prices for export crops or extensi-
fy in order to counter the rising prices for inputs and consumer goods
(i.e., wages).
In desa Parigi households indeed intensified their farm production as
a response to the economic crisis. Despite the fact that it is normal for
farmers to respond to changes in market prices, many of the changes
through intensification and commercialization in desa Parigi could be
seen as a crisis response. This is corroborated by the fact that the
economic crisis influenced the prices more than normal market fluc-
tuations.
Overall, the less vulnerable households in desa Parigi tried to intensi-
fy their production. The economic crisis created market opportunities
for farmers and almost all the sample households were able to antici-
pate these market opportunities by intensifying their production.
However, as already mentioned market prices for capital inputs like
fertilizers and pesticides also increased dramatically. As a response
some households belonging to the marginal-defensive strategy group
were not able to intensify their production. In some cases these house-
holds even had to engage into non-farm activities in order to keep buy-
ing the same amount of capital inputs for their land. In two cases
households even saw their farm output decrease because they could no
longer afford to buy sufficient farm inputs.
In spite of these exceptions it would appear that almost all the sample
households were able to intensify their farm production. On average
output increases were mainly generated in the kebun land-use system
due to the fact that market prices for kebun products increased more
than market prices for products produced in the sawah and tegalan
land-use system. Intensification in the kebun was mainly achieved by in-
creasing the use of capital inputs. But kebun areas have only seldom
been expanded in desa Parigi. Only three very rich households that ap-
plied expansionist-innovating enterprise and accumulation household
strategies could expand their kebun area. The lack of area expansion can
be partly explained by the fact that, unlike with rice production, the out-
put can be easily increased by modest increases in the use of inputs
and by boosting the cropping density.
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Intensification through the increased use of labor was only applied
by households with expansionist-innovating enterprise strategies and by
some households with consolidating-conserving enterprise strategies.
These households increased their use of external labor which was
mainly used in their non-farm enterprise activities. However, house-
holds noted that the kebun land-use system is quite labor extensive as la-
bor is only needed to plant the kebun trees and during the harvest sea-
son. The kebun also needs little maintenance when the trees are mature.
Some households which applied marginal-defensive enterprise strate-
gies, however, even reduced their investments in the kebun, because
they simply could not raise the money or because their time was mainly
spent on non-farm wage work to cover their subsistence needs.
The majority of households also intensified their production in the
sawah land-use system during the 1997-2003 period, although to a les-
ser extent than in the kebun. The use of capital inputs such as fertilizers
and pesticides for example increased in the sawah, and in some cases
households which applied an expansionist-innovating enterprise strat-
egy were even able to expand their sawah areas. Households which ap-
plied a consolidating-conserving or a survival strategy were less able to
intensify their production in the kebun and the sawah systems at the
same time mainly due to a lack of capital. When households were
forced to choose, they usually preferred to intensify their production in
the kebun because it could generate more profits and needed less labor.
Despite the fact that kebun land could now generate more profits than
sawah land, the latter was still highly valued as a security investment by
households that applied expansionist- innovating enterprise strategies.
These households also reinvested their profits generated in the kebun
through rising market prices by buying more sawah land.
The tegalan land-use system, which in its purest form is only repre-
sented in the dusun of Asana, was not much affected by the economic
crisis, because tegalan crops, which mainly supply staple food for the lo-
cal markets, did not fluctuate much in value. In fact, the tegalan area
might even have declined, because some households started using their
tegalan land for the production of kebun crops. Only one of the sample
households increased its production of tegalan crops for subsistence
purposes in order to reduce their consumption expenditures on food.
Besides the intensification of farm production, non-farm production
also intensified as a result of the economic crisis. Especially households
that already owned non-farm trading activities were able to intensify
these activities because the farmers tented to intensify especially their
commercialized production. Trading activities are mainly employed by
households that apply expansionist-innovating enterprise and accumula-
tion household strategies and in some cases by households that apply a
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consolidating-conserving enterprise strategy and a consolidation house-
hold strategy.
So it seems that farm intensification has increased as a response to
the economic crisis within all enterprise strategy groups, although with
some exceptions for households that applied marginal-defensive enter-
prise strategies. Quite remarkably, farm intensification in desa Parigi
was mainly achieved by increasing capital inputs. Only the more afflu-
ent households that applied expansionist-innovating or consolidating-
conserving enterprise strategies could increase their farm and non-farm
production by expanding their cultivated area, the use of external labor
input, and/or the scale of their non-farm activities.
Diversification and specialization
Besides commercialization and/ or intensification of their production,
households which are confronted with crisis conditions may also diver-
sify or specialize their production. Once again these responses can be
seen as both a response to increased vulnerability or to decreased vul-
nerability. According to Mula (1999) diversification of enterprise activ-
ities is more often a strategy used by better-off households due to the
capital needed.
In our research, enterprise diversification was defined as focusing
the production effort on more types of resource use at the same time.
This can be observed when a household uses more capital and/or labor
inputs in different types of activities or for different types of crops.
As already mentioned before, almost all the sample households were
able to increase their capital inputs in the kebun. Especially high-status
households which applied expansionist-innovating enterprise strategies
were able to diversify their kebun production by cultivating new and
very lucrative but expensive crops like petai (Parkia speciosa which are
smelly green beans) and vanilla. In other cases lower status households
were able to diversify their kebun production with less expensive crops
thanks to support given by the government through the re-greening
project. Especially households residing in the dusun of Asana were gi-
ven the means to diversify their original tegalan system as a result of
this project.
Households also increased their capital inputs in non-farm activities
as a response to the economic crisis. Better-off households applying ex-
pansionist-innovating enterprise strategies were able to start new non-
farm activities thanks to profits generated by their farm activities or
other non-farm activities, due to changing market prices. These house-
holds opened new shops, rice processing sheds and started new trading
activities. Some households with consolidating-conserving enterprise
strategies were also able to start small-scale trading activities or open a
KRISMON YANG SELAMAT: THE CRISIS IMPACT ON LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 243
shop. Even two households with marginal-defensive enterprise strate-
gies had started small shops. In one case this household started a shop
thanks to the windfall profit it could generate in its farm enterprise dur-
ing the economic crisis. Another household started a shop as a coping
response – not to the economic crisis but as a response to old age. This
couple became too old to work the land and opened a shop in order to
generate a much-needed income. So it seems that enterprise diversifica-
tion is not only used as a way to increase profit, but sometimes also as
a necessary change in order to survive.
The majority of sample households diversified their enterprises by in-
tensifying their production in the kebun and in the sawah, and some-
times also in their non-farm activities at the same time. Specialization
in the kebun was mainly applied by households which belonged to the
consolidating-conserving enterprise and the consolidating household
strategy groups, as well as the households which belonged to the mar-
ginal-defensive enterprise strategy group. Because households wanting
to diversify their enterprise activities needed more capital investments,
the higher-status households were more inclined to diversify their enter-
prises. High-status households in particular were also more inclined to
intensify their non-farm activities. These households did so by applying
an expansionist-innovating enterprise strategy, that is, by shifting labor
and investments to these non-farm activities.
On average, households conducting expansionist-innovating enter-
prise strategies also were better able to diversify their enterprise activ-
ities by intensifying their production in more than one type of resource
use at the time. Households which applied consolidating-conserving
and/or marginal-defensive enterprise strategies were less able to inten-
sify the use of capital inputs in more than one type of resource use due
to the lack of capital. Thus specialization in the kebun was mainly ap-
plied by households with consolidating-conserving and marginal-defen-
sive types of enterprise strategies.
In compliance with Mula (1999) enterprise diversification in desa
Parigi was not only applied by better-off households and can thus be
seen as a response reflecting a low level of vulnerability. However, there
are also some exceptions as some poorer households were only able to
diversify their productive activities thanks to government support. In
one instance a household even used production diversification as a sur-
vival technique which therefore, in this case can also be seen as a re-
sponse reflecting a high level of vulnerability. Figure 9.1 presents an
overview of the productive coping responses of households by socioeco-
nomic group, by measuring the changes in enterprise variables between
1997 and 2003. It clearly shows that in nearly all cases and household
categories responses have been positive, but especially so among the
highest and middle group household.
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El Nin˜o
In addition to the economic crisis the peasant society of Parigi was also
affected by several El Niño drought spells during the 1997-2003 period.
In general the sample households were more strongly negatively af-
fected by El Niño than by the economic crisis conditions. Moreover, it
seems that especially households residing in the dusun of Asana were
affected as a result of the lack of irrigation facilities, so that newly
planted kebun trees and rain-fed sawah land suffered the most. Espe-
cially the households which applied marginal-defensive enterprise stra-
tegies and the less profitable households which applied a consolidating-
conserving enterprise strategy were affected by El Niño. These house-
holds were less able to replace the plants and trees that died during the
El Niño drought and therefore were likely to experience a relatively
strong decline in their farm incomes. In accordance with Tiffen’s theory
(2002) the households without non-farm income sources in this group
were especially vulnerable to a decline in income. In some cases, how-
ever, households noted that in spite of their losses during El Niño, they
did not experience a real decline in total profitability because the prices
for their products increased during the economic crisis. In these cases
the positive effects of the economic crisis were able to nullify the nega-
tive effects of El Niño. However, this was only possible when the house-
holds still had enough productive kebun land at their disposal to com-
pensate for the drought losses on sawah and/or tegalan fields.
Figure 9.1 Changes in Enterprise Variables 1997-2003: Socio-Economic Classification
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Impacts of the economic crisis on household strategies and
social structures
The economic crisis of course did not only affect the productive activ-
ities of the households, but also their consumptive behavior. As already
mentioned above, the economic crisis has affected both the market
prices of export crops as well as the prices for consumer goods and ser-
vices. Households responded to these price changes by making adapta-
tions in both their enterprise and household expenditures. Depending
on whether the household profited or suffered from the economic cri-
sis, it could either, increase or reduce its expenditures and/or change
its income sources.
In this section the main household responses to the economic crisis
encountered in desa Parigi will be analyzed for a series of variables di-
rectly affecting the household’s capacity for consumption. First the
changes in their income generating activities will be discussed by look-
ing at the conditions and reasons for the diversification of their income
generating activities. Second, we shall deal with other strategies to in-
crease the household income, like borrowing, lending, using up of sav-
ings, saving money and increasing labor participation and thirdly, we
shall focus on the changes in household expenditures and the reasons
behind these changes. Figure 9.2 presents the relative frequencies of
the household responses on these variables for the three socioeconomic
categories.
Figure 9.2 Changes in Household Variables 1997-2003: Socio-Economic Classification
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Income diversification
In desa Parigi many households responded to the economic crisis by in-
creasing their level of income diversification. Both the households that
profited and those that suffered from the economic crisis responded in
this way.
Households that did not own enough land and already applied mar-
ginal-defensive enterprise and survival household strategies were usual-
ly not able to counter the rises in consumption prices with increases in
profits. These households were forced to diversify their income sources
by seeking wage-work activities in order to supplement their income.
Many found jobs as a seasonal worker on someone else’s land, as a
lumberjack, or in construction.
Households with much land that applied expansionist-innovating en-
terprise and consolidation or accumulation household strategies usually
were able to profit from the economic crisis and therefore used income
diversification as a way to reinvest profits.
So it seems that especially households without much land that were
employing a survival strategy were forced to take resort to non-farm ac-
tivities as a means of supplementing the shortfalls in farm incomes re-
sulting from crisis conditions. To the more affluent farmers who were
applying consolidation or accumulation strategies, non-farm activities
offered a way of increasing their relative wealth.
The reasons behind income diversification did not only differ be-
tween the various strategy groups; the types of activities they deployed
differed as well (Tiffen et al. 2002). Households applying an expansio-
nist-innovating enterprise strategy and an accumulation household
strategy more often diversified their income sources through non-farm
business activities (trading, merchandising, rice processing), whereas
households which applied less advanced strategies more often diversi-
fied by means of casual wage work.
Use of savings and selling of assets
Income diversification is not always sufficient to cope with a decline in
average income as a result of the economic crisis. Another possible cop-
ing response is the use of savings or the sale of assets in anticipation of
better times (Warr 1999).
The use of savings was most often resorted to as a coping mechan-
ism by households with consolidating-conserving enterprise and survi-
val household strategies and to a lesser extent by households that ap-
plied marginal-defensive enterprise and survival household strategies.
Households which applied marginal-defensive enterprise and survival
household strategies also used some of their assets and savings, but this
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group of households already had fewer assets at its disposal. The rea-
sons why these households needed to sell assets was not always directly
related to the economic crisis, but also to life-cycle conditions. The eco-
nomic crisis may nevertheless have affected their economic position to
such a degree that they were forced to sell or pawn some of their assets
when confronted with their increasingly pressing personal conditions.
In other words, the economic crisis affected them indirectly by aggravat-
ing their already weak economic situation. On the other hand, none of
the households which applied expansionist-innovating and accumulat-
ing household strategies used any of their savings. On the contrary,
these households even were able to increase their savings and buy more
assets due to the windfall profits that the crisis generated among this
group.
Borrowing money
When confronted with crisis conditions households may turn to rela-
tives or other people in their community for assistance. Kutanegara and
Nooteboom (2002) observed little in the sense of increased sharing of
risks and helping others in times of need. They concluded therefore,
that most households were forced to carry the burden of the crisis by
themselves (see also Lont & White 2003).
In desa Parigi borrowing money for household purposes was not
mentioned very often by the sample households. However, it also be-
came clear that households were reluctant to admit that they had been
borrowing money and in reality, therefore, borrowing money may well
have been a more common coping response than households were will-
ing to admit.
Some households that applied expansionist-innovating enterprise and
accumulation household strategies admitted that due to the economic
crisis more people asked them for loans and, because their profit in-
creased, they were able to grant more loans.
Money for household purposes was usually borrowed from family
and sometimes, when a household was confronted by financial difficul-
ties, their children would be taken in by better-off family members.
However, it also became apparent that social networks in Parigi eroded
due to progressing commercialization in conjunction with the crisis.
Overall households indeed were forced to carry the burden of the crisis
themselves, as was mentioned by Kutanegara and Nooteboom (2002).
Use of labor
Another way to cope with income reduction is to increase household la-
bor participation. Research suggests that this is especially the case
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among women and young people in an effort to maintain income levels
(Warr, 1999).
Against the expectation of Warr (1999), the increased use of house-
hold labor was a coping response that was hardly encountered in desa
Parigi. Only one household with an expansionist-innovating enterprise
and an accumulation household strategy increased its external labor in-
put after it expanded its non-farm enterprise activities in response to
the economic crisis. All the other changes in the use of labor were di-
rectly related to the life-cycle phase of the households in question. How-
ever, during the research only the number of laborers and the total la-
bor force participation in the households were examined and not the
number of hours these individuals worked. Due to this imperfection it
is still possible that households that wanted to increase their labor input
but did not have the means to hire external laborers had increased their
own labor input with the same number of family workers.
Changing household expenditures
Besides increasing the household income by diversifying income
sources, borrowing money, selling assets, and increasing labor input,
households also responded to the economic crisis by changing their
household expenditures.
Setiawan (2001) noted that households that were confronted with de-
clining incomes usually responded by minimizing expenditures, cutting
back on less essential goods, changing dietary habits, and eating more
of their own crops (Setiawan 2001).
In desa Parigi quite a few households made adjustments in their
household consumption expenditure patterns during the period 1997-
2003. However, caution should be taken when linking these changes to
the economic crisis. The majority of changes were related to the life-cy-
cle phase conditions of the households and the resulting increases or
decreases in household size, and school attendance of their children.
However, in some cases the changes in household consumption expen-
ditures were also related to conditions created by the economic crisis it-
self.
Reduction of the household consumption expenditures as a response
to the economic crisis mainly occurred in households which applied
marginal-defensive enterprise strategies and survival household strate-
gies. These households sometimes reduced their consumption expendi-
tures by eating more of their own crops, and by buying fewer or no lux-
ury food items, such biscuits and fish. One household was even forced
to take its children from school due to the economic crisis. In accor-
dance with Warr’s (1999) observation, however, taking children from
school due to the economic crisis conditions was not very common in
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desa Parigi, but the phenomenon was not altogether absent either. Be-
fore drastic steps were taken, such as taking the children from school,
households would first have tried to cope by using some of their sav-
ings or by borrowing some money.
On the other hand, households which applied expansionist-innovat-
ing enterprise strategies and accumulating household strategies were
usually able to increase their household expenditures. They often did so
by buying considerable quantities of quality food and expensive durable
consumer goods, such as cars, motorcycles, and television sets from the
extra profits generated by their enterprises during the peak of the crisis
period. However, after this bonanza period most of these households
had to reduce their expenditures again on expensive goods. None of
these households, however, needed to reduce their consumption expen-
ditures out of necessity.
The group of households which applied the consolidating-conserving
household strategy experienced both positive and negative influences
from the economic crisis. Some households discovered they found it
difficult to continue buying the necessary household consumer goods
and others saw the profitability of their enterprises increase. The major-
ity of these households, however, did not need to economize very
much.
Finally, only few of the households belonging to the less expansio-
nist/affluent strategy groups were ever able to buy durable consumer
goods (see figure 9.2).
The impact on social relations
Because households were all affected differently by the economic crisis
the social structures could also have changed at desa level. Braudel
(1979), cited in White, Titus and Boomgaard (2002), already noticed
that: “Economic and political crises always result in a “redistribution of
the cards, held by different players”.
In desa Parigi, as in any Macassarese village, there was a clearly strati-
fied social structure before the onset of the economic crisis. There were
households with a higher socioeconomic status, and households with a
middle and low socioeconomic status.
In a peasant society like Parigi’s, the socioeconomic status of a house-
hold is largely determined by the quantity and quality of the land and
cattle people own. Owning land offers households the strongest base
for their socioeconomic status, due to the fact that they can make inde-
pendent decisions and keep all the profit from their efforts. Sharecrop-
ping land out also has a relative high status due to the fact that the
manual work is done by others. Renting land has the lowest status be-
cause it involves dependency and a high level of uncertainty. The right
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to rent land can always be withdrawn by the landowners (cf. Jay 1969;
Rössler 1997; Doekes 1997).
Beside ownership of land and cattle, the socioeconomic status of
households is also determined by kinship relations, political influence,
and the level of education. Nowadays the socioeconomic status of a rur-
al Macassarese household is still very much determined by their land
ownership, but other aspects of the household have become equally or
even more important. Due to the commercialization of the rural econo-
my, ownership of non-farm trading activities contributes highly to the
socioeconomic status of a household, as well as having a higher level of
education or offering your children a higher education. Having a family
member with a higher-status occupation also contributes to the socioe-
conomic status of the household.
In this research the socioeconomic position of a household was deter-
mined by scoring on a whole range of variables, that is, education level,
income position, occupational status, presence or absence of Hajji sta-
tus, diversity of income sources, control of means of production/qual-
ity/type of land, cattle, machinery. All these aspects determine the social
positions of households in a society and consequently also their ability
to pursue successful livelihood strategies.
The social relations between households with a high and low socioe-
conomic status in Parigi often are characterized by a patron-client sys-
tem. In this system the low-status clients (anaq anaq) can turn to a
high-status patron (punggawa) for protection and help. In return the cli-
ent will repay him by offering certain services, such as working on his
land or political support. This association with a patron takes place on a
voluntary basis. Through such an association with a patron the status of
both patron and client will rise (Tol, Van Dijk & Acciaioli 2000).
This social structure might change due to the economic crisis if the
impact of the economic crisis differed between these households. Some
households might have benefited more then others and in doing so
might be able to improve their socioeconomic status as others might
suffer during the economic crisis and thus reduce their socioeconomic
position in the village. Social mobility as a result of the economic crisis
might differ between the households and consequently socioeconomic
structure in the desa might change correspondingly.
However, it is very unlikely that the economic crisis could alter the
patron-client system on the short term. Socioeconomic structures as
such are embedded into society and will not change rapidly. This does
not mean however, that within the patron-client system the position of
the people involved might not change at all. Some relatively poor farm-
ers mentioned that as a result of the economic crisis their socioeco-
nomic position had improved slightly. However, because the majority of
higher status households were able to improve their socioeconomic po-
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sition even more during the crisis, the relative position between these
two household types did not really change, despite the fact that for both
their socioeconomic status had improved.
There seemed to be a strong relationship between the socioeconomic
status and the enterprise strategies conducted by the sample house-
holds. Households which conducted an expansionist-innovating enter-
prise strategy belonged mainly to the highest socioeconomic group.
Households which conducted a consolidating-conserving strategy
mainly belonged to the middle socioeconomic group and households
which conducted a marginal-defensive enterprise strategy mainly be-
longed to the lowest socioeconomic group. Despite this strong relation-
ship it is not a deterministic one as the socioeconomic status of the
households varied also within each strategy group and the household’s
status may shift during the crisis.
In the context of desa Parigi the majority of the sample households
were able to benefit from the economic crisis. However, the more afflu-
ent and higher status households were still able to benefit the most while
the less affluent households benefited the least, or were even hit by the
economic crisis. When looking at the social mobility only two of the
thirty-one sample households did not experience any changes in their so-
cioeconomic status between 1997 and 2003. The majority of the house-
holds improved their socioeconomic status, which would suggest consid-
erable social mobility between the groups. It can be observed that house-
holds which applied expansionist-innovating and consolidating-
conserving enterprise strategies could improve their social economic sta-
tus, while households which applied marginal-defensive enterprise stra-
tegies remained in the same position or even decreased their social eco-
nomic status slightly. Households which applied an expansionist-inno-
vating enterprise strategy and an accumulation household strategy were
best able to improve their socioeconomic status. The household that im-
proved its social-economic status the most applied an expansionist-inno-
vating enterprise and a consolidation household strategy. Box 9.1 pre-
sents a description of how this household was able to achieve this.
Households that applied an expansionist-innovating enterprise strat-
egy and an accumulation household strategy were able to reinvest their
profits made during the economic crisis in both farm and non-farm en-
terprises, and some of them could even establish new non-farm enter-
prises. In doing so, some of these households even created new mono-
poly positions in the area. These new monopoly positions are influen-
cing existing social structures and social relations in a way that is still
unfolding today. Because the already wealthy households were able to
establish these monopolies, social polarization could advance as well by
using their socioeconomic power to exploit the poorer farmers. How-
ever, these new businesses may also have created employment opportu-
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nities for households with a lower socioeconomic status and thus enabled
these households to maintain or improve their socioeconomic position.
On the other hand, the economic crisis also helped to reduce some
monopolistic positions. The increased level of commercialization in desa
Parigi attracted more traders to the area, even to the relatively isolated
dusun Asana. Farmers now were able to choose to which trader they
wanted to sell their products. Some farmers were able to benefit from
this increased competition between traders as their bargaining position
improved correspondently. However, very poor farmers were still not
able to improve their bargaining position as they were bound to traders
who borrowed them the starting capital they needed to buy capital in-
puts for their cash crops. These farmers still were forced into contracts
that minimized or even diminished their options for improving their
socioeconomic position in the village.
It should be noted, however, that these social relations also enabled
relative poor farmers suffering from the economic crisis, to buy inputs
which they otherwise would never have been able to use. Thanks to in-
stitutions like kapital bagihasil and patron-client relations, poor farmers
were also able to receive loans when no bank would grant them one, or
to sharecrop some of their land when they needed some extra income.
Therefore, it can be concluded that although on the whole, the social
hierarchy remained the same, in some cases the gap between the high-
est and the lowest status households deepened, while it tended to di-
minish between the middle status and the highest status households.
Social relations like the patron-client system might have changed
slightly, but surely did not disappear. It can even be said that this an-
cient social system enabled the poor households suffering from the eco-
nomic crisis to continue their enterprise activities and/or at least to sur-
vive as a household.
Box 9.1: An example of high social mobility
A household that conducted an expansionist-innovating enterprise
strategy and a consolidation household strategy is the only one in
the sample that rose from the lowest socio-economic rank in 1997
to the highest socio-economic rank in 2003. This is a large accom-
plishment considering that this household’s main income source
consisted of the relatively less profitable rain-fed sawah with a small
kebun and without tegalan, while this household also resided in the
less accessible dusun of Asana.
This household’s high social mobility can be explained by the fact
that it had diversified its
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Conclusions
As a general conclusion it should be noted that the economic crisis has
affected desa Parigi in many different ways. On the whole the economic
crisis mainly created new opportunities as the majority of the peasant
population was able to benefit from it, but it also brought shocks and
stresses for vulnerable households, which were not always able to cope
with them. Households with expansionist-innovating or consolidating-
conserving enterprise strategies mainly applied positive coping re-
sponses by anticipating the market changes, whereas households which
applied marginal-defensive enterprise strategies were mainly forced to
apply negative coping responses just in order to buy enough food.
When confronted with opportunities or shocks and stresses, house-
holds on the whole gave priority to the development of their enterprise
strategies, sometimes at the expense of their household strategies. In
some cases, households applied similar enterprise and household strate-
gies and in other cases they applied a less advanced household strategy
in order to reinvest most of their money in their own enterprises. This
was especially the case with households which applied a consolidating-
conserving enterprise strategy and a survival household strategy and to a
lesser extent also with households which applied an expansionist-inno-
vating enterprise and consolidation household strategy. Two of the sam-
ple households did exactly the opposite however, by investing more in
their household strategies and selling some of their production means in
order to increase their household consumptions. In doing so, they will of
course reduce the profitability of their enterprises in the long run.
The economic crisis has also affected the resource use systems in the
village area. In general the farmers increased their focus on the produc-
tion of commercialized kebun products and intensified their overall
production. Non-farm enterprise activities also expanded and more
households resorted to non-farm income-generating activities. However,
farmers noted that market prices for some export kebun products were
no longer as high as they were during the peak of the economic crisis
(1997/1998) and in some cases these commodities were already de-
creasing in value. So it seems that the positive impact of the economic
crisis had already diminished in 2003. Some wealthy farmers were re-
sponding to these new market changes by focusing their attention on
new products with a higher market value, like the lucrative vanilla crop.
However, it usually takes several years before they can harvest the fruits
of their labor and before that time elapsed market prices might have
changed again.
Overall it can be concluded that the economic crisis has also affected
the household strategies. Households applying expansionist-innovating
enterprise strategies usually also were able to increase their household
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expenditures because they could increase the profitability of their enter-
prises. Their household strategies therefore, were mainly indirectly af-
fected by the economic crisis. This group of households in particular
benefited from the rising prices for export crops and in doing so in-
creased their standards of living by buying consumer durables, invest-
ing in farm and non-farm activities and by increasing their household
consumption expenditures.
Sometimes the crisis impact was direct, as was the case with house-
holds applying a marginal-defensive type of enterprise strategy, which
could no longer afford the necessary capital inputs and therefore were
forced to diversify their income sources in order to buy these inputs.
Some of these households suffered so much from the impact of the
economic crisis that they had to drastically reduce their expenditures on
consumer goods, deplete their savings and sometimes even take their
children from school.
The group of households which applied a consolidating-conserving
household strategy experienced both positive and negative impacts from
the economic crisis. Some households discovered they found it difficult
to continue buying the necessary capital inputs and household consu-
mer goods while others saw the profitability of their enterprises in-
crease. The majority of these consolidating households however, did not
need to economize very much.
As the economic crisis has changed both the enterprise and the
household strategies, it indirectly also affected the social relations in
desa Parigi. Despite the fact that the majority of the households was able
to benefit from the economic crisis, those with the highest social eco-
nomic status were able to benefit the most, while those with a very low
social economic status benefited the least, or even were hurt by the eco-
nomic crisis. A redistribution of the cards held by the different players
however, did not yet occur in Parigi.
The sample households can be classified into those which had the
means to anticipate the rising market prices and in doing so were able to
benefit substantially without being adversely affected by the rising prices
for inputs and consumer goods, and those which did not have the means
to anticipate the rising market prices and consequently were directly hurt
by them. Households which did have the means to anticipate market
changes mainly applied an expansionist-innovating or a consolidating-
conserving enterprise strategy, whereas households which did not,
mainly applied marginal-defensive enterprise and survival household
strategies. In general it can be concluded that only households which
could ride the waves of the ever-changing market prices were able to har-
vest a profit, while those who were not, barely survived and sooner or la-
ter may even go down. The economic crisis can be seen as just one of
many waves farmers have to ride, although a particularly large one.
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10 The Asian Crisis, Livelihood Conditions,
and Resource Use in the Coastal Village of
Tamasaju, South Sulawesi
Rogier Vogelij
Introduction
Based on research performed in 2003, this chapter investigates the ef-
fects of the Asian crisis of 1997 on livelihood strategies and resource
use in the village of Tamasaju, South Sulawesi. The main aims of the
research were to gain insight into how households with different types
of livelihood strategy, resource use, age structure, and different levels of
wealth coped with the crisis.
This chapter highlights the changes that occurred in different re-
source use sectors and livelihood strategies, using the livelihood ap-
proach of Lösch, Fusilier, and Dupraz (1991). This approach distin-
guishes between enterprise strategies and household strategies. Both
types are strategies that are used by households. Enterprise strategies
refer to the strategies that they follow in their productive pursuits,
whereas the household strategies are strategies that appliy to consump-
tion purposes, the use of the household’s labor, and saving and borrow-
ing (in cash or in kind). The three categories that can be distinguished
in the consumptive sphere are accumulation, consolidating and survival
strategies. Enterprise strategies, on the other hand, apply to a house-
holds’ entrepreneurial activities, and usually are defined by the use of
inputs, the use and ownership of production assets, and the use of sav-
ings and loans for productive purposes. The three categories of enter-
prise strategies are expanding-innovating, consolidating-conserving, and
marginal-defensive strategies.
In our paper, the emphasis is on the productive activities of house-
holds, but consumptive behavior was also taken into account. As house-
holds in Tamasaju actively use various types of resource, very different
types of dynamics have been taking place. Moreover, it turned out that
prevailing social relationships (box 10.1) have played an important role
in softening potentially detrimental effects of the crisis. Before analyz-
ing the effects of the crisis any further, we will first discuss the research
village and its economy.
The village economy
Tamasaju is located about 10 kilometers south of the provincial capital
Makassar, and is easily accessible by road and public transportation.
The population of Tamasaju, about 4200 in number, is made up exclu-
sively of ethnic Macassarese1 (BPS Kabupaten Takalar 2003, p. 39). The
Macassarese are renowned throughout Indonesia for their seafaring his-
tory (Kristanto et al., p. 387). They form a society where Islamic beliefs
and traditional adat2 are intertwined (Koentjaraningrat 1975). Status
and family ties are important aspects of their daily life. Social status is
determined by blood relationship, courage, wealth, education, and occu-
pation. Being a hajji is also an important indication of status. Status is
not a predetermined fate that never changes; it is possible to acquire
more status, or conversely to fall into disgrace. People are therefore very
competitive in acquiring status.
Fishing is the most common type of resource use in Tamasaju, as about
50 percent of the households depend on fishing for their main source of
income. An estimated 25 percent of the households engage in agricultural
and non-agricultural activities for their main source of income.3
In Tamasaju, where primary activities make up the lion’s share of the
local economy, weather conditions are an important feature of everyday
life. While insufficient rainfall places constraints on agriculture (box
10.2), winds are a limiting weather condition for some types of fishing.
During the wet season strong winds often cause the sea to be choppy,
Box 10.1: Patron-client ties
An important feature of Macassarese culture is patronage relation-
ships. Patrons, or punggawa, support their clients in times of hard-
ship in return for services, labor, or agricultural products. Punggawa
help their clients by employing them, by providing loans, or by pro-
viding inputs. The patron-client relationship is based more on practi-
cal considerations rather than on loyalty; a client will commit to an-
other punggawa if the relationship is not to his satisfaction. As losing
clients means losing status, punggawa will try to maintain strong ties
with their clients, often by means of lending money. As long as a
client is in debt, the commitment cannot be broken (Pelras 2000).
Unlike a bank, patrons do not ask for collateral or interest, but they
receive a share of the clients’ output, or clients pay by supplying
labor. These relationships can therefore be instrumental in improv-
ing access to financial assets for poor people, while they can also be
powerful tools of exploitation and marginalisation.
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thereby making fishing more hazardous. Different types of fishing are
affected in different ways, however. Some types of fishing are virtually
impossible to perform in the wet season, while other types of fishing
can continue near Tamasaju all year round.
Fishermen who use the pa’renggae technique have to avoid the dan-
gerous weather conditions during the wet season, and go to the extreme
south and southeast of the peninsula, where winds are less strong (Egal,
1997, p.12). Pa’renggae boats are the largest type of fishing boat in Tama-
saju; they have crews of ten to fifteen people, most of whom are from
Tamasaju (although some of them come from nearby villages). The start-
ing investments are extremely high, around Rp 100 million,4 because of
the size of the boats, the large nets, and the three engines required in
this fishing method (two for thrust, and one to pull in the net).
Up to three years ago, pa’renggae boats were still active in the coastal
area of Tamasaju, but because of overexploitation due to the large number
of fishermen in this area, most pa’renggae now go to Jeneponto or Sinjai
Box 10.2: Tamasaju and its environs
Tamasaju is located in the alluvial plain of the Jeneberang River, on
the west coast of South Sulawesi (see map 2). This province is one
of the most densely populated areas of Indonesia. About 20 kilo-
meters north of Tamasaju is the provincial capital of Makassar. With
a population of almost one million (BPS 2001) and, as home to the
main port of eastern Indonesia, it is a large source of employment,
trade, and economic demand.
Gunung Lompobatang, a dormant volcano situated about 100 kilo-
meters inland, has provided fertile soils for much of the surrounding
area, including Tamasaju. Because of the high fertility and the ab-
sence of relief, soils here are very suitable for agriculture. However,
the lack of rainfall hampers agriculture during the dry season. Irriga-
tion is therefore needed during much of the year. The main source
of irrigation water for Tamasaju, the Jeneberang River, is not very reli-
able, as the amount of water varies greatly from year to year, and
from month to month. A large dam, the Bili-Bili Dam, was built for
the purpose of improving irrigation facilities and supplying drinking
water. Because of these efforts, irrigation facilities have improved sig-
nificantly. However, the urban demand for water has a more potent
voice, and a large share of the water is used up in Makassar. Be-
cause of this, irrigation is insufficient, and most of the agricultural
land of Tamasaju is still completely dependent on rainfall.
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(see figure 10.1), or even to Flores and Sumba. At the time of the research,
it was estimated that ten vessels from Tamasaju used pa’renggae.
The pa’rere technique is another fishing technique that is relatively new
to Tamasaju. The starting investments are considerably lower than for
pa’renggae, ranging from Rp 30 to 40 million for a boat with two thrust
engines, one net-pulling engine, and a net. The boats have a crew of
five to six men, which makes it a more attractive method of fishing for
sailors (sawi) than pa’renggae, because the catch, which can be about as
large as that with pa’renggae, is divided among fewer people.
Boats using the pa’rere method of fishing operate around the island
of Pulau Tanah Keke in the Spermonde Archipelago (map 2). Since
about five years ago, pa’rere is no longer carried out along the coast of
Tamasaju, but further out at sea, as this technique is particularly detri-
mental to the environment (see box 10.3).
Pa’rere boats can also be used near Tamasaju during the wet season.
They benefit from the wet season in a way, because fish prices are high-
er then. As these pa’rere boats do not need to move to faraway fishing
Figure 10.1 Map of South Sulawesi
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grounds during the wet season, and the investments that are needed
are relatively low (compared to pa’renggae) this type of fishing is an at-
tractive option, and it is becoming increasingly popular. About 15 boats
in the village are equipped with pa’rere.
Investing in modern techniques such as pa’rere and pa’renggae is only
possible for those who have access to sizeable funds. Poor people are
unable to invest in these types of fishing, but modern fishing does offer
them a source of employment. However, those without substantial fi-
nancial assets can invest in more traditional types of fishing that re-
quire much lower investments, both for starting capital and on a regu-
lar basis. The most common types of traditional fishing systems are pa’-
lanra and pa’torani.
Pa’lanra boats are either dugout prahu (called lepa-lepa), measuring
three to six meters in length, or a larger type of boat (with a maximum
weight of three tons, and a length of seven meters). In Tamasaju, there
are some 30 prahu, and about three larger pa´lanra boats. A lepa-lepa
can accommodate two people (often father and son), while the larger
boats carry more. Pa’lanra fishing cannot be practiced when waves are
Box 10.3: Overfishing
The Spermonde Archipelago (map 2) is an important source of fish
for Tamasaju’s fishermen. This collection of coral reefs and islands
stretches out for about 40 kilometers just off the coast of Takalar
and Makassar. It provides an important shelter for many fish species
and ample fishing opportunities for an estimated 6500 households
(Pet-Soede 2000, p.13).
Because the fish are highly mobile within the archipelago, and be-
cause of natural fluctuations in fish stocks, the catch varies strongly.
Rising numbers of fishermen, the increasing use of explosives and
cyanide, and the modernization of fishing equipment have led to de-
clining fish harvests. Many blame pa’rere in particular. With this tech-
nique, a large funnel-shaped net is dragged through the water, some-
times damaging coral reefs. Moreover, the mesh size of the nets is
very small, making this a very harmful technique. Boats using pa’rere
are no longer allowed to catch fish close to shore.
The decline of the fish stock has been most severe on the reefs that
are nearest to the coast (within a 5-kilometer range). This is also the
area where reefs are most at risk, largely due to blast fishing, which
is performed by 15 percent of the population of the islands of the
Spermonde Archipelago (Pet-Soede 2000). This technique is illegal,
and is not performed by fishermen from the mainland.
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high, so during the wet season they often have to wait for days or even
weeks for an opportunity to go fishing. During this season, pa’lanra
fisher folk often incur debts in order to survive, rather than seek work
in other jobs. This may seem odd, but it probably is due to the incom-
patibility of their fishing skills and lifestyles with other occupations.
The starting investments are only about Rp 10 million (for a five
horsepower engine, a boat, nets, floaters, and rope). The nets are 700
meters long and two meters wide, and the larger type of boat uses nets
of up to four meters (however, fishermen sometimes tie two nets to-
gether, to increase the reach of the net). Costs are relatively low, but so
are the returns, and pa’lanra fishermen hardly save money, as all re-
turns are needed to cover their household consumption.
There are also four or five pa’torani boats in Tamasaju. Pa’torani fish-
ermen fish for the eggs of flying fish by leaving bamboo traps with co-
conut leaves in the water for a while, until the fish have laid their eggs
inside. This method used to be more common in the past, but other
methods (such as pa’renggae) are more profitable now, and pa’torani also
has the disadvantages of being seasonal and highly dependent on
weather conditions. The season runs from May to August, and fisher-
men are 15 to 20 days away from home per trip, as they go to faraway
islands such as Java and Flores. Recently pa’torani boats from Tamasaju
have even started fishing near the coasts of Irian Jaya.
In the off-season pa’torani ships are often used for other fishing
methods. Pa’torani boats accommodate a crew of five, and are medium-
sized. The starting investments are about Rp 20 million, of which Rp 8-
10 million is needed for the fishing gear, and Rp 10 million for the boat
with a 220 horsepower engine.
Rice growing is the most common agricultural activity in Tamasaju, be-
cause its flatlands are particularly suitable for the cultivation of rice. Rice
is grown mostly for consumption by the households themselves. During
the dry season, however, rainfall is too low to cultivate the rice fields. It is
only possible to provide permanent irrigation on sawah land near the
main irrigation canals, but even there supplies are often insufficient.
Sometimes rice paddies are sown twice a year. The second harvest is
always considerably smaller than the first one, because of the insufficient
availability of water, while the seeds that are used (collected from the first
harvest) are inferior in quality to the seeds bought from the store, which
is a common problem with HYVs. If a second rice harvest in the same
year is not possible most people plant spinach, soybeans, and other off
season (palawija) crops, which yield a considerably less valuable harvest.
Some people also grow vegetables (such as tomatoes, spinach, and
cabbage) on small garden plots near the house, which are sheltered
from the sun. This practice (called pekarangan) is fast disappearing in
Tamasaju, because the available land is becoming scarce as more
262 ROGIER VOGELIJ
houses are being built within the village boundaries. Similarly, the area
for expansion of rice cultivation is limited as well (box 10.4).
Large-scale chicken-farming enterprises represent an agricultural ac-
tivity that is relatively new to Tamasaju. Households have started pursu-
ing this activity in years directly following the crisis in different ways:
sometimes only marginal, selling to the local market, but sometimes
also in a capital intensive way, with investments coming from Makassar.
Only a few households engage in this activity.
The non-agricultural sector of Tamasaju consists of a diverse range of
activities. It comprises small-scale activities which reward poorly, as well
as activities such as fish and shrimp trading that are often quite success-
ful, judging by the ability of many traders to make the hajj and improve
their houses. Trading fish is one of the most common non-agricultural
activities. Whereas some fish traders buy their fish at the local auction,
others go out to sea to trade with the fishermen there, as traders who buy
fish at sea pay lower prices. Larger boats (pa’joloro) regularly go out sev-
eral miles, while smaller boats (pa’coto-coto) stay close to the coast.
Non-agricultural activities also include the fabrication and repairing
of fishing gear, running a toko, working in construction (in the village
itself or in Makassar), making furniture, driving a bemo (motorised
trishaw), selling ice (which fishermen use to keep their catch fresh),
drying fish, and working in the local crab-processing factory.
The crab-processing factory has been set up in Tamasaju quite recently,
in 1998. This enterprise has become an important employer for many
households, as it employs about 120 people, mostly young women. Work-
ing for this company enables employees to be more independent, and to
contribute to their respective household incomes. For many households
in Tamasaju the income from the crab factory is an important addition to
their incomes, and it probably played an important role in helping house-
holds make ends meet when price levels rose during the crisis.
Box 10.4: Limited availability of agricultural land
Most farming households only have small plots of land, as larger
holdings have been split up because of the inheritance system. Over
time households saw their farmlands decrease, and with it their in-
comes. At times of economic recession, selling or pawning land to
richer farmers often is the only option. Because of this concentration
of land ownership, only a small proportion of the farmers in Tamasa-
ju have been able to benefit from modernization in agriculture. Many
of the marginalized households sought refuge in fishery or non-agri-
cultural activities (Egal 1997, p.15-6).
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Also, there have been initiatives to form cooperative groups for pro-
cessing fish. These cooperatives have not been very active though, lar-
gely due to organizational problems and mismanagement.
The majority of households that engage in non-agricultural activities
have a weak position in agriculture or fishery, indicating that their activ-
ities in the non-agricultural sector constitute a key component of their
livelihood. Households that are more affluent often opt to invest in on-
going agricultural or fishing activities, as owning boats and sawah land
especially bring status to the owner.
Resource use during the crisis
During the crisis, the price levels of many types of inputs have been
very unstable: the prices of fuel and fertilizers have skyrocketed within
the course of months, and the prices of some of the major commodities
that are produced in Tamasaju (rice, for instance) dropped drastically
during the crisis, after an initial rise.
One might expect that households would react to this by abandoning
certain activities in favor of others. Conversely, in general, the abandon-
ment of production assets or activities is rarely observed, because mem-
bers of most households that started engaging in side activities did so
in addition to their main activities. A few exceptions aside, retirement
seems to be the only reason to stop engaging in economic activities.
The opposite, diversification of employment, has also taken place
mainly because of demographic reasons. Marketing, both in terms of
percentage of the output that is marketed and types of marketing chan-
nels, has hardly changed for any of the groups either.
These general trends were visible among households in all sectors of
resource use, but there is also a number of differences between the way
different sectors have reacted to the crisis. Moreover, households in the
various sectors have been operating in different contexts, experiencing
different changes in the nature of their activities. These changes often
already started before the crisis. In fishery, people had to deal with de-
clining fish stocks on the one hand, but were also benefiting from the
availability of modern techniques and machines on the other. Similarly,
in agriculture the shortage of land posed limits on resource use, but the
increased use of machines helped to increase outputs for some. In the
non-agricultural sector, the new crab-processing plant offered a new
source of employment. This section explores these developments and
the effects of the crisis for each resource use sector.
Rich fishery households in particular have been relatively unaffected
by the crisis. In a significant number of cases, fishery households
bought sawah and boats of various kinds, which are both important
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types of production assets in Macassarese society. This expansion of own-
ership did not occur as commonly in the agricultural or non-agricultural
sectors. The notion that wealthy fishery households were untouched by
the crisis is further supported by the rise in production output that many
fishery households experienced upon purchasing production assets.
It is quite remarkable how fishery households were able to cope in
spite of the decline in the fish stocks and the rising price levels of in-
puts such as fuel, as reported by almost all fishermen and many of the
key informants5 who were interviewed on this issue.
There are several aspects which may explain this. Firstly, most house-
holds for whom fishing is their main economic activity carry out side
activities in the other two sectors much more often than agricultural
and non-agricultural households. Having side activities in other sectors
reduces these households’ sensitivity to stresses and shocks in their
fishery activities.
Secondly, because of the modernization that has been taking place in
the fishery sector (see box 10.5), members of fishing households are
nowadays better equipped to sail to fishing grounds that are located far
away. This applies in particular to modern fishing techniques such as
pa’rere and pa’renggae, as practitioners of more traditional types stick to
the same fishing grounds as before the crisis, despite the fact that they
have also increased the use of engines. With their smaller boats they
cannot go farther out into the open sea, because deeper waters are more
hazardous, while going to other locations along the coast would lead
Box 10.5: The modernization of fishing techniques
Fishermen in Tamasaju have modernized their resource use through
the increased use of engines instead of sails, and because of new
techniques and types of nets used.
The increased popularity of modern fishing methods has two faces.
On the one hand, these modern types of fishery operate on a much
larger scale than the traditional fishery types, and are very effective
in depleting marine resources. As stated earlier, pa’rere in particular
is seen by many as the main cause of the overfishing of the waters
near Tamasaju. On the other hand, while thus limiting the catch for
traditional fishermen, the modern types of fishing methods do offer
relatively easily accessible employment opportunities to poor people,
because the latter need no ownership of production assets and a
minimum of skills. Therefore, while contributing to the marginaliza-
tion of the poor independent fishermen, modern types of fishing
also offer employment opportunities to these fishermen as sailors.
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them into waters already fished by people from other villages. Ulti-
mately, however, the modernization of fishing techniques tends to bene-
fit both the rich and the poor fishermen, as the investments of the rich
are rewarded with higher yields, while the sailors working on the boats
receive an income, without having to invest money themselves.
Thirdly, the patron-client system is likely to provide those deprived
with the necessary assistance. Although only a few of the interviewed
households reported that they had borrowed money, several key infor-
mants6 underlined the importance of the patronage system for the in-
come of poor people, a point also supported by the literature (Pelras
2000). A sense of embarrassment might be the main motivation for de-
nying indebtedness.
In recent years many fishery households have been changing the way
labor is used. A number of fishery households concentrated the labor
input of their members, but this had nothing to do with the crisis, as it
was most frequently related to demographic reasons. Since the crisis,
the members of most fishery households did not diversify the number
of income sources by taking up other jobs. These fishery households
did not need to do so, as they often already had quite a diverse portfolio
of activities before the crisis. When comparing the relative importance
of wage labor and family labor, fishery households, in contrast to the
households in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, used less la-
bor of their own household members. This is because of the increasing
popularity of modern types of fishing, which use wage labor more often
than the traditional fishing types. All households that bought boats and
increased the input of labor did so by increasing the use of wage labor.
The agricultural sector experienced different developments. At the
time of the crisis, many farmers in Indonesia were confronted with
freak weather conditions, pest attacks, and expensive fertilizers and pes-
ticides (Bourgeois & Gouyon 2001, p. 309). In Tamasaju, however, very
few people reported pests, and improved irrigation with water from the
Bili-Bili Dam softened the impact of droughts. However, the trends of
rising input prices and declining output prices were felt commonly.
Farmers consequently reduced their use of inputs such as fertilizers
and pesticides. The shopkeeper of a local shop that sells farming sup-
plies complained that many farmers had cut down on the use of fertili-
zers because of the rising costs. Low and middle income farmers are
slightly overrepresented in this group. While this is clearly a result of
the crisis, it should not be overestimated, as none of the households
that were interviewed had stopped using fertilizers entirely.
For farmers in Tamasaju the enhanced irrigation opportunities are
perhaps the most important change that has occurred during the crisis.
The construction of the Bili-Bili Dam (see box 10.2) doubled the area of
sawah that can be irrigated.7 Almost all households that are active in
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agriculture were able to increase their output because of this dam, and
because of an expansion of the area under cultivation by one-third of
the households. The expansion of agricultural land might seem to con-
tradict the earlier-mentioned shortage of agricultural land, but the for-
mer was due to a few wealthy landowners in Tamasaju who were able
to obtain land outside the village, and hire people to cultivate it. In
other cases, the shortage of land has forced farmers to move, or more
commonly, to take up non-agricultural side jobs within the village or
sometimes even in the city (Box 10.6). Additional use of wage labor did
not occur among any of the agricultural households that were inter-
viewed. In a few cases, however, agricultural households did start using
more family labor, mostly because of demographic changes rather than
because of crisis-induced conscious decisions to employ a larger labor
force. Agricultural households thus have clearly added more family la-
bor than fishery and non-agricultural households.
In addition, many agricultural households started using machinery
(box 10.6), often to replace the traction power of buffalo that they used
to own before the crisis. Farmers who started using machines bought
these machines or rented them. They were able to use machines more
often despite the higher fuel prices, partly because they cut down on
the use of fertilizers and used more (unpaid) family labor than before.
The improved irrigation, the increased use of machines, and adding fa-
mily labor have together resulted in increased agricultural outputs. This
increase in output, however, did not lead to higher incomes, as rice
prises were declining, while input prices increased. Agricultural house-
holds, therefore, experienced a rise in their incomes as often as a de-
crease. Increases were achieved by households with successful invest-
Box 10.6: The use of agricultural machines
Farmers have started to use more machinery than before the crisis.
This makes the cultivation of the land less laborious, but could on
the other hand result in a loss of employability for agricultural la-
borers and sharecroppers. However, the new machines are mainly
tractors and irrigation pumps. Tractors replace buffalo rather than
people, and irrigation systems raise the yields and lead to multiple
cropping, thereby creating more employment for farm labor. As few
people are full-time agricultural laborers, there does not seem to be
a strong impact of mechanization in agriculture. The main problem
for agricultural activities in Tamasaju therefore still seems to be the
shortage of land, and the supply of irrigation water, which is still in-
sufficient, despite the improvements that have been made.
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ments and because of the improved irrigation, but also because of im-
proving employment opportunities in non-agricultural side activities.
No clear patterns have emerged to explain declining incomes, as these
households attribute various causes.
Unlike agricultural households, non-agricultural households have
mostly added wage labor to their enterprises. This labor was added for
activities in all three sectors, both for side and main activities. Appar-
ently, non-agricultural households felt no strong need to economize on
labor expenses, due to the direct relationship between labor input and
output in these weakly mechanized types of non-farm activities.
Little has changed in the number of household members that are em-
ployed, and in the few cases where such changes occurred, the reasons
were mostly demographic. However, in recent times, changes did occur
in gender aspects of employment (box 10.7).
This is the result of relaxing attitudes on gender roles and progressing
age structures of households, rather than a result of the crisis. This con-
clusion is supported by the fact that most women started working only
after they had completed their education. This firstly shows that women
are being educated, which used to be very uncommon prior to changing
attitudes relating to gender. Secondly, this shows that in general there was
no urgency in getting these women employed, as they could first finish
Box 10.7: The use of female labor
A lot of change has occurred in women’s activities, particularly in
the non-agricultural sector. Macassarese society used to be charac-
terized by a very low participation of women in economic activities,
but the presence of the crab factory in particular has increased op-
portunities for women to engage in economic activities. These activ-
ities have not only increased the potential independence of young
women, but have also contributed to a significant rise in some of
the households’ incomes. In a number of cases, a daughter who
started working in the crab factory has become the main income
earner, instead of the head of the household. Quite a number of wo-
men in the sample were also working as home-based shopkeepers,
while one female interviewee was earning the lion’s share of her
household’s income as a teacher. However, women are still comple-
tely absent in another important type of non-agricultural activity:
trading outside their household. In fishery as well there are still no
females active at all, while women in agricultural activities usually
work only on the household’s own sawah.
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their education. This lack of employment urgency suggests the absence
of motivations such as an all-paralysing fear of crisis-induced poverty.
Many non-agricultural households have started to engage in what is
now their main activity after the crisis, but in most cases continued to
perform their previous activities as well. Through this diversification,
non-agricultural households have clearly been attempting to spread
risks, instead of focusing on one particular activity like households in
the fishery sector. By comparison, households in the agricultural sector
have been carrying out both types of activities.
One-third of the non-agricultural households have increased their
production output. This increase in output was achieved in both agricul-
tural and non-agricultural side activities, mainly by increasing the use
of capital and labor inputs, as non-agricultural households have hardly
been able to expand their ownership of production assets. Despite this
increase in output, a number of households have experienced income
depreciation, but for the majority of these households this was due to
an increase in expenditures on electricity and education. The increase
in expenditures on education is clearly related to the life-cycle phase of
these households, all of which have young children.
Analyzing household groups on the basis of their enterprise strate-
gies also disclosed some interesting patterns:
One might anticipate marginal-defensive households to concentrate
on labor inputs, and expanding-innovating households to concentrate
on capital inputs and the acquisition of production assets. In Tamasa-
ju’s case this turned out not to be completely true, as marginal-defen-
sive households have been acquiring new production assets as well, and
they also used capital inputs. Moreover, expanding-innovating house-
holds have also maximized their use of labor. The main difference be-
tween these two groups is the type of production system that the house-
holds focused on. The changes that were made in expanding-innovating
households were geared towards production systems that use modern
techniques which, albeit expensive, also yield higher returns. These
households bought various assets for activities in all sectors, but in par-
ticular modern boats and fishing gear. These are not only households
that depend on fishery for their main source of income, but also house-
holds belonging to the other two sectors. Virtually all expanding-inno-
vating households appear to have specialized their production activities.
The marginal-defensive households have specialized quite often as
well, but the difference with the expanding-innovating households is
that the changes which occurred in this group were geared at marginal,
artisanal-type activities that require easy-to-come-by production assets
and inputs. These households, that are mainly active in pa’lanra fishing
and agriculture, also specialized by increasing their labor inputs. As
none of the marginal-defensive households have diversified, households
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in Tamasaju that are concerned with surviving apparently do so mainly
by focusing their labor on one particular activity with which they are al-
ready familiar. In contrast, only a few of the consolidating-conserving
households have specialized, and they occupy a position in between
with regard to the nature of the investments that they have made.
Because of these differences, households practicing expanding-inno-
vating strategies commonly experienced increasing incomes and profit-
ability,8 whereas most consolidating-conserving and marginal-defensive
types of households did not.
A second reason why the marginal-defensive and the consolidating-
conserving categories experienced a less appreciable rise in income ap-
preciation and profitability is that these two groups hardly undertook
commercialization, while quite a few of the expanding-innovating
households have commercialized, as they started to engage in activities
that primarily generate output intended for the market.
Moreover, expanding-innovating households have not only changed
the nature of their activities and marketing orientation, but they have
also expanded the scale of existing activities, by buying more boats or
land for instance. This occurred considerably less frequently in the
other two categories.
These differences among the strategy categories resulted in a lack of
change of the profitability for the marginal-defensive and consolidating-
conserving types, whereas the expanding-innovating households have
been able to capitalize on their investments, and increase the profitabil-
ity of their activities, thereby improving their incomes.
Household incomes and expenditures during the crisis
Households have not only experienced changing conditions in their
productive activities, but also in their consumption behavior. While
some had to economize on their expenses or use up savings, others
have been able to buy luxury goods, or to save money.9
Grouping households together on the basis of their enterprise strate-
gies showed that, despite the increased incomes in the expanding-inno-
vating category, no clear patterns have emerged for changes in the
household expenditures. Education was mentioned most often, but none
of the categories show clear increases or decreases of expenditures on
education. Moreover, these changes were often induced by demographic
dynamics. Making the hajj on the other hand did occur notably more of-
ten in the expanding-innovating group than in the other two categories.
Households in the consolidating-conserving group have increased ex-
penditures on various items, in particular when comparing the pre-cri-
sis spending with the post-crisis expenditure levels. None of the indivi-
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dual households has made large changes in its expenditures, but be-
cause many households made small upward changes, the general pat-
tern that emerges does indicate an increase in expenditure, which is ex-
plained by the increasing price levels. In the marginal-defensive group
the predominant change that occurred in the expenditures was a de-
crease, but in a number of cases, households were still able to increase
their expenditures on home improvement.
Quite remarkably, the expanding-innovating households are the only
category where households reported borrowing money, both for produc-
tive purposes, and for household consumption.
The resource use categorization shows that a large proportion of
households in all sectors increased their expenditure on electricity,
while in the non-agricultural sector households also spent more on edu-
cation. The latter group probably attaches higher priority to education
as a means of securing a future livelihood. Thirty to forty percent of the
households in all sectors have spent money on durable goods, the most
common expenditure concerned home improvement.
There are hardly any differences discernible in the consumption beha-
vior of the different sectors, but some interesting insights can be drawn
from how households in the different sectors experienced crisis condi-
tions, and how the acquisition of incomes affected their coping behavior.
The main changes that fishery households had to deal with during
the crisis were the rising price levels of basic needs such as food and
fuel, and the overfishing of the waters near Tamasaju. However, fisher-
men have some advantages over farmers that enable them to cope with
crisis conditions. First, they are used to dealing with some of the condi-
tions similar to those caused by the crisis. They always had to cope with
fluctuating resource stocks and drastic changes in price levels (Allison
& Ellis 2001, p. 380). Moreover, fishing yields fluctuate on a daily and
seasonal basis (dictated by weather conditions), so that their earnings
have a regular but insecure aspect.
Second, the relationship between the use of inputs and the genera-
tion of output is not as linear as in agriculture. When a poor farmer
can only buy a small amount of fertilizer he cannot achieve a high out-
put, as the soil needs a certain amount in order to be productive. How-
ever, when a poor fisherman can only afford little fuel, he can still be
lucky and have a good catch.
Despite the overall rise of production output that fishermen experi-
enced, most of them did not report a change in their incomes. This
contradiction probably is caused by the fact that the respondents de-
ducted the increased expenses for inputs from their income increase.
As farmers receive an income only a few times a year, upon harvest-
ing they are quite vulnerable compared to those in the other two sec-
tors. On the other hand, this means that these households are more
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used to saving money and planning their expenditures, so one could ex-
pect more solid strategies among these households.
Owners of land tend to experience effects of the crisis to a lesser ex-
tent than landless farmers, as they can decide to cut down on the use of
inputs10 and spend it on other items if they need to. Landless farmers,
however, depend on others for their employment and income. Few
farmers, whether landless or landowning, stopped cultivating the land
because of the crisis, but some agricultural wageworkers started to work
in a non-agricultural side job (in the harbor, or as a bricklayer for in-
stance). This was not a common trend though, as this would imply a
breaking away from established patronage relations, while the wages in
these types of activities remained low as well.
A number of the agricultural households however could afford to bor-
row less money than before the crisis because of increases in their in-
comes, but this was not very common.
For non-agricultural households the rising price levels of inputs such
as fuel, and the rising prices for rice and consumer goods were impor-
tant consequences of the crisis. Like fishery households, non-agricultur-
al households usually receive an income on a regular basis. The em-
ployees of the crab factory, and people such as teachers actually receive
a salary, but the majority – traders, craftsmen, drivers, and the like – do
not. Because of the widely differing nature of the various types of non-
agricultural activities it is difficult to identify trends for the entire sector.
It did become clear though, that diversification of the employment was
quite common among these households, as many of them diversified
into activities which now are their main source of income. Specializa-
tion was rarely observed among non-agricultural households.
How the crisis affected social relations
As has been illustrated in the preceding sections, households responded
in different ways to the changing conditions. Some households
struggled to cope with the crisis, some were hardly affected by it, and
others were able to turn it to their advantage; there were both winners
and losers. This section explores at the village level how the crisis has
changed the proportion of poor to rich households, how it affected so-
cial relations within the village, and, on a regional level, the role of Ma-
kassar City.
Since the crisis, only the expanding-innovating households clearly im-
proved their socioeconomic position. In both the marginal-defensive
and the consolidating-conserving categories, few households were able
to do so. As the expanding-innovating households were more successful
in capitalizing on their investments than the marginal-defensive house-
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holds, one might expect a situation where the rich get richer, and the
poor are impoverished even further. The patron-client system that per-
vades Macassarese society could easily facilitate such polarization. How-
ever, while patron-client relations contain an element of extortion, at the
same time they bring benefits to both parties involved. People who do
not own assets are enabled to use the assets of those who do own them.
Without the help of patrons, poor people would thus have fewer oppor-
tunities to invest, or to purchase items for consumptive purposes. In
this way patrons enable their clients to take on activities and types of re-
source use that would otherwise be denied to them. However, the con-
ditions under which this help is supplied certainly add an extortive as-
pect to patron-client relations. The patrons benefit from maintaining ex-
isting power relations, and from tying clients to them. As people in
Tamasaju do not often borrow from family members, the patron-client
system is the only safety net for many poor.
These issues are not limited to any of the resource use sectors in par-
ticular, as they apply equally to the relations between sharecropper and
landowner, sailor and boat owner, and non-agricultural employer and
employee. In particular in agriculture, patron-client relations can easily
lead to unsustainable types of resource use, as the temporary cultivation
of land tends to lead to output maximization without consideration for
the future. This applies to a much lower extent to fishery because of the
open-access nature of the resources, although patronage relations may
have contributed to the overcrowding of the fishery sector and its over-
fishing.
Although patron-client relations as such have not changed, the occur-
rence of these relations most likely has increased in the fishery sector.
As boat-owning households have in several cases been able to buy more
boats, they increased the number of workers that they employ, thus in-
creasing their status, but also the pressure on common resources. This
development, a direct result of the behavior of expanding-innovating
households in fishery, has not been observed in the agricultural or non-
agricultural sectors.
While patron-client relations occur only at the local level, we also
need to consider the socioeconomic impacts of relations at the regional
level, that is, between Tamasaju and the city of Makassar. Tamasaju’s
proximity to Makassar might lead one to expect that this economic
center attracts people looking for non-agricultural employment in parti-
cular. The role of the urban economy therefore deserves some special
attention.
While most urban areas in Indonesia were more adversely affected
by the crisis than rural areas, Makassar coped relatively well due to the
presence of the harbor and the predominance of export trade commod-
ities that benefited from the crisis (Titus 1999). Moreover, Makassar’s
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informal economy might have functioned as a safety net for landless
farmers and other rural poor, and to a certain extent this indeed seems
to have been the case for people from Tamasaju. Some of the key infor-
mants who were interviewed about this said that there was some com-
muting,11 although only one person in the sample mentioned that he
worked occasionally in Makassar as a bricklayer, in addition to his sa-
wah cultivation. Low wages in Makassar’s non-agricultural sector, how-
ever, make this an unattractive option. Moreover, people often lack the
required skills and education, nor do they have the social networks
needed. Furthermore, the lifestyle of fishermen often is not compatible
with non-agricultural activities, as many work at night and rest in the
daytime. Consequently, there does not seem to have been a trend of
people moving from Tamasaju to Makassar.12 As a matter of fact, some
households even moved from Makassar back to Tamasaju, and started
working as pa’lanra fishermen and as furniture makers during the peak
of the crisis. This, however, does not imply that inhabitants of Tamasaju
have not been frequently interacting with Makassar. Furniture making,
driving a minibus, and the fish auction of Tamasaju are just some ex-
amples of activities that have clear links with Makassar, and shrimp tra-
ders have always sold their merchandise in Makassar and the Maros re-
gion. There are no indications that the role of these places has changed
for these activities, and that they did not play a vital role in overcoming
some serious crisis impacts.
The emergence of poultry farms introduced strong urban ties that
did not exist before the crisis. These changes in rural-urban interaction,
however, can hardly be seen as impacts of the crisis.
Conclusions
Crisis-induced changes in price levels have certainly been felt in Tama-
saju, but the crisis effects on resource use have been small. The moder-
nization in fishery and agriculture, which occurred despite the in-
creased prices for fuel, pesticides, and fertilizers, are proof of the rela-
tively low impact of the crisis. Nonetheless, some farmers reduced their
use of fertilizers, as these became too expensive.
The crisis thus hardly altered resource use per se, nor did it force
households to abandon any of the resource use sectors in favor of
others. While engaging in non-agricultural activities enabled fishermen
and farmers to cope with the crisis conditions, they did not stop per-
forming their main types of existing activities. In a number of cases,
seeking employment for grown-up children has been the main motiva-
tion to start engaging in new non-agricultural activities.
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Table 10.1 below presents a concise overview of the developments that
shaped resource use before the crisis, as well as the direct effects of the
crisis on households, and the coping behavior of households in the dif-
ferent types of resource use. Changes that occurred in resource use are
mostly caused by structural processes of commercialization, technologi-
cal modernization, overexploitation of fishery resources, and the limited
Table 10.1 Resource use and livelihoods during the crisis
Fishery Agriculture Non-agricultural activities
Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor
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1 It should be emphasized that some households have several migrant members at
different locations.
THE ASIAN CRISIS, LIVELIHOOD CONDITIONS, AND RESOURCE USE 275
availability of agricultural land. These are processes that have been pre-
sent in Tamasaju since long before the crisis. Because of Tamasaju’s di-
verse economy, its links with trading channels in Makassar, and the pa-
tron-client relations, the ramifications of the crisis have remained fairly
limited.
Notes
1 The fertilizers mentioned most frequently by the farmers in the research were:
TSP: Triple Super Phosphate – to fertilize the soil
Urea: NO2 (Sodium) – for the leaves of the crop
KCl: Potassium Chloride – to improve the growing process of the crop
ZA: Ammonium Sulphate – for the leaves of the crop.
2 Obviously Macassarese here does not refer to the inhabitants of Makassar city. It is
the name of one of the largest ethnic groups that live in South Sulawesi. Other impor-
tant groups are the Buginese and the Toraja.
3 Adat means custom, the oral adat laws constitute an important part of the Indonesian
legal system. (Koentjaraningrat 1975, p. 164)
4 Having a certain activity as the main source of income means just that, as it is not un-
common for households to carry out side activities, often in other sectors than their
main activity.
5 All prices that are mentioned are at 2002 levels, when Rp. 10,000 was equivalent to
E 1.00.
6 Field research, 2003.
7 Interviews with key informants, field research, 2003.
8 Interviews with key informants, field research, 2003.
9 That is, the degree to which changes in the use of inputs are reflected in the produc-
tion output and income appreciation.
10 Because of the private nature of borrowing, lending, and saving money, it was difficult
to obtain reliable information on these issues.
11 Interviews with key informants, field research, 2003.
12 Interviews with key informants, field research, 2003.
13 Interviews with key informants, field research, 2003.
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11 Indonesian Rural Livelihoods and
Resource Use in Crisis?
Milan J. Titus
In this final chapter an attempt is made to draw some general conclu-
sions from the preceding case studies in order to answer two major
questions: what were the main impacts of the economic crisis on rural
livelihoods in Indonesia and which response mechanisms were devel-
oped to cope with these impacts?
In the widely adopted sustainable livelihood approaches developed by
Scoones (1998), the DFID (1999), and Ellis (2000), the use of local as-
sets by households – as expressed in their livelihood strategies and cop-
ing responses – first of all is determined by the vulnerability and flex-
ibility of their personal conditions and structural contexts (i.e., the re-
source use systems, social organization, local governance, institutional
framework, and cultural factors). Consequently, our analysis will focus
on the role of these determinants in the explanation of the differential
impacts and responses to the crisis, but with special attention to two
different levels of analysis: the community and the household. The
main reason is that structural conditions manifest themselves more
clearly at the community level, whereas the impact of personal condi-
tions is most evident at the household level. Finally, this concluding
chapter will try to answer another fundamental question of the research
program: who were the winners and the losers of the coping strategies
induced by the crisis (cf. White, Titus & Boomgaard 2002).
Crisis impacts at the community level
At the community level differences in vulnerability and flexibility in fa-
cing the impacts of the crisis seem to be primarily related to structural
conditions such as the dominant types of resource exploitation (local re-
source base, technology, types of production), the level of commerciali-
zation (mode of production), population pressure upon local resources
(land, capital, labor/employment), and social organization (regulating
access to resources). This is not surprising, as it is these conditions
which ultimately determine the sensitivity of a rural community to the
shocks and stresses of changing prices of industrial consumer items,
farm commodities, production inputs, and wage labor, as well as to sud-
den fluctuations in demand and supply on the local, national, and inter-
national markets. Although the Indonesian crisis seems to have hit the
urban economy in particular (Booth 2002; Lont & White 2003), the rur-
al economy was not unaffected, due to the mass dismissals of rural mi-
grants from urban formal sector jobs, the soaring prices for urban pro-
duced or imported manufacturing products, and the lagging prices for
rural wage labor and farm products. This would suggest that the level
of rural-urban interaction and commercialization of a local rural econo-
my would be a major determinant of its vulnerability to the crisis.
This assumption seems to be corroborated by the case studies dealing
with rural communities that are mainly dependent on intensive food
crop farming (rice, maize, soybean) in combination with (additional)
non-farm work performed locally or in nearby urban centers. These
cases are mostly found in the densely populated, irrigated farming areas
around the big cities of inner Indonesia, such as the hinterlands of Ja-
karta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta (cf. Breman & Wiradi 2002; Kutane-
gara & Nooteboom 2002).
In those areas, rural communities often suffered the most because of
their strong dependence on faltering urban markets, the steeply rising
costs of production inputs, and the lagging prices for food crops on the
domestic markets, while – at the same time – they had to absorb an in-
creasing flow of return migrants from the collapsing corporate sector.
Commercial rice farmers were among the severely affected categories,
because of their dependence on a semi-monocropping system, which is
quite inflexible with respect to the introduction of other cash crops
apart from the palawija, or food crops, and also tends to become reliant
upon expensive biochemical inputs (cf. Gérard & Ruf 2001). Most hit,
however, were the landless farm workers in these areas, because the
bigger farmers could no longer afford to pay the rising wages which
subsequently fell below the increasing costs of living (Booth 2002;
Manning 2000). On the other hand, rural non-farm workers were
usually less affected, because they could produce cheaper products and
services for lower-end market niches and because of their tendency to
use less expensive raw materials that were mainly of local origin (cf. Ri-
janta 2006). Moreover, many small non-farm producers in rural areas
were able to substitute their cheaper products for the more expensive
formal sector products (such as mattresses, garments, processed food,
and so on), because the latter type of products were facing the negative
impacts of rising import costs and declining purchasing power. In the
case of export-oriented non-farm production, for example furniture,
leather goods, ceramics, and artisanal products (batik, silverware), local
export “booms” even seem to have occurred, as their international com-
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petitiveness was enhanced by the deteriorating domestic currency rates
(cf. Sandée 2002). Similar cases of resilience against the crisis could be
noticed in certain informal sector niches like the expanding network of
telecommunication shops/kiosks (wartel) which also sell cellphone
cards and serve the increasing demand for commnunication with mi-
grant workers (cf. Rijanta, 2006).
Less affected were rural farm communities which could subsist on
their own food production, sometimes supplemented by non-farm in-
comes from (seasonal) migrant workers. Usually these subsistence
farmers are found in villages in relatively isolated upland areas, or in
pioneer farming areas where there is still some access to “common
pool” resources and state forests that are not adequately protected (cf.
Burgers 2004, and chapter 2). Although households in these commu-
nities certainly have suffered from the sharply rising prices for consu-
mer goods, agricultural inputs, fuel, and public services (health, educa-
tion), usually they have been able to cope with the worst impacts of the
crisis by producing their own food with low-input farming techniques,
and by occasionally selling small amounts of more valuable commod-
ities such as timber, fish, or cattle to make their essential procurements
and payments.
A contrasting development is shown by the highly commercialized
rural communities producing cash crops for either the export market or
the domestic market. A first category mainly produces perennial crops
in so-called mixed forest gardens planted with a variety of crops, such
as coffee, cocoa, coconut, clove, cinnamon, pepper, vanilla, and various
types of fruit trees. These export cash crop farmers usually derived con-
siderable benefits from the crisis through the subsequent depreciation
of the domestic currency, which greatly improved the competitiveness
of these farmers on the world market and raised their rupiah incomes
to the extent that they often started to engage in conspicuous consump-
tion (cf. Singeling 2005, and chapter 1). The second category of cash
crop farmers benefiting from the crisis mainly subsisted on the cultiva-
tion of horticultural crops such as peppers, eggplant, cucumber, spi-
nach, chilli, onions, cabbage, leek, and carrots, which are mainly pro-
duced for the domestic market and the urban market in particular.
Although these farmers generally did not benefit from international cur-
rency disparities (except those in Kerinci) and had to cope with rising
input costs, they were facing rapidly growing urban markets with a ris-
ing demand for vegetables due to further urbanization and changing
consumption patterns. Consequently, horticultural farmers were less
vulnerable to the crisis and its negative impacts on overall purchasing
power. Moreover, the labor-intensive nature of this type of cultivation
also created “windows of opportunity” for many landless and petty
farmers who could participate as farmworkers and sharecroppers. Evi-
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dence of the resilience of horticultural farmers, however, does not seem
to be conclusive, as there are also reports of severely hit horticulturalists
in lowland Yogyakarta, who suffered from the rising production costs
and collapsing urban market, due to the coincidence of overproduction
and declining purchasing power (see chapter 5).
Our conclusion, therefore, must be that there is no unilinear relation-
ship between the level of rural-urban integration or commercialization
of rural communities on the one hand, and their vulnerability to the im-
pacts of the economic crisis on the other, for the very reason that these
impacts are more closely related to the specific resource base conditions
and prevailing type of resource exploitation of a community than to its
mode of production characteristics as such.
With respect to the flexibility of rural communities in coping with
the crisis impacts, however, the case studies seem to present a more
complicated picture. Here, both the main types of resource exploitation
and the dominant types of social relations seem to play a major role in
coping behavior. The first determinant presents its own intrinsic oppor-
tunities for adaptations to shocks and stresses. Wet rice or sugarcane
farmers, for example, being less flexible in crop choice and cultivation
techniques than horticulturalists, often operate in block systems which
have to follow strict cultivation and irrigation schedules according to a
monocropping pattern that is strongly favored by local authorities for
reasons of food security and pest control (cf. Gérard & Ruf 2001). Due
to the prescription of specific high-yielding varieties, there is also little
flexibility in the use of expensive biochemical farm inputs. Considering
the suppressed price levels for this staple food – which have been
mainly imposed for social and political reasons – it is not surprising
that many rice farmers tend to switch to more rewarding crops and flex-
ible types of cultivation. In the densely populated and intensively culti-
vated rural hinterland areas of the larger urban centers, horticulture be-
came a profitable alternative. The same applies to mountainous upland
areas, where dry field farming of food crops and animal husbandry are
increasingly making place for the cultivation of highland vegetables,
which have become a booming (export) cash crop in the aftermath of
the crisis (cf. chapters 8 and 3, respectively).
Quite surprising was the relatively high level of flexibility found in
perennial cash crop farming or agro-forestry systems. Unlike seasonal
crops, perennial crops have to be planted years in advance before bear-
ing fruit, so that it is not possible to adapt the cropping system to short-
term market fluctuations. This latter problem, however, seems to have
been adequately solved by planting mixed stocks of perennial crops in
so-called mixed forest gardens. If, for example, the price for coffee in
the world market starts falling, the farmer may simply shift his atten-
tion to another crop with a better price in his mixed forest garden, for
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example cocoa or clove. Thus, by planting a sufficiently heterogeneous
stock of perennial crops, a farmer may secure relatively constant in-
comes by “riding the waves” of world market price fluctuations and
switching from one crop to another. Another reason for the flexibility of
perennial cash crops in times of crisis is that these crops do not require
high labor and capital inputs in periods of rising input prices or market
flaws (cf. Singeling 2005; Burgers 2004). Moreover, most perennial
cash crop farmers also seem to own land for food crop cultivation,
thereby considerably reducing their vulnerability to cash crop failures
and price drops.
In communities with dry upland farming systems based on subsis-
tence food crops, flexibility usually is achieved by adapting labor inputs
and – to a lesser extent – by raising money from animal husbandry. In
times of crisis for example, cattle that is often kept as a form of invest-
ment may have to be sold. In doing so, however, the farmers do not
only deplete their savings, but also the amount of manure available for
food crops, which affects the yields on which they have to subsist. Con-
sequently, many farmers in dry upland areas such as Gunung Kidul
(DIY) have started to cultivate fodder crops and timber trees during the
crisis, in order to increase their cattle stock and reduce their vulnerabil-
ity (see chapters 5 and 4, respectively).
In the case of nearby “open access” resources, such as coastal waters
or forest reserves, these resources have often been tapped for an addi-
tional income from fishing or logging. During the crisis the demand
for essential commodities, such as fish or construction timber, seems
not to have declined significantly, as a result of which their prices could
at least rise with the inflation rate.1 Consequently, these “open access”
resources have often been exploited in an indiscriminate way, namely
without any regard for legal regulations and sustainability requirements
(cf. Singeling 2005; Vogelij 2005; Burgers 2004; Koning 2004; Sunder-
lin 2000). Attempts by local authorities to control this abuse of natural
resources often failed for various reasons. First, because these local
authorities usually were too close to the problems of the needy house-
holds involved in these illegal practices, and also because by turning a
blind eye they often could enjoy some of the proceeds of these practices
(Kartodiharjo & Jhamtani 2006).
In rural communities mainly depending on non-farm activities, flex-
ibility is usually achieved by increasing the self-exploitation of (family)
labor, reducing the use of wage labor and switching to the production
of goods and services that may substitute the more expensive types of
corporate sector products (especially those with a high import compo-
nent). In this way most small-scale non-farm producers in Yogyakarta
province and South Sulawesi have been able to survive the crisis and
even consolidate their position (cf. Rijanta 2006; Sandee 2002). A spe-
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cial case that demonstrates the flexibility of non-farm activities in cop-
ing with the crisis is reported from semi-rural or peri-urban commu-
nities, which utilized their locational advantages near urban markets
and switched to student housing, catering services and various informal
sector jobs (see chapter 7).
Flexibility with respect to crisis impacts, however, is not only a func-
tion of the intrinsic qualities of the respective resource use systems, but
also – or even more – of the social characteristics of the rural commu-
nities themselves.
The prevailing social relations of production, and especially the insti-
tutional framework regulating access to resources and their exploitation,
are key factors of differential flexibility in the various types of commu-
nities. In weakly commercialized tribal or peasant-type communities,
such as those in Torajaland (C. Sulawesi), East Kalimantan and upland
Southern Java, social cohesion and production relations on the basis of
reciprocity and sharing may still be strong, and therefore offer effective
networks for coping with livelihood stresses and shocks. This was
clearly exemplified by the way in which the Toraja communities were
able to bind their migrant workers with commitments to both their rela-
tives and their communities through ceremonial obligations, which
brought in a considerable flow of money from other parts of Indonesia
(cf. chapter 1).
Other examples of resilience offered by social networks and sharing
mechanisms to counter the crisis are presented in the case studies on
upland communities in Kerinci (W. Sumatra), South Sulawesi, and Yo-
gyakarta, where temporary and rotational rights of land utilization (pin-
jam, giliran) and various types of sharecropping (bagi hasil) and labor ar-
rangements provided access to land, work, and produce for the less en-
dowed farmers (cf. Burgers 2004; Singeling 2005; Baiquni 2006, and
chapter 5). Institutions based on reciprocity such as gotong royong (com-
munal voluntary work), sambat sinambat (neighbor help) and numpang
(family obligations for providing food and shelter) often played a deci-
sive and vital role in absorbing the flow of return migrants to the rural
areas of Java during the peak of the crisis (Baiquni 2006).
In return these migrants were expected to offer their labor for all
kinds of useful jobs, as occasional workers or “kuli serabotan”. Usually
this labor is not paid for if it is performed within one’s own household
or enterprise. Social networks offering a minimum level of security to,
for example, female single-headed households or the elderly, were often
put under severe stress by the crisis, but continued to function at a low
level. An interesting adaptive mechanism found in the Javanese case
studies, was that the needy households and family members were no
longer expected to contribute to public events or family ceremonies in
money or in kind, but could suffice with providing their labor or help.
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On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that these informal social
networks never would have been able to offer enough help and security
to the rural poor, without the parallel social safety net (JPS) program of
the World Bank in cooperation with the Indonesian government. This
program was implemented by local authorities and mainly provided
cheap rice and other vital daily needs (sembako) to households classified
as poor or needy by the local village administration.
Thus, even in the more commercialized rice farming or (export) cash
crop farming communities, formal and informal types of institutions
and networks were still functioning as buffer mechanisms under stress
conditions. Interestingly, however, the advancement of commercializa-
tion tended to shift their role from social security and sharing mechan-
isms to more business-oriented and exploitative mechanisms (cf. Hüs-
ken 1979, 1989; Titus et al. 1994). This is also clearly demonstrated by
the case of changing patron-client relationships such as the Macassarese
punggawa system, which in the presented case studies still play an im-
portant role in providing work and capital to farmers, fishermen, and
newcomers on the labor market, but in a socially less binding and more
business-like way (cf. chapters 10 and 9, respectively, and Pelras 2000).
The same seems to hold for traditional sharecropping, labor, and credit
arrangements, which in South Sulawesi and Central Java often have
been transformed into modern exploitative mechanisms such as kontra-
kan, borongan, and kapital bagi hasil.2 The first type of sharecropping ar-
rangement is based on contractual relationships with villagers or outsi-
ders, and usually involves a sharecropping arrangement for a certain
time period on a fifty-fifty basis, without any contributions from the
landowner’s side (as was still the case in the traditional form). The latter
type of arrangement involves sharecropping on the basis of investment
loans from traders and money lenders. Both forms enable landless or
petty farmers to obtain access to vital resources, and have often evolved
as a result of larger farmers engaged in commercializing farming sys-
tems switching to more rewarding activities such as transport, trade,
and credit services (cf. Singeling 2005; Rijerse 2005).
These examples of institutional flexibility clearly show that commer-
cialization as such does not necessarily imply the erosion of institutions
offering access to resources for the poorer sections of the rural popula-
tion, not even under crisis conditions. As the crisis definitely has bene-
fited many large (export) cash crop farmers, it may even have promoted
their switch to trade, transport, and financial services, and, therefore,
have improved access to vital resources for poor farmers.
A similar flexibility of the institutional framework was also observed
in some export cash-crop-producing pioneer farming communities in
Kerinci, where new settlers in the uplands could be absorbed through
arrangements which allowed them to clear, plant and sharecrop land for
INDONESIAN RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND RESOURCE USE IN CRISIS? 283
the larger landowners who had initially benefited from the export
“boom” and then switched to other, more lucrative types of activities
when this boom subsided. Such symbiotic practices enabled the land-
owners to accumulate agricultural wealth and land while providing op-
portunities for sharecroppers3 (cf. Burgers 2004). Moreover, advancing
commercialization and the crisis sometimes made the fairly rigid gen-
der relations more flexible by increasing female labor participation. In
South Sulawesi, for example, female employment (outside the house-
hold) has always been the lowest in Indonesia, especially in rural areas.
But with the increasing commercialization and diversification of the
rural economy, rising levels of female education and the increasing
pressure for additional cash income, female employment clearly has ri-
sen in the research villages since the crisis (cf. Singeling 2005, Rijerse
2005, Vogelij 2005).
Quite remarkably, however, socio-institutional flexibility seems to
have played a much less positive role in pioneer farming areas with eth-
nically mixed types of communities. When these communities were
confronted with increasing pressures upon resources and sudden eco-
nomic shocks, tensions and conflicts tended to arise along ethnic lines,
often leading to the discrimination, expulsion, or departure of minority
groups of recent migrants such as the Madurese in East Kalimantan (cf.
chapter 2) and the Javanese in Kerinci (cf. Burgers 2004). Similar eth-
nic tensions, reinforced by the crisis, have been reported from pioneer
farming zones in Luwu District (South Sulawesi) by Roth (2002). Ob-
viously, institutional flexibility requires a certain level of social cohesion
and stability, in order to become effective under stressful conditions.
It would be naïve, therefore, to assume that all types of rural commu-
nities would be potentially strong enough to re-configure their resource
allocation mechanisms in such a way, that they could cope with all the cri-
sis impacts. Particularly communities already suffering from high popu-
lation pressure upon resources and strongly linked with the faltering ur-
ban economy, such as those in Yogyakarta province or Java’s north coast,
often were unable to overcome the shocks and stresses on their own
strength. Consequently, the national and local governments had to install
local support programs, such as the social safety nets (JPS), which pro-
vided food aid and school fee subsidies to the poorest households. In
spite of much criticism on the arbitrary implementation of these pro-
grams, due to frequent abuse through “leakages” (i.e., theft), favoritism
and corruption, the programs certainly have contributed to relieve the
plight of the rural poor in the Javanese case studies (cf. Baiquni 2006,
and chapter 5). This was also clearly demonstrated by their low propensity
to withdraw children from school, or sell their houses and land in order
to secure their basic needs and maintain a minimum level of survival.
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Household strategies and responses
The analysis of the impacts of the crisis on household livelihoods
should be primarily based on insights into the coping mechanisms and
responses among the various types of households according to their so-
cioeconomic position within the respective communities. As it can be
assumed that there is a close relationship between a household’s socioe-
conomic position and its livelihood strategy (cf. Ellis 2000), this should
hold as well for the household’s coping responses which can be seen as
ex post facto extensions of a household’s strategy. For instance, it may
be assumed that survival households would be most vulnerable to crisis
impacts and have the least risk-taking capacity, so that these are most
inclined to diversify income sources, maintain production levels by in-
creasing labor inputs, retreat into subsistence production, or look for
additional work elsewhere through migration. Where consumption is
concerned, these survival households would be most inclined to save on
household expenditures, modify diets, reduce spending on public facil-
ities (such as health care and education), and – finally – eat into their
own stocks and savings. At the other extreme, accumulation households
would display the opposite characteristics of this behavior, with the con-
solidation type of households somewhere in between.
The case studies presented in this book, however, show considerable
deviations from this ideal-typical pattern of responses as outlined. Not
in the least because of the “disturbing” influence of large differences in
social and environmental conditions, as well as of the prevailing types
of resource use among the various types of households, or even within
each of the strategy types themselves. Thus, survival households of sub-
sistence-oriented upland farmers, or pioneer farmers, appeared to be
less vulnerable to the crisis impacts than survival households of for ex-
ample commercial rice farmers with their high external dependency on
capital inputs and the urban economy for selling their output and for
additional employment opportunities during the dry season. Survival
households of (export) cash crop farmers and horticulturalists also tend
to be more vulnerable to external factors, but due to favorable market-
ing conditions the crisis often offered them opportunities to even im-
prove their position (cf. Burgers 2004, and chapters 9, 8, and 5, respec-
tively). On the other hand, survival households exclusively depending
on either farm or non-farm employment were often severely hit, be-
cause they did not own any land for subsistence production, and were
facing declining demand for goods and services, while their wages
lagged considerably behind the rapidly rising prices for basic consumer
commodities (cf. Rijanta 2006, and chapter 7). Many of these survival
households consequently were forced to find (additional) livelihoods as
workers or exploiters of open access resources, such as fishing, sand
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and gravel digging, stonecutting/crushing, illegal logging, or brick mak-
ing.
Similar differences in vulnerability could be seen among the accumu-
lation type households, although these differences were subdued be-
cause of their greater ability to cope with the negative impacts of the cri-
sis and to switch to other, more rewarding types of activity. The latter
case is clearly illustrated by the larger-scale farmers within commercia-
lized farming systems who switched frequently to wholesale marketing
in farm commodities and production inputs, and to financial services
(cf. chapters 8 and 5, respectively), while – at the same time – renting
out their land to poorer sharecropping farmers. However, in cases
where accumulation type households could directly benefit from rising
commodity prices and windfall profits, they usually did not take much
risk and continued to produce what they had always been doing. This
sheds a different light on the assumption that risk-taking behavior is a
typical attribute of accumulation households. An explanation might be
that since most of them already had achieved a high living standard
and accumulated enough wealth, they felt little need to expand their
farms or enterprises even further, and become exposed to increasing
costs of investment and rising risks of failure, especially during the cri-
sis and its aftermath. In that light, many accumulation households
seem to display a rent-capitalistic type of behavior rather than an entre-
preneurial type of behavior.
On the other hand, survival and consolidation type households often
appear to have exploited the crisis benefits to the utmost. Usually this
was done by expanding their farm areas and planting new and more
profitable crops in order to secure their precarious positions (cf. chap-
ters 9, 5, and 4, respectively), Accumulation type households, therefore,
could not always be singled out as the most dynamic ones in respond-
ing to the crisis, that is, neither in an a priori or in an a posteriori sense.
Remarkable differences among and within types of households were
also found with respect to specific productive responses. Usually, it is
assumed that survival households have no other resource than their la-
bor when coping with crisis impacts. This would imply that increasing
labor inputs in production is the only solution for maintaining produc-
tivity levels in the face of a declining use of capital inputs.
This indeed has been the common response of many small scale sub-
sistence type of producers who resorted to greater self-exploitation of la-
bor. But, in case of a high dependence on modern farm inputs to eke
out a subsistence livelihood from their tiny farms, petty farmers also
seemed willing to spend part of their non-farm incomes to buy these
expensive inputs. This was especially the case among petty rice farmers
with non-farm side jobs in nearby urban centers, such as Yogyakarta
(cf. chapters 5 and 4, respectively) or Makassar (cf. chapters 9 and 10,
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respectively). Moreover, many survival and consolidation types of farm
households involved in highly commercialized forms of horticulture re-
sorted to credit systems such as kapital bagi hasil which enabled them
to procure the necessary capital inputs from the commodity traders (cf.
chapter 8). Of course, this system was only possible because the rise in
the market prices for these commodities matched those of the agricul-
tural inputs, which was clearly not the case with rice. This latter case
again shows that petty farmers do not necessarily engage in risk-avoid-
ing behavior when offered viable opportunities. But, where there are no
opportunities for marketing a surplus at reasonable prices, or engaging
in non-farm side jobs and obtaining productive loans, petty farmers in-
deed have no other choice than to retreat into subsistence types of pro-
duction and to use their own (family) labor to maintain productivity le-
vels. This response pattern has mainly occurred in isolated upland
farming communities, or in pioneer farming areas. However, a com-
mon problem here is the frequent lack of available family labor due to
the household’s composition which often may be either too old or too
young.
In contrast, accumulation households rarely face these labor pro-
blems, as they have enough surplus production and financial means to
attract wage labor. Consequently, family labor is much less used for
farming activities in these households and their children are often en-
rolled in advanced education, while the adult household members are
able to participate in more rewarding types of non-farm jobs. Neither of
the case studies, therefore, has shown any evidence that labor commit-
ment in the accumulation type households has been deeply affected by
the crisis conditions.
Within the sphere of responses in consumption, diversification of in-
come sources seems to have played a major role in coping with the cri-
sis. This applies to all types of households, but for different reasons
and in very different ways. Among the survival and consolidation
households, often there was the urgent need to find additional cash in-
comes to pay the rapidly escalating costs of basic needs, production in-
puts, and public services. Moreover, there was the increasing pressure
to find gainful employment opportunities for the growing group of job-
less household members and return migrants. These aims could be rea-
lized first of all by looking for all kinds of odd jobs and occasional work
within the household and the local community itself, usually known as
kuli serabotan. This included jobs, carried out simultaneously or succes-
sively, as farm workers, sand and gravel diggers, cargo loaders, water
carriers, pasar sweepers, or tricycle drivers. In instances of proximity to
open access resources, the list of activities can be extended to include il-
legal logging, fishing, firewood collection, charcoal making, timber saw-
ing, and so on. In nearly all of these cases, cash earnings, if any, were
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so low that most of these occasional workers and return migrants gravi-
tated to the cities again when the urban economy started to recover in
the aftermath of the crisis, as can be witnessed from the enormous
swelling of the informal sector since the turn of the last century (cf.
chapter 7, and Manning 2000). An increasing number of rural migrant
workers also choose to seek employment abroad, namely in Malaysia,
the Middle East and Hong Kong, but frequently also or in the resource
“boom” provinces of outer Indonesia (cf. Titus 2002).
It should be emphasized, however, that in many cases these external
resources could only be tapped through considerable investments and
debts made by the rural households in helping these migrant workers
to gain a foothold (cf. chapter 7). Job diversification in these poorer
types of households, therefore, was mainly due to economic push con-
ditions that were strongly affected by the crisis and its aftermath,
whereas job diversification in the accumulation type of households was
the result of a switch to more rewarding types of activities which be-
came accessible through the higher levels of education and capital accu-
mulation in these households. As job diversification through labor mi-
gration and multilocality of activities are concomitants of increasing rur-
al-urban interaction and economic globalization, this response
mechanism will become more pervasive in all household categories in
the near future, although for different reasons and with different out-
comes. Even households in remote upland areas and pioneer farming
communities, such as those in Gunung Kidul (DIY), Kerinci (West Su-
matra) or Torajaland (Central Sulawesi) now seem to be involved in this
type of livelihood response mechanisms (cf. chapters 5, 3, and 1, respec-
tively), which suggests that the impact of the economic crisis has be-
come less relevant in view of the overwhelming forces of economic inte-
gration and internationalization.
Restraining consumer expenditures is another important response
mechanism, with considerable differences between the various types of
household strategies. Usually, accumulation type households hardly ex-
perienced any constraint in this respect, whereas survival type house-
holds often had to sell some assets and substitute vital items in their
menu with inferior types of food. Important deviations from this gener-
al pattern, however, were found in the (export) cash crop and horticul-
tural farming communities, where even the poorer farm households
could still benefit from stable or rising crop prices and increasing ru-
piah incomes during the crisis.
Another unexpected finding was that only very few survival and con-
solidation type households were compelled to withdraw their children
from school due to the rising school fees and falling household in-
comes. This reflects not only the strong motivation of parents to send
their children to school – if necessary with the help of relatives – but
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also the positive effects of the government’s program which subsidizes
school fees for the rural poor (with World Bank support).
The forced selling of vital assets such as land and houses was hardly
encountered in the case studies covered by the KNAW projects in Yo-
gyakarta and South Sulawesi. This was true even among the survival
households, although this may be due to some methodological deficien-
cies of the research, because such households usually will have left the
community altogether. Much more common was the selling of jewelry,
consumer durables, and cattle, as well as using up cash savings and
borrowing money from relatives, traders, money lenders, and shops.
Another important finding from the case studies in Yogyakarta pro-
vince and South Sulawesi was that the productive responses of the var-
ious types of households and their consumptive behavior did not always
correspond. Normally, it might be expected that accumulation type
households would mainly display an innovating-expansionistic type of
behavior in their productive responses, together with a typical consu-
meristic behavior in their consumption responses (cf. Lösch, Fusillier &
Dupraz 1991). Actually, there were considerable deviations from this
ideal-typical response pattern; especially among households with re-
source use systems that could benefit from the crisis such as (export)
cash crop farming, horticulture, and certain non-farm activities produ-
cing export articles or cheap substitutes. Singeling (2005, pp. 141-158),
for example, found that 25 percent of the accumulation type households
in Parigi did not follow an expansionist-innovative response pattern,
while 42.8 percent of the consolidation type households followed this
pattern, and not less than 44.4 percent of the survival type households
followed a consolidating-conserving pattern.
A considerable part of the socioeconomically weaker types of house-
holds in this cash crop producing village, therefore, were more active in
entrepreneurial activities or undertakings than expected. Of course, they
could only do this by exercising restraint in their consumption behavior.
On the other hand, one-quarter of the accumulation type households
obviously were satisfied with their economic position, and were not
willing to improve it further by making sacrifices in consumption.
Some of these households indeed had reached the more advanced age
brackets with grown-up children who often were on the verge of leaving
the household, but most of them did not fall into this category and were
just disinterested in the pursuit of more wealth, and therefore might be
characterized as displaying a form of rent-capitalistic behavior. The
more so, since some of them maintained levels of consumption and
lifestyles that clearly were not compatible with the productivity of their
entrepreneurial undertakings (cf. Singeling 2005; Rijerse 2005).
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Impacts on resource use sustainability
This section tries to assess the impacts of the crisis and the related
household coping mechanisms on the sustainability of rural resource
use itself. Although this was not a central research topic in most of the
case studies, an assessment can be made in an inductive way by analyz-
ing the experiences in a few relevant case studies. In his dissertation
study Baiquni (2005), for example, has made an interesting analysis of
these sustainability impacts in five villages in Yogyakarta province,
which had very different agro-ecological conditions and resource use
systems. By first classifying the major resource use systems according
to their sustainability criteria, he was able to determine the direction of
change in sustainability as a result of the main impacts of the crisis and
related coping responses on each of the criteria. For this purpose he
used Conway’s (1986) typology of criteria, indicating three dimensions
of sustainability: economic sustainability (productivity and viability cri-
teria), social sustainability (access and equity criteria), and ecological
sustainability (environmental stability and continuity criteria). The re-
sult of this exercise was that sustainability of local resource use was
highest in the mixed forest gardening and the tree farming/fodder
crop-cum-animal husbandry systems. Both are dry upland farming sys-
tems that are relatively resistant to drought, erosion, and crop diseases,
and – due to the diversity of crops and products – also to the vicissi-
tudes of the market. In addition, these upland farming systems are also
characterized by low requirements for technical inputs that often are ex-
pensive and environmentally polluting.
On the other side, sustainability was lowest in the tegalan food crop-
ping systems and in the lowland or upland horticultural systems, be-
cause these were either drought-sensitive and erosion-prone, or sensi-
tive to plant diseases, soil depletion, and pollution, because of the heavy
use of biochemical inputs. In terms of economic viability, however, the
horticultural systems scored much higher than the first resource use
category, and consequently were increasingly adopted even during the
crisis.
Quite surprisingly, wet rice cultivation – formerly characterized as
the ecologically most stable agricultural system (cf. Geertz 1963) –
scored only in the middle category. This is not only due to the enor-
mous increase in the use of biochemical inputs since the Green Revolu-
tion, but also to the declining economic viability of wet rice cultivation
with the discontinuation of input subsidies and the increasing control
of its market prices. Moreover, social accessibility of wet rice land did
not improve with the increase in rural population pressure and the ad-
vancing commercialization of production, both of which exerted pres-
sure on several traditional resource allocation and sharing mechanisms
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(cf. Hüsken 1979, 1989; Hardjono 1986; Titus et al. 1994). Considering
that the crisis has positively affected the spread and the cultivation tech-
niques of the first two upland farming systems – due to very favorable
commodity prices and low input requirements – it seems safe to as-
sume that the crisis has also improved the sustainability of resource
use in the upland areas in general. In her study on the crisis impacts
on upland farming in Parigi (South Sulawesi), Singeling (2005) arrives
very much at the same conclusion, as did Baiquni (2006) in his study
on the upland farming villages in Yogyakarta province.
At the same time, however, the crisis has probably also expanded the
area used for tegalan food crops and upland horticulture systems which
are very sensitive to soil erosion and depletion, as well as to crop failure
due to drought, plant diseases, and so on. Here, the crisis impact on
sustainability therefore was mainly detrimental, as was also concluded
by Rijerse (2005) in her study on upland agriculture in the mountain
village of Lembanna (South Sulawesi). A special case is presented in
Burger’s (2004) thesis on changing resource management in upland
agriculture in the aftermath of the crisis in Kerinci (West Sumatra).
Here, a stable agro-forestry system based on the cultivation of coffee
and cinnamon trees, which performed well during the peak of the cri-
sis, completely collapsed in its aftermath when free-falling world market
prices and advancing globalization effects necessitated a shift to the
more rewarding, but ecologically less sustainable cultivation of vegeta-
bles for export. With respect to the crisis impact on wet rice farming,
the trend is less clear. Under the pressure of stagnant rice prices and
steeply rising prices of biochemical inputs and fuel, many larger farm-
ers decided to switch to more profitable types of annual or seasonal
crops such as soybean, groundnuts, or vegetables and, in some in-
stances, even to tree crops such as citrus or snake fruit (cf. chapters 5
and 4, respectively). The smaller farmers, however, often seem to have
stuck to wet rice farming for subsistence purposes, but with a distinctly
reduced use of modern inputs as they usually fell back on less demand-
ing traditional species (cf. Singeling 2005).
Certainly the most harmful effects have been the crisis impacts on
the utilization of “open access” resources, such as forest reserves and
coastal waters, where illegal practices of exploitation often inflicted
much harm (cf. chapters 10 and 9, respectively, and Burgers 2004).
Many of these practices, however, cannot be blamed on the economic
crisis only, because it seems that they are also closely related to the sub-
sequent introduction of local and regional forms of autonomy which
have weakened central control over these resources (cf. Kartodiharjo &
Jhamtani 2006). In sum, therefore, the crisis probably has had a predo-
minantly negative impact on rural resource use in Indonesia, but with
large regional variations in net outcomes, and by far not as negative as
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might have been expected as compared to earlier experiences during
the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) or the Revolution period (1945-
1949), when large-scale deforestation and food crop cultivation on steep
slopes caused huge problems of erosion, soil depletion, flooding, and
drought, and subsequent famines (cf. Donner 1989; Hardjono 1991).
Winners and losers of the crisis
By summarizing the findings on the impacts of the crisis and the re-
sponses at both the community and the household levels, we might try
to answer the final question: who were the winners and the losers of
the crisis in rural Indonesia? Clearly, the question cannot be easily an-
swered, because there is no direct and linear relationship with house-
hold characteristics such as socioeconomic status, gender, or age group,
or with community characteristics such as the prevailing type of re-
source use, social organization, or level of commercialization. Each of
these factors played a role, but often in opposite directions. A few gen-
eralizations, however, still can be made. Survival type households con-
sisting of young starters or aged (single) parents in communities de-
pending on intensive food crop farming and non-farm side jobs, defi-
nitely belong to the losers. To a lesser extent, this also holds for survival
households with petty food crop farms in dry upland areas and no op-
portunity for nearby off-farm employment, and who therefore, had no
other choice but to retreat into subsistence production and low level
consumption (cf. Kutanegara & Nooteboom 2002). In communities
with different resource use systems, however, survival households often
could seize opportunities for maintaining or even improving their posi-
tions, in spite of the crisis or even due to the crisis (cf. chapters 8, 9,
and 3, respectively).
On the other hand, accumulation type households in highly commer-
cialized food crop communities sometimes also became losers. This was
especially the case among the older types of households which had to
cope with a shrinking labor force, suppressed prices for staple foods,
sharply rising costs of capital inputs, and inflexible production condi-
tions prevailing in wet rice and sugarcane cultivation. In the case of per-
ennial cash crop production for export markets, or horticultural produc-
tion for growing urban markets, accumulation households, however, of-
ten enjoyed great opportunities for expanding their (farm) enterprises
and raising their consumption level. So, winners and losers are found
among all types of livelihood systems and household strategies, although
it is also true that they tend to predominate in particular categories.
At the community level, winning or losing the confrontation with the
impacts of the crisis seems, first of all, to be determined by the domi-
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nant types of resource exploitation, as each of these resource use sys-
tems has its own vulnerability to the crisis and offers its own opportu-
nities for coping with its impacts. At least as important, however, have
been the role of social factors, such as social cohesion and the flexibility
of the institutional framework for allocating resources. Destitute survi-
val households, living in the densely populated and intensively farmed
areas of Central Java, for example, still had some access to basic needs
because of the flexibility of their own social networks and some external
support from the government’s social safety net (JPS) program. The
same crucial role of social networks in obtaining a minimum of liveli-
hood security was also found in the relatively isolated, but no longer
self-sufficient types of upland communities, which depend on extensive
migration networks for additional incomes that could be reestablished
in the aftermath of the crisis (cf. chapters 1,7, and 3, respectively).
Even in the highly commercialized cash-crop-producing commu-
nities, there was still some redistributive role of “traditional” sharecrop-
ping, credit, and labor arrangements, which offered opportunities for
the poor or landless farmers and newcomers to participate in commer-
cial production, or in food crop production through, for example, rotat-
ing user rights (cf. Burgers 2004).
In these cases, however, the traditional institutions were usually
transformed into more business-like and exploitive types of arrange-
ments, used by large farmers to switch to more lucrative types of activ-
ities without abandoning their land and agricultural interests. Moreover,
some case studies seem to suggest that institutional flexibility in re-
source allocation was greater in culturally and ethnically homogeneous
types of communities with sufficient social cohesion than in heteroge-
neous pioneer farming communities where economic crises and re-
source pressures tend to lead to tensions and ruptures along ethnic
lines (cf. chapter 2, and Roth 2002).
Finally, winning or losing the confrontation with the crisis also
turned out to be highly affected by external, macro-level conditions such
as government policies and interventions, world market prices, and the
encroaching globalization process. The last mentioned factors of course
are beyond the control of local farmers, authorities, or even national
governments, but this does not imply that they remain passive in their
response to the impacts of these macro-level factors. As we have noticed
before, perennial cash crop farmers, for example, developed cropping
systems with which it was possible to “ride the waves” of the rising and
falling world-market prices. A similar flexibility has been observed
among non-farm producers focusing on the production of cheap substi-
tutes for expensive (imported) manufacturing products, or – reversely –
on the production of artisanal products and furniture for exports (cf. Ri-
janta 2005; Sandee 2002).
INDONESIAN RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND RESOURCE USE IN CRISIS? 293
The most spectacular phenomenon, however, was the increase in in-
ter-regional and international labor migration as an instrument for tap-
ping external resources by households under severe livelihood pressure.
Both in the relatively isolated and more integrated types of rural com-
munities this became an increasingly important safety valve in the after-
math of the crisis, as it enabled many of these households to maintain
their levels of consumption and at the same time invest in their (new)
economic pursuits (cf. Burgers 2004, and chapters 1 and 5).
On the other hand, however, it should also be acknowledged that the
combined forces of the crisis and spreading globalization, often have
caused great harm to the local environment. This has been especially
the case in rural areas with “open access” resources that were often
overexploited through overfishing, illegal logging, deforestation, and
land grabbing. Moreover, increasing international competition has often
added to the plight of small farmers in food crop production through
cheap imports of rice, soybeans, and wheat flour which substitute local
staple foods (cf. Gérard & Ruf 2001).
This takes us to the final conclusion that the impacts of the economic
crisis itself and its aftermath on rural livelihoods in Indonesia have
been so diverse that it is hardly possible to arrive at a clear balance of
benefits and losses. This conclusion, of course, is no surprise for a vast
and diversified country such as Indonesia, but what has been a surprise
is the great flexibility of the various types of communities and house-
holds in coping with these varied conditions and impacts, so that the
impacts have not been as devastating as might be expected from earlier
experiences in the 1930s (cf. Lont & White 2003) and the enormous
rise in rural population pressure in the ensuing period.
It seems, however, that besides the persistent role of social flexibility,
there is also the fundamental difference between the nature and im-
pacts of the world economic crisis in the 1930s and the Asian crisis at
the end of the 1990s. The first crisis engendered mass dismissals and
free-falling prices and wages through tight monetary policies and a
worldwide collapse of the demand for commodities, whereas the latter
crisis was primarily monetary in nature with a regional dimension,
which hardly caused a decline in demand for raw materials and com-
modities at the world market level. Instead of tight money conditions,
the domestic market in Indonesia was plagued by high inflation rates.
Consequently, domestic demand for basic farm and non-farm products
did not completely collapse, while external demand for cash crops even
increased due to the currency depreciations. This, in turn, enabled a
further growth and diversification of the various types and sectors of
the rural economies, which was confirmed by the fact that the agricul-
tural sector was the first to recover from the crisis in Indonesia (cf. Gér-
ard & Ruf 2001; Booth 2002). In addition there were greater external
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opportunities for the rural communities, due to the continuing integra-
tion of the rural and urban economies which together with the emer-
ging process of globalization have at least partly contributed to create
“windows of opportunity” and ease increasing pressures upon local re-
sources; factors that were clearly absent during the crisis in the 1930s
and which must have nourished the remarkable flexibility and resili-
ence of rural households during the last economic crisis. The muted
impact of the crisis in rural areas and the success of many rural house-
holds in coping with these impacts are also reflected in the frequently
echoed answer “Crisis? What crisis?” when the respondents were asked
about their own experiences (cf. Hüsken 1999; Burgers 2004; Singeling
2005; Rijerse 2005). Of course, this comment does not imply an ab-
sence of the crisis phenomena as such, but rather serves to stress their
limited impact or relevance for the respondent’s case.
In this respect, the conclusions of the “Coping with Crisis in Indone-
sia” research program seem to lend more support to the moderately op-
timistic view presented by Manning (2000) than the alarmistic view
presented by Breman and Wiradi (2002). The latter authors emphasize
the irreversibility of increasing pressures upon rural livelihoods and
communities, which under conditions of increasing commercialization,
globalization, and the economic crisis inevitably will lead to the reinfor-
cement of exclusionary mechanisms and social polarization.4 Manning,
on the other hand, emphasized the temporary character of the crisis
and the potentially beneficial effects of continuing rural-urban integra-
tion, economic recovery and internationalization, which may open new
“windows of opportunity” for rural communities. All the evidence on
social flexibility and resilience of livelihoods in the face of the crisis,
however, should not conceal the fact that the crisis certainly has contrib-
uted to greater social inequality in the various types of rural commu-
nities, because the crisis hit the poorer (survival type) households much
harder than the wealthier types of households, and consequently set
them further back into marginal positions of extreme dependency.
Usually, these households were not so much deprived from any access
to work or food, but rather from influential networks, stable incomes,
and vital facilities, such as more advanced types of education and health
care. For the poorer households the crisis has been a very real experi-
ence, but at the same time not unfamiliar as their livelihood conditions
are regularly plagued by recurring crises of both a personal and struc-
tural nature.
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Notes
1 Research data from Yogyakarta Province, Makassar, and West Java all indicate an in-
crease in private housing construction during the crisis years, because of the necessity
to find safe objects for money hoarding under conditions of hyperinflation, as well as
to build additional accommodation and income opportunities through renting rooms
to students, migrant workers, and boarding relatives (cf. chapter 7, and Titus 1999;
Breman & Wiradi 2002). This inevitably also created a rising demand for cheap, that
is, domestically produced building materials such as timber, bamboo, cement, bricks,
and roof tiles (cf. Van den Berg & Binnendijk 2002). Additionally, the demand for
food essentials such as fish did not show any tendency to decline during the crisis, be-
cause there are hardly any substitutes available (except cheaper species) and demand
for fish consequently tends to be inelastic (cf. Titus 1999).
2 Actually, the rise of more business-oriented types of resource allocation and exploita-
tion which are no longer based on the performance of mutual services, such as the
renting of land, produce-sharing agreements, contract work, and piece wages, is not
so much related to the crisis as such, but rather to the broader, long-term processes of
agricultural modernization and commercialization. There is strong evidence, however,
that the crisis may have reinforced the ongoing trends of transformation of these allo-
cation and exploitation mechanisms because of their cost-reducing aspects. These cost
reductions became even more necessary with the grossly inflated prices for both capi-
tal and labor inputs during the peak of the crisis and its aftermath.
3 Forest land was often cleared, planted and sharecropped by newcomers according to a
bonus system, which provided essential food supplies for a two- to three-year period,
that is, in the interim period before the newly planted perennial crops could mature.
This system even survived under conditions of a price slump for the perennial crops
in the aftermath of the crisis, because its costs still could be covered from the ex-
pected crop yields and price recoveries in the near future (cf. chapter 3).
4 Breman and Wiradi (2002, pp. 3-6) question the view held by Manning (2000) that
the increased absorption of rural surplus labor (including return migrants) in the agri-
cultural sector during the peak of the crisis probably was a temporary phenomenon in
the face of continuing long-term trends of urbanization and rural-urban labor mobi-
lity. But this is exactly what seems to have happened in the aftermath of the crisis.
The resumption of urban dominance in economic and regional development with the
first signs of economic recovery and advancing internationalization enabled a further
growth of the informal sector in these urban centers. Looking for work in this urban
sector still proved to be more attractive to the young rural labor force than remaining
in a dependent position in the stagnant subsistence sector at home. Another reason
for the more alarmist view presented by Breman and Wiradi (2002) might be that
their research focused on exactly those types of rural communities in Java which were
identified in our study as belonging to the most vulnerable types, namely the densely
populated hinterland areas of large urban centers depending on commercial food crop
farming and sugarcane cultivation with high input needs, while at the same time sub-
jected to food price controls, the abolishment of input subsidies, and the collapse of
the urban (labor) market for their own non-farm incomes.
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